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Abstract 
This thesis begins with some old questions about the French conservatism. 
Why has the French right failed to create a united party on the British model'? 
Why have conservatives so regularly turned to authoritarianism? More 
precisely, how is the emergence the Croix de Feu in the 1930s to be accounted 
for? Was it fascist? Did it pose a threat to the established order,? These 
questions have been addressed by means of a detailed study of the right and 
the extreme right in one French department, the Rhone. 
It is argued that from 1870 until the early 1960s the French right was 
divided by two fundamental problems: the desirability or otherwise of 
industrialization and the legacy of the French Revolution, especially the 
historic quarrel over the place of the Catholic Church in French society. 
Neither of these issues were primary; what is important is the way in which 
they were related in the minds of conservatives. In the 1930s these problems 
became acute. The efforts of conservative governments from 1928 to 1932 to 
stabilize and modernize the Republic initiated, on the contrary, a process of 
fragmentation. Instability was exacerbated by the world economic crisis. By 
1935 coalition politics had become impossible. Government could be carried 
on only thanks to the grant of special powers. 
This was the context in which the Croix de Feu emerged. The league 
represented a mobilization of the rank and file of the right against leaders who 
were perceived to have failed in domestic and foreign politics. Hence its 
combination of radicalism and reaction. It is argued that the Croix de Feu 
(though not its successor, the PSF) was a fascist movement. It is also 
suggested that in the period which ended with the "fascist riots" of 6 February, 
1934, a crisis had been developing out of which a fascist regime might have 
emerged. But the formation of the Popular Front and its success in 
manipulating the French Republican tradition, prevented this crisis from 
developing beyond its early stages. The electoral victory of the Popular Front, 
the strikes of June 1936 and the dissolution of the leagues put paid to the 
fascist threat. But the right remained as unstable as ever. So authoritarianism 
survived in different ways. 
In the Rhone this crisis took the form of a breakdown of the liberal 
tra~ition which had dominated conservative politics since the 1840s, and 
whIch was deeply rooted in the silk industry. In the 1920s this liberal-
conservative tradition was concretized in the Chamber of Commerce and the 
Federation republicaine. From the end of the decade it was undermined from 
two directions. On the one hand th~re was a challenge from a coalition of 
Catholic integrists, merchant-manufacturers and large landowners who were 
w?rried by certain aspects of economic and social change. In the early 1930s 
thIS group won control of the Federation republicaine. On the other hand there 
~merged a reformist challenge to the liberal tradition. In the countryside 
mdependent peasant proprietors turned to the Jeunnesse agricole chretienne. 
In Lyon the bureaucratization and feminization of white collar work coincided 
with the formation of a Catholic trades union movement. The diversification 
of the economy led to the emergence of a challenge from engineering 
employers. In the late 1920s these groups were sympathetic to the parties of 
the centre right. During the crisis of the 1930s they turned to the Croix de Feu 
and the PSF. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
At the time of the general elections of April 1928 French conservatives were united 
behind the elderly ex-President Raymond Poincare.! The fiasco of the Cartel des 
gauches government of 1924 to 1926 had reduced the left to impotence, which in turn 
caused a decline in the fortunes of the extreme right. The result of the election was to 
give the right its second and last clear majority under the Third Republic. Once the 
Radicals had left the government in November 1928 all doubt about the meaning of 
this triumph was removed. It is not surprising that many believed themselves to be on 
the threshold of a new era. 
Yet 1928 was to prove a false dawn. Successive crises fractured a unity which 
had in any case been tenuous. First, the efforts of Poincare and Andre Tardieu to sta-
bilise their own version of the Republic succeeded only in widening cracks within the 
right-wing coalition and indeed within the Republic itself. Together with the onset of 
the world economic crisis these divisions led to the return to power of the Cartel des 
gauches in May 1932. 
In the following twenty months the right was united in disgust at the inability 
of a succession of Radical-led governments to implement a deflationary economic 
policy. On 6th February 1934, following the implication of several Radical politicians 
in the Stavisky scandal, various organizations of the extreme right demonstrated on 
the Place de la Concorde. Fifteen people were killed and 2,000 injured. On the fol-
lowing day the Radical Prime Minister Daladier resigned. His party switched its sup-
port to a government of the right under ex-President Gaston Doumergue. Subsequent 
events, however, showed that the unanimity of the right had been superficial. No 
more than the Radicals, were right wing governments able to elaborate a coherent 
economic strategy. Anti-parliamentary leagues such as the Croix de Feu profited from 
the paralysis of government. Meanwhile the left reorganized, and on 14th July 1935 
the Radicals joined the SFIO and the Communist Party in the Popular Front. 
Even the electoral victory of the Popular Front in April and May 1936 and the 
mass strikes which greeted the arrival in power of Leon Blum were insufficient to 
cement conservative unity. On the contrary, the consequence of June 1936 was 
merely to add to the scrum of competing parties. The Croix de Feu became the Parti 
social fram;ais, while the renegade communi st, Jacques Doriot formed the P arti pop-
ulaire fran(;ais. Relations between the right and extreme right deteriorated. Neither 
parliamentary nor extreme right played more than a subordinate role in the defeat of 
1 In order to avoid an unnecessary clumsiness of expression the terms 'right' and 'conservative' will be used to 
designate both the parliamentary and the extreme right. 
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the Popular Front. On the eve of war both supported the authoritarian Daladier gov-
ernment. Out of fear of war, and of a working class that had suffered a major defeat, 
but which was still not eliminated as a factor in the political equation, the right ac-
cepted the rule of the 'fusilleur du 6 fevrier'. 
This brief summary raises two questions. In the fIrst place, how can the 
chronic disunity of a right which struggled even to present a united front in the depths 
of the crisis of June 1936 be explained? It is a banality to state that French conserva-
tives have always looked enviously across the Channel at their British counterparts, 
able in the twentieth century to lay some claim to being the 'party of Government'. 
The second group of questions regards the dramatic re-emergence of the ex-
treme right as a political force in the early 1930s. What were the causes of the growth 
of the leagues and parties of the extreme right? Were they fascist? Did they pose a 
significant threat to the established order? Why did the leagues fail to win power? 
What was the relationship between emergence of the extreme right and the collapse of 
the parliamentary right? 
Understandably, historians have shown less interest in these questions than 
they have in similar issues in interwar Germany and Italy. Our knowledge of the 
French right is both less extensive and less sophisticated than is that of its counter-
parts in the two countries where fascist movements became fascist regimes. 
Nevertheless, it is essential to begin with a look at certain contrasting overviews of 
the French right. 
Historians and French Conservatism: One or Several Rights? 
The obligatory starting point for any historian of conservative politics in France is 
with Rene Remond. Beyond superficial discontinuities, R. Remond detects three irre-
ducible elements within French conservatism, each 'with its own system of thought, 
temperament and clientele'. The fIrst is a reactionary and traditionalist strand de-
scended from Ultraroyalism, which passes through Legitimism and survives in 
Catholic integrism. The second is a liberal and parliamentary tradition originating in 
the July Monarchy, the modern descendants of which are parliamentary Republicans 
like Valery Giscard d'Estaing.2 Bonapartism, the third tendency, reconciles democ-
racy and authority in a way which is unique to France. Amongst its capacities is an 
ability to absorb and neutralize movements of the anti-democratic extreme right. 
Hence the impossibility of a French fascism of any importance. Examples of 
Bonapartist movements are the Croix de Feu,3 the Gaullist RPF and the Front na-
tional.4 No single idea united the three rights, not even the defence of the status quo. S 
2 R. Remond, The RighI Wing in France. From 1815 loDe Gaulle. Philadelphia, 1966, p. 279. 
3 Remond op. cit.. pp. 279-281. Remond argues that fascism differs from conselVatism in its claim to derive from 
the will of the people. Yet his definition of Bonapartism also includes an appeal to democracy. 
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The task of the historian is simply to trace the successive fonns taken by each ten-
dency. 
These views have been frequently and effectively criticized. 6 The thesis of 
continuity of opinions over several generations is vulnerable to the objection that 
broad regional affiliations to particular doctrines may mask a considerable volatility. 
Neither does the fixing of the essential characteristics of the right in the first half of 
the nineteenth century allow room for new responses to new problems.7 One can also 
qualify the contention that there is no single characteristic which unites the right. 
Certainly this is true in the sense that the notion of the 'right' is an historical concept 
par excellence, in that it has no meaning outside of a particular conjuncture and can 
therefore radically change its nature from one period to another. 8 But within periods 
there is by definition a minimum unity of the right, though this might consist merely 
in defence of private property, and not extend to agreement on the ways in which it 
could be protected. 
Of Rene Remand's three varieties of conservatism, that which is most de-
batable is Bonapartism. This nonetheless has been among the most influential of his 
concepts, informing most French writing on the far right. 9 On close examination 
Bonapartism turns out to cover a range of rather different movements. In its pure 
fonn, represented by Gaullism, Bonapartism means the reconciliation of authority and 
democracy.l0 There is secondly a left Bonapartism which is socialistic and populist, 
and which differs from fascism only in its lack of a mass party.ll Finally there is a 
right Bonapartism of the notables which stresses authority.12 R. Remond uses 
'populist' and 'democratic' interchangeably, without definition, thereby making it 
possible to group together radically different movements. Because of this conceptual 
imprecision it is often difficult to know where Bonapartism ends and fascism or con-
ventional conservatism begins. Individual movements like the Croix de Feu are diffi-
cult to classify in terms of these definitions. A further problem is that since Bona-
partism is in Remand's view a response to crisis, the question is raised as to where its 
4 The potential embarrassment of classing Gaullism and the Fronl national together is avoided by arguing that dif-
ferent movements stress different aspects of the Bonapartist legacy~ither authoritarianism or democracy. 
Gaullism, Remond's favourite political movement, was alone in achieving a genuine synthesis. 
5 R Remond. op cit. pp. 29-30. 
6 e.g. R. Martelli, 'Peut-on connaitre la droite? Approches critiques', CHIMT, 1976, pp. 17-18. 
7 For example, the moderate Christian democracy represented by the Parti denwcrate populaire (PDP), cannot be 
assimilated into any of R. Remond's three rights. 
8 For an excellent discussion of this problem see J-Ch. PetitftIs, La droile en France de 1789 a nos jours, Paris, 
1973. 
9 P. Milza, Fascisme fram;ais. passe el presenl, Paris, 1987. 
10 R. Remond argues that Gaullism unites democracy and authority, and therefore returns to the essence of 
Bonapartism. In the same passage it is suggested that the interwar leagues were anti-democratic. But how can the 
leagues be Bonapartist if they are lacking in one of that tradition's two essential features? Turning back to the ear-
lier discussion of the Croix de Feu does not help, for it is admitted that 'we know nothing of the real orientation of 
this movement'. pp. 278-9, 380-2. 
11 Remond, op. cit.. p. 281 and note 13. Yet the Croix de Feu were populist, even socialistic, and possessed a mass 
party. 
12 Remond, op. cit., p. 281. 
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'distinctive clientele' is to be found, and of how the tradition is transmitted across 
several generations. Neither is it plausible to see Bonapartism as a distinct ideology. 
Rather it is part of the pool of ideas on which the European extreme right draws. Even 
a cursory examination of Mein Kampf reveals the influence of the notion of the 
plebiscited leader. 13 
Perhaps the fundamental flaw in Rene Remand's thesis is that although he 
speaks of groups with specific clienteles, he in practice confines himself almost ex-
clusively to the reconstruction of 'the genealogy of a family of ideas '.14 Contexts are 
evoked only as a vague background to which essentially stable ideologies are adapted. 
The adjustment of the right to mass democracy, for example, is seen merely as a sur-
face phenomenon. And just as the relationship between doctrines and politics is 
vague, so the question of the articulation of ideology with social formations is left 
open. It is this which makes possible the establishment of identity between political 
movements separated by many decades, on the basis of often quite random formal 
comparisons. 
In spite of these reservations Rene Remond's stress on traditions is un-
doubtedly of value. Ways of seeing the world generated at particular historical mo-
ments become part of the circumstances governing behaviour in later periods. But 
traditions cannot be divorced from historical context. Attention must be paid to the 
way in which they are transmitted, to the changes they undergo through time and to 
the way in which they overlap with other traditions. 
Whatever their faults, Marxist interpretations of the French right are not open 
to the charge of neglecting historical context. In the nineteenth century, it is argued, 
the struggle to eliminate the last vestiges of the ancien regime meant that the 
Republican bourgeoisie could present itself as on the left, and could therefore enlist 
the support of workers and peasants. But this conflict of old and new elites was in-
creasingly circumscribed by the assimilation of the aristocracy into the capitalist 
economy and above all by the development of popular struggles. By the 1930s the 
class struggle had been simplified. The left, led by the Comintern, confronted a bour-
geoisie in which international monopoly capital was preponderant. There was still no 
single party of the right. But this had little significance beyond the fact that a diversity 
of vocabularies was used to broaden the right's appeal,15 
13 'The folkish state from the township up to the Reich leadership, has no representative body which decides any· 
thing by the majority, but only advisory bodies which stand at the side of the elected leader, receiving their share 
of work from him. and in turn if necessary assuming unlimited responsibility in certain fields, just as on a larger 
scale the leader or the chairman or various corporations himself possesses'. A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, 1925, 1926, 
translated by W. Mannheim. London. 1969. pp. 347-9. The first emphasis is in the text. The second was added by 
myself. Hitler's constitutional projects were remarkably similar to those of the French leagues. 
14 Remond, op. cit.. p. 24. 
15 Martelli, op. cit.; M. Margairaz. 'La Droite et retat dans les annees trente'. CHIMT 1976. This interpretation 
has been elaborated largely by CommunIst Party hlstonans. It has also mfluenced the American historians S. 
~lwitt and H. Lebovics. who hav~ been concerned with the emergence of a united anti-socialist conservative party 
m the 1890s. (S. Elwltt, The ThIrd Republic Defended: Bourgeois Reform in France. 1880-1914. London and 
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Given that the bourgeoisie and its political representatives are seen as a bloc, it 
follows that it was the whole of the right which turned to fascism in the mid-1930s. 
Leagues and parties formed part of a functional whole, united around Gaston 
Doumergue's policy of reform of the state. This was a programme which amounted to 
a form of fascism. Behind this movement, inevitably, was monopoly capital, manip-
ulating the discontent of the petty bourgeoisie in order to secure its own undisputed 
control over the state. I6 
It will already be clear from the discussion of Rene Remand's approach that 
the refusal to recognize the significance of ideological divisions is a major flaw in this 
interpretation. Gramsci, a less dogmatic communist, saw that parties which had come 
into existence at crucial moments in history would not necessarily be able to adapt 
themselves to new tasks in new epochs, and were always liable to end up 'suspended 
in mid-air'.17 
A second criticism of the Marxist interpretation is its assumption of unity in 
the socia-economic domain. It may be true that the right was increasingly preoccu-
pied with the Marxist danger. But beyond this there was often considerable disagree-
ment over how best to meet this threat. Meanwhile socially subordinate conservative 
groups also attempted to have their say. The 'petty-bourgeoisie' were not simply ma-
nipulated by 'monopoly capital'. 
Apart from these two approaches to French conservatism it would also be pos-
sible to infer a global view from the work of certain other historians. Zeev Stemhell, 
for example, argues that the fundamental conflict in French society is not between left 
and right, but between a liberal centre and revolutionaries of extreme left and extreme 
right I8 Extremists, it is argued, are brought together by their hostility to a liberal-
capitalist status quo. The result of their rapprochement is a synthetic ideology to 
which the right contributes nationalism and the left socialism--national socialism. 
This meeting of left and right occurred first during the Boulanger affair. Z. Sternhell 
goes on to argue that because of the inordinate strength of the political centre in 
France, fascism as an intellectual movement has been especially strong there. By the 
end of the 1930s fascist modes of thought had corrupted French society in general. 
The provocativeness of Zeev Sternhell's thesis scarcely compensates for the 
bizarre twists of his argument. I9 He sees proto-fascism everywhere, in figures as di-
verse as Ernest Renan, the socialist Andre Philip and the Catholic intellectual 
Baton Rouge, 1986; H. Lebovics. The Alliance of Iron and Wheat in the Third French RepUblic, 1860-1914: The 
OriRins of the New Conservatism. Baton Rouge. 1988). 
16 Margairaz. op.cit passim. 
17 Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith. (ed.), London, 
1971. pp. 210-23. 
18 Z. SternheU. Ni Droite ni Gauche. I'ideologie fasciste en France. Paris. 1983; La droite revolurionnaire. 
StemheU was anticipated on many points by J. Plumyene and R. Lasierra. us Fascismes Franr;ais. 1923-36. Paris. 
1963: for example they conclude. before Sternhell. that the Cercle Proudhon was a key moment of pre-fascism. a 
synthesis of right and left oppositions. 
19 For a critique of Z. Stemhell's ideas see Milza. op. cit.. chapter 1. 
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Emmanuel Mounier. Just about the only elements in French society which were un-
tainted by fascism were paramilitary leagues like the Croix de Feu! 20 The fundamen-
tal problem here is that Z. Sternhell concentrates on marginal intellectuals, and more-
over removes their ideas from their historical contexts.21 Indeed, it is suggested that 
real fascism is compromised by contact with reality. It is better studied in its pure 
form in the works of someone like Thierry Maulnier, than in a concrete historical 
movement like Jacques Doriot's PPF or the Nazi regime.22 
Finally, mention must be made of the work of William Irvine, in which it is 
argued that the fundamental concern of the right since 1870 has been to adapt its eli-
tist organizational forms to the rise of democracy.23 Aspects of W. Irvine's thesis can 
be contested: the primacy accorded to organization; the dismissal of ideological con-
flicts between the leagues and the parliamentary right,24 and the failure to explore 
fully the relationship between organization, ideology and sociology. Nevertheless, 
this is a valuable contribution to the study of the French right. We shall see that orga-
nizational questions are fundamental to its history in the Rhone. Finally, W. Irvine's 
work has the great merit of being based on real research into the Federation repub/i-
caine and its relationship with the Croix de Feu. As such it represents a major ad-
vance over previous work.25 
To sum up, this historiographical survey of the French right permits the identi-
fication of three problem areas. There is a lack of conceptual rigour. Remond' s three 
tendencies of the right are as loosely conceived as Sternhell's definition of fascism. 
The Marxist view is not lacking in precision, but it is achieved by reducing all con-
servative movements to tools of monopoly capital. Second, there is an exaggerated 
concern with ideology, although the work of Zeev Sternhell confirms Tim Mason's 
view that 'what presently passes for intellectual history should not be left to intellec-
tual and political historians'.26 Thirdly, detailed research on the right has been the ex-
ception rather than the rule. Next to nothing is known of the Croix de Feu and PSF. 
Bearing these points in mind, it is now possible to outline the main arguments 
of this thesis. 
20 Z. Sternhell, 'Strands of French Fascism', in B. Hagtvet, S. Ugelvik, J. P. Myklebust (eds.), Who were the 
Fascists?, Oslo, 1980, p. 494. 
21 Sternhell, Ni droile ni gauche, p. 101. What counts is 'Ia logique d'une situation et d'un cheminement intel-
lectuel et non pas une conjoncture exterieure qui se trouve It l'origine de cette synthese nouvelle'. 
22 Sternhell, op. cit., pp. 121,293: 'Le potentiel revolutionnaire des mouvements fascistes, [ ... ) fut ainsi largement 
neutralise par les mecanismes du clivage gauche-droite auquel ils ne purent echapper, et qu'ils avaient tout fait 
pour briser'. This is not too far from Remond's view that fascism was denatured by the French bourgeoisie, who 
took from it only anti-Bolshevism, anti-parliamentarianism, and defence of order. 
23 W.D. Irvine, The Boulanger Affair Reconsidered. Louisiana, 1990; French Conservatism in Crisis. The 
Republican Federation of France in the }930s. Louisiana, 1979. 
24 W. Irvine is agnostic on the question of whether or not the leagues were fascist. But his view is compatible with 
that of Robert Soucy: that fascism means conservatism by other means. R. Soucy, French Fascism: The First 
Wave, 1924-1933, New Haven and London, 1986. 
25 Indeed, most of the empirical work on the French right in the interwar period as been done by 'Anglo-Saxons'. 
This is interesting given that it is mainly non-French historians who argue for the existence of French fascism. 
26 Tim Mason, 'Open Questions on Nazism', in R. Samuel (ed) People's History and Socialist Theory. London 
1983. 
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1. The divisions of the right must be understood in relation to a process of negotiation, 
from which economic, social and ideological power are never absent 27 This can be 
analysed on three levels. First a struggle to set the tone within the ruling class. Second 
the efforts of the ruling class to mobilize a popular constituency, and correspondingly 
the more intermittent attempts of that constituency to give its own meaning to the 
conservative coalition. Thirdly, there is the relationship of the right to those move-
ments which stand outside it. It must be understood that bargaining is ongoing, so that 
whilst it might sometimes be fruitful to analyse the way in which the conservative 
coalition crystallizes around a certain set of policies, such as protectionism, the ideo-
logical cement of conservatism must be understood more broadly. At its widest it in-
volves merely an agreed framework for resolving differences, such as republican 
democracy. It must also be borne in mind that negotiation involves economic, social, 
political, ideological and organizational questions, none of which, in a given historical 
context, is reducible to another. 
2. It will be argued that there was an economic dimension to conflict within the right. 
It was related to the lengthy development of industrial capitalism in France and its co-
existence with a large petty production sector. French conservatives were unsure 
whether industrialization was a good thing. They were also uncertain whether their 
interests lay in forming a united front of property owners against the left, or in at-
tempting to incorporate the working class through social reform or social mobility. In 
addition the right in the 1930s had to cope with the mobilization of interest groups 
representing conservative white collar workers, small businessmen, peasants and even 
workers. 
3. This class conflict within the right was complicated by deep cultural cleavages. 
One of the major reasons for the chronic instability of the French conservatism was 
that industrialization had occurred at a time society was already profoundly divided 
by the legacy of the French Revolution and the quarrel over the place of the Catholic 
Church in society. Economic and social problems were therefore conceived differ-
ently by clericals and anti-clericals. This does not mean simply that economic inter-
ests are mediated by a cultural superstructure. Rather, in a given historical situation 
economic and cultural determinants were inseparable. Individuals conceived their 
economic interests differently because of their religion, and their religion differently 
because of their economic position. Furthermore, the meaning of Catholicism was 
contested by different elements within the right. 
4. In the late 1920s and early 1930s the long-term crisis of the right became acute. 
The causes were firstly the efforts of the governments of Poincare, Tardieu and Laval 
to stabilize a conservative republic by placing economic interests above 'sterile' ide-
2~ These ideas owe much to the use of Gramsci by historians such as Geoff Eley in his Reshaping the German 
!?Ight. London. 1980. Where I differ from him is in eliminating the Althusserian aspects of his interpretation. This 
mvolves giving greater emphasis to the inseparability of ideology and material interest. 
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ological quarrels. They failed partly because of fears of immoderate industrialization 
and partly because neither Catholic nor lay rights could conceive their economic in-
terests separately from their views of the religious question. The resulting conflict was 
further complicated by the economic crisis of the 1930s. Its effect was to intensify 
competition between interests within an already fragmented right, and to paralyse the 
formulation of policy. 
5. Out of this crisis of the right emerged the leagues. They were a response to the 
breakdown of 'negotiated consent' both within the right and within society as a 
whole. There was a perceived inability of the established conservative parties to deal 
with the range of problems which faced them. The leagues represented a mobilization 
of the rank and file of the right. Their revolt therefore had an 'anti-establishment' 
tone. It was not reducible to a revolt of the petty bourgeoisie, though it sometimes in-
cluded hostility to economic and social authorities. The function of the leagues was to 
shift the balance in the reproduction of social power away from negotiation towards 
authority. Hence the appeal of a strong leader, who would reimpose unity by en-
forcement of the national interest. 
6. It will be argued that the leagues, (with the exception of Action Franr;aise) were 
fascist. It will also be suggested that there was a fascist threat in France, but that it did 
not develop beyond its early stages. The crucial period was 1933 and early 1934, 
when there were signs of the detachment of the Republican rank and file from the 
regime. But the reaction of the left, very different from that of its Italian or German 
counterparts, was responsible for blocking the route to fascism at an early stage. 
7. On the eve of war, although the Popular Front had been defeated by an alliance of 
state and employers' groups, none of the conflicts within the right had been resolved. 
Indeed, the expansion of the PSF had complicated the problems of the right. Because 
the left too was by now in a state of advanced disintegration the way was clear for the 
executive power, in the form of the Daladier government, to assert its independence. 
Thus the (temporary) outcome of the long crisis of the Third Republic was not a fas-
cist regime, but another variety of authoritarianism--perhaps Bonapartist 
8. By 1940 there were some signs that the importance of cultural cleavages within the 
right were declining. The PSF proclaimed its desire to reconcile clericals and anti-
clericals at a time when even the Radicals were reconsidering their attitude to the Lay 
Laws. The origins of this rapprochement were to be found, paradoxically, in the mis-
sionary efforts of Catholic Action. Yet it had its limits. Most of the right agreed, at a 
minimum, on the social value of the Church. Conservatism was more absolutely 
identified with Catholicism than it had ever been. But the cost was the import of ide-
ological divisions within the Church into the right. This prepared the way for the 
emergence after the war of the Mouvement republicain popuiaire. 
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In the following section the developing crisis of the Third Republic will be 
analysed in more detail. The main point is to explain why France was vulnerable to 
authoritarianism. This will help us to understand the crisis of conservative parties in 
the Rhone. 
Conflict and Stability in the Third Republic 
It is often argued that the stability of the Third Republic rested on a social and politi-
cal compromise between capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production. More con-
cretely, this involved an alliance of peasants, artisans and other small producers with 
the industrial bourgeoisie, from which the working class and what was left of the 
aristocracy were excluded. In return for support against the socialists, small producers 
were accorded social and economic protection--hence the slow pace of French in-
dustrialization. The argument was originally formulated by Stanley Hoffmann, and in 
a modified form has been taken over by Marxists such as Sanford Elwitt and Herman 
Lebovics.28 Their contribution is greater precision on the nature of the underlying 
economic interests: they argue for an alliance of protectionist heavy industry, textile 
manufacturers, landowners and peasants. 
There is much value in this interpretation. Businessmen were prominent 
amongst Republican leaders, whilst iron, steel, textiles and agriculture were the main 
props of the economy. The electoral base of the regime was provided largely by the 
peasantry and petty bourgeoisie; the history of the Third Republic is in-
comprehensible if the constraints this imposed are forgotten. On more than one occa-
sion the regime was saved by a conjunction of social and political centres. 
Nevertheless, this view has certain draw-backs. It obscures the fluid nature of class 
alliances in the Third Republic, and leads to an exaggerated stress on the equilibrium 
of the regime. Although dependence upon peasant votes limited the freedom of action 
of RepUblicans, there is hardly any evidence of positive action on their part to defend 
the social and economic position of small producers. Such measures were taken after 
World War One, but they were part of a crisis of the Republic. Little space is allowed 
for religious conflict. Thus Herman Lebovics dismisses the Dreyfus Affair as a minor 
disruption in a pattern of class alliances which lasted until 1936, whilst Sanford Elwitt 
sees labels like 'clerical' and 'anti-clerical' as useful only for keeping track of min-
istries. In reality the alliance of capitalists and small producers was never complete; it 
was always in a state of incipient dissolution, and went through a number of muta-
tions. 
28 S. Hoffmann. 'Paradoxes of the French Political Community'. in Hoffmann. et al. {eds.).ln Search Of France. 
New York. 1963; S. Elwitt. The Making of the Third Republic: Class and Politics in France. 1868-1884 Baton 
Rouge. 1975; Lebovics. op. cit. passim. • 
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The Republican legacy 
The capture of the Third Republic by the Republicans in the 1870s and 1880s did in-
volve the establishment of a bourgeois hegemony.29 But significant aspects of 
Republicanism are obscured if it is not recognized that the Republican bourgeoisie not 
only acted in accordance with what it took to be its material interest, but also defined 
itself and its material interests in terms of Republican ideology. 
This meant that on the one hand, Republicanism was less than the industrial 
bourgeoisie, for the simple reason that by the 1870s many entrepreneurs, perhaps the 
majority, were Catholics. This was not necessarily incompatible with anti-clericalism, 
but in places like the Nord or the Gard many businessmen were royalists. The mine-
owner Leoncie Chagot at Montceau-les-Mines was notorious for his Catholic royal-
ism.30 
On the other hand Republicanism was more than the industrial bourgeoisie. It 
was also based on the small town and rural bourgeoisie. The RepUblicanism of this 
group derived from a Revolutionary tradition which had been kept alive by decades of 
conflict with priests and aristocrats. There was sometimes an economic dimension to 
this conflict, for landowners and small businessmen might resent clerical injunctions 
against Sunday working. In other cases economic motivation was less evident. 
Doctors and priests disputed the management of illness and death; priests and school 
teachers struggled for control over the young; professional men feared the influence 
of the clergy over their wives. 
It follows from this that we cannot see Republican ideology only in terms of 
the strategies of an industrial bourgeoisie. Republicans defined themselves as anti-
clericals. From this it followed that Catholics were opposed to democracy and 
progress--an equation which was sometimes, but not necessarily, true. Thus the 
Republican middle class in a town dominated by a paternalist Catholic businessman 
might have encouraged resistance to that employer through the setting up of a lay 
school. Such was the case at Carmaux. Hence also the division of employers along 
confessional lines in the Nord)1 So Republican ideology served as a framework for 
integrating the bourgeoisie itself. This was achieved at the price of including elements 
liable to de-stabilize an alliance based on property, and of excluding elements which 
might have been class allies, and who where seen partly because of their views on the 
religious question as enemies of order. 
The inseparability of religion and economic interest can also be seen in the 
relationship of the Republicans to their rank and file. Sanford Elwitt argues con-
~9 Elwitt, The Making. passim. Some of the arguments which follow are derived from Elwitt. although he explic-
Itly adheres to the Hoffmann social protection thesis. 
30 R. Locke. French Legitimists and the politics of Moral Order. 1914. R. Gibson. A social History of French 
Catholicism. London. 1989. pp. 199-212. 
31 R. Magraw. France 1815-1914: The Bourgeois Century. Oxford. 1983. p. 281. 
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vincingly that Republicans won small producers over to a policy of industrialization 
by presenting railways as an opportunity for them to sell their products in a wider 
market, thereby obscuring the fact that industrialization threatened their elimination. 
Republican propaganda associated markets with the possibility of social ascension 
through work, facilitated by Republican education and democracy. But what S. Elwitt 
fails to see are the consequences of linking such themes to anti-clericalism, for many 
small producers attributed perceived success to values learned in lay schools. As a re-
sult that section of the right which had originated in anti-clerical Republicanism 
crystallized around defence of status, future prospects and lay values. For such people 
anti-clericalism and conservatism meant the same thing. On the other hand 
Republican values could be turned against moderate Republicans as Radicals fastened 
onto the economic discontent of small producers. The Opportunists were denounced 
by the Radicals for their lukewarm pursuit of anti-clerical measures, which prevented 
the emergence of a true society of opportunity. 
The situation was further complicated by an often neglected aspect of Re-
publicanism. Certain Republicans were practicing Catholics. Though opposed to the 
schemes of integrists, they sought to contain anti-clericalism. They regarded religion 
as a means of moralizing the working class, and so without calling into question lay 
education they attempted to graft support for Catholic education onto their democratic 
and liberal Republicanism. Perhaps the best examples of this are the Progressist lead-
ers Eugene Motte in Roubaix, and in Lyon Edouard Aynard.32 They contributed 
therefore to the formation of a parallel route to social mobility which depended on 
Catholic rather than lay values. Two white collar workers, one a Catholic, the other an 
anti-clerical, could therefore conceive their conservatism in different ways. One might 
attribute status to having obeyed the Church's condemnation of dancing and the 
cabaret; the other might look to the lay school and to the liberal-republican philoso-
phy of self-help. So however much men like Motte and Aynard spoke of transcending 
the religious quarrel, their relationship with their rank and file obliged them to take up 
a position. 
To the right of Eugene Motte was an anti-republican right, which with the de-
cline of Royalism defined itself more and more in Catholic terms. Little is known of 
the reasons for the gradual rallying to republicanism of formerly royalist areas like the 
west in the 1890s. It is usually assumed--perhaps incorrectly--that docile peas-
ants followed landowners and priests in their choice between Ralliement or sullen op-
position.33 But what is certain is that the formerly monarchist right was increasingly 
32 See chapter 2. 
33 The process may have been less passive, for it would appear that the royalist electorate turned to Boulangism 
well before royalist leaders put their weight behind the General. Boulangism might therefore have provided a 
bridge to the Republic. 
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confined to areas previously known for their Legitimism, though this is often ob-
scured by the fact that after 1883 royalists were led by an Orleanist Pretender with 
Bonapartist proclivities. In all of these areas Catholicism was essential to the right. In 
the Breton countryside conservatism was about defence of peasant communities de-
fined in terms of a popular Catholicism; in Midi towns Catholic royalism fed on cen-
turies of conflicts with Protestants; in the north-east industrialists had traditionally 
seen the Church as an instrument of social control. 
What all of this means is that however much they wanted to do so the various 
strands of French conservatism were not free to set aside 'sterile quarrels' in order to 
create an anti-socialist alliance. In the minds of the majority either anti-clericalism or 
Catholicism were the best means of defence against socialism. 
A second founding? 
These conclusions throw an interesting light on the view that in the 1890s atavistic 
squabbles gave way to bourgeois unity against socialism.34 S. Elwitt details a growing 
consensus among lay Solidarists and Catholic Le Playists that the social question was 
now the priority in politics. Liberal notions of the dissolution of classes into a society 
of opportunity gave way to acceptance of the working class as a fact of life. 35 H. 
Lebovics shows how Republican businessmen, Catholic landowners and peasant 
farmers were drawn together by a common commitment to protectionism, which was 
designed to raise the income of sellers and remove the causes of working class dis-
content by reducing unemployment. Imperialism and the Ralliement worked to the 
same end. The result of this 'second founding' of the Republic was to bind small pro-
ducers to a united capitalist class in an alliance which lasted until 1936. 
Undoubtedly there was in the 1890s a realignment in 'social politics' thanks to 
the rise of socialism, the bankruptcy of royalism and the new direction of the Papacy. 
There was also a marked shift from the economic optimism of the 1870s to Jules 
Meline's association of protectionism with defence of the peasantry. There can be no 
doubt either that both Republicans and Catholics wanted an anti-socialist front. Yet 
the ruling class remained divided. The regime itself continued to be unstable. 
Protectionism did not have the central importance it possessed in German or 
British politics. In other respects Republicans remained more or less true to economic 
liberalism.36 Apart from tariffs little else was done to defend the interests of small 
producers.37 This was one reason why the turn of the century saw the emergence of 
34 Lebovics, op. cit., passim; Elwin, The Third republic Defended, passim. 
35 He says 'labels like opportunist, liberal or radical, clerical or anticlerical arc useful only for keeping track of 
ministries'. 
36 This, no doubt, is why Meline reffered to his own ideas as a form of'libl!talisme amenage'. Protectionism was 
not coupled to authoritarianism, the threat of a coup d'etat and corporatist social experiments in the way that it was 
m Germany. 
37 P. Nord. Paris Shopkeepers and the Politics of resentment. Princeton. 1986. shows how small shopkeepers in 
Paris were alienated from the Republic by its failure to limit the growth of department stores. 
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the left wing Radical party as a key political force. Neither was there much of an ef-
fort to improve the conditions of the working class, either through state action or pri-
vate initiative. Finally, protectionism does not seem to have led to a lasting rap-
prochement of Republicans with Catholic landowners. In the l890s and 1900s the 
latter were busily founding confessional agricultural syndicates as a means of pre-
serving their influence.38 
In reality, what bound the Republicans together was not agreement on protec-
tion, but the same broad commitment to liberal democracy and the market economy 
which had mobilized the preceding generation. This would explain why some of the 
most prominent Republican leaders, such as Eugene Motte and Edouard Aynard, did 
not break with Meline, even though they were free traders and opponents of social re-
form.39 
In consequence the same cultural issues continued to divide conservatives. 
However much certain leaders might have wanted to create a 'new spirit' in Church-
state relations, Catholic and Republican values remained inseparable from left-right 
and intra-right conflicts. The Ralliement was disrupted by the unwillingness of rank 
and file Catholics in the constituencies to accept it, and by the refusal of the 
Republicans to touch the lois scolaires.40 Most obviously the Dreyfus Affair put an 
end to the 'new spirit' and split the Republicans. 
Thanks to the Affair the 'fusionism' of the 1890s was followed by an un-
precedented fragmentation of bourgeois politics, which moreover had long-lasting ef-
fects. Elements of the anti-clerical bourgeoisie were attracted to the left in the form of 
the Radical party. There they met with the discontent of anti-clerical small producers. 
The latter criticized the Opportunists for subservience to 'big capital' which was 
crushing small producers, and blamed the Opportunists for their failure to pursue the 
war against the capitalists' ally the Church [sic] with sufficient vigour. This shows 
again how anti-clericalism had escaped the control of Republican elites. The inability 
of the Radicals to decide whether their interests lay in an anti-clerical and anti-capi-
talist alliance with the left or in lining up with the right in defence of property, was a 
major source of instability in the Republic. 
Another result of the Affair was to institutionalize a division within the right. 
On the one hand were the supporters of Raymond Poincare who rallied to the defence 
of the Republic and formed the Alliance democratique. On the other hand the mainly 
Catholic Republican anti-Dreyfusards formed the Federation republicaine. It is surely 
significant that the cause of this split in the Republicans should be the religious ques-
38 G. Garrier. 'L'Union du sud-est des syndicats agricoles avant 1914', MS, 1969; S. Berger. Peasants against 
Politics: Rural Organization in Brillany, 1911-1967, ch. 1. 
39 See also P. Garrigues, 'Leon Say: un liberal sous la Troisieme Republique (1871-1896), Revue Historique, 
1991. 
40 D. Shapiro. 'The Ralliemenl in the French Politics of the 1890s', in SI. Anthony's Papers, 13, 1962. 
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tion rather than protectionism. Economic questions did not divide Federation and 
Alliance, but the way in which lay and Catholic values were related to their liberalism 
did drive them apart. Meline, Motte and Aynard joined rallies and crypto-monarchists 
in opposition. But although these three factions shared Catholicism, they remained 
divided by attitude to the regime and by economic questions and even to the Church. 
None of these rights was ever entirely convinced that the others were genuinely con-
servative. Even in 1928 Raymond Poincare of the Alliance regarded the right wing of 
his majority as 'des hommes du seize mai', that is as a subversives. 
Another criticism of Herman Lebovics is that the Ralliement should not be 
seen exclusively in terms of the attempts of Catholic elites to join with Republicans in 
the defence of order. The Church's acceptance of democracy should be placed along-
side the endorsement in Rerum Novarum of social reform and of trades unions di-
rected by the workers themselves. Together these changes opened the way for the 
emergence of Christian democracy.41 The moment was favourable because of the fi-
nal collapse of royalism in the Boulanger affair and because of the growth of white 
collar employment associated with the Second Industrial Revolution. In Finistere 
Christian democracy enabled the clergy to assert their leadership of the peasantry 
against the wishes of notables and even the hierarchy.42 It is therefore possible to see 
a mobilization of Catholic petty producers on the right in parallel with the disaffection 
of the Radicals on the left.43 This provides another example of the way in which po-
tential class alliances were disrupted by religion, and shows that Catholicism, like 
anti-clericalism, was not merely an ideological weapon in the hands of the ruling 
class. Christian democracy was decidedly on the right, and represented one more at-
tempt to give meaning to conservatism. 
One could object that once the Separation crisis was over a new consensus be-
gan to emerge in opposition to revolutionary syndicalism.44 But rather than see the 
religious cleavage as secondary, would it not be better to accept that there was a per-
manent instability in the Third Republic? The fact that even as late as 1910 Eugene 
Motte's efforts to create an anti-socialist alliance in the Nord were disrupted by a 
resurgence of anti-clericalism, would seem to confirm this point of view. 45 
One can then agree with Sanford Elwitt that Third Republic represents the tri-
umph of the bourgeoisie, and that this depended in part on the incorporation of small 
producers. But it must immediately be added that the Republic also represented the 
41 The best analysis of this aspect of the Ralliement can be found in C. Ponson, Les calholiques lyonlUlis et la 
Chronique sociale, Lyon, 1979. 
42 Berger, op. cit., ch. 1. 
43 The similarities between Radicalism and democratic social Catholicism have often been noted. For example, in 
J-M Mayeur, 'Catholicisme intransigeant, catholicisme social, democratie chretienne', Annales ESC 1972 pp. 
483-99. ' , 
44 R. Watson, 'The Right and the Social Question', in St. Anthony's Papers, 13, 1962. 
45 D. Gordon, 'Liberalism and Socialism in the Nord: Eugene Motte and Republican Politics in Roubaix, 1898-
1912, PH, 1989, pp. 312-43. 
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triumph of anti-clericalism. For this reason the Republic was permanently unstable. 
Conservatives were increasingly desirous of an anti-socialist alliance, and from time 
to time achieved one. But their own self-images prevented them from recognizing 
potential allies as true conservatives, whilst the methods used to mobilize popular 
support prevented conservative leaders from ignoring the religious question. Finally, 
both Catholic and lay varieties of conservatism could be turned against the elites, as 
the emergence of Christian Democracy and Radicalism demonstrated. 
The fragmentation of the right 
Fear of revolution prolonged the wartime Union sacree into the Bloc national. The 
Bloc, stretching from the royalist Action fran~aise to the right of the Radical Party, 
won the general elections of 1919. The coalition partners patched up a compromise on 
the religious question. During the next two decades financial, economic and social 
questions were the main focus of domestic politics. With the exception of the Cartel's 
effort to resume the anti-clerical offensive in 1924, religious questions were appar-
ently secondary.46 
Yet deeper analysis shows that the regime remained precarious, whilst the 
right was as divided as ever on the best means of stabilizing it. Consensus was limited 
to a recognition that the promise of social mobility in a liberal-democratic society was 
no longer sufficient to contain the left. Disagreements on this issue were related to a 
debate on the nature and desirability of industrialization, stimulated by the economic 
expansion of the 1920s. These debates coincided in turn with a change in the institu-
tional structure of the Republic, as a system of interest group representation was 
grafted onto the parliamentary system. The effect of all this was further fragmentation 
of political life. This was all the more serious because although the religious question 
was no longer central to national politics, it remained important in more subtle 
ways.47 Paradoxically, the Church's acceptance of Republican institutions liberated 
its organizational potential. One new development in the 1920s was that interest 
groups were formed within Church and lay networks. 
During the 1920s the French economy experienced a period of growth that 
was impressive by both French and European standards. One effect was to accentuate 
the structural imbalance in the economy.48 The development of highly capitalized in-
dustries like engineering and electricity contrasted with the weight of small business 
and the peasantry. Some businessmen in the modern sector were coming to see this 
46 H.W. Paul. The Second Ralliement, the rapprochement between Church and State in France in the Twenlhieth 
Cenlury, Washington, 1967. 
47 For the dependence of Federation republicaine leaders de Wendel and the agnostic Louis Marin on the church 
see Jeanneney, op.cit., pp. 436-9. 
48 F. Caron and J. Bouvier. HislOire economique et social de la France, p. 647; for a recent restatement of the case 
for a structural imbalance see Tom Kemp, 'French Economic Performance', in European History Quarterly, vol 
15. 1985, pp. 474-5. 
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economic dualism as a handicap to further growth.49 Above all such ideas were cur-
rent in the electricity industry, where they were associated with figures like Auguste 
Detoef of Alsthom and Ernest Mercier of the CGE. In 1926 Mercier and Detoef set up 
Redressement fram;ais to promote what at the time was known as neo-capitalism. 
This meant in practice concentration, integration, rational use of labour and raw mate-
rials, high consumption, disciplined competition by means of ententes, and an end to 
state protection of small business.50 
Neo-capitalism was for three reasons of fundamental political significance. 
Firstly it implied a reformulation of the social basis of the regime. In the past 
Republican democracy had incorporated a fairly broad alliance of petty bourgeois, 
peasants and even workers, whilst police and army confronted those workers and 
peasants who opposed the dominant ideology. Neo-capitalists envisaged concessions 
to the working class, which would be rewarded for greater productivity by higher 
wages and social reform.51 Neo-capitalists could not afford to alienate small produc-
ers. Indeed, their interest in using rural electrification recalled that of the early 
Republicans in railways. But there was no disguising that neo-capitalism implied a 
fundamental shift in social politics.52 
This was all the more true because neo-capitalism emerged partly in reaction 
to renewed interest after the war in recruiting small producers as allies against the left. 
Such themes were taken up by the Bloc national, and resulted in a system of tax ex-
emptions and cheap credit for artisans. In 1922, with the encouragement of the gov-
ernment, the Confederation generale de I' artisan at was formed. 53 These were the first 
measures of any importance which had been explicitly designed to preserve the small 
production sector. 
In spite of the government's efforts to channel and control petty bourgeois 
discontent it tended in practice to develop a momentum of its own, fuelled by the be-
ginning of a long-term decline in the artisanate and an intensification of the rural exo-
dus. The Radicals were responsive to the demands of their constituency, creating in 
the mid-1920s official bodies such as the Chambres des metiers and Chambres 
d'agriculture. The Radicals also took up the demands of small businessmen that they 
49 P. Fridenson. Histoire des Usines Renault. vol 1. pp. 133-4. Louis Renault denounced the innefficiency of agri-
culture and the multiplicity of commercial establishments which creamed off the profits made by the productive 
sectors. 
50 R.F. Kuisel. Ernest Mercier. French TechnocraJ. Los Angeles. 1967; Kuisel. 'Auguste Detoef. Conscience of 
French Industry'. IRSH vol 20. 1975; Kuisel. Capitalism and the State in Modern France: RerwvaJion and 
Economic Management in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge, 1981 
51 Kuisel. Mercier. ch. 4; Fridenson. 'L'ideologie des grands constructeurs dans l'entre-deux-guerres', MS. 81, 
1972. pp. 52-68; S. Schweitzer. De l'Engrenage ilia chaine. Les Usines Citroen, 1913-1935, Paris p. 86. 
52 The difference was that in the 1920s the Radical Party functioned as a guardian of petty bourgeois interests. 
!hlS became.clear when Andre Tardieu presented his Mercier-inspired National Retooling scheme to Parliament. It 
mcluded various rural public works. but failed because it was substantially modified by the Radicals to take ac-
count of rural interests. 
53 S. Zdadtny. The Politics a/Survival. Artisans in TwenJieth Century France, Oxford, 1990, ch. 1. 
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be granted the same tax privileges as artisans.54 To business, especially the neo-capi-
talists, it appeared that the pivotal parliamentary position of the Radicals gave petty 
producers an undue influence on state policy. There was always therefore an anti-par-
liamentarian sub-current in neo-capitalism. 
Secondly, Redressement fram;ais reinforced historical cleavages in the right. 
In spite of his anti-parliamentarianism, Mercier tended in the 1920s to work with a 
favourable group of politicians in the lay centre right. The reason is partly that the 
centre right was more open to social reform. But French politics are too complicated 
for this to be the sole reason: sections of the centre right were more conservative on 
such matters than the social Catholic wing of the Federation republicaine. Once again 
ideology and history cannot be separated from economic interest. Pierre Lanthier has 
shown that bosses in the electricity industry derived their power not simply from 
ownership of capital but from technical expertise, often learned in the Ecole poly-
technique.55 It could be argued that this outlook predisposed them to accept the 
Republican right's notion of the career open to talent. Mercier, as a Protestant, and 
married to a niece of Captain Dreyfus, was almost by necessity on the advanced wing 
of the ruling class. 56 
The origins and outlook of figures like Mercier separated them from that part 
of the grand patronat which owed its power to inherited wealth. This explains a dou-
ble hostility to the Catholic Federation republicaine and to established employers' 
organizations. The former included a considerable number of bosses of insurance 
companies, mining, heavy metallurgical and textile concerns.57 These were older in-
dustries with an historical connection to Catholic royalism. Textile manufacturers in 
the Lyonnais and the Nord had seen the monarchy as a defence against the proletarian 
masses who lived in close proximity to them. The other sectors had grown directly out 
of aristocratic activities, enabling them to overcome their antipathy to trade. 58 These, 
moreover, were industries with relatively high labour costs, or in the case of the tex-
tile industry, a difficult market position, factors which made them suspicious of social 
reform. So economics, religion and history combined to oppose the Federation to 
R edressement. 
The same kinds of employers also dominated the peak employers' association, 
the CGPF, which was ultimately in the hands of the steel makers of the Comire des 
54 The question here was how artisans should be defined: small business demanded the right to empoy up to ten 
workers, a view which horrified big business as much as genuine artisans. 
55 P. Lanthier, 'Les dirigeants des grandes entreprises electriques en France, 1911 - 1973', in M. Uvy-Leboyer, 
(ed.), Le Patronal de Ia seconde industrialisation, Paris, 1979. 
56 Similarly, the fact that Louis Renault denounced cartels in the older sectors of the economy such as gla~s, 
leather and steel for raising the prices of his raw materials does not simply reflect material interest, but also 
Renault's sense that he owed his own success to hard work and self-reliance, not to inheritance (Fridenson, op. cit, 
pp.152-4. 
57 Irvine, op.cit., pp. 19-21. 
58 D Higgs, Nobles in Nineteenth Century France, Baltimore and London, 1987, chapter 4. 
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forges. 59 The historical dimension emerges from the case of Fran~ois de Wendel, a 
leading member of both the latter organization and the Federation republicaine. De 
Wendel was the offspring of an aristocratic Legitimist family which had been ex-
ploiting iron ore deposits on its estates since the eighteenth century.60 It should be 
stressed that the heavy industry-textile axis was by no means uniquely of Catholic-
conservative opinion. Leaders of business organizations were often selected from the 
more liberal wing of heavy industry. Largely this was a question of the route to state 
power, which for business passed through the deputies of the centre right, with their 
quasi-monopoly on the Ministry of Commerce. 61 Nevertheless, neither the CGPF nor 
the Comite des forges were enamoured of Redressement franr;ais or its ideas. 
Finally, neo-capitalism has to be seen as part of a remaking of French in-
stitutions. Formation of Redressement franr;ais was part of a wave of corporate orga-
nization. It included the CGPF (1919), Chambers of Agriculture (1925), the Jeunesse 
agricole chrhienne (1929), the CFTC (1919), and the Union des syndicats 
d'ingenieurs Franr;ais (1919), to name but a few. The interwar years were also the 
heyday of non-economic pressure groups like the veterans' associations and the 
Federation nationale catholique. Interest group politics contributed to political insta-
bility. One thing united all of these bodies: they aimed to influence government policy 
in mutually contradictory ways.62 In the 1920s economic prosperity limited conflict. 
But when during the slump their room for manoeuvre was reduced, many saw the 
government as having been captured by rival interest groups, and therefore demanded 
restoration of state authority. 
What is more, many of these groups crystallized within existing Catholic and 
lay networks. The specialist Catholic Action groups are one example. Stephen Zdatny 
has shown how the artisan movement was disrupted by conflict between a Catholic 
wing centred on Alsace, and a pro-CGT majority.63 Examples could be multiplied 
endlessly. The background to this was the Church's acceptance of Republican institu-
tions in the early 1920s.64 This coincided with a fundamental change in the strategies 
of the hierarchy. During the crises of the previous century the Church had clung to the 
myth of a fundamentally Catholic population. This meant that all the Church had to 
do to defend its interests was to eliminate the pernicious influence of Freemasons, 
59 I. Kolboom, La revanche des patrons. Le palronal fran~ais face au Front populaire, Paris, 1986 pp. 76. 96; 
H.W. Ehrmann, Organized Business in France, Princeton, 1957, pp. 16-29. 
60 J-N. Jeanneney, de Wendel. p. 445. 
61 This applies to men such as Rene Duchemin of the CGPF, Lambert-Ribot of the Comite des forges and Henri 
de Peyerhimhoff of the Comire des Houilleres. Organised business also tended to concentrate financial support on 
the politcally crucial centre right (Jeanneney, de Wendel. p. 445). On the division of ministerial responsibility see 
D. Taratowsky, 'Le Radicalisme et Rcformisme Politique dans la France de I 'Entre-deux-guerres', CHIRM vol. 35 
No. 11980. 
62 Note, however, that business groups were better organised and more disciplined. They therefore tended to de-
mand devolution of state power to themselves. whereas organizations of peasants or artisans preferred the state it-
self to enforce measures such as minimum prices. 
63 Zdatny, op.cit., passim. 
64 Paul, op. cit., passim. 
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Jews and Protestants. After the war the hierarchy recognized that Catholicism was one 
opinion among many. The Church would therefore have to fight for its interests 
through bodies like the FNC. And if France was ever to be re-Christianized then a 
missionary effort would be necessary. Hence the development of specialist Catholic 
Action groups. The effect of all this was to make the Catholic right more dependent 
upon the Church precisely because the Church had ceased (more or less) to contest 
the regime. 
Neo-capitalism then was one aspect of a crisis in the relations of bourgeoisie 
with the petty bourgeoisie and the working class; it fractured the unity of the business 
class, reinforced historic cleavages in the right, and was part of an intensifying pro-
cess of interest group competition. By the mid-1920s it was clear that Republican in-
stitutions were not functioning well. This was confirmed by the disproportionately 
hysterical reaction of the right to the arrival in power of the Cartel in 1924, the impo-
tence of Cartel governments themselves and the fact that the crisis was resolved only 
by the granting of special powers to Poincare. The main purpose of the rest of this 
thesis is to examine the efforts of the right in one French department to manage and 
resolve this crisis. 
From France to the Rhone 
The following chapter describes the emergence of a liberal-democratic and Catholic 
conservative tradition at the turn of the century in the Rhone. Chapters three and four 
are concerned with rural and urban social structures and interest group politics. They 
show how the Catholic liberal consensus on the right was undermined by the new so-
cial and political strategies of the Church, the emergence of an independent peasant 
movement and the CFTC, the relative decline of the silk industry, and the rise of an 
engineering industry in which many employers were reformist and committed to 
modernization. The sociology of the electorate and party members of the parliamen-
tary right before June 1936 will be analysed in Chapter five. The links of these same 
parties to the Church will be examined in chapter six. Chapter seven discusses the im-
pact of the reforms of Andre Tardieu, inspired by neo-capitalism, on both the right 
and associated interest groups. It is shown that the reforms caused a reaction on the 
part of certain Catholics, land owners and silk manufacturers, mobilized by the 
Federation republicaine. It is shown that the right in the Rhone was already in crisis 
before the slump. Chapter eight demonstrates the growth of authoritarianism and cor-
poratism in agricultural and industrial circles during the recession, and shows radi-
calization of the Parliamentary right. In chapter nine the nature of the extreme right 
before June 1936, especially the Croix de Feu, will be analysed. It is argued that the 
Croix de Feu gathered together many of those who had been opposed to the liberal-
conseravative establishment in the Rhone. The three final chapters are concerned with 
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the response of the right to the crisis of June 1936 and the nature of the PSF. The 
central problem is to explain why the success of the patronal counter-offensive 
against the Popular Front contrasted with an unprecedented degree of factionalism on 
the right. 
The drawbacks of a departmentalized history of France are well-known.65 The 
Rhone is certainly unique; generalization from a single case is always hazardous. But 
the department is sufficiently populous and its politicians influential enough in na-
tional politics for the example to have considerable importance in its own right. 
Furthermore, its social structures and landscapes are varied enough for it to serve as a 
microcosm of the nation. In order to orientate the reader it is necessary to provide a 
brief introduction to the department. 
Although the smallest department outside the Paris region the Rhone had in 
the 1930s a population of about 900,000.66 About 70% lived in the agglomeration of 
Lyon, while 12% resided in smaller towns such as Villefranche, Tarare, and Givors. 
The rest lived in communes with populations of less than 2,000. 
For administrative purposes the department was divided into two ar-
rondissements: Villefranche in the north and Lyon to the south (see Maps 1.1 and 
1.2).67 These arrondissements were subdivided into thirty-three cantons, twelve of 
which were within the commune of Lyon. Cantons will frequently be used as a unit of 
analysis in this thesis, but in the 1930s their sole use was as constituencies for local 
elections. Below this level were 269 communes. The commune of Lyon was split into 
seven municipal arrondissements (see Maps 1.3 to 1.6).68 Whereas in the case of Mar-
seille urbanization had been accompanied by the absorption of suburban communes, 
those surrounding Lyon remained autonomous. In addition, advantage has been taken 
in this thesis of the division of Lyon and Villeurbanne into polling districts, which 
permit a fine level of analysis. 
As for social structures, only the briefest of guides is necessary at this stage. 
The commune of Lyon is divided into three by the Rhone and Saone rivers. The old-
est part of the city--the Fifth Arrondissement--lies on the right bank of the 
Saone with the narrow streets of Vieux Lyon at the foot of the cliffs. Vaise, to the 
north, is industrial, while the south is bourgeois or petty bourgeois. 
Between the two rivers lies the old heart of the city. The apartments of the no-
bility and the rentier class were traditionally located between Bellecour and Ainay 
(districts 204-208), where a number of religious institutions such as the Catholic 
651. Rougerie, 'Faul-il departementaliser l'histoire de la France?', Annales ESC, janvier-fevrier, 1966. 
66 The exact population cannot be known because from 1900 unti11936 census returns for the commune of Lyon 
were deliberately and systematically falsified. J. Bienfait, 'La population de Lyon It travers d'un quart de siecle de 
recensements douteux, (1911-1936)', Revue de geographie de Lyon, 1968, 1-2, article 1: pp. 63-94' article 2: pp. 
95-132. ' 
67 For the history of the administrative boundaries of the Rhone see M. Gardin et. aI., Paroisses el communes de 
France: Le RhOne, Paris, 1978. 
68 Some of these were divided into two cantons, again for the purpose of local elections. 
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University are also found. The commercial classes lived further to the north. Still 
further north is the historic centre of the silk industry, the Croix Rousse, where in the 
interwar years white collar workers had taken over from weavers. 
The left bank of the Rhone was only gradually made safe from flooding in the 
course of the nineteenth century. The bourgeois residences of the Brotteaux contrast 
with industrial La Guillotiere. Expansion of the commune of Villeurbanne also dates 
from the second half of the nineteenth century. Its popUlation grew from 9,000 in 
1876 to 56,000 in 1936. 
The 1920s witnessed the explosive growth of a belt of industrial communes 
stretching from Vaulx en Velin in the east to Oullins in the South West. The popUla-
tion of Venissieux, for example, rose from 8,000 to 16,000 between 1921 and 1931. 
By this time only 9% of the adult male population had been born in the commune, 
while no less than 44% were of foreign extraction.69 Meanwhile, new residential 
zones appeared to the west. In communes such as Ecully, Tassin la Demi-Lune and 
St. Cyr, peasant farms and the summer residences of the Lyonnais elites were 
swamped by commuter bungalows 
The rural part of the department can be thought of as comprising three natural 
regions. A fourth can be added if the if the mountains are divided, though the Monts 
du Beaujolais and the Monts du Lyonnais are set off from each other less by physical 
geography than by the omnipresence of industry in the former. The Monts du 
Beaujolais form a continuous line of peaks from the Col des Sauvages to Mont 
Rigaud in the north.70 Three river valleys, the Trambouze, the Rhins and the Az-
ergues, drain them from north to south. The Monts du Lyonnais are cut into two mas-
sifs by the Brevenne river. In general the mountains are inhospitable. Soils are too 
acid in all but a few areas to be worked normally. Long cold winters, hot summers 
and unpredictable rainfall ensure that only potatoes and rye can be cultivated with any 
success. Forest often covers the slopes and crests of the mountains. There are few ex-
ceptions to this bleak picture. The relatively broad valleys of the Azergues and the 
Turdine are more suited to agriculture than the gorge-like Brevenne. South of the 
Brevenne, in the interior of the mountains, gently rolling hills also provide a less dif-
ficult environment.71 Livestock farming progressed in those areas in the interwar pe-
riod. Both mountain ranges were areas of dispersed peasant farmers, many of them 
tenants, and all but a few of them Catholic. 
The Beaujolais also consists in reality of two natural regions. Close to the 
river is the flood plain of the Saone, where the land is suitable for polyculture, partic-
ularly grain and stock raising. The Beaujolais proper is relatively featureless in its 
69 P. Videlier, 'Images d:un banlieu ordinaire dans l'entre deux gu.erres', unpublished paper. 
70 GeographIcal descnptlons from G: Gamer. Paysans du LYOMOIS et du Beaujolais, Grenoble. 1973. pp. 15-38. 
71 These haut pays are to be found m the canton of St Symphonan, between the eastern slopes of the mountains 
and the Coise river basin to the west. 
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southern part, and is more hilly to the north. The first hills bordering the Monts du 
Beaujolais are the domain of the vine. The best quality wines are produced on the 
better soils of the north.72 The climate also favours the vine, though late frosts and 
hailstorms are always possible.73 This was an area of small independent producers, 
aristocratic and bourgeois landowners and sharecroppers. The only town of any im-
portance is industrial Villefranche. 
Finally, the Lyonnaise plateau stretches from the Azergues in the north to the 
Gier in the south. In the west it is bounded by the Monts du Lyonnais and in the east 
the cliffs of the left bank of the Rhone-Saone valley provide precisely defined limits. 
As its name suggests, the macro-relief of the plateau is raised and fairly flat. But its 
surface is dissected by a host of streams running in deep wooded valleys. 
Mechanization is consequently difficult. As late as 1949 sledges were often used in-
stead of carts.74 Soils are poor, and frosts and droughts are always a possibility. But 
the proximity of a large urban market compensated for the poverty of natural condi-
tions, enabling peasants to produce vegetables and above all fruit on a commercial 
scale. Almost all of the land was farmed by small and medium peasant proprietors; 
large property was rare. The eastern border of the Plateau shades into the residential 
suburbs of the Lyonnais banlieu. 
72 The famous names are Brouilly, Chenas, Julienas, Morgon and Fleurie. 
73 The Rhone is the department most vulnerable to this form of meteorological disaster. Wine producing com-
munes usually possessed a syndicat de tir, which sought to disperse storms by the fIring of cannon shots from hill-
tops. Results were mediocre until 10 1936 Colonel Ruby coordmated a major campaign involving the use of spotter 
planes to track enemy clouds. 
74 P. Guiot, Thurins: denwgraphie d'une commune rurale de rouest lyonnais, Paris, 1949. 
Chapter Two 
The Orleanist Tradition 
Enfin 11 droite, Ie plus bete de tous: Ie conservateur liberal. Celui-Ia son grand-pere etait royal-
iste sous Louis-Philippe, devenue quelque peu rcpublicain en '48, Ie digne ancctre se mit 11 
frequenter les Tuileries apres Ie 2 Decembre: Son pere, depute ro~aliste 11 I' Assemblee na-
tionale, fut un des fondateurs de la Repubhque. Lw SUIVlt Ies dlverses fortunes de notre 
aimable regime. C'est un bon bourgeois, qui tient 11 ses digestions, iI est et sera toujours du 
cote du manche. Mais il a sa coquetterie, il est 11 I'ailr droite du parti au pouvoir; c'est l'etre Ie 
plus dangereux, Ie fourrier de toutes les catastrophes. 
Admiral Schwerrer's account of the history of the bien-pensant right must have struck 
a chord in the Rhone. Willingness to live with the party in power as long as material 
interests were protected from a working class prone to insurrection was indeed a con-
stant of conservatism in that department. It is also true that opposition to social reform 
in the name of an integral liberalism placed Lyonnais conservatives on the right of the 
regime under the July Monarchy and throughout the Third Republic. 
This combination of inflexibility on essential interests with political adapt-
ability could be interpreted as supporting opposed views of the right wing in France. 
Following Rene Remond, Lyonnais conservatism could be seen as an example of the 
durability of the Orleanist business tradition, with its hostility to constraints on eco-
nomic progress, whether associated with a vestigial ancien regime or with socialism. 
Or it could support a Marxist thesis of a precocious regrouping of the right against a 
threat from the working class. A more detailed survey, however, shows neither view 
to be entirely adequate. On the one hand the Orleanist tradition was fundamentally 
altered by its encounter with Third Republican democracy. On the other, although all 
strands in the Lyonnais right were anti-socialist, it was riven with contradictions and 
needed constant management. 
The Making of the Lyonnais Right: Commerce and Class Struggle 
Before 1870 the politics of the Lyonnais right had been relatively simple. A 
cohesive ruling class dominated by silk merchants confronted a socialist proletariat of 
small master weavers.2 For A. J. Tudesq the nobility in Lyon in the first half of the 
century was indistinguishable from the upper bourgeoisie. It was recently ennobled, 
without a military tradition, and many were involved in business. Legitimism, such as 
it was, was characterized by a de Jacto rallying to the regime, encouraged by the 
traumatic experience of the risings of the canuts of 1831 and 1834.3 Rapprochement 
with Orleanism was also facilitated by the attractiveness of Catholicism to Orleanists 
1 Admiral Schwerrer at a meeting of Ac/ionfraTlfaise in the Croix Rousse, reported in La Republique lyoTUlaise, 
29-2·1931 
2 For a brief survey of politics in Lyon during the nineteenth century see A. Latreille (ed.), His/oire de Lyon el du 
lyonnais, Lyon, 1956. 
3 A. J. Tudesq, us Grands No/abies en France. (1840·1849), Paris, 1964, pp. 166·8,284·91. He argues that the 
ruhng class of Lyon resembled a modern capitalist bourgeoisie more than notables with uncontested power. 
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as a means of social stabilization. Liberalism was the dominant creed of the elites. 
During the Revolution they had favoured the Feuillants and the Girondins. They 
elected liberals under the Restoration, and saw the July Monarchy as the incarnation 
of their ideals. Support for the Second Empire was a matter of pragmatism not con-
viction. 
Whilst the thrust of Tudesq's argument cannot be contested, it must be re-
membered that a few aristocrats, such as the Marquis de Mortemarte in the Beaujo-
lais, possessed an independent source of power in the ownership of land. Their hostil-
ity to the July Monarchy had been uncompromising.4 Under the Second Republic Le-
gitimists were temporarily given real leverage by universal suffrage. Whereas Or-
leanists were isolated from the urban proletariat, Legitimists could count on the sup-
port of the peasantry.5 Where the influence of the Church was strong, there was also 
Some sympathy for Legitimism in Lyon itself. The existence of this minority strand 
was to prove important to the remaking of the right under the 1930s. 
Moral Order to the Great War: dissolution and remaking 
The elections of 1871 saw the triumph of a 'peace list' extending from the very mod-
erate Republican Jules Favre to Legitimists such as the Marquis d'Albon.6 But soon 
the isolation of the right became apparent. Republicans provided the whole of the de-
partmental delegation to the Chamber of Deputies from 1876, were unopposed in the 
municipal council of Lyon from 1877, and won all of the department's Senate seats 
from 1883. 
An intransigent Orleanism controlled the Comite de l'union conservatrice.7 Its 
candidates in the general election of 1885 included four Orleanists (of whom three 
were important businessmen), two Legitimists, (including the landowner the Comte 
de Jerphanion), two extremely moderate Republicans, and two Bonapartists. The re-
sult was a relatively respectable score of 19%, but the inability of royalism to break 
the political power of the Republicans, who again won every seat in the department, 
was plain.8 
The popular classes of Lyon and the smaller towns had always preferred the 
leadership of socialists and middle class Republicans to that of the elites. What was 
new was the defection of the peasantry.9 In the 1870s peasants were won over to the 
4 M. Stewart-McDougall. The Artisan Republic. Revolution, Reaction and Resistance in Lyon, 1848-1851, Mon-
treal, 1984, pp. 23-4: in a by election of January 1848 the Marquis de Mortemarte, a Beaujolais landowner, won on 
the third baUot after making an alliance with reformers. 
5 Stewart-MacDougall, op. cit, pp. 72-3, 113, 139. 
6 A. Latreille, 'Lyon sous Ie regime republicain', in A. Kleinclausz (et a1.), Histoire de Lyon, Vol 3, De 1815 a 
1940, Lyon, 1952; P. Oric, pseudonym of O. Rieussec, Les Courants Poliliques du Rhone, Types el Si[}wuelles, 
Lyon 1934; L. Bonnevay, Histoire polilique du conseil general du RhOne, 1790-1940, Lyon, 1946. 
7 Known as the 'comite de l'archeveche'. 
8 F. Delpech, 'La presse et les partis a Lyon de l'avlmement des republicains a i'esprit nouveaux' Cahiers 
d'histoire, vol. 16, 1971. ' 
9 Already during the Second RepUblic th~re had heen signs that the loyalty of rmal society to large landowners 
could not be taken for granted. In the elecllons of May 1849, thanks to the propaganda of the democ-socs, only six 
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moderate Republic by bourgeois notables who promised political stability and rail-
ways. Gilbert Garrier attributes this to the prosperity of the Empire, which permitted 
the liberation of peasants from the tutelage of landowners. to Whatever the 
cause, the monarchical right had been almost entirely cut off from the masses. Only 
the isolated and devout peasantry of the west continued to follow the lead of royalist 
landowners. 11 
The impasse in which Royalism found itself produced several kinds of reac-
tion, ranging from ralliement through retreat into an integrist counter-society to flirta-
tion with a new plebeian right. Historians have generally concentrated their attention 
upon the radical right. But of greater long-term importance was the formation of a 
parliamentary right, the result of a coming together of extremely moderate Republi-
cans with Orleanist ralliees. The causes were part political and part socio-economic. 
Edouard Aynard had collaborated with Republican opponents of the Empire 
since 1868.12 This follower of Thiers had been educated by the Dominicans of 
Oullins, amongst whom the democratic tradition of Lacordaire persisted, and in Eng-
land where he studied the classical economists. He was distrusted by Republicans for 
his Catholicism, and by his own milieu for his Republicanism and supposedly luke-
warm attitude to defence of religion. 13 But an opportunity came with disorientation 
that resulted from the Boulanger debacle. Orleanists in the Rhone had been tempted 
by the General. One of their number, the forgemaster Edouard Prenat, had even been 
elected as revisionist deputy for Givors.14 Nonetheless, Boulangism was a disap-
pointment, and so many Orleanists were pre-disposed to accept the Ralliemellt. 15 
Aynard himself had already been elected to represent l' Arbresle in 1889,16 a 
seat he held until his death in 1913. Another moderate was elected in Tarare in 
1893,17 In 1898, with the victory of the rallie Gourd in the second arrondissement, 
home of monarchism, came the first success in Lyon. Thus the moderes profited from 
a shift to the right of urban and rural electors even before the Dreyfus affair, which 
precipitated the break-up of the Opportunist majorities on the municipal council of 
rural cantons, all situated in backward mountain areas, failed to give majorities to the red list. In the Plateau com-
mune of Crapo nne there was an armed mobilization against the coup of Louis-Napoleon. McDougall, op. cit., pp. 
212-13; T.W. Margadant, French Peasants in Revolt. The InsurrectIOn of 1851, Princeton, 1979, p. 27. Garrier is, 
however, probably right to argue that the dhnoc-soc vote had more to do with artisans than the peasantry. 
to Garrier, op. cit., 1973, pp. 515-17. 
liOn the Conseil ghliral conservatives were left only with the Legitimist JeIphanion who represented mountain-
ous St Symphorian. 
12 On Aynard see Laurent Jauffret, 'Quelques grands bourgeois Iyonnaises dans la deuxieme moitie de la xrxe 
siec1e', mernoire de nwfirise, Lyon II, 1987, esp. p. 114-128. 
13 Vaucelles, Le Nouvelliste de Lyon ella defense religieuse, 1879-1889, Paris, 1971, pp. 15-16. 
14 This lends support to W.D. Irvine's view that in most areas Boulangism was hijacked by Orleanists in search of 
a means of reestablishing contact with the masses. See 'Royalists, Mass Politics and the Boulanger Affair' French 
Hislory, 1989, pp. 31-47, and 'French Royalists and Boulangism', FHS, 1988, pp. 395-406. ' 
15 Delpech, op. cit., passim.; J. Joly, (ed.) Diclionnaire des parlemenlaires frant;aises, 7 vols. Paris, 1962-72; Pon-
son, op. cit., pp. 50-52, 54. The toast of Algiers was rejected by Salut Public, Le Nouvel/iSle, and the Orleanist 
~ommittee. But Au milieu des solicitudes ended the debate, leading to the collapse of an attempt by partisans ofre-
IiglOUS defence to form a catholic party (L 'union de la France chTl!tienne). 
16 Typically, his electoral platform consisted of opposition to both personal power and parliamentary anarchy. 
17 Aynard and the industrialist Sonnery-Cottet at Tarare. 
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Lyon and the Conseil general. 18 Aynard and his allies passed into opposition in both 
local and national politics, though they remained deeply suspicious of the anti-Re-
publican right. 
In 1904 the Progressist Federation des comites republicains du sixil!me ar-
rondissement, animated by Etienne Fougere, appeared. It was soon extended to cover 
the whole of the conurbation, and then the department. 19 By 1905 Aynard's followers 
had adhered to the Federation republicaine, which had been founded in Paris in 
November 1903 by Eugene Motte in order to regroup the anti-Dreyfusard majority of 
the Opportunists.20 From the turn of the century until 1936 the Federation was to be 
the predominant conservative party in the RhOne. It regularly elected three or four of 
the department's twelve deputies. 21 
There are significant continuities between Orleanism and Progressism. Fear of 
social upheaval caused Progressists to look to a strong executive. Aynard's purpose 
was a conjunction of centres against both collectivism and the far right, which he de-
fined in terms of Lyon's Girondin tradition.22 Like Theirs, he saw the Republic as 
overcoming sterile quarrels.23 Thirdly, the Progressists defended the Church on 
grounds of liberty of conscience, and saw it as a useful means of preserving order. 24 
Aynard can be placed in the Orleanist tradition of economic liberalism, and both Or-
leanism and Progressism were led by business elites. Often it was only generation 
which divided Progressists from monarchists. Auguste Isaac, for example, was the 
son of a member of the old Orleanist committee, who was personally won over to Re-
publicanism by Aynard.25 
But for all the continuities, Aynard's liberal Republicanism was historically 
specific. One of its features was the diversification of the Lyonnais economy. Mer-
chant-manufacturing of lUXury silks began to give way to industrial capitalism in the 
chemical, engineering and especially the silk weaving industries. Greater capital re-
quirements led also to the emergence within the silk industry of a small elite of silk 
importers and weavers, each with an associated bank.26 Aynard, one of the wealthiest 
of the latter, made himself the spokesman of a wider group of factory-owning 
weavers, which saw itself as a new breed of self-made men. 27 Optimistic ideas of this 
variety were strong in the Chamber of Commerce, over which Aynard presided from 
18 J. Prevosto, 'Les elections municipales a Lyon de 1900 a 1908'. RHMC. 1979, pp. 51-78; Bonnevay, op. cit., 
pp.49-50. 
19 L'Union republicaine, 17-5-1932. 
20 For the origins of the Federation see Irvine op. cit., pp. 1-3; Fonds Louis Marin, AN 317 AP 70. 
21 Ponson, op. cit., pp. 50-I, 54, 302n; Delpech, op. cit., passim. 
22 E. Aynard, Discours prononces d la Chambre des deputes pendanlla legislature de 1889 d 1893, Paris, no 
date, pp. 4-5,213. 
23 Prevosto, op. cit., p. 66. 
24 Ponson, op. cit., p. 105. lauffret, op. cit., pp. 119-120. Aynard opposed the banning of religious orders from 
teaching on the grounds that to do so would be an offence against liberty of conscience. 
25 Ponson, op. cit., 208-9. 
26 P. Cayez, Metiers Jacquard et hautsfourneaux, passim. 
27 M. Lafferere, Lyon, ville industrielle: essai de geographie et de techniques industrielles, Paris, 1960, pp. 188-9. 
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1891 to 1899. His successors in the presidential chair, Auguste Isaac and Jean 
Coignet, also played significant roles in the Federation republicaine. Among Ay-
nard's associates were such enterprising businessmen as Henri Germain, Deputy of 
the Ain and founder of Credit Lyonnais.28 It is also significant that at first Aynard 
made headway only in the 6th arrondissement of Lyon, the preferred residence of 
many of the new industrial bourgeoisie. In the first decade of the new century, the 6th 
remained the sole arrondissement in which the Federation republicaine was well-or-
ganized, though because of the presence of numerous artisans and workers in its east-
ern part, the constituency was not won by the right until 1936.29 
Little is known of the electoral base of Progressism in Lyon. But it is safe to 
assume that the bulk of voters were salaried employees. It might also be speculated 
that Aynard's brand of liberal elitism and his combination of support for Catholic 
schools with'nouvelles couches' rhetoric was what bound them to the right. 3D Of 
course, not all white collar workers were Progressists. Others supported the lay parties 
and some were linked to the Christian democratic right through nascent trades 
unions.31 
Of greater importance in terms of votes was that Aynard's peasant electorate 
had followed him to the right. Gilbert Garrier attributes this to a return of peasant in-
debtedness, which permitted landowners and bourgeois to re-establish authority.32 
This argument is difficult to sustain in the case of the Plateau, where, if the Church 
was influential, landowners had never been strong, and where decline of rural weav-
ing deprived urban bourgeois of influence. More weight should be given to the fact 
that peasant Republicanism on the Plateau had always been of a conservative variety, 
and although anti-clerical had never been anti-religious. In an area where Catholic 
values helped preserve conservative medium peasants from the effects of extreme 
subdivision of land, Aynard's propagation of 'promotion republicaine' through 
Catholic education no doubt had a certain attraction. There had been no serious eco-
nomic crisis like that which radicalized the winegrowers of the Beaujolais. This was 
the peasant France of the 'satisfied centre'.33 
Progressists also gained the votes of the peasantry of the Mountains. But here 
the relationship between Church, liberal Republicanism and the peasantry was differ-
ent. Influence of landowners remained strong because the Church formed the only 
28 For Joseph Rambaud, editor of the Nouvelliste, 'un reptile de centre.gauche'. On Henri Gennain see J. Bouvier, 
Le Creditiyonnais, 1961. 
29 Ponson, op. cit, 99-100; Delpech, op. cit., 32-3. , pp. 58-70. Also involved in the Aynard group were Etienne 
Fougere, and Franyois Gillet, both of whom will be met in chapter four; the railway entrepreneur, Felix Mangini; 
the protestant banker, Morin Pons; the forgemaster and ex-Boulangist, Prenat; Ennmond Morel, one of the most 
powerful of the Marchands de Soies. Most were from Orleanist backgrounds. 
30 For example, Aynard spoke of the 'merveilleux instruments de relevement' put at the disposal of workers by 
the Republic. 
31 See page 31. 
32 Garrier, op. cit., pp. 515-7. 
33 The expression is from R. Magraw, op. cit, pp. 350-353. 
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link between farmers living in isolated farms. Republican voting was merely tacti-
cal--a consequence of the swamping of the mountain vote by that of the plateau. In 
the Beaujolais viticole, on the other hand, the right had no chance of electing anyone 
in a constituency where peasant winegrowers were ferociously anti-clerical. So the 
sympathies of landowners and their clerical allies remained with royalism and later 
went to the ALP. 
In all three rural regions, just as in Lyon, Catholicism was essential to the co-
hesion of the right. In the heartlands of Progressism-the Plateau and Lyon it-
self--Catholicism was grafted onto liberal Republicanism. Technological progress 
and supply and demand, Aynard argued, were the sole means to improve the lot of 
humanity.34 Universal suffrage had created a society in which there were no more 
classes. Free education--lay or religious---enabled all to fulfil their potential 
through a combination of self-help, savings and temperance. Democracy and educa-
tion permitted the emergence of an elite, defined in typically Lyonnais terms as a 
group of men 
plus inslruits, maitres de la science ou des arts, ou bien plus pourvus de ressources emprunlees 
ou It'!gilimement acquises, qui ont la rude fonclion ~e diriger Ie travail, avec tous les 
responsabililes el tous les risques inherents Ii celie dlfecllon. Ce sont des esprits superieurs; ce 
sont ces directeurs du travail, ceux qui e~5ont la lourde responsabilile, ceux qui vous lIes 
socialislesJ ont donne Ie suffrage universe!. 
Accommodation of Orlean ism to democracy cannot be dismissed as a marginal 
episode. It was related to changes in the structures of the elites, and to an altered rela-
tionship with the masses. 
Comparison of Aynard's strategy with that of the Roubaix Progressist Eugene 
Motte is fruitful. David Gordon shows how liberals in the Nord built an alliance of 
cotton manufacturers and petty bourgeois which was able for a decade to keep Gues-
dism at bay. Like Aynard, Motte was a Catholic who kept his distance from integrism, 
partly because of its anti-liberalism, and partly in order to build an alliance with the 
anti-clerical petty bourgeoisie. His slogan, 'Dieu, petite commerce et liberte', together 
with a firm committment to democracy, served to create an anti-socialist alliance. It 
was broken up only at the end of the 1900s, when anti-clericalism returned to the po-
litical agenda.36 Aynard too lauded the petty bourgeoisie, but offered them no mate-
rial concessions; only the prospect of 'promotion sociale'. His success was more lim-
ited because in Lyon, unlike the more socially polarized Roubaix, the petty bour-
geoisie was larger, less frightened by socialism, and therefore capable of independent 
political action. As in the Nord, Aynard's attempts to make defence of property and 
34 A~nard, op. cit., p. 20~: to those socialists who. demanded the eight hour day he replied in a speech of 17-11-
1892 nous avons la convIctIOn que ~ar ce machtnls?'e maudlt, constamment ameliore par la science, par ce ma-
chmlsme sans cesse perfecttonne, qUI a suppnme d mnombrables souffrances, l'ouvrier arrivera Ii la joumee de 
hUtt heures I ... JOn y arrivera par les seuls progres de la science et Ie jeu naturel des choses. 
35 Aynard, op. CII., pp. 195-7. 
36 D. Gordon, op. CIt., pp.312-93. 
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economic liberty the rallying cry of the right were disrupted by the religious issue. 
Progressists were profoundly embarrassed by the crisis over the Law of Separation.37 
The disruptiveness of the religious issue from the point of view of business 
politicians like Aynard, is also emphasized by the unwillingness of many Orleanists to 
endorse the republic. This tendency is epitomized by Le Nouvelliste, founded in 1879. 
It protested 'neutrality' on the question of the regime. Joseph Rambaud, like his suc-
cessors in the interwar period, placed defence of religion above all else. But Rambaud 
was also an integral liberal of the Leroy-Beaulieu school, who urged Christians to see 
God 'a travers les lois de ce monde economique qui, dans son ensemble et ses moin-
dres details, porte [ ... J l'empreint de son eternelle pensee' and like many Progressists 
he too had business connections. He differed from Progressists in his distrust of mass 
politics and in an inability to distinguish the cause of the Church from that of social 
hierarchy.38 Aynard, on the other hand, rejected the integrist view that religion should 
suffuse all aspects of life. 
Rambaud's economic views were in most respects not far removed from Ay-
nard's liberal individualism.39 But there are certain nuances. Rambaud did not share 
Aynard's vision of an elite constantly renewed by democratic education and eco-
nomic and scientific progress. Rambaud's portrait of Jules Favre shows an elitist 
contempt for the parvenus of moderate Republicanism: 'Ie representant Ie plus com-
plet de cette caste bourgeoise ambitieuse et cupide, savante et dissolue, qui apres 
s'etre elevee par !'intelligence et maintenue par la force, espere encore dans sa 
decrepitude triompher par 1 'hypocrisie, opprimer par la corruption'. 40 In the 1920s the 
laws of supply and demand were explicitly harnessed to a static view of the economy, 
but it is possible to see the origins of this view in the late nineteenth century. 
At the turn of the century there were signs that some sections of business were 
attracted by a form of traditionalism. J-P. Houssel shows that cotton manufacturers in 
the Monts du Beaujolais, in the face of the socialist threat and in a bid to avoid hours 
regulation, began to disperse their production into the countryside, cultivating a 
passeist myth of an harmonious bucolic society.41 In Lyon the role played by figures 
such as Victor Perret (senior)42 in some of the conservative political organizations op-
posed to the Progressists, suggests that some lUXUry silk merchants without fixed cap-
ital were also worried by industrialization and the consequent decline of the arti-
37 G. Lapierre, La separation a Lyon (1904-1908). Elude d'opinion publique, Lyon, 1973, pp. 123-5. Ponson, op. 
CIt., pp. 89-95. 
38 Vaucelles, op. cit., pp. 50-55, 114-122. Rambaud was careful, however, not to offend the Legitimist sensibili-
ties of some of his board. 
39 Vaucelles, op. cit., pp. 52-55. 
40 Quoted in Vaucelles, op. cit, p. 12. (1880). These attitudes confIITn Robert Locke's view that in the National 
Assembly 'The Right-centre [Orleanist intransigentsl was more socially conservative than the Centre [supporters 
of Thiers) because it preferred oligarchy to the middle class democracy Thiers and his friends [like Aynard) were 
fashioning' (op. cit., p. 51). 
41 I.-P. Houssel. La region de Roanne et Ie Beaujolais textile/ace a l'economie moderne, 2 vols. Lille 1979 pp 147-50. ' , ,. 
42 Not to be confused with his son, leader of the Federation republicaine in the 19308. 
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sanate.43 Their critique of liberalism was however partial, and was perhaps best ex-
pressed by the uneasy reconciliation of liberalism and corporatism in the Action 
liberale popuiaire, and from the late 1920s by the Federation republicaine, once Vic-
tor Perret junior had won control over it. 
The strand of the Lyonnais right represented by Le Nouvelliste proved as 
durable as Progressism, even though it cannot be said to represent the views of the 
mass of conservatives. Rambaud's paper, thanks to clerical backing, rapidly built up a 
large circulation. Progressists subsequently found it difficult to breach Le Nouvei-
liste's acquired position. In the first thirty years of the century they made several at-
tempts to create a daily paper sympathetic to their views,44 but always failed dismally. 
This again dramatizes the tensions of the liberal-Catholic alliance, for Le Nouvelliste 
incessantly criticized the Progressists for their weak defence of the Church. 
Le Nouvelliste can also be seen as a link between intransigent Orleanists and a 
third tendency in the right--Legitimist and Catholic. Legitimism was all but extinct 
as a political force, but it conserved influence in the legal profession, among landed 
proprietors and in the Church. Christian Ponson has shown how many monarchists, 
Legitimists in particular, reacted to the disappointments of Moral Order by using the 
Church as a means of protecting their social and economic power. 
To some extent the institutional network they created resembles a counter-so-
ciety. It was co-ordinated by the Congregation des messieurs de Lyon, a kind of ex-
clusive Catholic freemasonry. The Facultes catholiques (1877), recruited students and 
professors from the same few hundred families. The Association catholique des pa-
trons lyonnais (1871) and De Mun's Oeuvre des cercles (1872), limited themselves to 
the protection of a few proletarian islands from the socialist contagion.45 The Union 
du sud-est (USE) (1889) federated agricultural syndicates. 
But this entrenchment of integrist elites within the Church hierarchy possessed 
a wider significance. A network of ostensibly non-political organizations was created 
which used the immense power of the Church to influence political and social life. 
The USE contributed to setting the parameters of the debate over agricultural policy. 
The same applies to Le Nouvelliste, which moreover had close links to USESA. This 
ability of the most reactionary elements of the old elites to maintain their power in un-
favourable circumstances is illustrated by the career of the lawyer Charles Jacquier 
(1848-1928). A one time Legitimist, he continued to be involved in a variety of politi-
cal organizations of the far right, but above all he devoted his life to the cause of the 
43 Ponson. op. cit.. pp. 40-42. ALP did not criticize the workings of the internal market; its corporatism often 
meant little more than professional regulation of apprenticeship. 
44 In 1902 Gourd and Auguste Isaac attempted to turn Salut Public into a morning paper. a manoeuvre directed 
against the Nouvelliste. 'dont l'intransigeance et Ie sectarisme commencent a lui faire pen.lre beaucoup d'abonnes'. 
Laperriere. op. cit .• p. 91. n. 14. In the 1920s the Nouveau Journal was an equally unsuccessful attempt to attain 
the same goal. See Chapter Eight. 
45 Ponson. op. cit .• pp. 39-52. 
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Church. He became doyen of the Faculte catholique de droit, and in 1925, president 
of the powerful Federation nationale catholique in the RhOne.46 This was part of a 
restoration of the influence of the long-moribund Legitimist tradition in Lyonnais 
politics at the end of the 1920s.47 
Monarchists also attempted to break out of their political isolation. Indeed, it 
is possible to see in the coming together of royalists with the new radical right the 
origins of a new anti-liberal alliance. The Rhone had not been a centre of radical 
Boulangism: the General had declined to present himself in a by-election in the de-
partment in 1887, while in the same year the Opportunist membership of the Ligue 
des patriotes had deserted Deroulede as a result of his adventurism.48 But at the tum 
of the century nationalist leagues, thanks to three developments, did playa part in lo-
cal politics. 
First, the crisis in the leadership of the right left the way open for new forms 
of political activity. Second, the growth of white collar employment in Lyon provided 
a new audience for the right In contrast to both Orleanism and Progressism, the lead-
ership of the leagues included a significant proportion of persons of middle and petty 
bourgeois origin. Auguste Gruffaz, president of a conservative trades union in the silk 
industry, was a prominent Nationalist militant 49 Third, the Ralliement, together with 
the anti-liberal social Catholicism of Rerum Novarum, liberated the political energies 
of 'les nouvelles couches catholiques'.50 
The consequence was the appearance of a Christian democratic movement 
grouped around the weekly La France libre, linked to Abbe Garnier's Union na-
tionale. It combined acceptance of democracy, anti-capitalism, and a call for reforms 
such as a progressive income tax, with nationalism, anti-Dreyfusism and a savage 
anti-semitism. The Dreyfus affair put an end to hopes for rapprochement of Catholi-
cism and democracy. La France libre ceased publication at the end of January 1899, 
following quarrels with Le Nouvelliste and the hierarchy. Militants such as Auguste 
Gruffaz found a home in Nationalism.51 
Pre-eminent among the nationalist leagues that prospered in Lyon during and 
after the Dreyfus affair was La Ligue de La patrie fran~aise. Police reports stress that 
'dans la deuxieme ville de France, [ ... J les idees conservatrices semblent mieux 
s'accommoder avec Ie programme modere de la Patrie fran9aise'. The Progressist 
46 C. Ponson, op. cit., pp. 19-51. 
47 See Chapter Six on the creation of an alliance between the Federation republicaine. the Oeuvre des cercles, and 
the FNC. 
48 Stemhell, La droite revolutionnaire, p. 96. See page 25: revisionist candidates in the elections of 1889 were all 
of monarchist origin. 
49 AN F7 13 256, surveillance des nationalistes. S. Wilson, 'The Anti-semitic Riots of 1898 in France', Historical 
!ournal, vol. 19,1976, pp. 787-806, shows that the majority of those arrested in the course of an anti-semitic riot 
In January 1899 were students and petty bourgeois. Desire Gumaud, leader of La Patrie fraTlfaise was the lawyer 
son of a white collar worker. 
50 See chapter 1. 
51 AN F7 13256; Ponson, op. cit., pp. 62-67_ 
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deputy Gourd was seen at one of its meetings, and in December 1903 Gurnaud, the 
leader of La Patrie. fused its journal with L 'Express de Lyon, controlled by Aynard.52 
The marriage, however, was short-lived. Aynard and Isaac wanted nationalist 
patronage at no price, while Gurnaud saw the Progressists as 'reactionary'. La Patrie 
was in fact a loose organization, simultaneously drawn in other directions. It had ex-
cited the interest of royalists, including such well-known Legitimists as Charles 
Jacquier and the brothers Lucien-Brun.53 Neither did all the leagues with which La 
Patrie collaborated share the moderate aims of Gurnaud. Capitaine Mege, leader of 
the local section of Guerin's Grand occident de France54 was also, until the summer 
of 1901, a leading adherent of La Patrie. Even after this date the two leagues contin-
ued to collaborate, although Gurnaud disapproved of a the Grand occident's contacts 
with the Jeunesse royaliste, led by Pierre de Saint-Victor of a Beaujolais Legitimist 
family. Finally, La patrie received the support of the Blanquiste deputy of the 3rd ar-
rondissement of Lyon.55 
There were also overlaps between nationalism and the more moderate Action 
liberale populaire, founded in 1901 with the active support of Cardinal Coullie. Mil-
itants such as the future deputy Pierre Lenail and Victor Perret (senior) were involved 
in both movements. Again, leading royalists such as Ravier de Magny and the Lucien-
Bruns were present at its meetings and in its committees. Action liberale experienced 
some success during the Separation crisis, though it never posed a significant threat to 
the Progressists even in the countryside where it was at its strongest.56 Disappoint-
ment in the elections of 1906, and in 1907 the reversal of papal policy towards the 
Republic led to the decline of ALP. Many monarchists subsequently turned up in the 
committees of A ctionfran(;aise and the separate royalist committee. 57 
Thus the tum of the century witnessed the coming together of some of the 
remnants of monarchism with a new plebeian right. This meeting took various politi-
cal forms, from Christian democracy, through the Republican ALP and La Patrie 
fran(;aise, to the proto-fascist Grand occident. Emergence of the extreme right in the 
early years of the twentieth century cannot be explained, following Zeev Sternhell, in 
terms of the conjunction of radical nationalism and dissident socialism. Blanquistes 
may have contributed, but it must not be forgotten that they had changed sides, and 
that this was recognized by the electorate. Rather, the new radical right was associ-
52 AN p7 13 256; Laperriere, op. cit., 87-92. 
53 They were among fifty royalists who attended a meeting of Jules Lemrutre in March 1901. 
54 Formerly the Ligue anlisemi/ique of Drumont. 
55 AN p7 13 256. 
56 The ALP was strongest in the Beaujolais vi/ieole, the mountains and in the Croix Rousse district of Lyon, where 
there was a vibrant popular Catholicism. 
57 Ponson, op. cit., pp. 100-102; Depierre, op. cit., pp. 76-77. Does the strength of ALP in the 1st and 4th ar-
rondissements, home of the traditional silk industry, along with the presence of fabric ants such as Victor Perret and 
Lows Chavent confirm the thesis of fear of unrestrained industrialization? 
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ated with conflicts within the classe dirigeante, its search for a mass base in the age of 
democracy, and the rise of white collar employment 58 
In spite of the ferment on the far right Progressism was firmly established by 
1901 as the predominant conservative force. Does then the example of the Rhone con-
firm the Elwitt-Lebovics' thesis of a remaking of the French bourgeoisie on a basis of 
protectionism, anti-socialism and reformism? Certainly anti-socialism was Aynard's 
rallying cry, and one of his aims was to win over the anti-clerical petty bourgeoisie. 
But beyond this some important qualifications must be made. 
In the first place the Progressists were integral liberals. 59 Sanford EIwitt's de-
piction of Aynard as a participant in a reformist consensus does not ring true. He may 
have participated in Le Playist associations, but his interpretation of reform was indi-
vidual. 60 His interest in cheap working class housing reinforced a low wage policy by 
fixing workers in one place, and was not accompanied by the kind of paternalism seen 
in other areas. Workers' savings banks were intended to facilitate individual social 
mobility. Similarly, Hermann Lebovics is wrong to underplay Lyonnais anti-protec-
tionism.61 In fact, in disputes over protectionism within the silk industry Aynard, 
Isaac and the Chamber of Commerce reafflrmed faith in commercial liberty. 
Protectionism was no more than a minority movement in Lyon.62 Finally, although 
undoubtedly imperialism was a powerful means of integrating French elites, Lyonnais 
imperialism was one of free trade. 
The strength of liberalism in Lyon leads to the suspicion that although the 
Meline tariff undoubtedly inaugurated a policy of protecting small producers, it was 
not of fundamental importance in holding the regime together. Aynard denounced the 
Meline tariff as a return to Ancien regime protectionism, a society of 'small industry, 
living off secrecy, monopoly [and] privilege'.63 He certainly sought an alliance of 
capitalism and petty production, and agitated fear of collectivism, but like Eugene 
Motte, he made use of an older Republican ideology. And like Motte, founder and 
president of the Federation republicaine, Aynard was a leading figure in Progressism 
in spite of his hostility to protectionism. What held Republicanism together was not a 
specific set of economic policies, but rather an agreed set of codes for the identifica-
tion of allies and enemies, and a framework within which differences could be incor-
58 Of course. white collar workers also provided electoral support for the Progressists. and indeed. for the left. The 
ca<e of Lyon confirms the interpretation of R. Magraw. op.cit .• ch. 7. 
59 Elwitt, op. cit.. p. 236; 'Aynard had a special interest and long experience in social reform'. This is just one ex-
ample of a tendency towards amalgamation of quite distinct ideologies which reaches Sternhellian proportions. 
60 L. Jauffret, op. cit.. pp. 123-128. concludes that Aynard's understanding of Le Playism was simply that the in-
dustrialist had to do his best to avoid sackings during recessions. and to explain the inanities of Marxism to the 
workers. That would be sufficient to create the 'industrial family'. 
61 Lehovics. op. cit. pp. 153-55. He argues that imperialism provided a cushion for free traders. adding that a 
protectionist current appeared in the silk industry in the 1900s. 
62 It would be interesting to discover the precise details of the relationship between protectionism and conser-
vatism in the Rhone. 
63 Aynard. op. cit .• pp. 4-5: he continued. 'quant lila grande industrie. reine de notre temps. qui s'epanouit au 
grande air. qui avec ses forces indefinies. vit et ne peut vivre que d'expansion. son regime naturel est Ie regime de 
la liberte'. 
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porated. This in fact is a pre-condition of a society in which 'negotiated consent', 
rather than repression is the chief mode of social integration. 
Even if these arguments are not accepted, it remains that the 'social protec-
tion' thesis must be modified to account for the non-adherence to the consensus of 
two of the most important industrial regions in France. 
Furthermore, the example of the Rhone shows that the religious question con-
tinued to disrupt right wing politics. The Progressists themselves were unable to re-
main above this issue because their appeal was bound up with Catholicism. Secondly, 
integrist Catholicism was bound up with a minority far right, which was able at the 
time of the Separation and Inventory crisis to gain a wider audience. Third, the 
Church was never a docile tool of any movement of the right. Furthermore, the Ral-
liement put an end to the political unity of Catholicism. Encouraged by the Church, 
conservative white collar workers were beginning to question economic liberalism. 
Aynard's Republicanism, although hegemonic, was also unstable. It needed constant 
political management if it was to reconcile economic and ideological contradictions. 
From Bloc national to Union national 
In the aftermath of the Great War the triumph of liberal Republicanism seemed com-
plete. In the general elections of 1919 the Federation republicaine, Alliance 
democratique, ALP and Independent Radicals united in a single list. Aynard having 
died in 1913, leadership of conservative forces passed to his close associates, Auguste 
Isaac and Laurent Bonnevay. In the unusual conditions of this election, seven out of 
twelve members of the conservative list were elected.64 Five years later, the same al-
liance was reproduced in new elections, though on this occasion the unity of SPIO 
and Radicals ensured that not a single conservative was elected. But the impression of 
consensus and continuity on the right is confirmed by the relative weakness of the 
extreme right in the Rhone during the crisis of the Cartel. 
Yet the old problems of conservative politics remained. The right failed to 
overcome its minority status. Aynard's dream of an alliance with the Radicals re-
mained unrealized. In 1919 in spite of the best efforts of Weitz, president of the 
Comite Republicain de commerce et de l'industrie, a Bloc national list was not 
formed in the RhOne, thanks to the refusal of Herriot to accept the participation of 
Gourd.65 As a result the right remained in a minority in the Rhone throughout the in-
terwar period. This can be seen in Graph 1, which shows the combined votes of all 
candidates of right and left from 1914 to 1936.66 The right never won more than 33% 
of those eligible to vote, and never elected more than four or five of the department's 
64 This was by far the best result obtained by the right in the department during the Third Republic, though in 
terms of actual votes the right-left balance had hardly shifted since 1914. 
65 Oric. op. cit" pp. 56-7; S. Berstein, Edouard Herriot ou la Repub/ique en personne, Paris, 1985. 
66 See also Table 1 in Appendix 2. 
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deputies. 67 The right 's performance on the municipal council of Lyon was equally 
poor, for in 1935, its best year, it won only 14 o ut of 54 seats. All other industrial 
towns were also held by the left, with the exception of Amplepuis and Cours. Onl y 
the Conseil general functioned intermittently as a co unterweight to the power o f the 
left. 68 The right won an overa ll majority in this body in 1934, but factional sq uabbl es 
deprived it of the fruits of victory. 
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Meanwhile the internal cohesion of the right was undermined by the e mer-
gence of a challenge to the Federation from within the parliamentary right in the form 
of the Alliance democratique and the PDP. In 19 14 all cand idates were e ither mem-
bers of or in one case allied to the Federation .69 But from 1928 unti I 1932, as Graph 2 
reveals, the centre right vote steadily increased. In part this is deceptive , because often 
it was a matter of the desertion of Federation deputies such as Laurent Bonnevay 
(Beaujolai s Mountains) and J-B Delorme (G ivors) to the Alli ance, and voters were 
given no choice of conservative candidate. Nonetheless, the tendency is clear. 
Like the Federation the Alliance was a product of the Dreyfus affa ir, gro uping 
those moderate Republicans who had rallied to Waldeck- Rousseau' s government of 
Republjcan Defence. Although E. Aynard had played a part in the formation of the 
national organization, the party had at flrst been insignificant in Lyon. 70 Before the 
war only a few individuals, such as the deputy Fleury-Ravarin, had been associated 
with it. Even he presented himself to the e lectorate under the umbrella of the FR. 
67 Four in 1928; three in 1932; five in 1936. 
68 Mainly because usc of cantonal boundanes in local elections led to an over-representation of rural area.~ . ThIr-
teen co ns tituencies in the agglomeration of Lyon representcd an average of 10.874 electors. whlie twenty main ly 
rural cantons englohed an average of 4.961 voters . According to the e lectorallisls nf 1':136. 
69 The al ly was Claudius Auray in the Reaujolais. who waas linked 10 hath ALP and Fellcrnli Cl Il . 
70 G. Lachapell e, L 'tl/liance Democraliqlle. Paris. 1935 . 
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From 1919, however, as the Federation became more firmly anchored on the ri ght, the 
Alliance began assert its independence, especially in the 6th aITond issement. 
Shares of the Regi stered El ectorate 
The Rise o f the Centre Ri ght 
30,- ---------, 
~------­,0,1-- --=' --=----"'--,./--1 
~o'I------'-Vr;:--r--­
;~i~-------~--~ 
~ r. _ ... _ ............• _ ................................. _.::.,,:: .. _.::,.:: ................... . 
1914 1924 1932 
~019 ~02e ~o~o 
YtllJI 
Graph 2 
--ftlytlr ctiofl 
Ai:) I ?QP 
Alongside the lay centre right was a new Christian democratic party, the PDP. It ap-
peared in Lyon a few days after its founding conference in Paris, on 15th and 16th 
November 1924.71 Although it never achieved the electoral success of the Alli ance, 
the PDP too was to become a source of concern to the Federation, not least because of 
sympatlly for its reformist aims on the left of the Federation . 
By the late 1920s the Federation itself was in the grip of crisis. Auguste Isaac 
resigned as national leader of the Federation after defeat in the elections of 1924. The 
election of Loui s Marin as his successor led to a marked shift to the right. After this 
date Isaac ceased to playa visible political ro le in the Rhone. Within the party a 
power struggle developed. On one side stood the new departmental president. 
Franc;:ois Peissel. He was a moderate who favoured the international policy of Briand , 
the conservative reformism of Tardieu and some of the ideas put forward by social 
Catholics. In sp ite of this Peissel enj oyed the support of liberal grandees like Isaac. 
No doubt this was because Peissel was infinitely preferable to his rival, Victor Perre t. 
The latter was an ally and friend of Louis Marin, to whose intransigence in inter-
national affairs Perret added an equally intransigent attitude to social reform and an 
ambiguity towards parliamentary democracy. Both Perret and Pei ssel, then, broke 
with the integraJ liberaJism of Aynard and Isaac. 
By mid-1932 Perret 's faction had established complete control over the Feder-
ation. But the price of his victory had been a strengthening of the centre right. In the 
two chapters which fo llow the social and economic dimensions of the collapse of the 
liberal tradition will be examined. 
7 1 For the fOlmation of the PDP see 1. Raymond-Laurent , Le Parti democrate pop"iaire. Le Mans. 1965. 
Chapter three 
Change in rural society 
A relatively insignificant 18% of the population of the Rhone lived in communes de-
fined as rural; 64,000 economically active persons were occupied in agriculture. The 
figures confirm the urban and industrial nature of the department. Yet because of the 
advantage that conservative parties drew from the overrepresentation of the country-
side in electoral bodies, the rural world cannot be neglected. 
During the belle epoque the peasantry had provided relatively passive support 
for the right. In the mountains, where isolated peasants were subject to clerical influ-
ence, or in the Beaujolais where conservatism depended on the ties of landowner and 
sharecropper, it is possible even to speak of manipulation. In these areas the elites 
supported Progressists for tactical reasons, but at heart remained monarchists and in-
tegrists. On the plateau, on the other hand, there existed a peasant conservatism based 
on protection of status and loyalty to Progressist notables. In the interwar period the 
conditions in which notable politics had flourished broke down in all three regions, 
leading to the growth of socialism in the Beaujolais and of the Croix de Feu and PSF 
in the rest of the department from 1935. 
One cause of change was a strengthening of medium peasant farms: there was 
a fall of 36% in the number of exploitations in the Rhone between 1912 and 1942, 
while their average size increased from 6.5 to 9.5 hectares. Losses were essentially 
from the ranks of small property holders.1 The background to these changes was the 
decline in population.2 Before 1914 the rural exodus in the Rhone had been relatively 
restrained. But losses in action, the resulting low marriage and birth rates, together 
with high mortality, and the attraction of employment in an expanding industrial 
economy, caused depopulation to gather pace.3 Small peasants were least likely to 
have the capital necessary for reconstruction of their holdings, and were most likely to 
limit families to a single child. 
Depopulation led in many areas to domination of villages by medium peas-
ants, as the rural bourgeoisie, petty-bourgeoisie and marginal proprietors departed. 
One result was gradual conquest of the Conseil general by the right, for medium 
peasants were mainly conservative. In the longer term it also contributed to peasant 
self-consciousness. Meanwhile tenants and sharecroppers benefited from a shortage 
of competition for leases, which may have assisted them in shaking off the domina-
tion of landowners. 
1 Garrier. op. cit .• pp. 581-2. The structural analysis of pea.~ant society that follows is heavily reliant on Garrier. 
However. Garrier draws few genera! conclusions in his section on the interwar years. 
2 Garrier. op. cit.. pp. 463-91. especially pp. 464 and 487. 
3 Garrier. op. cit.. pp. 619-35. 
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Peasant isolation was also broken down by greater integration into the market 
economy. But the agricultural population also became more vulnerable to price fluc-
tuations at a time when the Church accentuated its critique of economic liberalism. 
One of the chief signs of the breakdown of notable politics was the challenge posed 
by the Jeunesse agricole chretienne to established agricultural syndicalism. Before 
analyzing the impact of these changes in the different regions of the Rhone it is nec-
essary to provide a brief introduction to the conservative electorate in the department. 
The Conservative Electorate 
The election of 19324 has been used to produce a typology of political orientations in 
the communes situated outside the agglomeration.5 Fourteen types were produced, 
which have been regrouped into three categories according to whether there was pre-
dominance of right or left, or near equality of the two camps. They are plotted on 
Maps 3.2 to 3.4, while map 3.1 shows the conservative vote as a percentage of those 
who voted. The mean percentage of votes cast in each type, together with the number 
of communes in each type is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Typology of voting behaviour in 1932. Mean percentage of 
votes cast by type 
Type Number Right Radical SFIO PCF 
1 25 89 6 4 1 
2 37 74 16 8 2 
3 32 62 28 8 3 
4 22 52 10 33 4 
5 41 51 40 6 3 
6 I 14 81 1 4 
7 42 38 43 13 5 
8 2 9 45 46 0 
9 7 27 35 31 8 
10 1 5 0 93 2 
11 4 23 12 64 1 
12 36 37 12 49 2 
13 7 9 45 46 1 
14 1 26 14 38 22 
It can be seen from Map 3.2 that almost all areas of right wing predominance were lo-
cated in the mountains. The conservative vote is highest in type one, which is most 
often found in the interiors of the ranges, and where the average score of the right was 
no less than 89%. In type two it falls to a still impressive 74%. The third type, in 
which conservative candidates gained on average 62%, is distinguished by a certain 
4 It is difficult to chose a general election which is representative of the conservative electorate because of the fail-
ure of the Radicals to present a candidate in the second constituency of Villefranche in 1932 and 1936. 1932 was 
chosen for this analysis because it represents the mid-point in the decline of Radicalism: in 1928 a Radical candi-
date was presented; in 1932 a 'Socialiste fran~ais' was endorsed, and in 1936 no candidate at aU was presented. 
5 The method used is heirarchical cluster analysis (See M. J. Norusis, SPSS-X inlroduclory Sialislics Guide, 
ChIcago, 1988). Briefly, the technique involves grouping th.e communes into types according to similarities in 
votmg patterns. Note that the separallon of the fourteen types mto three on the maps was not the result of statistical 
analysis, but was done to facilitate interpretation. 
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strength of radicalism. The only parts of the mountains in which the left was able to 
challenge the right was in industrial towns and villages in the Beaujolais mountains 
(type four), and the Brevenne valley (type five). 
On the plateau two types predominate. Type five, in which the right gained a 
small majority of votes (51 %), represents a transition from conservative strength in 
the mountains to relative weakness in the more densely populated industrial east. It 
covers much of the west and north of the plateau, as well as the Brevenne valley. On 
the eastern fringe of the plateau and in isolated industrial centres like Sain Bel the 
conservative score falls to a still respectable 38% (type seven). The main rivals of the 
right in both cases were the Radicals. 
The Beaujolais viticole, like mountainous Monsols to the north, was a bastion 
of socialism.6 In the four communes of type eleven, for example, the socialist vote 
was 64%, while in type twelve, to which 37 communes belong, it was 49%. Only in a 
few communes, mainly situated in the canton of Anse, were conservatives a match for 
the combined left, winning an average of 52% of the vote. 
Contemporaries were in no doubt that this pattern was accounted for by two 
variables: Catholicism and agriculture.7 A report at the 1936 congress of the F edera-
tion republicaine identified the Catholic peasantry as the main source of support for 
the party, admitted an inability to cross the Catholic-anti-clerical divide, and reported 
a lack of success in small rural towns where the socialists could exploit their 
'ridiculous tall story about the 200 families'. 8 
The geography of conservatism lends considerable support to these views. It 
coincides broadly with the Map of religious practice.9 Neither is there any reason to 
doubt a correlation between the agricultural population and right wing voting, as 
comparison of voting patterns with the distribution of electors registered on the 
Chamber of Agriculture lists shows (map 3.5). The same relationship appears even at 
the lowest level of analysis. A report on the commune of St. Genis l' Argentiere (St. 
Laurent) divided the population into two parts: 800 farmers who were mainly conser-
vatives, and twenty-seven leftists who were employed in local quarries and tile facto-
ries.lO 
6 The most important wine producing communes bordering the Rhone also show a high propensity to vote for the 
left--in this case the Radicals. That a mountainous canton like Monsols was socialist is to be explained by the 
concentration of inhabitants in small villages where many were occupied in sawmills, and by the fact that many 
inhabitants worked at harvest time for winegrowers. 
7 B.M.E. Leger, Les opinions poliliques des provinces franr;aises, Paris, 1934. p. 139-40: 'Les populations agri-
coles, la bourgeoisie des campagnes sont moderees; les ouvriers des mUltiples usines installees dans Ie pays sont, 
en revanche, revolutionnaires; ils ne constituent cependant qu'une minorite, Ie plus souvent, sauf toutefois dans la 
premiere circonscription de Villefranche qui est assez 'avancee'-mais qui com porte des elements moderes im-
portants'. 
8 L'Union Republicaine, 21-6-1936. Much the same conclusion is reached by Serge Berstein, who suggests that 
the Rhone was one of a number of areas in which supremacy of small and medium property was not associated 
with hegemony of Radicalism: 'c'est Ie role du parti dans les villes petites et moyennes qui expJique son audience 
electorale' (Berstein, Hisloire du Parti radicale, Paris, 2 vols., 1984 p. 308). 
9 O. Le Bras, Etudes de sociologie religieuse, between pp. 324 and 325. 
10 ADR4m, conseils municipaux, dossier St: Laurent de Chamousset, report of 16-4-1941. See also De Farcy on 
the diVISIOn between launderers and peasants In Crapponne, op. cit., pp. 129-30. 
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All the same, the correlation between conservatism and the peasantry must be 
qualified. Variables such as form and size of landholding, extent of involvement in 
the market, settlement patterns and sociability must also be taken into account Only a 
comprehensive analysis of the multiple interrelationships between them would allow 
firm conclusions. We have, however, to be content with examination of some of the 
influences on the conservative vote, using the method of multiple regression. 
There are, unfortunately, no department-wide statistics which give the sizes of 
farms worked by peasants.ll But useful data on forms of landholding can be obtained 
from the electoral lists of the Chamber of Agriculture of 1935. These distinguish six 
categories of elector, of which four are useful: proprietors, tenants and sharecroppers, 
agricultural labourers and retired farmers. 12 The lists are not a perfect source. They do 
not distinguish between tenants and sharecroppers; only those over twenty-five were 
allowed to vote in Chamber of Agriculture elections, and there is no guarantee that all 
those entitled to register actually did so. All the same, Map 3.6, which shows the per-
centage of the fIrst two categories who were either tenants or sharecroppers appears to 
be a reasonable approximation to reality. The proportion of proprietors in the whole 
department on the electorallist--73%, is not too far removed from a fIgure of 60-
70% given by a contemporary national survey. 13 
Other variables examined are first, difference in population between 1911 and 
1936: positive correlations indicate strength in communes suffering from depopula-
tion. Second, the number of wine co-operative members as a proportion of those in-
scribed on the electoral list, is a rough guide to the signifIcance of small winegrow-
ers.14 Lastly, density of population has been included as a measure of the strength of 
the industrial population. 
Clearly the models which result are likely to be somewhat weak. This is partly 
because important variables are lacking. Also, correlations between the dependent 
variable (vote) and some of the independent variables are diminished because the lat-
ter are not homogeneous. For example the category 'proprietors' lumps together 
Catholic gentry and anti-clerical smallholders. More serious still is the failure to dis-
tinguish sharecroppers and tenants. For this reason the fifty-one communes in which 
the proportion of agricultural land devoted to cultivation of the vine was greater than 
30% are analysed separately, on the assumption that these include sharecroppers and 
not tenants. 15 Analysis of the rest of the department covers 189 communes where less 
11 For sizes of holdings we have only Gilbert Garrier's sampling of representative communes. 
12 ADR 7 Mp 36, Listes electorales de la Chambre d'agriculture. See also H. Rollet, Les Chambres 
d'AgricuIture, Lyon, 1926, especially pp. 94.5: The other two categories were female heads of agricultural fami-
lies, and women who had taken the place of therr husbands during the war. 
13 Atlas de France. Comite national de geographie; Societe fram;ais de cartographie, Plaque N' 41. The map in-
dicates 10·20% tenants and 10·15% sharecroppers. 
14 The latter figures were obtained from the maps in Perrin, op cit. 
~5 The source of this information is Garrier, op. cit., Map 42. In the Beaujolais, where much land is of poor qual. 
Ity, 30% was a considerable amount of land to devote to the vine. 
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than 20% of cultivatable land was occupied by the vine. As a result twenty-three 
communes where the confusion of tenants and sharecroppers can be assumed to be 
greatest are excluded from the analysis. But this was the only way to achieve mean-
ingful results. 
In wine growing areas the conservative vote correlates best with communes 
where population loss between 1911 and 1936 had been greatest, where proprietors 
were numerous, co-operative members few, and where the proportion of land devoted 
to the vine was relatively 10w.16 Given that population loss led often to domination of 
villages by medium proprietors, and given also the appeal of the co-operative move-
ment to smaller proprietors, it can be inferred that conservatism in the Beaujolais was 
an affair of polycultural medium and large peasant proprietors. This is confirmed by 
the strength of Radicalism in communes with more stable and therefore less homoge-
neous populations. 
Although the model is not very strong, it is also interesting to look at the 
electorate of the socialists. Best explained by monoculture of the vine and the pres-
ence of co-operative members, it is reasonable to assume that socialism appealed to 
small proprietors who saw in cooperation a means of escaping subservience to the 
market.17 Particularly intriguing is the absence of correlation between either socialist 
or conservative votes and sharecroppers. A report to a congress of the PDP in 1935 
claimed that socialism 's'est faufile dans les vigneronnages meme des gros proprie-
taires'.18 Our results suggest that many sharecroppers must have remained faithful to 
landowners, but that socialists had made progress in this traditionally deferential cate-
gory.19 
In non-wine growing communes the model is weak where the conservative 
vote is the dependent variable. Again, however, there is an association between con-
servatism and population loss. The importance of this variable is confirmed by a 
stronger model for the Radical vote, which shows the expected negative correlation 
with communes in which population was declining. Here too, emigration of artisans 
and small proprietors strengthened the right and weakened Radicalism. Albert Pin 
shows that this was the explanation for the passage to the right of Messimy 
(Vaugneray) in 1919. The process was exemplified by mayor Jean Parrel, whose farm 
grew by renting, purchase and inheritance from little more than five hectares in 1919 
to nearly fifteen in 1939.20 
16 The equations are reproduced in Appendix 2. 
17 The negative correlation of socialists with proprietors is not incompatible with this view. It merely means that 
socialists were a minority among proprietors in general. 
18 Nouveau Journal, 25-2-1935. 
19 It is likely that sharecroppers passed directly from conservatism to socialism, and did not travel via radicalism. 
Socialism was not merely an extreme form of Republicanism. This supports the argument of Tony JudI, op. cit., 
pa~sun. 
20 See the excellent A. Pin. meffUJire de mal/rise. Lyon n. 1989. on the career of his grandfather, Jean Parre\. 
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As in wine growing communes, differentiation among the peasantry is prob-
lematic. Tenants are a somewhat better indicator of the conservative vote than propri-
etors, though whether this was due to greater prosperity, openness to the influence of 
landowners, or simply to the fact that tenants lived in areas of high religious practice, 
is open to question. As for proprietors, they also contribute to explanation of the 
Radical vote, which means that the right cannot have monopolized this category. In 
the mountains most proprietors, whatever the size of their holdings, were conserva-
tive. In Ste. Catherine (Morn ant) where the right gained 162 of 183 votes cast, only 
14 tenants were inscribed on the electoral lists of the Chamber of Agriculture, against 
70 proprietors. In some strongly agricultural communes on the plateau, on the other 
hand, Radicalism dominated. In Montagny (Givors) 63% of registered electors voted 
Radical and only 11 % for the right;21 41 % of the electorate were listed as proprietors. 
Given the negative correlation between Radicalism and popUlation loss, it would 
seem that it was mainly small proprietors, perhaps also engaged in non-agricultural 
pursuits, who voted for the Radicals.22 
The Mountains 
In the mountains conservative voting depended more on the influence of the Church 
over an isolated and relatively poor peasantry than upon the influence of the notables 
who led the right in the mountains. This is why the right held the allegiance of both 
proprietors and tenants. 
A number of very large properties stood out from the peasant mass. It was ei-
ther forested or worked by tenant farmers. 23 Landowners were noble in the Monts du 
Lyonnais. Although the Comte de S1. Victor owned 600 hectares at Ronno,24 bour-
geois property was more common in the Monts du Beaujolais, especially around 
Tarare where businessmen and other wealthy residents of cotton towns owed land 
(see Map 3.9). These differences explain why the moderate Republican conservatism 
of Laurent Bonnevay dominated in the Monts du Beaujolais, whereas the influence of 
landowners nourished an older variety of conservatism in the Monts du Lyonnais. 
Both, however, depended on peasant passivity and a friendly Church. 
Most farmers owned and worked their own land, though as Map 3.6 shows, 
tenants were more numerous in the mountains than anywhere else in the depart-
ment.25 It is difficult to say anything meaningful about the size of peasant farms, ex-
21 It is worth noting that Montagny was a commune of concentrated settlement. 
22 An interesting account of political alignments comes from an administrative report on factional struggles in the 
commune of Marcilly (Limon est) in 1943. They opposed '80 personnes vivant des foyers des gros producteurs' to 
'350 personnes composees de petits cultivateurs et des leurs, d'artisans, d'ouvriers'. ADR 4m con seils munici-
paux. dossier Marcilly. 
23 Garrier says that they were most numerous in the south, in the canton of SI. Symphorian sur Coise. A look at 
the cantonal distribution of tenants and share-croppers on the electoral lists of the Chamher of Agriculture, how-
ever, suggests that the proportion of tenant farmers was highest in St Laurent (45%) ADR 7 Mp 36. The answer 
could be that they worked a greater proportion of the soil in St. Symphorian. 
24 The Marquis d' Albon had 260 hectares at St. Romain de Popeye. 
25 Category one electors always outnumber those in category two. 
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cept that there is some evidence that tenants were relatively privileged. They tended 
to be grouped in areas where conditions were better, such as the mountain interiors 
and the Azergues valley. 
In those parts of the mountains in which terrain permitted agricultural activity, 
farmers lived either in hamlets of two or three families or in isolated dwellings in the 
middle of farms (see Map 1.3). This, in other words was the classic settlement pattern 
in areas of poor upland farming where farms had to be large. 26 Communication was 
possible but not always easy, especially during the winter. The steep slopes of the 
mountain borders were a barrier. They split the commune of Thurins into two separate 
worlds. As late as 1949 dwellers in the upland part of the commune went to mass in 
Yzeron and to the market in St. Martin en Haut. Only administrative reasons obliged 
them to descend to Thurins-bourg.27 Dairy farmers in the cantons of St. Symphorian 
and St. Laurent were obliged by the insufficiency of the transport system to specialize 
in the production of cheese and butter rather than milk. 28 
Mountain society was therefore somewhat cut off from the rest of the depart-
ment.29 Often within the mountains the only regular link between peasant families 
was provided by attendance at mass. In a passage which applies particularly to the 
mountains one contemporary commentator wrote of the Rhone peasantry that 'dans 
les campagnes, apres la grand'messe, les hommes envahissent les cafes, car c'est Ie 
seul moment pour ces braves gens de se rencontrer; de discuter de leurs interets pro-
fessionnels comme de ceux de la commune; toute Ie reste de la semaine, chacun se 
livre a ses propres occupations, sans trop se soucier de son voisin'. Religious practice 
was indeed high in the mountains. In the commune of Yzeron 92% of men and 96% 
of women attended church on Sundays.30 
During the 1920s the structures of mountain society were beginning to alter, 
and with them the relationship of the peasantry to notables. Firstly, progress of 
medium properties at the expense of small matched the general trend in the depart-
ment. As elsewhere the cause was a decline in population. It was most evident in the 
Monts du Beaujolais, where silk and cotton weaving ceased from the late nineteenth 
century to provide supplementary income to peasants scraping a living from impov-
26 A. Perrin, 'Le Mont d'Or Iyonnais et ses abords', ER, vol. 3, p. 55-81; Guiot, op. cit., passim. Scarcely any non-
industrial commune in the mountains had more than 40% of their population living in the bourg. For Tony Judt a 
figure of less than 50% characterizes conservative communes in the Var (T. JUdt, Socialism in Provence, Cam-
bridge, 1979). 
27 Guiot, op. cit., passim. 
28 Garrier, op. cit., pp. 611-2: Perrin, op. cit., passim: Even the small massif of the Monts d'Or was an obstacle to 
the influence of Lyon, allowing anachronistic rural habitats to survive in the commune of Poleymieux, in close 
proximity to the banlieu. 
29 Henry Lagardette, wrote in 1931 of the Beaujolais Mountains '[ ... J res tees si pleins de mystcres, jusqu'h 
I'apparition de I'automobile, que les habitants du vignoble Ie consideraient com me aussi inaccessihle et aussi 
lointain que Ie pole nord! '. It was said that in the not too distant past the inhahitants of the Beaujolais had believed 
the mountains to be inhabited by fairies. (H. Lagardette, Impressions Beaujolais: De la resislance a la vigne, 
Lyon, 1931). 
30 G. Le Bras, Eludes de sociologie religieuse, Paris, 1938, pp. 153-4; G. Le Bras, 'Notes de statistique et 
d,".isto.ire religieus~s', Rev~e. d'hisloire de I'Eglise de France 6, 1933, pp. 503-505; G. Le Bras, Introduclion a 
I hlSlolre de Ia pratIque rellgleuse en France, (two vols.), Pans, 1942 and 1945; de Farcy, op. cit, pp. 139-40. 
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erished soils.31 The communes of the Monts du Lyonnais were less affected. A natu-
ral surplus of births over deaths only just failed to compensate for emigration of the 
young.32 
Second, there are signs that the ties of dependence between landlord and ten-
ant were beginning to break down. This was partly because of the difficulty of finding 
tenants in a period of rural exodus and partly because of absenteeism. Proprietors 
resident in Lyon often left total liberty to their tenants, not daring to increase a some-
times derisory rent. Often land was sold to the tenant. 33 
Thirdly dairy farming was beginning to transform the economy of the moun-
tains.34 In the early 1920s peasants remained subsistence farmers. It was calculated in 
1926 that the price of milk covered only half of production costs. Also, there were 
problems resulting from the over-population and mongrelization of cattle, insufficient 
forage, and epidemics of foot and mouth disease. Yet matters gradually improved. 
After a two year struggle by producers' associations, including an abortive strike in 
1922, the price of milk was raised to a more satisfactory level by an accord with the 
wholesale trade in 1924. A marked improvement in productivity followed. In the 
Monts du Lyonnais, where transport was too poor for milk to be sent to Lyon, small 
cheese and butter factories were established. 35 The market, then, brought peasants 
into active involvement with each other and with agricultural syndicates. 
Fourthly, the decline of rural weaving (except around the textile towns of the 
cantons of Tarare, Amplepuis and Thizy), caused many areas to revert to dependence 
on agriculture alone. Even around industrial Tarare communes such as Darieze and 
Joux returned to agriculture.36 We shall see that in the interwar period most mayors 
were recruited from among peasant notables.37 
As a result of these changes peasant associative life in the mountains began to 
develop. A rising money income may have permitted a more diverse sociabilty. Those 
peasants who had returned from the war joined veterans' groups: according to An-
toine Prost it was the mouvement ancien combattant which took on the role of ani-
mator of social life in the countryside during the interwar years. 38 In the 1920s most 
communes possessed running water and electricity; supplies to remote hamlets now 
31 The worst affected canton, Lamure, lost 42% of its population between 1906 and 1936. 
32 Garrier, op. cit., pp. 619-635 Note that in the absence of industry, except in the commune of St. Symphorian 
and in the Brevenne valley, these areas had never been densely populated. 
33 Garrier is contradictory. insisting both on the difficulty in finding fermiers and the superiority of demand over 
supply of tenancies. at least in the Monts du Lyonnais'fP. 554 and 586. Barral, op.cit., pp. 191-94 on the reduction 
of the value of rents due to inflation. One example a an absentee landowner was Alexandre la Batie, mayor of 
Montromand and leader of the FederaJion republicaine in the canton. He was hardly ever in Montromand, and in 
1937 found that his influence in the canton had been eroded by the PSF. 
34 Especially in more hospitable areas such as the Haut pays of St. Symphorien, the valleys of the Azergues Tur-
dine. Rhins and Tramhouze, and in the northern part of the canton of Monsols. ' 
35 Garrier, op. cit., 609-612; P. Barral, Les Agrariens Franr;ais de Meline a Pisani, Paris 1968, pp. 212-3: the gov-
ernment opposed the milk producers----mindful of the interests of ' genuine commerce'--searches at the HQ of 
the USE in 1926 provoked widespread annoyance. 
36 Albout. op. cit .• passim. 
37 See Chapter 6. 
38 A. Prost, Les Anciens CombaJlanls ella sociele/ranr;aise, 3 vols., Paris, 1977, vol 2, pp. 180-213. 
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preoccupied the authorities. One consequence of the arrival of electricity was that 
peasants could listen to the radio. Little is known of the impact of radio on rural soci-
ety, but it is possible that receivers in cafes formed a part of social life. 
These changes should not be exaggerated. But it does seem that the isolation 
of mountain dwellers both from each other and from the outside world was breaking 
down at a time when the influence of large landowners was declining for economic 
reasons. 
The plateau 
In some respects peasant society on the plateau resembles that of the mountains. The 
settlement pattern was less dispersed than in the mountains, but still there were no 
large peasant villages to compare with those of Provence. To the north peasants typi-
cally lived in hamlets of five or six farms, situated on the steep sides of valleys. This 
is explained by the fractured topography, shortage of cultivatable land, abundance of 
sources of water and the need for shelter from the sun. Only towards the southern 
edge of the plateau were there larger villages.39 But even here bourgs often contained 
a largely non-agricultural population.40 
Furthermore, all sources agree that peasants lived rather isolated lives. Farms 
were often surrounded by high windowless walls which, in the view of one geogra-
pher, symbolized 'the hereditary desire for isolation, the fear of involvement in the 
lives of others and of allowing others to interfere in their own'. He also reports that in 
the 1920's there was much feuding between peasants.41 Mutual aid was not unknown, 
but was limited to family and immediate neighbours. As in the mountains attendance 
at mass on Sundays remained the primary form of social life. Without attaining the 
levels of the mountains, church attendance remained respectable, and were clearly 
related to the proportion of peasants in the population. Moreover, religious life was 
private. It did not involve collective ceremonies or the 'chants de foule' of Alsace or 
Brittany.42 
But at this point similarity with the mountains end. Population density was 
much higher; communications were easier. The proximity of an urban market com-
pensated for unfavourable agricultural conditions. A decisive turning-point in the 
plateau economy was the wine over-production crisis of 1907, from which time fruit 
began to replace wine as the principal cash crop.43 Progress was halted during the war 
years, but between 1921 and 1931 prosperity returned as recovery was aided by state 
and private institutions. Even in the Bas Beaujolais, fruit began to supplant poorer 
39 Garrier, op. cit., pp. 162-3. 
40 Guiot, op. cit., p. 113: in Thurins in 1936 only 60 out of 625 inhabitants of the bourg were involved in agri-
c1Ulture. 
41 De Farcy, op. cit., pp. 107-109. 
42 Farcy, op. cit., pp. 139-40: Vaugneray: 50% for men and 60% for women. A. Pin, op. cit., p. 35. 
43 Andre Cholley, 'Quelques. Remarques sur la Culture et la Commerce des Fruits dans la Banlieu de Lyon', ER 
vol 3, 1927, pp. 83-107.; Garrler, op. CIt., 448-50. 
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quality wines.44 At first produce had been destined primarily for Lyon, but this mar-
ket was easily saturated due to ease of communication with the lower Rhone valley, 
and so peasants increasingly concentrated on good quality production for a wide na-
tional and international market.45 This further encouraged specializa-
tion--Chaponost and Irigny for example concentrated on strawberries. The diffi-
culties presented by climate, terrain and soil meant that peasants were obliged to 
avoid putting all their eggs in one basket.46 Intensive monoculture was largely con-
fined to the grande banlieu, an area where vegetable production by small market gar-
deners was also important.47 
Nonetheless, fruit production helped break down peasant isolation. Most 
transported their own produce to railheads or even to markets in Lyon.48 This was 
particularly true of market gardeners, who were both small traders and peasants, pos-
sessed of a strong collective identity.49 Peasants were also exposed to price fluctua-
tions in a world market. Gilbert Garrier concludes that 'the peasant proprietor, a small 
producer, remains strictly subordinate to a market of which control entirely escapes 
him'. Heavy borrowing to finance investment in fruit production left them poorly 
equipped to face an economic downturn.50 
This was all the more so because on the plateau the trend towards rein-
forcement of medium property was uneven. In many areas subdivision of land contin-
ued unabated throughout the interwar period. This appears to have been particularly 
true in areas where fruit production was most profitable. 51 On the other hand the same 
areas were also likely to experience an influx of commuters, and small peasants were 
most vulnerable to the advance of urban property. 52 But some communes in close 
proximity to Lyon, such as Brignais, became almost entirely agricultural as the rural 
artisanate departed. In more westerly communes such as Messimy, however, there 
was both a growth in the number of medium farms and a tendency for the non-agri-
cultural population to depart. 53 
The point to emphasize, however, is that on all parts of the plateau the social 
independence of the peasantry contrasted with vulnerability to the market. In some 
44 CholJey. op. cit., passim; Garrier, op. cit., p. 614. 
45 CholJey, op. cit., p. 88: about one quarter of production was consumed in Lyon. Of the rest about one third was 
exported. 
46 This was particularly true of regions more distant from Lyon, where the principal fruits, apples, pears and cher-
nes, were less demanding of labour, and where transport was inferior. Garricr, op. cit., pp. 614-5; Cholley, op. cit., pp.l03-7. 
47 R. Jeantet and J. Willemain, 'La banlieu maraichcre et la commerce des legumes a Lyon jusqu'en 1939'. ER, 
vol 16, 1940. 
48 Cholley, op. cit., p.84. 
49 Jeantet and WilJemain, op. cit. p.250: 'Le maraicher vit dans un monde a part, ferme. 11 ne ressemhle ni au 
paysan ni a I 'ouvrier, il partage son temps entre Ie travail de la terre et la vie au marche. Affllle par les difficultes 
memes de son mctier, il est ennemi de 1a routine, rendu avise par sa condition. Sa vie garde Ie caractcre artisanal', 50 Garrler, op. cit., p. 614-5. 
51 Far.cy, op. cit., p. 73-4; Garrier, op. cit., p. 550; Guiot, op. cit., p. 25. 
52 GUto!, op. cit., passim; Garrier, op. cit., p. 549. 
53 Pm, op. cit., pp. 113-4. In Messimy the popUlation fell by 17% from 1906 to 1931. Losses were mainly from 
the ranks of small proprietors, most of whom were also engaged in paid labour or non-agricultural activities. 
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circumstances this might have led to socialism. But on the plateau conservatism de-
rived from a tradition of clerical influence over a relatively isolated peasantry. 
Catholic Republican notables like Aynard had grafted onto this Catholicism a demo-
cratic rhetoric which stressed the spirit of initiative of small property and presented 
railways as an opportunity for peasants to break into a wider market This kind of 
thinking appealed especially to those medium peasants with sufficient land to be able 
to take advantage of new opportunities, and who saw their own Catholic values as es-
sential to family stability, social status, and avoidance of the consequences of inheri-
tance laws. Peasant conservatism on the plateau was an affair of Catholic medium 
peasants-'bonnes familIes' -of which the Parrel family in Messimy was a typi-
cal example.54 The left, on the other hand, was associated with a (declining) rural 
petty bourgeoisie and small peasantry. 
All of this meant that the Progressist hegemony on the plateau was dependent 
firstly on the goodwill of the Church, and secondly upon the maintenance of eco-
nomic prosperity. 
The Beaujolais 
The anti-clericalism, radicalism, and even socialism of the Beaujolais peasantry con-
trasts sharply with the relative passivity of farmers in the mountains and even with 
the contented proprietors of the plateau. Here the influence of the right was confined 
to large landowners, their sharecropping clientele, and to medium proprietors, espe-
cially in the southernmost part of the Beaujolais where conditions were similar to 
those on the plateau. The Beaujolais was an area of class and cultural conflict, bril-
liantly satirized in Gabriel Chevallier's 1934 novel Clochemerle, for which the model 
was the village of Vaux en Beaujolais.55 How does one account for the weakness of 
the right in the Beaujolais? 
Firstly, contrasts in social structure were very marked. Large proprietors, 
sometimes bourgeois but most often aristocratic, dominated most of the Beaujo-
lais-with the exception of the most southerly part. Many had been present for 
centuries; the Brac de la Perriere family had been important landowners in St. Lager 
since 1550. Nobles like the Comtes de Sparre, de St. Charles56 and de Fleurieu,57 
owned perhaps half the land. Big properties were worked by paid labour or most often 
by sharecroppers. This system of 'vigneronnage' was unique to the Beaujolais and a 
small part of the Maconnais. It was usual for the sharecropper to supply the labour of 
himself and his spouse and to meet the cost of temporary workers taken on during the 
54 Pin, op. cit., pp. 30-34. 
55 G. Chevallier, Clochemerle, Paris, 1934. The newspaper Lyon republicain was obliged to inform its readers that 
Clochemerle did not recount real events. 
56 Of St Etienne les Ollieres. 
57 The Cornie de Fleurieu owned land in Villefranche, Arnas, Anse and St. Georges de Reneins. In 1914 he had 
been the most important landowner in the department. 
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vintage. Customarily his expenses were raised further by the whole of the cost of mi-
nor equipment, by his duty to pay half the cost of hay and straw and the necessity to 
purchase food not produced by himself. Theoretically, his only income was from the 
sale of half the wine produced. 58 
Proprietors saw vigneronnage as a perfect example of class collaboration, 
lauding the sharecropper for his freedom from the servitude of the worker, his will-
ingness to have his say, and his courtesy to his 'monsieur'.59 Gilbert Garrier shows, 
however, that in the nineteenth century the position of sharecroppers was of strict de-
pendence. They were caught in a vicious circle of debt by the practice common to 
most proprietors of advancing cash at the beginning of each year, whilst poverty 
forced sale of wine at the moment when prices were at their lowest. Sharecroppers 
were subject to daily surveillance. 60 
Yet as in the case of tenant farmers in the mountains dependence was dis-
solving in the 1920's, thanks to growing difficulty in finding vignerons. Consequently 
proprietors were forced to accord advantages to them. The obligation to pay a fixed 
due for the use of pasture was reduced and in bad years waived; premiums for acci-
dent and hail insurance were taken on by the proprietor; hay and straw were paid for 
by the proprietor alone, wages were paid for days spent planting new vines and per-
mission was often granted to cultivate an orchard.61 Also, it is probable that inflation 
had permitted sharecroppers to rid themselves of debts.62 Finally contemporaries 
noted a tendency towards the absenteeism of some proprietors. It was said that such 
landlords had sufficient income from other sources not to worry about the excessive 
demands of sharecroppers, which put less fortunate proprietors in a difficult po-
sition.63 Growing economic independence was, then, one of the reasons for the ad-
vance of socialism in the Beaujolais in the 1920s. 
A more long-standing aspect of political conflict in the Beaujolais was the op-
position of small independent wine producers to the axis of noble and cure--the 
type of conflict described by Gabriel Chevallier. Many small growers owned no more 
than a single hectare, and few had as many as four. Many laboured on the holdings of 
the more fortunate. It is noticeable that although there were independent winegrowers 
all over the Beaujolais, they leaned towards the left only in those areas where they 
lived in close proximity to the aristocracy. 
Another factor which divided small growers from large was the development 
of commercial winegrowing, that had been accentuated since the days of the phyllox-
58 Jacques Burel, 'La Vignoble Beaujolais', These de Droit, Lyon 1941; Raymond Billiard, Vigneronnage el Vi-
gneronBeaujoiais, Villefranche 1938; Garrier, op. cit., p. 268 
59 Billiard, op. cit, p. 32-3. 
60 G~er! op. cit., pp. 268-9 and 390-1. Note also that if vigneronnage permitted the survival of certain feudal 
traditIOns, It remained a capitalist form of agriculture. 
61 Billiard, op. cit., passim; Garrier, op. cit., pp. 584-5, 
62 R. ESher, review of Garrier. 
63 Burel, op. cit., pp. 59-60. 
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era crisis.64 The vine lost its importance in areas of po1yculture and was increasingly 
concentrated in a few communes on the banks of the RhOne and above all in the 
Beaujolais.65 Monoculture was accompanied by a tendency towards mass production 
from high yield hybrid vines rather than the gamay for which the Beaujolais was fa-
mous. Big growers in particular sought to repair the neglect of the war years by 
planting high production varieties with a view to an immediate profit. Small indepen-
dent producers were worse affected by absence and death during the war, but did not 
have the capital necessary for re-planting with hybrids. Many were forced to abandon 
the land. Those who adapted best were concentrated in areas where quality of wine 
was good enough to maintain profit levels-mainly the north. Small growers 
tended therefore to accuse the large of exploiting the Beaujolais name in order to sell 
inferior products.66 Like the fruit growers of the plateau, small viticulteurs were 
obliged to sell their wine immediately after the vintage, when prices were at their 
lowest.67 During the downturn which began in the late 1920s such producers turned to 
co-operatives.68 
One reason for this was a tradition of association among winegrowers. The 
pattern of settlement in the Beaujolais viticole is as dispersed as in many other areas 
of the department, with a predominance of large hamlets. In the Haut Beaujolais a 
handful of sharecropper cottages often surrounded the residence of a noble or bour-
geois proprietor. But social life was richer. Viticulteurs were never far apart and 
communication was easy. Market production had long accustomed winegrowers to 
contact with the outside world. The town of Villefranche was a source of new ideas. 
Contemporaries saw Beaujolais winegrowers as characterized by a mixture of con-
viviality, honest independence and egalitarianism, ever-ready to co-operate in the 
search for solutions to the multitude of problems with which winegrowers were af-
flicted. 69 
A combination of subjection to the market, sociability and an historic opposi-
tion to aristocracy and Church explains the radical sympathies of small Beaujolais 
winegrowers. The right did well in two kinds of areas. Firstly in the southern part of 
the Beaujolais, especially the canton of Anse. Here the rural exodus and the decline of 
64 Garrier. op. cit .• pp. 417-442: large proprietors used their capital resources to reconstitute their vines at an early 
date. and concentrated on quantity rather than quality. 
65 During the interwar years the amount of land devoted to the vine in the Rhone fell continuously from its peak in 
1902. While the number of those declaring a harvest fell to a proportionately even greater extent. The proportion of 
land occupied by the vine in the southern part of the Rhone declined from 25% in 1912 to between 10 and 15% in 
1929. Garrier. op. cit .• pp. 595-6. 
66 Garrier. op. cit .• pp. 603-4 and 550n. 
67 Burel. op. cit.. pp. 37-9. 
68 A. Perrin. 'Le Mont d'Or Iyonnais et ses Abords'. ER. vol 2. 1927. pp. 55-81. Garrier. op. cit.. f' 598-9. 
69 H. Lagardette. Impressions Beaujolais: de la resistance a La vigne. Lyon. 1931; I'influence de 'unique boisson. 
Ie Vln •. se marque sur Ie caractere sociable de ses habitants. 11 rapproche les distances entre les hommes et eveille la 
franchise. Le vigneron airne I'egalite et I'independance. fuit Ies chicanes et se montre respectueull de la parole 
donnee'. Similarly. A Perrin. op. cit.. p. 6. wrote that the winegrower '8 rhabitude de reunions ou I'on cherche des 
parades contre les fJeaul\. de la vigne; 11 I'apparition de la pyrale. de I'oldium il en fut ainsi'. 
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small in favour of medium property most pronounced; 70 large domains were few, and 
monoculture of the vine less developed. Conditions were not dissimilar to those on 
the plateau, and peasant conservatism was just as conditional. Secondly, the right re-
tained the support of a dwindling number of sharecroppers. 
Agricultural Syndicalism 
The Union du Sud-Est: from counterrevolution to pressure group 
The Union du Sud-est des Syndicats Agricoles (USE) was officially constituted in 
October 1888. The initiative came from two large proprietors in the Beaujolais, the 
Comte de St. Victor and Emile Duport, both of whom had Legitimist backgrounds. 
Their aim was to defend Catholic and hierarchical conception of rural society. All 
those engaged in agriculture, regardless of class, would combine in a corporate de-
fence of rural interests. The mark of paternalist Beaujolais landowners is evident, and 
not surprisingly Republicans denounced a rebirth of feudalism. But in fact the foun-
dation of the USE implied a recognition that the quasi-feudal ties of vigneronnage 
were insufficient to win mass support in the age of democracy. Rather than attempt to 
win the allegiance of the peasantry through direct political pressure, the aim was to 
reach them through the provision of material services. Thus the first progress of the 
Union coincided with the phylloxera crisis.71 
After the war the USE continued to expand.72 In 1935 there were 1,900 syndi-
cates and 183,500 subscribers to its journal in the south-east. Of these the Rhone ac-
counted for respectively 112 syndicates and 17,824 members spread across most of 
the department.73 The only competitor of any importance was the Federation des syn-
dicats de defense viticole du Bas Beaujolais, presided by the Radical-Socialist senator 
Emile Bender, a reflection of political conflict in the Beaujolais. 
Large proprietors remained prominent in the leadership of the USE. Repre-
senting the department of the RhOne were members of noble families such as Andre 
Brac de la Perriere, the Comte de St. Victor and the Comte de Leusse.74 All three 
were from families which regularly appeared in the subscription lists of the local 
journal of Action franr;aise. Yet after the war the USE appears to have undergone 
fundamental changes as it inserted itself into a new system of corporate representa-
tion. Its function was now to lobby for concessions within the Republic; therefore the 
USE's anti-republicanism was muted. 
70 Garrier, op. cit., pp. 549-50 and 5500. 
71 Gilbert Gamer, 'L'Union de Sud-est des Syndicats Agricoles avant 1914', MS, 1969; Garrier, op. cit. pp. 518-
522; Barral, op. cit., pp. 107-13. Membership rose to about 120 000 in 1914, organized in 500 syndicates in ten 
departments. 
72 In the Vaucluse a similar organization suffered between the wars from the competition of specialist groups, a 
consequence of the advance of market agriculture. Claude Mesliand, 'Le Syndicat Agricole Vauclusien', MS, 67, 
1969, pp. 39-60. 
73 Annuaire de rUnion du Sud-est des SyndicaJs Agricoies, 1936. 
74 Much of the biographical information that follows is from Gerard Gayet, TUnion de Sud-est des Syndicats 
Agncoles', memoire de maftrise, Lyon II, 1972; the rest is from my own files of political militants. 
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This can be seen in the leadership of the USE. Alongside nobles were bour-
geois proprietors such as Vice-president Julien Riboud, who owned 200 hectares in 
the canton of Monsols, as well as vines in the Haut Beaujolais. He was the son of a 
banker.75 What is more, Riboud possessed impeccable Republican credentials. His 
father had been a part of the Aynard circle, and remained a director of the Aynard 
family bank. A more ambiguous figure was Felix Garcin, President of the USE since 
1923. He was linked to the founding milieu of the syndicate because he combined a 
professorship of political economy at the Catholic University with the presidency of 
the board of the Nouvelliste.76 Yet Garcin also maintained cordial relations with the 
Alliance democratique politician Andre Tardieu. Julien Riboud was also a member of 
that party, as well as of the Federation republicaine.77 
Contacts with politicians of the centre right, who were more or less perma-
nently in government, were the key to the USE's success as a pressure group. In the 
1920s the USE operated more or less independently, cultivating its links with local 
deputies, but was most influential when Tardieu was Minister of Agriculture in 1929 
and 1930. A pragmatic alliance with centre right and centre left politicians was typical 
of interest groups between the wars. 
The USE's near monopoly of agricultural syndicalism in the Rhone also meant 
that it was able to make use of official bodies created in the 1920s. Thus the Conseil 
general, although in the hands of the left, had to award the presidency of the Depart-
mental Agricultural Office (created in 1919),78 to a moderate conservative conseiller 
general who played a secondary role in the USE. Of greater significance was the 
USE's domination of the Rhone Chamber of Agriculture, set up in 1927. It was 
elected partly by direct suffrage, and partly by syndicates. The USE possessed 658 out 
of 770 mandates in the syndical college. Direct elections were always uncontested, for 
the USE put forward joint lists with pro-Radical bodies. Nonetheless, most Chamber 
personnel were drawn from the USE. President of the Rhone Chamber from 1933 was 
Julien Riboud. The need to conciliate Radical peasants was perhaps one reason for the 
eclipse of aristocratic leadership.79 Control of the Chamber conferred upon the USE 
both economic and political advantages. It enabled the USE to channel government 
money to farmers. It also reinforced its legitimacy. 80 
75 Two other examples were Claude Sylvestre, who owned a medium-sized property at Bois d'Oingt, and a large 
~ortune obtained in the fertiliser industry, and Pierre Gonnard of Fontaines SI. Martin, who possessed 240 hectares 
m addition to his industrial wealth. 
7.6 Garcin had come into the possession of a large property in the Loire on his marriage. He was also director of a 
SIlk company, S.A Joseph Dubost. 
77 Gayet, op.cit., pp. 92-145, reports that in 1931 Garcin was offered the Agriculture Ministry by Tardieu. 
78 Barra!, op. cit .• p. 209. These organisms competed with the reformed Chambers of Agriculture, and were sup-
pressed m 1935. Michel Auge-Larihe, La Politique agricole de la France, Paris, 1942, sees them as an attempt by 
the admmistration to fend off demands, chiefly from the right, for elected Chambers of Agriculture. 
79 Charles Gallet of the Alliance dhrwcratique was also a member of the Chamber. 
80 Gayet, op. cit., pp. 118-123. 
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The shift of the USE from counterrevolution to pressure group can also be 
seen in the USE's economic liberalism. It appealed to the social Catholicism of La 
Tour du Pin, but its conception of 'mutual aid' went no further than insurance against 
fire and bad weather.81 Only under pressure from the rank and file in the 1930s did 
the USE adopt a more genuine corporatism.82 In financial and economic policy the 
only exception to liberal principles was protectionism. The USE had no truck with the 
interventionist agricultural policy of the Radicals and socialists. The USE then owed 
much to the Orleanist tradition. Whereas Riboud adhered to the 'liberalisme amenage' 
of the Progressists, Garcin owed more to the curious blend of liberalism and integrism 
preached by Ie Nouvelliste. 83 
We have seen that this kind of ideology was an effective means of integrating 
the peasantry. It also seems to have been accepted for pragmatic reasons by the 
mainly aristocratic landowners who had founded the USE, though they remained roy-
alists malcontents at heart. But by the end of the 1920s the liberal leadership of the 
USE was under pressure. In the first place the USE could be seen as representing of a 
narrow group of big farmers, a group which did well out of the market system, and 
with increaSingly tenuous links to the countryside. An enormous paper membership 
was used merely to legitimize lobbying activities. The only contact of the rank and 
file with the syndicate was through the co-operative fertiliser depot in the chef-lieu of 
the canton. There was, then, a potential gap between the USE and its members. The 
USE leadership found it difficult to bridge this gap because whilst it was obliged to 
invoke the mass of the peasantry in support of its demands, it feared both a self-con-
scious peasant movement and the interventionist measures proposed by Radical 
spokesmen of the peasantry.84 The equivocal attitude of the USE towards the peas-
antry is best seen in its relations with the JAC. 
The leunesse agricole chretienne 
Although the JAC was one of the fIrst authentically peasant movements in France, the 
initiative for its creation came from outside rural society. It was a distant result of the 
Ralliement. Before 1914 rural study groups had grown out of the Chronique sociale 
de Lyon. The Chronique in turn was a social Catholic organization which had 
emerged from the anti-semitic and nationalist Christian democracy of the 1890s and 
which had subsequently moved towards the moderate right. 85 The study groups num-
81 According to its Annuaire there were 1,389 mutual aid societies affiliated to the USE in the Rhone in 1936. 
82 Croix du RhOne, 12-4-1936: JAC propagandists appealed to the corporatism of founders like Gaillard-Bancel 
agaInst the commercial attitudes of the current USE leadership. 
83 Gayet, op. cit., p. 78. 
84 For a similar argument see S. Berger, op. cit., passim. She argues that the aim of the Office centrale was to 
protect the peasantry from unhealthy infuences and to prevent the emergence of rival peasant organizations by as-
summg the task of mediating between the state and rural society. 
Mesliand op. cit., suggests that the Vaucluse union drew together so many aspects of rural life that it managed to 
convmce peasants that they were in some sense isolated from the nation, and thus mask social cleavages. 
85 See Chapters 1 and 2; Joseph Folliet, Noire Ami. Marius Gonin, Lyon. 1944. pp. 213-6; Ponson, op. cit .• pas-
sim. 
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bered less than a dozen before 1914, but already they represented an implicit chal-
lenge to the rural hierarchy.86 After the war the movement progressed, and in 1929 
was integrated into the leunesse agrico/e chretienne, one of a number of specialist 
movements designed to end the decline of Catholicism by making contact with work-
ers and peasants in their own 'milieu'.87 
The JAC was also encouraged by the hierarchy, which ensured close clerical 
encadrement. Catholic elites also patronized the JAC, just as they had the older rural 
study groups. Leaders of the USE, including Garcin himself, frequently gave talks to 
JAC groups.88 Thanks to the sponsorship of Julien Riboud, Jean-Marie Parrel, who 
was closely linked to the JAC, became the first authentic peasant to join the ruling 
circles of the USE.89 The USE leadership sponsored the JAC in order to contain it, 
and seems to have attempted to confine it to religious activities. But the anti-liberal 
JAC gained a momentum of its own, developing in ways which often horrified the 
elites. 
Total membership figures are unknown. Those given by the press were con-
tradictory: 600 subscribers to the JAC press were reported in September 1931, but 
only 150 members in the department one year later.9o By 1937 there were probably 
forty sections in the Rhone,91 Although not numerically strong, the lacistes were sure 
of an audience out of proportion to their numbers, for the columns of the widely-read 
Croix du RhOne were open to them. They also enjoyed the support of many of the 
clergy.92 
The JAC were led by a group which was a little set apart from the peasant 
masses. The first president of the Rhone federation was Claudius Delorme. His father 
combined the profession of surveyor with running the family farm,93 and was a rela-
tive of the local Federation deputy Jean-Baptiste Delorme, also a prosperous working 
farmer. In other words Claudius Delorme issued from a prominent example of the 
Catholic and conservative 'bonnes familIes' of the plateau. Young Claudius was edu-
cated at the Ecole Sandar, a Catholic agricultural college of which the staff were pro-
ponents of social Catholic ideas. In 1939 he came into possession of a few hectares at 
St. Laurent d'Agny. 
From a rather different background was Delorme's successor in 1934, Joseph 
Bosse-Platiere. The latter's father, Alexandre, was a leading militant of the Federa-
86.These study groups aimed to 'rendre au paysan la confiance en lui-meme', and to put an end to the sense of in-
fenority with regard to the towns, through the creation of a peasant elite. 
87 Folliet, op. cit., pp. 216; Adrien Dansette, Des/in du calholicismefranrais. 1926-1956, Paris, 1957; I.M. Leuw-
ers,. 'Etapes de raction des hues et conceptions successives de rapostolat du lalcat', in P. Barrau, et aI., Evangeli-
SallOn collective, Paris, 1964. 
88 Le Nouvelliste, 4-5-1930. 89 Pin, op. cit., passim. 
90 Le Pelit Montagnard de Tarare, 6-9-1931 and 18-9-1932. 
91 Nouvel/iste, 23-5-1937. 
92 Probably less from P:uish priests than from certain brotherhoods: e.g. teaching orders at the Ecole Sandar. 
93 The profession of geometre was not in this period one of high status. 
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tion republicaine in the Beaujolais. Bosse-Platiere senior was a prosperous wine-
grower and ex-army officer.94 Further research would be needed to test the point, but 
it is possible that Bosse-Platiere's succession represented a shift to the right in the 
lAC, perhaps imposed by the hierarchy, for he tended to emphasize more than De-
lorme the religious aims of the movement.95 Alexandre Bosse-Platiere enjoyed close 
relations with the agricultural elites of the Beaujolais, so the presence of his son also 
illustrates the dynamic of manipulation from above and pressure from below of which 
the lAC was a product. 
There can be little doubt that the JAC rank and file were genuine peasants. 
Map 3.8, which plots the communes of residence of delegates to the 1931 depart-
mental congress, shows that the movement was at first confined to the plateau. Some 
were from communes such as Brignais and Chaponost which specialized in the inten-
sive production of fruit. Others, like Caluire et Cuire, were zones of market garden-
ing, for which from 1933 there was a specialist section.96 These communes were all 
dominated by peasant proprietors.97 It is also significant that two mountain communes 
sent delegates to the congress--BrulIioles and St. Genis I' Argentiere. In the years 
which followed the lAC expanded further into the mountains and the southernmost 
part of the Beaujolais. In all these areas the loyalty of the peasantry to notables had, 
for different reasons, been highly conditional. Significantly there was no sign of lAC 
activity in any but the southernmost part of the Beaujolais. In the rest of this area 
landowners dominated what was left of conservatism, while opposition to them was 
monopolized by the anti-clerical left rather than partially contained within the right. 
The lAC can then be seen as a part of a crisis of notable politics on the right. 
This is confirmed by ideology of the JAC. The emphasis of Action catholique 
on proselytization in the milieu where the individual Christian found himself, could 
be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand Joseph Bosse-Platiere stressed re-Chris-
tianization. By living their Christianity in their daily lives, by acting in fields, mar-
kets, festivals and syndicates as they would on Sundays, ladstes would 'insensibly 
lead the masses back to the Church'.98 On the other hand, greater emphasis could be 
placed on Christian solutions to the practical problems which confronted peasants. 
This too was conceived as a means to re-Christianization. Yet in the action of some-
one like Claudius Delorme there was a slippage from re-Christianization to the more 
secular goal of creating a peasant elite. This elite would have the task of regenerating 
an agricultural syndicalism which had degenerated into a merely commercial affair. 
94 A measure of his wealth is that the fortune of his wife permitted him to purchase a majority of shares in a local 
newspaper, the Reveil du Beaujolais, in 1941. 
95 Croix du RhOne, 31-3-1935. 
96 Le Nouvelliste, 22-3-1933. 
97 On the electoral lists of the Chamhres d'Agriculture the twenty communes that sent delegates to the 1931 
c~:,"gress of the lAC had on average 79% of proprietors, compared to 72% in the department as a whole. Nouvel-
lISle, 2-9-1930. 
98 Croix de RhOne, 31-3-1935. 
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The regenerated syndicate would take more account of peasant interests, for it would 
form the nucleus of a new organization 'qui repartira plus equitablement la production 
et la consommation, Ie travail et les benUices'.99 
The elites of the USE were then suspicious of the lAC both on social and reli-
gious grounds. loo It is true that starting out from an integrist conception of Catholi-
cism which attacked the separation by liberals of religion and daily life, the lAC 
ended up with a quasi-secular position. In this way the lAC and other social Catholic 
movements prepared the way for the Croix de Feu, the first important conservative 
party in the Rhone to claim to stand above the religious divide. Yet the secularism of 
the lAC had very narrow limits. The movement remained organizationally and ideo-
logically dependent upon the Church, and was perceived to be so by its opponents. 
This helps to explain why the social critique of the lAC was contained within the 
right 
This can be illustrated by looking at a key figure in the ascension of the lAC. 
lean-Marie Parrel, aged 52 in 1933, shared many of the ideas of the Jacistes, of which 
a group flourished in his own commune of Messimy. He possessed about ten 
hectares--a considerable farm on the plateau--which he worked himself. In 
1932 Parrel took over from the late Regis Rambaud, director of the Nouvelliste, as 
President of the cantonal syndicate of Vaugneray. In his inaugural speech he recog-
nized that he had neither the culture nor the notoriety of his predecessor, but felt that 
he had at least, Tavantage d'etre plus pres de vous, d'etre I'un des votfes'. He imme-
diately set about the formation of communal sections of the USE, with the aim of in-
volving peasants more directly in syndical activities. In 1936 Parrel became a vice-
president of USE.lOl Yet Parrel, was also a conseiller general and member of the bu-
reau of the Federation republicaine in the RhOne. His debt to the Catholic and liberal 
values of the Progressism of the 'bonnes familles' of the plateau, is evident even in 
his corporatism. He saw in it a means of protecting the family, its savings, and the 
spirit of initiative which characterized small property, against the industrial methods 
of large scale farmers. I02 Parrel remained faithful to the Federation republicaine. but 
in the longer term the JAC also fed into the Croix de Feu. 
Conclusion 
Three conclusions can be retained from this discussion of the erosion of the Progres-
sist hegemony on the right in the countryside of the RhOne. First, the JAC is an index 
of the decline of notable politics in the countryside, and of an associated critique of 
liberalism. 
99 Croix de RhOne, 12-14-1936. 
100 Gayet, op. cit, pp. 75-7. Garcin, for example, criticized the lAC for preaching against the fourth command-
ment. 
101 Pin, op. cit., pp. 63-84. 
102 L'Union republicaine, 31-3-1935. 
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Second, the emergence of the JAC provides an example of the inseparability 
of religion, economics and class conflict in interwar France. to3 It shows how difficult 
it was in interwar France for political movements to break out of the ideological and 
political legacy of the Church-State conflict. As a Catholic Jean-Marie Parrel was un-
able to see peasant socialists as allies, even though both corporatism and co-opera-
tives represented attempts to deal with the helplessness of the peasantry in a market 
economy. On the contrary, Parrel attributed the decline of the peasantry to the spread 
of lay values. This illustrates again how difficult it was for conservatives, although 
conscious of the need for unity against socialism, to break free from a divisive set of 
ideological references. Furthermore, the JAC shows that religion was not simply a 
tool of conservatives. 
Third, the transformation of the USE into a pressure group and the emergence 
of the JAC were part of corporatization of French politics. The agricultural interest 
began to entrench itself within the state apparatus just at a time when those interested 
in rapid economic expansion were beginning to criticize what they saw as the out-
moded structures of French society. Neither this nor the fracturing of interest group 
politics by the religious question augured well for the stability of the regime. 
103 This implies rejection of P. Barral's argument that tensions within rural society were subordinate to 'une 
re~endlcatlOn globale dirigee contre la domination de l'industrie urbaine' (Barral. op. cit., p. 14). Rather, as 
PhillJlpe Gratton argues, we have seen that peasants were potentially divided by cla.~s conflicts which they often 
expenenced only indirectly through the market (P. Gratton, Les Paysans cOnlre r agrairisme, Paris, 1972). 
Chapter four 
Change in urban society 
Pierre Drieu la Rochelle chose Lyon, 'the most inhospitable town in France', as an 
appropriate setting for one of his periodic bouts of suicidal self-obsession'! For Henri 
Beraud Lyon was a town where avarice ruled and where wealth borrowed the visage 
of misery in order to disguise itself. 'Chez nous', he continued, 'rien ne change, ni Ie 
ciel, ni la pierre, ni les ames') Writers of greater and lesser talent portrayed Lyon as a 
city of individualism, secrecy, materialism and fear of the covetousness of others.3 
Contemporaries either took the Lyonnais character as given or more often explained it 
in terms of the city's commercial vocation. 
Certainly the liberal tradition of the Lyonnais right can be analysed as a mate-
rial fact to the extent that historical actors believed it to be real. Yet we have seen that 
the Girondin tradition was deliberately manipulated, even invented, by men like 
Edouard Aynard. Neither was liberal individualism the only tradition in Lyon, even 
within the bourgeoisie or the manufacturing class itself. Indeed, there was more than 
one variety of liberalism. In other words, there is no necessary connection between 
commerce and liberalism. It is an historical relationship, of which the genesis, trans-
mission and dissolution must be explained. 
In this chapter we shall see how a variety of liberal individualism, associated 
with the most successful elements of the silk industry, remained dominant into the 
early 1930s. This will lead us into business institutions such as the Chamber of Com-
merce and their ideologies. We shall also see once more the importance of Catholi-
cism to elite self-definition and to the incorporation of white collar workers into the 
right. It will be shown how the liberal consensus was undermined by the development 
of large scale capitalism and a reaction from businessmen in older sections of the 
economy. Meanwhile, formation of the CFTC showed that liberalism was losing its 
grip on the masses. To orientate the reader it will first be necessary to introduce the 
political and social structures of urban society in the Rhone. 
Social Space, Political Space 
Thanks to the work of Jean-Luc Pinol it is possible to divide the city into four types of 
social space according to the occupations of its electors in 1936 (see Map 4.1).4 Type 
1 Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, Secret JOllrnal and Other Writings, Gambridge. 1973, pp. 14-15. 
2 Henri Beraud, Ciei de slIie, Paris, 1933, p. 1. 
3 A. Demaison, 'Visites a la Presse de Province (V). Bourgogne et Region Lyonnais'. Revile des Deux Mondes, 
15-10-1929. 'A Lyon les jardins sont clos de hauts murs comme les ames, mais derriere les f~ades sans caractere 
que de splendeurs se devoilent 11 ceux qui parviennent dans ces refuges intimes. Meme la foi religieuse ne se mani-
feste qu'avec une discretion qui n'a d'egal que sa profondeur'. 
4 J.-L. Pinol, Espace Sociale el espace poliliqlle: Lyon a /'epoqlle du Front Popuiaire, Lyon, 1980. pp. 104-110. 
The method used was hierarchical cluster analysis. described in the previous chapter. Four suburban com-
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three is characterized by the strong presence of workers. It includes four suburban 
communes, (not shown on the map)--Venissieux, Oullins, St. Fons and Pierre 
Benite; all but one polling district of Villeurbanne; the northern part of the 5th ar-
rondissement (Vaise), and much of the 3rd and 7th. Often the proportion of workers 
in the electorate was extremely high, reaching 80% of the adult male population in 
Venissieux in 1931.5 
In type two there is no clear predominance of any social group, though white 
collar workers and artisans are somewhat overrepresented. It includes the Croix 
Rousse and parts of the left bank of the Rhone, where it forms a transition between 
the space of the workers and that of the ruling class. The situation is complicated by 
type four, which is marked by overrepresentation of non-manual employees of rail 
and tram companies, and sometimes also of postmen. In these districts both the ruling 
classes and the private sector salariat are under-represented. Socially the districts of 
type four belong either with working class or unsegregated areas. So the tripartite di-
vision of space is not really disrupted. 
The ruling classes are concentrated chiefly in the centre of the city: in the 
Presqu'ile from Perrache in the south to the Terreaux in the North; along the quais of 
the Rhone, especially in the 6th Arrondissement, and on the Boulevard des Belges, 
bordering the Parc de la Tete d'Or (also in the 6th). Elites are also well-represented in 
the Point du Jour (5th Arrondissement), and in the suburban communes of the west 
such as Ecully. The ruling class dominates certain quartiers: in district 201 it consti-
tutes 25% of the electorate.6 The remainder of the population in wealthy districts con-
sists of categories closely linked to them: clergy, students, higher grade white collar 
workers, and middle managers. 
Broadly speaking this tripartite division of social space coincides with voting 
behaviour in the city. Map 4.2 summarizes J-L. Pinol's 'typologies of political orien-
tations'. The conservative vote is dominant in types six and seven, which cover the 
presqu'ile north of Perrache railway station, and the 6th arrondissement, particularly 
along the quais, bordering the Parc de la Tete d'Or, and in the more recently devel-
oped area of the Gare des Brotteaux (district 602). J-L. Pinol also distinguishes two 
areas in which a greater than average conservative vote was accompanied by overrep-
resentation of other parties: the Radicals in Herriot's 1st arrondissement (type five), 
and the socialists in the southern part of the 5th (type 3). These are all areas where the 
ruling class was overrepresented. 
munes-Bron, Vauix en Velin, Ste. Foy Ies Lyon and Pierre Benite---all characterized by an over-representa-
tIon of farmers, do not fall into these categories. 
5 Vldeher, op. cit.: M. Bonneville. Naissance el melanwrphiJse d'une banlieu ouvriere: Villeurbanne. Processus el 
fo.rnws d'urbanislIlion, Lyon, 1978, p. 63: were foreigners to be taken into account the proportion of workers in the 
distriCts of Villeurbanne would vary from 75 to 85%. 
6 Agamst less than 3% of the electorate in the Agglomeration as a whole. 
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The exception is an area of right wing predominance in the socially mixed 
Croix-Rousse (4th arrondissement, type six). This is partly due to J-L. Pinol's choice 
of 1936 for his analysis, for in that year many Radicals voted for a conservative can-
didate put forward by a group of small traders.7 Nevertheless, conservatism was his-
torically stronger in the Croix Rousse than in other areas. The probable explanation is 
greater religious practice. In the Croix Rousse the parish network was much better 
established than in areas with a similar social mix on the left bank of the Rhone. In 
the latter case the urbanization of the late nineteenth century had run ahead of the 
Church's capacity to adapt. In fact, Catholicism was as important to voting behaviour 
in the city as in the countryside. 
Type four covers areas in which the scores of all parties, except for a small 
overrepresentation of the Radicals, were close to their average in the Agglomeration 
as a whole, that is most of the 3rd arrondissement and the northern part of the 7th. Fi-
nally, the right did badly in the socialist bastion of Vaise (type two), and the commu-
nist strongholds in the southern part of the 7th arrondissement, Villeurbanne, and the 
eastern suburbs of St. Fons, Bron and Venissieux, not shown on the map (type one). 
These generally unsurprising patterns are confirmed by J-L. Pinol's analysis of 
political and social variables, which shows a relationship between the conservative 
vote and the presence of the ruling classes and higher grade white collar workers. 
There is also a relationship between the conservative vote and the presence of older 
electors and those born in towns or cities. Quartier plays a significant role in that po-
litical polarization is less marked in socially mixed areas. But place occupied in the 
social hierarchy is the most important factor. 8 
Social and political polarization was then a marked feature of the Lyonnais 
conurbation. The explosion of the banlieu between the wars kept alive bourgeois fears 
of proletarian insurrection. Suburbs such as Venissieux were seen almost as foreign 
countries.9 Such sentiments were reinforced by the crowding together of immigrants 
in conditions of indescribable poverty. 10 Conservatives were apt to regard demonstra-
tions by the left in the centre of the city as a species of barbarian invasion--'les 
apaches venus de la banlieu'. This must be borne in mind if we are to understand the 
quasi-militarization of bourgeois districts by the Croix de Feu and PSF. 
7 The conservative vote in the 4th rose from 25% in 1932 to 36% in 1936. The right wing vote in the northern part 
of the 7th arrondissment, on the other hand, is lower than it might otherwise have been. This is because the sitting 
Radical deputy Paul Richard was one of only three radical parliamentarians to openly oppose the Popular Pronto 
8 Pmol, Espace socia/e, pp. 125-52. I also carried out an analysis of changes over time in the conselVative vote. 
but this revealed little of interest. Right wing support was being slowly eroded in its old ba~tions of the Peninsula 
and 5th arrondissement, and increa~ing in the newer quarters on the left bank of the Rhone. This was essentially a 
function of a decline in social segregation within the commune of Lyon, as proletarian suburbs expanded. 
9 Indeed. the commune was all but cut off from Lyon by the inadequacy of public transport. 
10 Videlier. op. cit. passim; Pierre Leon's study of bequests shows that in the context of a modest improvement in 
the wealth of society as a whole, the gap between rich and poor steadily increased until 1914. Qualitative evidence 
suggests that the same trend continued into the 1930s. Geographie des/ortunes et des structures sociuies Ii Lyon 
au XlXe siecle (1815-1914). Lyon. 1969. 
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But the fact of polarization must be qualified in two ways. First, within the 
commune of Lyon there were significant areas which were socially unsegregated. 
This helps to explain the historical strength of Radicalism in the city, symbolized by 
the long occupation of the Mayoralty by Edouard Herriot. It was the aim of all con-
servative movements to incorporate this social and political middle ground. 
Second, the homogeneity of bourgeois districts should not be exaggerated. In 
the interwar years much was made of a cultural and political opposition between the 
peninsula and the Brotteaux. Jean Dufourt's satirical novel Calixte tells the story of 
the efforts of a young Parisian, Philippe Lavrignais, to penetrate the salons of the Ly-
onnais elites. In the first chapter Dufourt opposes Ainay, 'un dedale de ruelles et de 
petites places de bien pauvre mine', with the rectangular pattern of 'larges avenues 
plantees d'arbres, de coquets hotels particuliers, de riantes squares'll of the left 
bank. 12 For some contemporaries this contrast symbolized the triumph of progressive 
capitalism over the obscurantism of the old bourgeoisie. Philippe's mentor, the 
eponymous hero of the novel, allows that many of the best families live in the Brot-
teaux, 'Mais je ne vous cacherai pas qu'elle y est plus melee qu'a Ainay, que les 
moeurs sont moins pures et qu'eUe a une tendance facheuse a s'ecarter des tradi-
tions'.13 In a similar vein a Parisian journalist wrote in 1929 that 'les Brotteaux se 
sont dresses en face de la presquile, l'unite, c'est un peu disloque'.14 
These observers were not entirely mistaken. In the last decades of the previous 
century there had been an exodus of wealthy bourgeois, reputedly the younger and 
more dynamic, from the presquile towards the newly urbanized Brotteaux. 15 In 1936 
the Brotteaux remained the preferred residence of industrialists, engineers and senior 
managers. The old bourgeoisie of rentiers, traders and merchant manufacturers, were 
more likely to be found in the older quarters of the centre. 16 Here they rubbed shoul-
ders with what remained of nobility. This is shown by Map 4.4, which plots the places 
of residence of the 128 noble households listed in the 1936 edition of the Annuaire 
Tout-Lyon. Over half of aristocratic families still lived in their traditional quartier 
between Place Bellecour and Ainay.17 Certain of the western suburbs, 
11 The use of the English 'squares' is a reference to the Anglophilia of the liberal elites of the Brotteaux. 
12 Dufourt, op. cit., pp. 19-22. Note, however, that the pattern of streets in the peninsula is hardly less rectangu-
lar-having been redeveloped by prefect Vaisse during the Second Empire. But its architecture was on a consid-
erably smaller scale than that of the Brotteaux. 
13 DufOUr!, op. cit., pp. 19-22. 
14 Demaison. op. cit, passim. 
15 I-L Pinol, 'Mobilites et immobilismes d'une grande ville: Lyon de la fin du XIX' siecle k la seconde guerre 
mondiale', doctorat es lettres, Lyon II, 1989, p. 184. 
16 Pinol, Espace sociale, pp. 80-84. 
17 A considerable majority still lived in the 2nd arrondissement (57·0%). The remainder were found mainly in the 
SIXth (23-44%) and Fifth (8·57%). 
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Map 4.4 
Residence of nobles in central Lyon 
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especially Ecully and Tassin la Demi-Lune possessed the same social mix as the 2nd 
arrondissement 
There was also a cultural division between the two districts. Practising 
Catholics were more numerous in the 2nd arrondissement, whilst there was a certain 
Protestant presence in the 6th. The 2nd arrondissement was the site of institutions like 
the Faculte catholique, while the left bank was home to the University and the Pre-
fecture. We shall see that the 6th was the only part of Lyon in which the lay centre 
right was well organized. 
There is evidence that by the 1930s this opposition was becoming blurred. 
Map 4.4 suggests that some nobles had moved to the Brotteaux, where a significant 
minority were clustered along the Quai de Serbie and around Place Morand. 18 This 
squares with Jean-Luc Pinol's finding that the geography and sociology of elite cer-
des was less contrasted in 1936 than it had been thirty years previously. From 1919 
one such body, the Cercle de runion, gathered together an upper bourgeoisie united 
by fear of social upheaval. J-L. Pinol's 'index of dissimilarity' also shows a declining 
difference between the bourgeois parts of the 2nd and 6th. 19 In the mid-1930s the 
Croix de Feu and PSF did indeed transcend the Brotteaux-Presqu'fle opposition, the 
first party of any importance to do so. All the same, we shall see that the 2nd-6th 
cleavage remained essential to understanding fractures in the ruling class. 
The diversity of elites in the Rhone becomes still more apparent when medium 
sized industrial towns are considered. Apart from monopolization of the dyeing in-
dustry by the Gillet group, local businessmen with slowly accumulated capital re-
mained dominant.20 None of the cotton towns of the Beaujolais possessed close links 
with Lyon. Perhaps the best example of the existence of an island of autonomous de-
velopment is the town of Cours, which possessed a remarkably distinct economic, so-
cial and political Hfe. The cotton merchants of Villefranche were part of a circuit that 
included Alsatian weavers and local dyers, while the metallurgical industry of the 
sub-prefecture was dependent upon the vine. The only exception to this pattern is 
Givors: its concentration of semi-skilled metal workers formed in effect a part of the 
grand banlieu of Lyon. 
From Merchant-manufacturing to Monopoly Capitalism 
The only available means of summarising changes in the economy is census data on 
the active population. Unfortunately, thanks to falsification of censuses in Lyon, this 
18 It may also be significant that one noble resident of Quai Serbie was a Protestant 
19 Before 1914 the Cercle de Commerce. dominated by anti·clerical new rich. recruited mainly in the Brotteaux. It 
contrasted with the aristocratic Cercle de Lyon and the old bourgeois Cercle de Divan. which was implanted 
mamly in the 2nd. A fourth cercle. the Jockey Club. occur,ied a median position. The latter three combined in the 
Cercle de rUnion after the war. Pinol. Mobilites et imnwb.lismes. pp. 239·64. and p. 408 for index of dissimilarity. 
20 Cayez, op.cit.. p. 353 notes for the nineteenth century the limits of Lyonnais influence over smaller towns. This 
sltoahon had not fundamentally changed in the 1920s. although silk weaving retained a significant position in the 
economy of the Monts du Beaujolais. and the Gillets were to establish control over the most important dyeing and 
finishing concerns of Villefranche, Tarare and Thizy. 
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information is not reli able. Graph 3 compares the s ituation in 1906, the year of the 
last re liable cen us, w ith that of 1936. In the latter year a suspic ious Sfafisliqlle 
generate purged a considerable number of duplicate and parti all y com pleted forms. 
Jean-Luc Pinol concludes that the resulti ng fig ures overestimate the traditional 
branches of the economy, especia lly the s il k ind ustry.21 But the resul ts are certain ly 
an improvement on earlier years. 
Gra ph 3: The Acti ve Population in th e Rhone, 1906 
and 1936 
aD 
15 
Pe r c ent 
The tendency is clear. New sectors such as meta l working and chemica ls expa nded , 
dragg ing the building industry in the ir wa ke. Textiles and cons umpti on industries 
(such as wood, c lothing, lea ther), declined in both relati ve and abso lute tcrms.22 Nev-
erthe less, ne ither the advances of 'secteurs de pointe' nor the overesti ma ti on of the 
traditional sectors should obscure the weight of the old economy. For example the 
garment industry provided a living fo r over 33,000 persons in 1936. 
The dua lism in the economy also e merges from Tabl e 2, which compares the 
level of concentrati on in selected sectors in 1906 and 1936. Drawn fro m the same 
source as the previous ta ble, it is necessary to interpre t these figures w ith similar ca u-
tion. In add ition, it must be borne in mind that the grow ing tendency for ind ustri a li s ts 
to own a series of fac tories leads to an underestimati on of the degree of concentration. 
Neverthe less, a ll those sec tors li sted experienced some increase in the rati o of workers 
to bosses. Even in the least concentrated sector, the food industry, the num ber of fir ms 
empl oying more than 100 workers increased. On the other hand, in a ll but the capital 
21 Pina l, M obi/ites et immobi/ismes, pp. 287, 293-96. My own comparison wi th survey of s ilk loo rn s available to 
the fabrique in 1935 suggests an overestimation in the census of about o ne th ird. In the metallu rgi cal industry a 
greater fig ure in the census is due to calcu lation of patronal statistics on the bas is o f fu ll lime equivalen ts, rather 
than individua ls. 
22 This is conlinned by J-L. Pino l's ligures, which show Ih al in Lyon Ihe numhe r of electors occlI)1lCd in older ar-
ItsanaJ trades suc h as shoemaking and carpentry had fa llen considerably in percent age terms s ince the late nine-
teenth cen tury, although the rate of faJl had declined bel ween the wars (Moui/i!tfs et i/lIlIlOui/isfIles, p. 451i). 
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intensive chemical industry the dispersal of production in 1936 is striking, especially 
in the food, clothing, leather and building trades. In Lyon the proportion of small 
shopkeepers in the electorate actually grew from 1921 to 1936.23 Even in the textile 
and engineering industries there are only ten or eleven workers per patron. There were 
few very large plant--16 in 1906, twice as many thirty years later. ~ch more 
common were establishments with 21 to 500 workers, the great majority of these, no 
doubt, were family fIrms. 
Table 2. Concentration of production in the Rhone25 
1906 1936 
Branch a b c d a b c d 
Food 31 7 
-
2.1 45 16 - 2.6 
Textiles 219 74 7 6.3 238 68 7 to.1 
Clothing 102 8 - 2.2 139 23 1 3.9 
Leather 19 7 1 4.2 25 1 2 5.9 
Building 51 2 - 4.2 84 10 2 5.8 
Metal 89 22 2 7.0 199 43 8 11.4 
Chemicals 32 9 3 36.4 40 18 3 52.0 
In the Rhone, then, the industrial growth of the 1920s led, with some signifi-
cant exceptions, to a slow and uneven elimination of small production and to an in-
crease in the relative importance of sectors such as engineering and chemicals. 26 In 
the following sections these changes will be examined in more detail. 
The Soierie: Relative Decline and Restructuring 
At its apogee in the 1860s the fabrique had employed nearly half of all workers in 
Lyon and possessed some 120,000 looms in the region.27 At the end of the 1920s not 
only had the silk industry declined in relative importance within Lyon, but production 
in the United States dwarfed that of France.28 Yet on the eve of the Depression, silk 
production still accounted for 11 % of the value of French exports. It employed an es-
timated 100,000 workers in twelve departments. And although the number of looms 
23 Pinol, Mobilires el imnwbilismes, p. 456. 
24 The rest were either commercial enterprises or glassworks. 
25 a = 21-100, b = 101-500, c = >501 workers, d = number of workers for each boss. 
26 In the past two decades historians have modified the pessimistic accounts of economic performance that were 
produced In the 1950s, placing considerable emphasis on the 1920s. This view is summarized by F. Caron, op. cit., 
passim. But as Tom Kemp has pointed out this does not dispose of the problem of the dualism in the French econ-
omy (T. Kemp, 'French Economic Performance: Some New Views Critically Examined', EHQ, vol 15, 1895, pp. 
473-88). 
27 Yves Lequin, Les ouvriers de la region Iyonnais (1848-1914), Paris, 1972. 
28 A. Isaac, 'Les cahiers de l'industrie fran<;:aise. La soie', Revue des Deux Mondes, 1930, pp. 89-106: The USA 
consumed 80% of world raw silk production; France one fifth of the American figure. 
Urban society in the RhOne 65 
had fallen to something like 49-50,000 by 1931, productivity was very much higher 
than in 1914.29 
What these figures do not show is a complex internal restructuring. Between 
the wars the industry was characterized by an intricate mixture of traditional and ad-
vanced technologies, of artisan and factory production, and of industrial and pre-in-
dustrial modes of production. 
Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin have argued that the silk industry repre-
sented an early example of 'flexible production', a viable alternative to the mass pro-
duction model, which was destroyed only by the misguided rationalizing efforts of big 
firms such as Rhone-Poulenc in the 1960s.30 It is true that the soierie owed its success 
to its flexibility. But the industry was characterized by intense competition and con-
flict, all the more relevant to the present study because it involved not only exploita-
tion of labour by capital, but also of artisan by merchant, and even of capitalist by 
capitalist. 
In 1928 278 out of 399 (70%) members of the Syndicat des fabricants de 
soieries (SFS), and an unknown number of un syndicated fabricants, possessed no 
factories of their own)1 An apparently anachronistic merchant-manufacturing system 
survived partly because its flexibility allowed the industry to adapt to the changing 
patterns of demand and constant fluctuations inherent in the market for luxury goods. 
The fabricant was able to have his cloth woven and dyed by sub-contracters 
(jaronniers), each with their own secret. giving the fabricant an enormous choice of 
threads, weaves, dyes and finishes, and the ability to switch rapidly from one type of 
production to another.32 Another advantage was that with no fixed capital of their 
own, fabricants were able to avoid some of the consequences of frequent economic 
downturns by passing them on to far;onniers. Forced by shortage of work to accept 
contracts at lower prices, it was the weavers who paid the price of recession. 33 
By the 19205 many faronniers bore little resemblance to the canuts of the pre-
vious century. Dyeing was monopolized by the multinational Gillet group, which 
nevertheless continued to work afar;on. Weavers too were often important businesses 
29 This includes all branches of the industry. See A. Isaac, op. cit.. His figures for looms are inconsistent: first he 
gives a figure of 49-50,000, then a few pages further on speaks of 52,600 looms in the region. It may be that the 
first figure takes into account the non-employment of a certain number of looms. 
30 C. Sabel and 1. Zeitlin, 'Historical Alternatives to Mass Production: Politics, Markets and Technology in Nine-
teenth Century Industrialization', Past and Present, No. 108, 1985. pp. 173-76. Their views owe much to the opti-
mistic assessments of certain interested contemporaries: a Christian trade unionist spoke of a system 'tout entier 
fonde sur les principes de liberte et de devoir qui sont les seules bases solides sur lesquelles doit s' edifier la paix 
sociale' (La VoixSociale,IO-5-1925). 
31 Compte Rendu Annuel des Travaux du Syndicat des Fabricants de Soieries de Lyon, (hereafter CRSFS) 1928. 
Many thanks to Madame Rieu of the Syndicat Textile du Sud-est who supplied me with copies of these documents. 
The number of merchants who were not members of the syndicate in 1928 is unknown. In 1935280 out of 600 
fahricants were members. 
32 M.Laferrere, op. cit., p. 96; Isaac, op. cit., p. 104. 
33 H. Bertrand, Soierie Lyonnaise. Chardonne et Soie Ordinaire. Evolutions Rkentes; SilUaJion Actuelle, Lyon, 
1930" pp. 80-81. 
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in their own right. The Syndicat des tisseurs mechanique itfar;on grouped 206 firms in 
the region in 1928. In 1935 these gros far;onniers possessed on average 80 100ms.34 
In the previous century it had seemed that artisan weavers might disappear 
along with their hand 100ms.35 Yet during the 1920s home weaving flourished. Aver-
age factory size, having grown before 1914, began to fall. This was made possible by 
rural electrification and by the inexpensiveness of converting handlooms. Apart from 
the advantages outlined above, home weaving now had the added attraction of es-
caping the Eight Hour Law of 1919.36 Not only therefore did traditional merchant 
manufacturers survive, but many of those fabricants who owned their own factories, 
especially those with less capital resources, put jobs out to smallfar;onniers.37 In 1936 
one in five of all looms in the Rhone were operated by home weavers. They were lo-
cated in the Croix Rousse, the Brotteaux, the Charpennes quarter of Villeurbanne, but 
above all in rural communes in the Monts du Beaujolais, especially the canton of 
Tarare, as well as in neighbouring departments.38 
The second wind of merchant-manufacturing coincided with industrialization 
of the silk industry, and the emergence of a closely integrated elite of spinners, throw-
ers, dyers and weavers, who came together in the production of artificial fibres. 
Mechanization of weaving from the last quarter of the nineteenth century39 was asso-
ciated with a certain democratization of silk products due to use of cheaper Asian raw 
silk and mechanized dyeing.40 Democratization was pushed a stage further by the use 
of artificial fibres to replaced cotton and wool in less expensive cloths from the early 
1900s.41 Use of rayon rose dramatically in the interwar years from 0.9m kgs in 1922 
to 7m in 1928, a year in which 6m kgs of natural silk were used by the fabrique. More 
and more the industry concentrated on a relatively narrow range of Chinese crepes, 
which led to extreme competition and to anxiety about the future of luxury cloths.42 
Industrialization and standardization led to the appearance of both the gros 
far;onnier and the fabricant-usinier. The latter accounted for 50% of looms in 1905. In 
1928 they made up 30% of the membership of the SFS, and possessed an average of 
34 Figures for the number of workers vary from 20,000 (Nouvellisle 24-5-28) to 27,000 (Nouvellisle 21-3-31). A 
more reliable sUIVey in CRCCL, 1935, p. 148, gives a figure of 15,157 looms--45% of those available to the 
fabrique 
42 M-L. Bourgeon, 'Repartition des metiers de Tissage de la Soie au SeIVice de la Fabrique Lyonnaise en 1937-8', 
ER 1938, pp.215-34, cit., p. 216. 
36 Laferrere, op. cit., pp. 180-1. H. Bertrand, op. cit., p. 46. Albout, op.cit., passim. 
37. Isaac, op. cit., p. 100: he added, 'Aujourd'hui la rationalisation technique a fait dispaTaltre Ie charme de ce tra-
vrulen famille. Chaque operation est fait dans un atelier separe, et Ie peu qui subsiste du tissage k domicile, grace k 
la diffusion du force electrique, imite Ie division du travail pratique dans les usines'. 
38 Bourgeon, op.cit., p. 232. In Lyon and Villeurbanne there were 3,963 looms in factories and 1,148 at home. 
There were 2,409 home looms in the Rhone. See also C. Albout, 'Demographie et industrialisation d'une region 
rurale de la fin du XVIIIe siecle k nos jours: Ie canton de Tarare', memoire de maftrise, Lyon II, 1970; Guiot, 
OP·Clt., passim. M. Bonneville, op. cit., pp. 48-9. 
39 Lequin, op.cit. pp. 76-85. Bourgeon, op. cit., p. 229; Laferrcre, op.cit p. 177-8; Isaac, op. cit., p. 92. Automatic 
looms represented less than 5% of the total in 1873,72% in 1914,90% in 1931 and 97% in 1936. 
40 Isaac, op. cit., p. 89. 
41 Pmton, 'La Soie Artificiclle k Lyon', ER vol 6, 1930, pp. 242-3; Isaac, op. cit., pp. 95-7. In 1931 rayon cost 
about 20% less than cotton. 
42 CRCCL, 1929, report of the marchand de soie, Cotte; Bertrand, op. cit., passim. 
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181 looms in 1936--considerably more than the gros jar;onniers. Pubricant 
usiniers were more likely to be limited liability companies than were those without 
fixed capital.44 
Average figures, however, conceal the appearance of an elite of very large 
weavers. In velvet weaving a monopoly emerged in 1924 when four firms were feder-
ated in the Manufacture de Velours et Peluches. Genuine monopolies were rare, but 
many owned a series of specialist concerns. Bianchini-Ferier, for example, set up its 
own retail outlet in Paris in 1898, and in 1910 and 1925 absorbed dyeing and finish-
ing factories at Tournon and Villeurbanne respectively.45 Large weavers were also in-
volved in other branches of the industry. Henry Bertrand participated in the Compag-
nie Generale de Soies de France et d1ndochine, which operated spinning concerns in 
Pnom Penh and the metropolis, and was also involved in the artificial textile indus-
try.46 
Concentration and monopoly was also a feature of dyeing, for the new method 
of roller dyeing was a capital intensive process. In the 1920s dying was dominated by 
the factories of the Gillet family--2,200 workers were employed at their rue Fla-
chet factory in Villeurbanne alone. Gillet reinforced its position through a series of 
take-overs.47 On the eve of the depression the Gillet's headed a powerful group. Fil-
ials had been set up abroad. Members of the family sat on the boards of powerful con-
cerns such as Rhone-Poulenc, Kuhlmann and Credit Lyonnais. Edmond Gillet was a 
regent of the Bank of France.48 
The third component of the big business interest in the silk industry consisted 
of importers, spinners and throwers of raw silk--usually known as marchands de 
soie. Even before the rise of 'artificial silk' this branch of the Jabrique had been 
dominated by a few rich merchants.49 Only those with considerable resources could 
import from the Far East Marchands de soie had traditionally served as bankers to 
jabricants, so they were closely linked to financial circles. In the 1920s they were 
able to corner the market in the high torsion threads used for producing staple Chinese 
crepes.50 
Marchands de soie, dyers and big weavers came together in the artificial silk 
industry. Here too the Gillet family played an important role, having taken the lead in 
the creation of the Comptoir des Textiles Artificiels in 1911. Foreign investors such 
as Courtaulds put up finance, but Lyonnais capital was of equal importance. Thus the 
43 CRCCL. 1935 p.148. 
44 CRSFS. 1928: 36% of fabricants-usiniers. 11% of non-usiniers. The latter figure would be much lower if non-
syndiqU/!s were taken into account 
45 Laferrere. op. cit .• p. 187. 
46 Laferrere. op. cit., p. 205. 
47 Bonneville. op.cit .• pp.l7.51; Laferrere. op.cit., p. 210-212. 226 
48 M.Peyronnet, op. cit .• pp. 108-9. 
49 Pinton. op. cit. there were 107 members of the Union des Marchands de soie in 1920. 
50 Bertrand. op. cit. pp. 55-9; Peyronnet, op. cit., pp. 201-8. 
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marchand de soie Morel-Journel and the fabricant-usinier Henry Bertrand were in-
volved in the Societe Lyonnais de Soie Artificial. 51 A number of large artificial textile 
factories were set up in suburban communes during the middle and late 1920s. The 
biggest was SASE at Vaulx en Velin, which employed 3,000 workers before the eco-
nomic crisis.52 
In the nineteenth century conflict within the silk industry had been relatively 
simple. Merchants had faced masters and journeymen. In the twentieth century, mat-
ters were rather more complex. At this stage it is necessary only to indicate three po-
tential sources of friction. 
1. The historic battle of fa{;onniers for a minimum price (tariff) continued. It was, 
however, complicated by the fact that gros far;onniers tended to blame the indisci-
pline and the competition of 'privileged' home weavers for driving down prices. They 
therefore demanded extension of social legislation to home weavers.53 
2. Large factory-owning weavers who had invested heavily in capital equipment in 
the hope of taking advantage of an expanding market, joined with gros far;onniers in 
denouncing the unfair competition of home weavers, and in demanding an end to their 
exemption from hours legislation. 54 They were backed by the large dyers and 
marc hands de soie with whom they were associated. 
3. Merchant-capitalists, along with those medium factory owners who also took ad-
vantage of the cheapness of home weaving, viewed such attacks on the artisan ate as a 
threat to their own existence. They idealized the artisanate and attacked 'American 
methods', whilst redoubling their exploitation of home weavers. In fact traditionalist 
rhetoric obscured the fact that not all home weavers produced luxury goods. Many 
produced low quality cloths for the eastern markets, and were able to compete with 
the Japanese only by avoiding social costs. Just because merchant-manufacturing was 
an older mode of production did not mean that it was less efficient. 
In the 1920s prosperity dulled the edge of conflict. During the war the silk in-
dustry had survived reasonably well, left to its own devices by the government From 
1919 new markets, especially in Brazil and Argentina, permitted expansion. 55 In spite 
of downturns in 1920-1 and 1924, the general trend was upwards until the end of 
1928. In that year it was reported to the Chamber of Commerce that 'business could 
not be better; all looms are working, all mills are turning. No unemployment ... '. The 
51 Pinton, op.cit., p. 237: 'The present tendency, as visible in Lyon as it is elsewhere, is pushing this industry to-
ward concentration under the more or less narrow surveillance of the Comptoir des Textiles Artificiels'. This cartel 
was in turn dominated by Gillet, which possessed interests in almost all the new enterprises. 
52 A. Pinton, op. cit.,; 1. Perret, 'Dans la banlieu industrie11e de Lyon: Vaulx en Vel in: ER, vol 8, 1937, pp. 24-33. 
Laferrere, op. cit., pp. 210-12; Bonneville, op. cit., pp.17, 51. 
53 Nouvelliste, 25-5-1928, Even in periods of prosperity, competition among f~onniers tended to result in the 
degradation of prices. 
54 Small weavers were also accused of luring away the best workers with the promise of overtime and high wages. 
PVCCL,7-2-1929. 
55 S. Garcin, 'La fabJique lyonnais de soieJies, 1900 A 1929', memoire de maltrise, Lyon n, 1969. 
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only complaint was a shortage of labour.56 But as far as equilibrium between produc-
tion and consumption was concerned, the fate of the soierie was in the hands of 
Japanese producers ofraw silk and American weavers. 57 
Cotton: backwardness and decline 
Cotton had been carded, spun and woven in the Monts du Beaujolais since the eigh-
teenth century. 58 Tarare specialized in the manufacture of muslins and heavier curtain 
and furnishing materials. These were embroidered by rural labour. Amplepuis pro-
duced cheap cotton cloths. 59 In Thizy dyeing and finishing employed the majority of 
the 5,000 cotton workers. Further north in Cours blankets were the speciality.60 fi-
nally, spinning, weaving and especially dyeing employed several hundred workers in 
Villefranche.61 
In many respects the structure of the cotton industry resembled that of the 
soierie. There was a strong movement towards concentration and monopoly in dyeing 
and finishing. In Ville franc he total concentration of the dyeing industry had been 
achieved by 1919.62 In the late 1920s the Alsatian Thaon group absorbed the dyers of 
Roanne, Thizy and Villefranche. Thaon was absorbed by the Gillets in 1935.63 Cours 
blanket producers monopolized the home market. 
But more often weaving was an affair of medium to large self-financing fam-
ily firms. In Tarare most firms had from eighty to 300 looms.64 And as in the silk in-
dustry home weaving had been reviving since the turn of the century as factory own-
ers sought to escape regulation and trades unions.65 The Beaujolais cotton industry 
was also marked by technological backwardness.66 Whereas in the Vosges one 
worker could operate as many as twenty-four looms, in the Rhone control of twelve 
was exceptional, and eight the rule.67 In Tarare, five sixths of motive power still came 
from steam in 1926.68 The survival of the industry depended on isolation in the safe 
56 CRCCL, 1928, p. 625. 
57 Garcin, op.cit., passim.; G.Christiane, 'La fabrique Iyonnais de soieries et la Grande depression, 1929 A 1934', 
memoire de mal/rise, Lyon II, 1969. 
58 For the history of the cotton industry in the Beaujolais see Garrier, op.cit., pp. 202·5; Albout, op.cit., passim; H. 
Velu, 'Villcfranche en Beaujolais', ER, vol XIV, 1938, pp.46-71; J.-P.Payant, 'Etude Demographique d'une cel-
lule industrielle en Haut Beaujolais: Thizy et Bourg-de-Thizy de 1836 11 Nos Jours', memoire de mal/rise, Lyon II, 
1974; J.-P. Houssel, op. cit, passim. . 
59 H. Bordas, 'Tarare', in Annales de Geographie, vol. 33, 1930, pp. 40-49: In 1923 there were in Tarare 96 cotton 
rums, employing 2,908 workers. There were also 76 silk establishments with 1,642 workers and a further 67 firms 
mvolved in lace making and embroidery. See also, Albout, op.cit, passim. and p. 61. 
60 Nouveau Journal, 3-1-1928. In Thizy in 1928 1,450 looms produced 6 million metres of cloth annually. 
61 Velu, op.cit., p. 51: 1,420 workers were employed in the largest enterprise in 1930. 
62 Velu, op.cit., p. 51 ff. 
63 Laferrere, op.cit., pp. 225-6 and note 286. 
64 Self-financing family firms prosper in textiles because it is possible to accumulate relatively inexpensive looms 
a few at a time. 
65 Houssel, op. cit., p. 147-8; Bordas, op. cit., passim. 48; A. Albitreccia, 'L'industrie du coton', Annales de gee). 
graphie, 1933, pp. 233-47. In the 1920s many /UI;onniers worked for both silk and cotton industries. 
66 Lequin, op.cit, pp. 93-5. This had been apparent before the Great War. 
67 La VOU: Socia/e, July/August, 1930. 
68 Bordas, op. cit., pp. 47-48 concludes 'A vrai dire,l'industrie du coton pur manifeste une certaine paresse et vit 
sur sa reputation '. 
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home and colonial markets.69 This was just the kind of industry attacked by neo-cap-
italists in the 1920s. In the use of rural looms and in fear of mass production, cotton 
weavers resembled medium weavers of silk. 
Consumption industries 
Thanks to the paucity of sources, it is not possible to say much about the 
'consumption' industries except that by the 1920s a number of large enterprises had 
emerged from the sea of small business and artisans. In the food industry brewing, 
food pastes and milling all experienced concentration.70 Clothing was dominated by 
small workshops and home-working, especially on the slopes of the Croix Rousse, the 
Brotteaux, Charpennes, Villefranche and Thizy. But there were some large concerns, 
notably Guicher & Coste, with 1,000 employees in Villeurbanne.71 In the leather 
trade the Tanneries Lyonnais at Oullins stood out from the mass. At the other end of 
the leather industry, the number of cobblers declined as mass-produced men's shoes 
with rubber sales, often of Czech provenance, penetrated the market. The female 
footwear industry, on the other hand, retained many features of the luxury in-
dustries.72 None of these branches were particularly dynamic; all produced largely for 
the protected home market 
The only real exception was the construction industry. Here too there was a 
mass of independent flrms. But building was increasingly dominated by large flrms 
working on important public works, such as the erection of a new headquarters for the 
PIT, redevelopment of the Gare de Perrache, and the construction of a new port at La 
Guillotiere.73 Building depended, as always, on general prosperity. 
The Chemical Industry 
In the interwar years the Lyon region was the principal centre of the French chemical 
industry, the most concentrated and capital intensive of all activities. It was centred 
on the commune of St. Fans. It provided raw materials for artificial textiles, 
colourants, fertilisers and the pharmaceuticals produced by Rhone-Poulenc. The lat-
ter, created by fusion of the Usines du Rhone with Poulenc Freres in 1928 was one of 
the largest companies in France. 
At its origins the chemical industry had been closely linked to the soierie. The 
Societe Coignet, for example, began by making gelatines for use in the flnishing of 
textiles. Later the wastes from this process were used to produce phosphates for 
69 Albitreccia, op. cit. p. 237: 75% of French cotton was consumed at home, 18% by the colonies, and only 7% 
by the foreign market. 
70 CRCCL. 1928; Velu, op.cit., p. 61; ADR 4m 235, 1-2-1929: the opening of the giant Chambeyron mill at Vaise 
was considered significant enough to be mentioned in a monthly police report. 
71 Bonneville, op.cit., p. 55. 
72 CRCCL, 1928. p. 714; Bonneville, op. cit., p. 18. 
73 CRCCL, 1928, p. 701. 
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matches and fertilisers. 74 The Gillet group meanwhile expanded from dyeing to 
chemicals.15 In the course of the nineteenth century the chemical industry developed a 
momentum of its own, and was given further impetus by the development of organic 
chemicals for arms during the war.76 Like the metallurgical industry the chemical in-
dustry owed its position in the interwar economy to war production. Saint Gobain, for 
example, had joined the Usines du Rhone in the manufacture of poison gas.77 
Nevertheless, the link with the silk industry remained. Between the wars it 
was reinforced by production of artificial fibres. The Lumiere company branched out 
from photographic chemicals to participation in a the Societe Lyonnaise de Soie Arti-
ficielle.18 Acetate fibre was produced in Vaise from 1928 by the Societe Rhodiaceta, 
fruit of a collaboration between the inevitable Gillets and the Usines du Rhone. Once 
again we see the role played by artificial fibres in the development of monopoly cap-
ital in Lyon. 
Metallurgy 
Since the 1830s Lyon had produced ships, railway equipment and machines for the 
silk and chemical industries. Modem electrical and automobile industries had ap-
peared before 1914. But it was the war which imparted the decisive impetus. In 1919 
metallurgy employed 45,000 workers, compared to 25,000 at the outbreak of hostili-
ties. After 1918 re-conversion entailed a certain decline in the number of workers em-
ployed; the postwar maximum of 44,446 was reached in 1930.79 
Heavy metallurgy (gros metallurgie) was a minority activity. 80 Blast furnaces 
were found only in Givors, represented by Fives-Lille and Prenat, each employing 
about 500 workers. Production of semi-finished products (petite metallurgie) was con-
fined largely to Lyon. Among the largest were the Acieries du Rhone which produced 
milled steel, while Teste of Vaise made wire and cables. There were about thirty 
foundries in the Agglomeration, mainly of small and medium scale. 
Most important was the engineering branch (construction mecanique), which 
employed 71 % of all metal workers in the Rhone in 1929.81 It too was chiefly con-
fined to the Agglomeration. But engineering was also carried on in Villefranche. 82 
74 Lequin. op. cit.. pp. 100·2; Laferrere. op. cit.. pp. 426490. Similarly the 51. Gobain factories in the St. Fons had 
begun by making sulphuric acid for use in the dying industry. 
75 Laferrere. op.cit.. p. 472; P.Cayez. Progil article; Peyronnet. op.cit.. pp. 87ff. Its factory at Vaise. known since 
1919 as Progil. had passed from the making of chemicals for the dyeing industry to manufacture of agricultural 
products and bitumen. 
76 Research into aircraft varnishes benefitted the artificial fibre industry. Phenol production led to manufactuer of 
glycol. aspirin and later nylon at Usines du Rhone (Rhone-Poulenc). 
77 Laferrere. op.cit .• pp. 445-9; Peyronel, op.cit .• pp. 97-109; E. Herriol, Lyon Pendant la Guerre. passim. 
78 Lequin. op. cit., pp. 87-9; Laferrere, op. cit.. p. 192-3. 
79 FIgures from CRCCL; E. Fougere, L'Effort industriel de Lyon Pendant la Guerre, Lyon, 1919 
80 This survey of the metallurgical industry relies on an interview with Edmond Weitz in Lyon Republicain, 15-
12-1935. . 
81 Out of 46,318 workers, 12,400 worked in the car industry. 8,433 in general engineering, 8,629 in electricity, 
and the rest in related sectors. 
82 Velu, op. cit., passim: 500 workers at Bonnet produced equipment for the dyeing industry, while at Vermorel 
another 450 made agricultural machinery. 
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Engineering firms made a diverse range of products. Les Fils de Jules Weitz special-
ized in the making of construction equipment such as mechanical diggers. 83 
Car production was dominated by Marius Berliet. From 1906 BerHet began to 
out-distance his rivals, having understood the need for outside capital. Government 
orders for lorries and shells during the war led to rapid expansion. In 1917 came the 
construction of an enormous integrated factory at Venissieux, larger than that of 
Henry Ford in Detroit. Taylorization was rigorously applied in a factory which was 
the first in Europe to feature a moving assembly line. BerHet was forced to come to an 
arrangement with his creditors during the downturn of 1921. In the 1920s Berliet 
therefore lost ground, and was forced to abandon car manufacture in favour of heavy 
goods vehicles. All the same, Berliet had repaid his debts by 1929, and the firm re-
mained one of national importance, employing 11,000 workers at Venissieux in 
1930.84 Alongside Berliet a number of smaller car firms prospered, such as Rochet-
Schneider and Luc Court. 
The electrical equipment industry had also been boosted by the war. Les Ca-
bles de Lyon began by supplying the electricity generating industry and new tram 
companies in the 1900s. In a development typical of this capital intensive industry85 it 
was in 1912 absorbed by the Compagnie generale d'electricite (CGE). During the war 
it made telephone cables, and afterwards profited from rural electrifIcation. 86 The 
CGE also controlled the Ateliers de Construction Electriques de Delle, which had 
transferred from Belfort to VilIeurbanne in 1917.87 The Lyonnais Fran~ois Gram-
mont, head of a gigantic group involved in all aspects of electrical construction, man-
aged to conserve his independence for a. relatively long period, but in 1928 was 
bought out by the American Westinghouse Corporation. 88 Local capital was not, 
however, entirely absent. As in the motor industry there were a number of smaller 
firms such as Petrier Tissot & Raybaud, which made electric motors. 
Little is known of the structures of the metallurgical industry. But certain gen-
eral characteristics can be identified. Firstly, large firms which usually depended on 
national and international finance dominated the electrical industry. In other branches 
such large firms were rare, though Berliet stands out. There were also a number of 
large family firms such as Teste or Weitz, which although legally socieres anonymes, 
were dominated by a single family. 
83 Laferrere. 0r.cit.. pp. 281-2 and 300-1. Edmund Weitz survived the decline ofrailway production by transfer-
nng that side 0 his achvities to Hagondage in the Lorraine. 
84 Saint-Loup. Marius Berliet, /'inflexible. Paris. 1962; Laferrere, op. cit.. pp. 304-10 and 361-81; P. Vidclier. 
venissieux d'A a Z. Lyon. 1984. 
85 Laferrere. op cit.. pp.327-8. 
86 Lyon Republicain. 29-12-1935; Laferrere. op.cit .. pp. 314-7. 326. There were over 1,000 employees in 1930. 
87 Laferrere, op.cit.. pp.326. 
88 Laferrere, op.cit.. pp.319-21. 
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Second, the progress of metallurgy involved the proliferation of small and 
medium enterprises.89 In Villeurbanne large modern metallurgical factories were al-
most entirely absent: most of the 96 firms which feature on the 1930 industrial map of 
the Rhone were medium, small or artisanal concerns. Some produced specialized ma-
chine tools in relatively short series. Others worked as sub-contractors for large engi-
neering firms. Some were simply engaged in repair and maintenance. Total integra-
tion of large metallic construction factories was in fact rare.90 For example they were 
provided with semi-finished products by 80 foundries of which in 1935 24 out of 80 
employed less than ten workers. 91 
Thus in some respects the structures of the metallurgical industry were not 
dissimilar to those of the silk industry.92 Edmond Weitz, President of the metallurgy 
employers' association, spoke of founders in such terms: 'elles formaient avec les 
ateliers de construction dont elles sont les fournisseurs. un ensemble industriel har-
monieux, souple et equilibre qui permettait a la region lyonnaise de soutenir la repu-
tation de qualite de ses fabrications'.93 Weitz idealized the sub-contracting system. 
But in fact many small and even medium firms were in a position of dependence 
which Marc Bonneville likens to that of Jat;onniers in the silk industry. In the metal-
lurgical, as in the silk industry, there was a potential anti-capitalism even in quite 
large firms. 
From Liberalism to Corporatism 
In the above outline of changes in economic structures several potential sources of 
conflict have been indicated. There was the shift from merchant manufacturing, typi-
fied by the Jabrique but found also in certain other industries such as furniture, to in-
dustrial capitalism. Associated with this was the emergence of an elite of monopolis-
tic firms in electricity, vehicle production, weaving, dyeing and artificial fibres. 
Meanwhile family firms proliferated. Although sometimes quite large. such firms of-
ten nursed a dislike of those upon whom they were dependent. Artisans and small 
businesses were disappearing in some sectors, but progressed in others. 
These were changes of some significance, and were bound in some way or 
other to have had a political impact. But conflicts in business are impossible to com-
prehend without also taking into account politics, culture and ideology. Business in-
stitutions in the Rhone, and more particularly in Lyon. were dominated by the succes-
sors of Edouard Aynard, who remained more or less faithful to his version of liberal-
ism. Since the days of the Progressist deputy this elite been immeasurably strength-
89 Laferrere. op. cit., p.305. 
90 Bonneville. op.cit., pp. 57, 61; Pinol, op.cit.. pp. 101-2. 
91 PVCCL 14-2-1935; CRCCL. 1935. 
92 Bonneville. op.cit. p. 62 suggests that small metallurgists in Villeurbanne operated in conditions similar to 
those of tisseurs a laf0n. 
93 Lyon Republicain, 15-12-35; Bonneville, op. cit., p. 57. 
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ened by the economic changes symbolized by the new artificial fibre industry. Yet by 
the late 1920s this liberal hegemony was threatened firstly by a modernising and re-
formist challenge from the engineering industry, secondly by a degree of sympathy 
within the elite itself for those ideas, and thirdly by a reaction against neo-capitalism 
from sections of the silk and other industries. Before detailing these changes we will 
look at the relationship of the liberal and Catholic tradition to the silk industry. 
The Liberal-Catholic Tradition 
Whilst the liberal tradition was not a necessary or direct product of the silk industry, 
the fact remains that it was nourished by certain aspects of production for the interna-
tional luxury market. The combination of individualism and discretion can be at-
tributed to the rapid changes in fashions which dictated a constant search for new fab-
rics, as well as secrecy and rapidity in their design and execution. It could also lead to 
a stress on the individuality of the consumer, and indeed of Frenchmen in general. 
Hence the reluctance of many Jabricants to join employers' organizations. 
Reticence was especially characteristic of Jab ric ants non-usiniers. Many of them spe-
cialized in the most expensive goods, for which demand was least predictable. All 
feared that organization of fabricants would encourage the unity of Jar;onniers and the 
establishment of minimum tariffs. Factory owners often shared the same attitudes. In 
1925 Bianchini-Ferier bought a finishing concern in order to protect its creations from 
the prying eyes of rivals and to ensure that they would appear on the market as speed-
ily as possible.94 A commemorative booklet published on the death of Edmund Gillet 
reveals his guiding principle to be that 'unless there is formal proof to the contrary we 
have only ourselves to blame if all does not go weIl'.95 
Social mobility is the second element of Lyonnais liberalism. Setting up as an 
employer that section of the industry which required no fixed capital was relatively 
easy. Conversely, this meant that many Jabricants non-usiniers were at the head of 
marginal concerns which relied on far;onniers to make cloth quickly enough for them 
to sell before suppliers demanded payment.96 Insecurity was reflected in the fluctuat-
ing membership of the SFS, which rose from 372 in 1920 to 725 in 1929, and dropped 
back again to about 300 in 1937.97 This openness to talent reinforced an the notion of 
rule by a meritocracy founded on the work ethic, rather than birth.98 We shall see that 
it also helped to ensure the allegiance of many white collar workers to liberalism. 99 
94 Laferrere. op. cit .. p. 188: Etablissements Gamma of Villeurbanne. 
95. P: Gillet, Edmund Gillet 1873·1831.lndustriel. Regent de la Banque de France, Lyon. 1932, p. 2. For another 
USlmer Henry Bertrand, the guiding principle of lubricants had to be 'exclusiveness and discretion, in the interests 
of their town and their country'. Bertrand, op. cit., p. 187. 
96 Laferrere. op. cit., pp. 95, 97. 107. 
97 CRSFS~ 19~7; F. Geni, 'L'Organisation Professionnelle de la Fabrique Lyonnaise de Soieries: Etude Historique 
et Cnhque , these de droit. Grenoble, 1942, p.52; CRSFS, 1937. 
98 Hence Calixte's contemptuous dismissal of the nobility, Dufourt, op. cit., p. 125. 99 See page 89. 
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Another bulwark of the liberal tradition was in the dependence of the soierie 
upon foreign markets and raw materials. Sixty per cent of production was exported in 
1930, while French sericulture met only a fraction of raw material requirements. Al-
though in the 1890s Jabricants had been split on protectionism,loo and although in the 
1920s worries about Japanese competition were growing,101 these were exceptions to 
the free trade rule. The silk industry fought a tenacious but increasingly hopeless bat-
tle in defence of liberty of exchange. Allies in port towns and the wine trade were in-
sufficient to overcome the enormous weight of protectionist interests. Liberal princi-
ples did not prevent alliance with the state in the promotion of imperialism in the Far 
East, though the silk industry resisted the neo-mercantilism of cotton and metallur-
gical industries. 102 
Finally, the labour intensive nature of production explains distrust of social re-
form. Paternalism was not unknown in the silk industry. But it rarely went beyond the 
provision of company housing as a compensation for low wages. This scarcely con-
tradicted the orthodox view that the only means of improving the lot of the workers 
was to reduce production costs. 
Unable or unwilling to dip into their pockets, only ideology and religion re-
mained as remedies for working class discontent. The goal was to diffuse a model of 
behaviour rather than to disburse funds. Charity was designed for the edification of 
the humble. Calixte reproached his uncle for the sin of anonymous charity: 'pas meme 
ses initiales. Est-il concevable? Comment les gens seraient-ils edifies et suivraient-ils 
Son exemple?103 The austere face presented to the world by the Lyonnais bourgeoisie 
can be interpreted as part of the same desire to 'set an example'. 104 
The Catholicism of Lyonnais businessmen can be seen in the same light. A 
cult of the Virgin Mary, the specialty of the Lyonnais Church, taught dutiful resigna-
tion to the working class.105 John Laffey shows how in the capital of the Oeuvre du 
propagation de laJoi missionary ardour and economic utility went hand in hand in the 
promotion of imperialism. 106 But there is more to the Catholicism of elites in Lyon 
than manipulation. In a city which Edouard Aynard had described as 'a convent 
where it is permitted to make a fortune', liberalism and Catholicism met at a multi-
tude of points. The apparently irreconcilable could be reconciled either by the Nou-
100 Laferrere, op. cit., pp. 196-9. 
101 J. Laffey, 'Lyonnais Imperialism in the Far East, 1900-1938', Modern Asian SlUdies, vol. 10, 1970, pp. 225-
40. 
102 Laffey, op. cit., passim; J. Laffey, 'Roots of French Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century: the Case of Lyon', 
French Hislorical Studies, 1973. 
103 Dufourt op. cit., pp. 64-66. 
104 Calixte indicates to Philippe, 'avec une fierte incomprehensible ses bottines fatiguees, son pardessus cire et 
son pantalon frange'. Philippe nai'vely replies 'Ah! Calixte [oo.J vous etes un gros patron, tout Ie monde Ie sait; vous 
pouvez eire sale'. op cit., p. 119. 
105 K. Passmore, 'Une contre-mobilisation. La droite et l'extreme droite Iyonnaise', in P. Dujardin (ed.), La me-
moire edifiante. Gestes de memoire et idenlites collectives, forthcoming. 
106 Laffey, 'Imperialism 1900-1938', p. 231, quotes Auguste Isaac, for whom the mission civilisatrice meant ele-
vating the native to the status of 'one who understands the services rendered to him and is accustomed to pay for 
them'. 
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vel/iste's belief that the classical economists had merely discovered the laws through 
which God regulated the universe,107 or by an Aynardian separation of religious and 
economic life. But in either case Catholicism was essential to the self-definition of 
elites. Charity, according to Jean Dufourt, was partly a means of getting oneself 
known in the best society.108 This applied as much to liberal patronage of private 
schools as to the distribution of alms to working class women by integrists. The Ly-
onnais did not make a public show of their Catholicism. ID9 But it was one of the keys 
to social acceptance. In Calixte Philippe is taken to task for hiding himself behind a 
pillar at mass. I 10 Catholicism, as we have seen in the case of the countryside and will 
see again when white collar workers are examined, was also essential to the integra-
tion of a popular constituency. But religion was never merely a tool of the elites and 
could therefore be a source of disunity. 
It must stressed once more that there was nothing necessary about the Catholic 
liberalism of business elites. Indeed, there were zones of ambiguity. Individualism in 
the silk industry was limited by rules that were largely unspoken, while written con-
tracts were rare. 111 At least among wealthier fabricants a network of family ties pre-
served the industry from some of the worst effects of competition. In 1929 Andre 
Demaison wrote: 'a Lyon on ne compte pas seulement sur l'individu, trop vite periss-
able, mais sur la famille dont Ie nombre est ainsi garant de continuite, de duree 
prospere '.112 The family could be seen in liberal terms as a bulwark against state in-
tervention. But it could also feed into a form of corporate self-regulation--an alter-
native means of saving the soierie from 'socialism'. This helps to explain the appeal 
of the ALP and later Victor Perret's traditionalist Federation republicaine to elements 
of the silk industry, for corporatism could be justified in terms of the protection of 
initiative and individuality. 
Maintenance of the liberal-silk hegemony 
Liberalism was nevertheless bound up with the fortunes of the silk industry. It owed 
many of its features to the nature of merchant-manufacturing in a lUXUry industry. 
Liberal individualism was transmitted to factory producers and even to monopolists, 
107 Le Nouvelliste. 1-1-1932: 'Les lois qui tient les rapports constant et etablies par l'experience entre les dif-
ferents phenomenes economiques presentent un caractere providentiel. Trop longtemps meconnues, eUes ont pour 
but 11 la fois de sauvegarder la liberte que Dieu donna 11 I nomme comme Ie premier et Ie plus grand de ses priv-
ileges et, en meme temps. de Ie rappeler simultanement aux regles de la morale et de la sagesse humaine r.arce que 
taus les abus que celie liberte peut permettre sont immediatement signaies ou corriges par les maux qi'i1s entrai-
nent'. 
108 Dufourt, op. cit., p. 121: 'Interessez-vous a nos oeuvres charitables. Ce sera une excellente fa~n de vous faire 
connailre avantageusement'. 
109 Demaison. op. cit., p. 12: 'Meme la foi religieuse ne se manifeste qu'avec une discretion qui n'a d'egal que sa 
profondeur'. 
110 Dufour!, op. cit .• p. 121-2. 
111 Laferrere, op. cit .• p.llO. 
112 Uemaison, op. cit., passim .. 
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like the Gillets and the Morel-Journels, who reigned over business institutions in the 
interwar years. 
The purpose of this section is to explain how the hegemony of these big dyers, 
weavers, and marchands de soie survived the diversification of the economy. Con-
cluding a study of industrialization in Lyon before the First World War Yves Lequin, 
states that 'Lyon n'est plus la ville de la soie que pour les esprits mal informes'.I13 
Yet in the interwar years many Lyonnais persisted in their ignorance. Even Edmond 
Weitz, an implacable opponent of the soierie, was obliged to recognize in 1930 that it 
'remains the dominant industry of this city '.114 
One explanation is that big firms in the electrical industry played little part in 
business politics in the Rhone, for their headquarters were in Paris. The same applies 
to the larger chemical firms. By default this left local institutions to the silk industry. 
Furthermore, the silk industry retained considerable economic weight. The extent to 
which it filled the role of a leading sector was probably diminishing. But the chemical 
industry relied on the soierie to absorb production of colourants, while the artificial 
textile industry was a market for sulphuric acid. Engineers produced machines for the 
weaving and dyeing industries. I IS So those metallurgists who attributed the crisis of 
the 1930s to the downturn in the silk industry were not entirely mistaken. 1 16 The silk 
industry also enjoyed close relations with local banks. Edouard Aynard's Caisse des 
Depots, as well as the Guerin and Morin-Pons banks had emerged from thefabrique. 
Most important, the silk industry possessed an entrenched institutional posi-
tion. Local newspapers were sympathetic to it, while the leading figures in the princi-
pal conservative party, the Federation Republicaine, had traditionally been drawn 
from it. 117 For the moment, however, attention can be confined to domination of the 
Lyonnais employers' movement by the liberal-silk interest. 
Leadership of the weavers' association, the SFS, was monopolized by some of 
the wealthiest/abricant-usiniers. In 1928 eight out of nine members of its bureau can 
be identified, of whom seven were factory owners. Non-usiniers were in a majority in 
the union, but were individualistic, lacked the resources to impose their will, and were 
in any case satisfied by the federal structure ofthe SFS.118 
The SFS was reputed to by contemporaries to pull the strings of business or-
ganizations in Lyon. One President of the Chamber of Commerce, the marchand de 
soie Henry Morel-Journel, rejected a government proposal on the grounds that 'c'est 
113 Lequin, op.cit., p. 203. 
114 PVCCL, 6-1-1930. 
1.15 According to Marc Bonneville before 1930 most engineering firms in Villeurbanne worked for the soierie, op 
CIt., p.15. 
116 Lyon Republicain, 15-12-1935. 
117 Nouveau Journal: 'Ce journal s'est assez souvent fait I'echo des reclamations de la soierie'. The same applies 
to Le Nouvel/iSle. 
118 Archives Juslin Godarl. (Hereafter AJG) carton I, Report of Daniel Isaac, 13-10-1935: the SFS was a 
'federation of unions. [ ... J composed of fifteen groups which in reality correspond to an almost equivalent number 
of very different commerces and industries '. 
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un principe a la Chambre de Commerce de Lyon de ne pas se mettre en opposition 
avec Ie Syndicat des fabric ants de soieries, en raison de l'importance de cette indus-
trie sur la place de Lyon et des repercussions que sa prosperite ou son marasme exerce 
sur la situation des autres branches de l'activite regionale'.119 The organization of the 
Chamber also shows a bias towards the silk industry. The Nouveau journal frankly 
admitted that 'the brutal application [of one vote per enterprise] would have had the 
effect of crushing industrialists under the mass of retailers'. 120 Instead, under a system 
of voting in four categories, eight out of twenty-three places went to the various 
branches of the silk industry. Four were allocated to the retail trade, four to whole-
salers and seven to other industries. The engineering industry was left with two of the 
seats in the category 'industries diverses'. In the elected bureau, where most decisions 
were made, thefabrique had a permanent majority. 
However, it was not the SFS that dominated. Indeed, certain of its leaders 
were of unorthodox opinion and on that count excluded from the leadership of the 
Chamber. Nofabricant was president from 1919 until 1937.121 Rather the authority of 
the relatively broad and prestigious SFS was cited in order to legitimate what in real-
ity was a very narrow elite of dyers, marchands de soie, bankers and thosefabricants 
who remained liberals. This elite depended for a majority on the chemical and con-
sumption industries, wholesalers and retailers. 
The alliance was held together by economic liberalism and opposition to in-
tervention and social reform. 122 This reminds us that even in the late 1920s liberalism 
remained a powerful integrating force. Five of the Chamber's six presidents since 
1890 had presided over the Societe d'economie politique, which was dedicated to the 
propagation of liberal principles. 123 Each of the non-silk categories, including the re-
tail trade, was represented by its most successful members, which again illustrates the 
role of social mobility and status in the diffusion of liberalism. 
For the liberal-silk elite control of the Chamber of Commerce was an enor-
mous asset. The Chamber gained legitimacy from its election by all patentes and its 
mission of representing the general economic interest of the region to the government. 
In practice this allowed the elite to merge its own interests with those of industry as a 
whole, and indeed with the general interest. The Chamber reinforced its claim to neu-
trality by observing the rule of unanimity in its public pronouncements. 124 For these 
119 PVCCL. 14-2-1935. On 10-1-1929. Louis Gueneau in a debate over the creation of a futures market in silk at 
Ly~n. stated 'puisque les fabricants de soieries ne sont pas prononces la Chambre ne peut pas aller contre leur 
deslr'. The President objected to such a naked expression of sectionalism. 
120 Le Nouvelliste. 26-3-1939. 
121 Until Paul Charbin took over as a result of the upheavals of the Popular Front. 
122 H. Morel-lournel, Noles sur la Clulmbre de Commerce de Lyon a [,Usage de ses Membres. Lyon. 1937. the 
Chamber of Commerce remained convinced that 'liberty is the soul of commerce'. and that 'the shackles of aU 
kmds that have been applied to trade. above all since the war of 1914 to 1918. [have notl modified its ideas on this 
question'. 
123 Morel-lournel. Notes. p. 27. 
124 PVCCL. 19-1-1934: President Antoine Celie reminded members that as 'arbiter of interests that are sometimes 
contradictory. our Chamber must not know division-unity is its strength'. 
Urban society in the RhOne 79 
reasons associations representing special interests attempted, not always successfully, 
to obtain the Chamber's endorsement of petitions to the government. 125 
The power of the Chamber was further enhanced by the Presidency of the 
Thirteenth Economic Region, which included amongst others the Chambers of Tarare 
and Villefranche. Both these bodies were dominated by conservative cotton manu-
facturers and wine merchants whose opinions generally matched those of their fellows 
in Lyon--free trade excepted. 1~lso, the Lyon Chamber was automatically 
granted a seat in the bureau of the Assembly of Presidents of Chambers of Commerce 
of France. This organization too was designed to circumvent the 'rule of number'. 127 
No other organization could seriously dispute the claims of the Chamber of 
Commerce of Lyon. The Union des Chambres Syndicales Patronales Lyonnaises 
(UCS) grouped 79 individual firms in 1928 and federated most of the large industrial 
and commercial interests. It claimed to be the organization that best 'brought together 
and synthesized' the views of the local patronat. 128 In reality its role was mainly re-
stricted to organization of elections--always uncontested--to corporate bodies, 
not least the Chamber of Commerce.129 The local organization of the COPF, the As-
sociationindustriel, Commerciale et Agricole (AICA), vegetated until June 1936.130 
In many ways the position of the business elite in Lyon was analogous to that 
of the USE. Both were Catholic and liberal, with a leaning towards the Progressists: 
two of the interwar Presidents of the Chamber of Commerce--Auguste Isaac and 
Jean Coignet--were prominent in the Federation republicaine, as Aynard had 
been. Continuity across the generations is illustrated by Isaac's sponsorship of Henry 
Morel-Journel, who became President in 1935. 131 Agricultural and business elites 
were both legitimated by control over 'democratically' elected corporate bodies. Both 
Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture, moreover, were key institutions in the sys-
tem of pressure group politics which grew up after the war. Finally, business leaders 
cultivated links with centrist deputies such as the right wing Radical Paul Massimi. 
Henry Morel-Journel was on good terms with Mayor Herriot, even though he thought 
little of his politics. John Laffey has shown the Chamber's imperial interests were 
furthered by contacts with civil servants. 
125 For example, refusal to consider a duty on imported raw rubber, PVCCL. 16-10-1930. 
126 A typical statement of their liberal views can be found in L'indus/rie dans la region de Roanne. Thizy. e/ 
Cours, April 1929. 
127 Morel-Journel's expression. PVCCL, 14-5-1936. 
128 Bulle/in de l'Union des chambres syndicales lyonnais' (BUCCL).lune 1928. 
129 Morel-Journal, NOles sur Ia Chambre de Commerce, p. 10. 
130 See page 82. 
131 Morel-Journel. Journal, passim, especially 8-8-1928: 'II n'y a pas de jour qu[lAuguste Isaac. qui m'honore 
de son amitie, repete qu'il ne veut pas mourir avant de m'avoir vu dans son ancien fauteuil de president [de la 
Chambre de Commerce). 
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The Crisis of Liberalism 
But by the end of the 1920s there were cracks in the edifice. Some members of the 
business elite began in the late 1920s to hesitate between traditional liberal individu-
alism, that which held together the majority in the Chamber of Commerce, and certain 
of the ideas of neo-capitalists. 
In the optimistic economic climate of the 1920s big dyers, marchands de soie 
and weavers were all involved in heavy capital expenditure, the consequences of 
which for the structures of the silk industry have already been seen. Businessmen in 
these industries sometimes made a fetish of mass production, a position which could 
lead to suspicion of lUXury industries. Thus Henry Morel-Journel complained in his 
diary of his inability to convince the Radical politician Anatole de Monzie that luxury 
goods served aesthetic and not industrial needs. 132 The weaver Louis Gueneau denied 
that recent progress in the use of artificial fibres had been due to 'abnormal circum-
stances', and that the construction of new factories would lead to disaster. Natural 
silk, said Gueneau, had had its day,133 Henry Bertrand saw transfer of the values of 
the artisanate into factories as responsible for the socialism of the French labour force. 
His solution was to reduce dependence on skilled work by importing immigrants and 
turning them into Frenchmen.134 
There were also economic reasons for hostility to the artisanate. In the Cham-
ber of Commerce Paul Charbin135 denounced home weavers for luring the best work-
ers away from factories with promises of high wages in return for long hours. That 
this represented an attack on the artisanate was scarcely disguized by a distinction 
between 'genuine' home production those who abused the privileges allowed to arti-
sans.136 
In the case of Henry Bertrand suspicion of the artisanate was extended to 
small and medium factory producers. He claimed credit for having contributed to 
concentration of machine builders: 'this scattering of small workshops constituted [ ... ] 
a marked inferiority'.137 In his own industry he urged the exclusion from the SFS of 
firms with less than 50 or 100 looms. 138 
Big firms were also distinguished by a pragmatic view of the Eight Hour Law. 
Thanks to the seasonal nature of their industry the majority of jabricants were impla-
cable in their hostility to it. Large producers also opposed the law in principle. But 
132 Morel-loumel, Journal, 11-11-1932: 'ce beau-la, quelques personnes seulement peuvent l'acheter, son raison-
nernent est esthetique, il n'est pas industriel'. See also Bertrand, op. cit., p. 18: 'Forward! For the new and colossal 
product, to the power of new and modern means of production'. 
133 Louis Gueneau, La soie artificielle, Paris, 1928. 
134 Bertrand, op.cit., pp. 49, 147-8: 'L'ouvrier franyais est plus habile--et moins discipline--et cela ne se 
cornpense pas'. 
135 Of the Manufacture de velours et peluches velvet monopoly. 
136 PVCCL, 7-2-1929. 
137 Bertrand, op. cit., p. 
138 Bertrand, op. cit., p. 135 ff. 
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many had nevertheless adapted to it by means of a double or triple shift system, which 
permitted continuous utilization of capital resources. 139 
A few went further. Bertrand's appeal for respect of the rights of the trade 
unions, and his approval of social Catholicism, even 'tinted with a light varnish of so-
cialism', put him far in advance of many.t40 Some jabricants and marchands de soie 
joined the Union catholique de commerce et de l'industrie which approved of the So-
cial Insurance Laws of 1928 and 1930.141 Social reformism did not, then, arize auto-
matically from economic interest. 
Finally, big firms were unanimous in endorsing cartels-as long as they 
were controlled by major producers. Perhaps their most important advantage was that 
they would facilitate the introduction of new technology, while helping to avoid over-
production and unemployment.142 In other words cartels would remove some of the 
risks involved in investment. Clearly this represented a break with liberal individual-
ism. Some went further. Paul Charbin, as president of the SFS, informed his con-
stituents that individualism had had its day, and that the interdependence of modern 
finns prescribed association for purchase of raw materials, manufacturing, sales, and 
defence of common interests. 143 
It must be stressed that the opinions described above represented only a partial 
break both with liberal individualism, and with the traditional structures of the jab-
rique. Firstly, support for cartels could be justified by an appeal to the liberal princi-
ple of freedom of association. Similarly, attacks on the privileges of artisans could be 
seen as a defence of laissez-faire. The same type of neo-liberal ideology was ex-
pressed by Rene Duchemin, President of the CGPF, and could be seen as a reaffirma-
tion of an Aynardian point of view. 144 Second, commitment to mass production was 
not total. Big firms wished to profit from the prestige of Lyonnais luxury goods to 
give them an advantage in the market. Many tended in the 1920s to combine mass 
production of raw cloth with diversity of finishes, and to treat artificial fibres simply 
as a means to extend the variety of finishes. Not until the 1930s did they break en-
tirely with 'flexible production'. 
Thirdly, the coherence of the ideas described above should not be exaggerated. 
There were few who subscribed to all of them. Social reform in particular was viewed 
139 Double shift meant the operation of two shifts from 4 a.m. to 8 p.m. The 'triple equipe' permitted round the 
clock working. 
140 Bertrand, op.cit., p. 49: Interestingly he does not add the usual rider, that the CGT confine itself to 
'professional' issues; M. Fine, 'Toward Corporatism: the Movement for Capital-Labour Collaboration in France, 
1.914 to 1936', Ph.D. thesis, Wisconsin, 1971, reports the involvement of a local fabricant, P.Dulot, in an associ a-
hon which aimed to use social reforms to combat Bolchevism. 
141 Formed in 1928 by a fusion of the Association des patrons lyonnais, close to the Nouvelliste, and the Union 
caJholique lyonnaise which was more moderate. The new group was affiliated to the national social Catholic asso-
ciation, the ConfederaJion franr;aise de professions of Zamanski. 
142 CRCCL, 1928, pp. 360-9. Even Le Nouvel/isle, a bastion of liberal orthodoxy, looked favourably upon en-
tentes (Le Nouvel/iste, 9-2-1928). 
1.43 Le Nouvellisle 31-3-1928: 'De plus en plus les differentes forces economiques sorganisent en vue d'une ac-
hon collective. Travaillons done dans notre sphere A la realisation d'une masse economique puissante'. 
144 Ehrmann, op. cit., pp. 28-9. 
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with suspicion. 'Modernist' views were most common among the largest firms in the 
weaving branch, perhaps because of the long-term conflict between factory and home 
producers in that sector. One President of the SFS, Etienne Fougere, was also Vice-
president of Mercier's Redressementfran~ais, (as well as of the CGPF). But most big 
weavers in the Chamber of Commerce remained loyal to the liberal majority. Morel-
Journel expressed his contempt for luxury production only in private. The liberal-silk 
interest was more or less united in fending off a challenge from the engineering in-
dustry. Only during the economic crisis of the 1930s did this alliance split apart. 
Study of the views of metallurgists is handicapped by scarcity of sources, 
which is in turn a reflection of the lesser prestige within Lyon of their industry. Nev-
ertheless, it is possible to build up a reasonably clear picture. In the first place metal-
lurgists went furthest in their support for social reform. In 1928 Edmond Weitz 
boasted to the Chamber of Commerce of the spirit of collaboration between employ-
ers and reformist trades unions, which had permitted technical improvement and 
higher wages. In September 1928 a collective contract was signed with the CGT and 
CFTC.145 This was a rare enough event to be mentioned in a contemporary publica-
tion on industrial relations, which saw the contract as creating a 'veritable economic 
parliament'.l46 The metallurgy employers' association distributed family allowances 
and other benefits. In addition to engaging in traditional paternalist activities of this 
nature the engineering industry was almost alone in patronal circles in accepting the 
Social Insurance Laws of 1928 and 1930. 
Recognition of the rights of trades unions implied reinforcement of patronal 
organizations. The Chambre Syndicale des Industries Mhallurgiques du RhOne 
(CSIM) was the best organized employers' group in the department. Whereas the SFS 
was essentially a pressure group integrated into a lobbying system crowned by the 
Chamber of Commerce, the CSIM was designed to take its place in a system of col-
lective bargaining. In this the CSIM was aided by Ayme Bernard's AICA. AICA had 
been established in 1918 to deal with postwar labour unrest and to implement the new 
system of collective contracts, something the Chamber of Commerce was ill-equipped 
to do. For this purpose an inter-syndical fund was set up and a documentation service 
created.147 AICA also posed a direct challenge to the Chamber, for it took upon itself 
the task of creating a common front of all employers. Since it was the metallurgical 
industry that was most affected by the strikes it inevitably took a leading role. The 
number of adherents rose from 533 in 1918 to 4 365 in 1928. But as working class 
militancy declined employers were no longer obliged to think in terms of collective 
contracts, so AICA lost a vitality which it fully recovered only after June 1936. 
145 CRCCL, 1928 pp. 687-93. 
146 E-S. Massoubre, Les Ententes professionnelles dans Ie cadre national etla doctrine economique, Paris, 1935. 
147 On the foundation of AICA see the intelView with Ayme Bernard in Georges Lefranc, Les organisalions pa-
Ironales en France du passe au present, Paris, 1976. 
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Nevertheless, AICA remained an alternative focus of employer loyalty, not 
least because of its affiliation to the CGPF. Attenders at its meetings included many 
of the Rhone's most important businessmen. 148 But it is in its bureau that its orienta-
tion was clearest. In 1928 five out of seven members can be identified. The two sec-
retaries were patronal functionaries-Bernard was a lawyer, and Johannes Dupraz 
was a journalist and one time manager of Radio Lyon. Two were members of the 
CSIM, including Vice-president Edmond Weitz. Interestingly the silk industry was 
represented by two of its most advanced members: Paul Charbin and Etienne 
Fougere.149 
In sum, employers in the engineering industry were moving tentatively to-
wards a democratic corporatism. There were no direct connections with Redressement 
jram;ais, apart from the presence of Fougere in the leadership of AICA. But there 
were clearly programmatic links. They are explained partly by economic interest, for 
as Table 3 shows labour costs in the various metallurgical branches were relatively 
low. Furthermore, the engineering industry suffered from a serious shortage of skilled 
labour, which was one reason for the collective contract of 1928. On the other hand 
labour costs in the embroidery of luxury silks, characterized by conservatism, were 
very high. 
Table 3: Proportion of labour costs in retail price in selected industries 150 
Dyeing 4% Wood 50% 
Lead 7% Building 50% 
Copper 8% Coal mines 46% 
Watch-making 15% Iron mines 50% 
Engineering 25% Hand embroidery 90% 
But this is not the only explanation. Labour costs in large weaving and dyeing facto-
ries were also low, yet many bosses in these sectors maintained an intransigent oppo-
sition to social reform. This brings us back to the question of ideology. Whereas the 
most important families of silk merchants were more likely to show a continuity 
stretching back into the mainly Catholic patronat of the nineteenth century, the roots 
of the engineering patronat were in the anti-clerical petty-bourgeoisie of the last 
quarter of the century. 151 Edmund Weitz is a special case, for like the enterprising 
textile manufacturer Hippolyte Simler in J-R. Bloch's novel Et compagnie, his family 
148 Mulsant, president of the Chamber of Commerce of Villefranche. representatives of the big banks. the PLM 
and also of agriCUlture in the person of Felix Garcin of the USE. 
149 Nouvel/iste, 26-2-1928. 
150 PVCCL, 18-2-1929. For the car industry Sylvie Schweitzer. op. cit., suggests 4%. For the artificial fibre in-
dustry it can be estimated at 30%. 
151 P. Cayez, 'Quelques aspects du patronat lyonnais pendant la deuxieme etape de rindustrialisation', in M. 
Levy-Leboyer (ed.) I.e Pa/ronal de la seconde industrialisation. Paris, 1979. Pinol. MobUites et immobilismes. pp. 
685-7. 
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was of Alsatian and Protestant origin.152 As we saw in Chapter one neo-capitalism 
reinforced ideological cleaveages in the ruling class. 
In the interwar years engineers were still marked by the Republican anti-cleri-
cal tradition. Although a second generation immigrant, Edmund Weitz never accepted 
the hegemony of the jabrique, which he referred as a 'feodalite industrielle', an ex-
pression with both Republican and Saint-Simonian overtones. 153 We shall see in 
Chapter five that engineering employers had an affinity to the Alliance democratique, 
of which Edmund Weitz was departmental President. That the Catholic forgemaster 
Louis Prenat felt the need to create a Syndicat catholique de fa mhal/urgie et de fa 
construction mhal/ique is revealing of the atmosphere pervading the main association 
of engineering employers. 154 So the reformism of engineers was simultaneously po-
litical and economic. 
There were, to be sure, exceptions to these patterns. But they tend to prove the 
rule that religion and economics were in practice inseparable. Marius Berliet, al-
though an adept of American industrial methods, was a Legitimist. This is explained 
by his background in a family of moderately prosperous ribbon makers of the Croix 
Rousse, which was faithful to the Petite Eglise, a sect which opposed the Napoleonic 
Concordat.155 Another example is provided by a small minority of leftist jabricants 
non-usiniers, such as Joseph Fructus, Eugene Schulz and B. 1. Van Gelder. The two 
latter were of foreign origin; Schulz was a Protestant. These merchants, as we shall 
see, saw collaboration with the Radicals as a means of preserving the artisanate on 
which they depended. They also, as Schulz put it, represented a 'liberal bourgeoisie', 
which recognized the dependence of commerce upon the purchasing power of the 
masses. 156 
Conflict in the Chamber of Commerce 
Open conflict in the employers' movement was rare. Yet in the late 1920s it is possi-
ble to detect a new self-assertiveness on the part of new industries in the Chambers of 
Commerce of both Lyon and Villefranche. In 1928 discussions began on the subject 
of reform of the Ville franc he chamber, a body dominated by liberal-conservative 
wine and textile merchants. The stated intention was to take account of the increased 
importance of industries which had expanded during the war. 157 However, the project 
submitted to the government did little to alter the status quo. The proposals of retail-
1~2 J-R. Bloch. Et Compagnie. quoted in Claude Fohlen. 'The industrial Revolution in France. 1700-1914', in C. 
CIpolla, (ed)., The Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol.4, part I, London, 1973, pp. 38-9. On the role of Al-
satians in Lyon see Pinol, Mobililtfs et immobilismes, pp. 467-8. 
153 Nouvelliste, 28-1-1928. 
154.The Prenat family was an old Catholic family. Its steelmaking plant were more labour intensive than engi-
neermg concerns. 
155 Saint-Loup, op. cit., passim. 
156 Bulletin mensuel du commerce, de l'industrie et de i'agriculture, January-March, 1928. 
157 CRCCV, 29-8-1928: categories which had grown in importance were said to be cotton trading. clothing. cot-
ton dressings, wine, food. metallurgy, cars, agricultural equipment and retailing. That is, virtually every activity in 
the town--a clear attempt at mystification. 
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ers' representatives were on the grounds that the prosperity of the region depended on 
big firms. Also rejected was the Conseil d'etat's opinion that a fresh category be cre-
ated for new industries. Ultimately the government bowed to the Chamber's view that 
it would be best to incorporate new industries into existing categories. The result was 
that little changed: there were now two engineers in a chamber of fifteen instead of 
one out of twelve.158 
In June 1929 Edmund Weitz began to lobby in the name of the 'heavy indus-
tries' for a seat in the bureau of the Chamber of Commerce of Lyon. 159 Seven months 
later, on the occasion of the renewal of the bureau, Weitz asked permission to read a 
declaration. He was refused by a majority of the Chamber. The vote over, Weitz was 
permitted to have his say: 
Nous trouvons en effet tres legitime, que l'industrie de la soie qui reste rindustrie dominante 
de celie ville so it, d 'une f~on pennanente et en quelque sorte traditionnelle, representee au 
Bureau par un membre marchand de soie et par un membre fabrique de tissues. 
Mais no us rappelons que les industries lourdes: Metallurgie. Mecanique. Electro-
mecanique, Automobile. Industrie extractive et Batiment, representent pour la circonscription 
de la Chambre de Commerce de Lyon un chiffre d'affaires qui atteint 2 milliards et payent 500 
milliards de salaires. II nous paraissait done legitime, qu'un Siege leur soit reserve au Bureau. 
Vous avez ete pressenti, Monsieur Ie President, vous ne I'avez pas pense. 
Weitz concluded by stating that he had withdrawn his candidature in the interests of 
unity. It is more likely that Paul Charbin, among the more advanced of jab ric ants, had 
been put forward as a compromise candidate. 160 This interpretation is supported by 
the probability that Weitz was behind a coup in 1932 in which Morel-Journel was re-
placed as First Vice-president by Charbin.161 
This incident confirms the interpretation of business politics put forward in 
this chapter. Weitz was backed by AICA. In 1934 Morel-Journel listed among his 
principal grievances against Weitz, his 'attaches trop marquees avec l'envahissent 
Ayme Bernard, directeur de I'AICA'.162 And when Morel-Joumel finally became 
president in January 1934, it was 'malgre la repugnance de l' AICA'.163 
It is also noticeable that the point of view of merchant-manufacturers was not 
aired in this or any other Chamber of Commerce debate. No-one dissented from Paul 
Charbin's attacks on home weavers. Given that no jabricant non-usinier sat in the 
Chamber, and that they were even excluded from the leadership of the SFS, this is not 
surprising. Nevertheless, criticism of modem industrial methods came from three 
sources. Firstly from representatives of those consumption industries whose condi-
tions of production resembled those of the old fabrique. Thus Antoine CelIe favoured 
158 CRCCV. 28-12-1928.19-6-1929,30-10-1929.27-11-1929. 
159 Morel-lournel. Journal. 14-6-1929. Confinned by Weitz. PVCCL. 6-1-1930. Weitz told Morel-Iournel that he 
had refused a political candidature susceptible of leading to the Town Hall of Lyon in order to orientate his life 
towards presidency of the Chamber of Commerce. 
160 PVCCL. 6-1-1930; Morel-lournel. Journal. 12-1-1932. Charbin obtained seventeen votes. Weitz three and 
there were three abstentions. 
161 Morel-lourneI,Journal.12-1-1932; PVCCL.12-1-1932. 
162 Morel-loumel. Journal. 2-5-1934. 
163 Morel-lournel. Journal. 23-1-1934. Fougere. its president. however. appears to have seen Morel-lournel as 
acceptable. 
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economy in labour costs, the use of bonuses and a wise division of labour. But he also 
felt that 'he who desired the integral application of American methods in French fac-
tories would commit the same stupid error as the farmer of the Nord who wanted to 
grow cotton on his land'. On behalf of his own leather goods industry he bemoaned 
the trend towards rubber soles and mass production. 164 Since CelIe was also speaking 
as President of the Chamber his views are also symptomatic of the ambivalent attitude 
towards mass production of large silk fIrms. 165 
Second, August Isaac defended high quality production in the silk industry. 
Through his occupation of lucrative directorships such as the Compagnie de Suez and 
the PLM Isaac was a representative of fInance capital. But he was distinguished from 
this milieu by his great age and by family connections with medium sized family silk 
firms which were fearful of big firms. 166 Isaac agreed that the French consumer could 
not be compared to the American, and that the chief advantage of Lyon in the world 
market was the cheapness of its highly skilled labour force. 167 Thirdly, the point of 
view of fabricants non-usiniers was expressed through the Federation Republicaine, 
which from the late 1920s was under the control of Victor Perret, President of the silk 
braid and church ornament section of the SFS, Perret owed something to traditional 
liberalism, but emphasized a form of neo-corporatism designed to protect skilled 
labour. In this he found some support even from a guardian of the liberal tradition like 
Auguste Isaac, but most importantly from certain white collar workers. 168 
Finally, mention must be made of the attitude of small business. In both the 
1928 and 1932 incidents in the Chamber of Commerce Michel Delzeux, representa-
tive of the retail trade, supported Edmund Weitz. More often this sector could be re-
lied upon to toe the majority line. The position of small business was then ambiguous. 
Its main representative, the Alliance des Chambres Syndicates (ACS) enjoyed a rather 
cosy relationship with big business in the Chamber of Commerce. It always collabo-
rated with the big business Union des chambres syndicales CUCS) in presenting can-
didates for professional elections and was itself led by relatively large retailers. 
Thus liberal individualism incorporated elements of the leadership of the small 
business movement, and indeed of the Radical Party, of which Delzeux was an influ-
ential member.l 69 Yet the reach of liberal individualism was limited. There is much 
evidence of small business anti-capitalism, and of friction with big business. Antoine 
Celle, complained that small cobblers had associated in order to market their prod-
ucts, expressing the (liberal) fear that this would merely extend the trade of some at 
164 See pp. 70 and 81. 
165 CRCCL.1928, pp. 360-9. 
166 Auguste Isaac's son Humbert was managing director of Dognin et Cie which had 137 looms in 1935. See 
Chapter 8. 
167 Isaac, op. cit., pp. 91-92. 
168 Isaac, op. cit., pp. 91·2. In this timid questioning of the free play of market forces Isaac is typical. See p. 96. 
169 Remember also Edouard Herriot's own liberalism in financial questions and his good relations with Morel-
Journel. 
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the expense of others. 170 The struggle between small and large production is best seen 
in the long-term failure of businessmen and small producers to agree a legal definition 
of the artisan. l7l 
There was then a battle for the allegiance of small producers, which involved 
anti-capitalist sectional associations, a liberal Radical leadership, the reformist and the 
liberal wings of business, and as we shall see a traditionalist current in the Federation 
rtffpublicaine. It goes without saying that this conflict cannot be understood separately 
from the religious issue. One of the few occasions on which Michel Delzeux criti-
cized the leadership of the Chamber of Commerce was for granting a subsidy to an 
exhibition mounted by a group of Catholic employers. Some of the same tensions can 
be seen in the relationship of white collar workers to the right. 
The CFTC: A stalking horse for the left?l72 
There is much more to conservatism than the history of the elites. In fact the right re-
cruited from all social classes and reproduced within itself, with an altered balance of 
power, all the tensions of society at large. An exchange between Auguste Isaac and 
the CFfC reveals the deep social and political gulf which separated elements of the 
conservative coalition: 
Vous [La CITC) partagez avec les syndicats socialistes c~tt~ conviction que .Ie patron est tou-
jours riche et fait toujours de bonnes affaues. [ ... J Ne vOls-Je pas ~ chaque Instant mes fi11es 
obligees de faire elles-memes la cuisine? Ne savez-vous pas que la plupart des bonnes ne veu-
lent plus garder les enfants la nuit1 La crise des domestiques. est non pas moins aigue que celie 
du logement. L'une et l'autre 01~~es causes multiples. mrus au fond dcsquelles on rctrouve 
toujours la loi du moindre effort 
This amounted to a class struggle within the right. For whatever Isaac may have felt, 
the CFfC's official apoliticism meant in practice visceral anti-communism and sup-
port for Raymond Poincare. 174 
CFfC influence was largest among white collar workers, who in turn consti-
tuted the greatest proportion of right wing voters. Growth of new types of salaried 
employment between capital and labour was a classic consequence of the Second In-
dustrial Revolution. In his examination of electoral lists in Lyon and Villeurbanne 
from 1896 to 1936, J-L. Pinol divides these categories into three. First, the proportion 
170 CRCCL. 1828. p.718. Bonneville. op.cit .• p.49: Master-weavers of silk lace in Vi11eurbanne attempted to es-
cape the grip of labricants by organising themselves into a cooperative. Shopkeepers meanwhile resented the at-
tempts of factory owners to reduce their wage bills by setting up purchasing cooperatives in their factories. and 
railed against the new prix unics (CRCCL. 1828, p.728-9). 
171 The crux of the matter was that the wider the definition. the larger would be the class of producers who stood 
to benefit from tax concessions and exemption from social legislation. Thus, while 'true' artisans agreed with big 
business that the employment of only one compagnon should be allowed, small businesses lobbied for a maximum 
of ten. Also. the big business was opposed to the inclusion of shopkeepers in the new organisms. 
172 The CITC was constituted nationally on 1/2 November, 1919. A regional organization of the CITC was sct 
up in Lyon on 14 March. 1920. M. Launay. 'Le syndicalisme chretien en France, 1885 ~ 1940', these d'etat, Paris. 
1980. pp. 1368 ff. 
173 Auguste Isaac. Open letter to the CITC. The CITC had denounced Isaac's plan, as Minister of Commerce. to 
reform the Eight Hour Law. La Voix Sociale. 29-7-1922. 
174 La Vou Sociale, February, 1926. For Maurice Guerin, one of the most advanced. 'Ie marxisme est une erreur 
economique et sociale. Cela. c'est notre cheval de batai11e. [ .. J La propriete privee individuelle et famiJiale est 
sacree'. 
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of senior managers and engineers in the electorate grew from 5% to 7%. Secondly, 
'middle managers' (cadres moyennes) increased from 2% to 7% per cent. Lastly, the 
fortunes of 'routine' white collar workers (shop assistants, office workers and those 
described in the electoral list simply as employes) are more complex. This category 
grew in absolute and percentage terms from 1896 to 1911; between the wars there 
was a stabilization of numbers but a relative decline. 175 Thus the tendency in the early 
twentieth century was a moderate growth of salaried non-manual employment as a 
whole, which was accompanied by internal differentiation. 
Given that definition of white collar employment is highly problematic it is as 
well to make clear that senior managers and engineers are excluded from the follow-
ing discussion because they scarcely played an autonomous role in conservative poli-
tics before 1936, doubtless because of a close identification with the patronat. 176 We 
are more concerned by J-L. Pinol's second two categories, which to some extent can 
be differentiated in the sources. They also correspond to a distinction made by Erik 
Olin Wright. On the one hand there are those higher grade workers who whilst depen-
dent on a wage share some of the delegated authority of the capitalist. On the other 
there are those routine white collar workers whose position is analogous to that of the 
proletariat. 177 
The central question is the increasingly problematic incorporation of white 
collar workers into the liberal consensus on the right. First the transmission of the 
dominant liberal ideology to white collar workers will be examined, then the chal-
lenge to liberalism represented by the CFTC. 
Liberalism and white collar workers 
In the early nineteenth century clerks in the silk industry had traditionally been con-
servative.178 This is hardly surprising in a period when a limited educational system 
was monopolized by the Church, and when the premium commanded by literacy en-
sured economic privilege. In the 1920s deferential conservatism survived, especially 
among white collar workers in the silk industry--partly because of the resilience of 
the liberal notion of the career open to talent. 
A certain prestige was attached to employment in the silk industry. Jean Du-
fourt has Philippe naively refer to the 'appointements royaux' of some of his fellow 
employees: 
[ .. ) Quand je leur parlais ainsi, ils croyaient que je me moquais d'eux. Puis devant mon visage 
sans malice, i1s daignaient m'eclairer.« Nous ne sommes point, me disaient-ils, parmi les priv-
i1egies de ce monde. Nous passons tous par la filiere et nos appointements sont des plus me-
diocres, mais no us sommes chez Grivolin, chez Taffarel et chez Bern icot ! ». Ce « mais » me 
semblait alors incomprehensible, inexplicable, car j'ignorais tout de la consideration. Au-
175 Pinol, M"bilismeset imnwbilisme~, 456-~. The figures quoted are ~ead from a graph! and are therefore inexact. 
176 A CatholIc orgamzatlOn, the Umon SoclQle des mgemeurs chretJens eXIsted, but Its membership was small 
and some were employers. 
177 These arguments are taken from Eric Olin Wright, Capital, Crisis and the Slate, London, 1978, pp. 61-97. I 
shall not discuss the special case of state employees, who played little part in the right. 
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jourd'hui, je Ie traduis avec assurance: «Mais ... nous sommes chez des patrons hautement con-
sideres, et la consideration du maitre est a la fois Ie pain quotidien et I'orgueil du servi-
teur. ,.179 
89 
This quotation suggests a tacit agreement. Employees accepted mediocre salaries in 
return for the chance to work their way up through the firm (passer par la filiere).180 
At the end of the novel Philippe himself becomes a partner in Calixte's own silk lace 
firm, having married one of the proprietor's relatives. 
It has already been seen that social mobility in the [abrique de soieries was 
more than a myth. 181 There is hardly any profession', writes Michel Laferrere, 'in 
which employees so quickly become partners, or where one has as many chances to 
set up on one's own',182 Social mobility was real enough to provide several weIl-
publicized examples. Fran~ois Peissel had begun his working life in a silk packaging 
factory and ended it as a commissionnaire en soieries and Federation deputy. This ex-
ample is especially relevant because in his youth Peissel had been a trade unionist. He 
never lost contact with the CFTC, and in the 1936 legislature presided over a group of 
deputies friendly to it. 183 
Dissemination of liberal values was facilitated by close contact of silk em-
ployees with their bosses. Offices of fabric ants were generally modest, even dingy, af-
fairs. Miron, Philippe's employer, occupied 'a kind of monk's cell which served him 
as an office', at the back of a high-ceilinged and bare-walled room, in which employ-
ees of all conditions busied themselves. 184 Identification with the employer was also 
encouraged by the patronat's conscious effort to disseminate a model of behaviour. 185 
Influence of liberal ideology in other sectors is more difficult to assess, and a 
subject for further research. But we do know that in the 1920s it was still common for 
bookkeepers and especially travelling salesmen to become self-employed. Similarly, a 
writer in La Voix Sociale argued that travelling salesmen, because of the conditions in 
which they worked, were too independently minded to join a union where they would 
merely 'soldiers in an army',186 
The possibility of rising to a senior position and perhaps ultimately of setting 
up on one's own implied adhesion (at least outwardly) to the outlook of the patronat. 
These values often included Catholicism as well as liberalism. This is perhaps one 
178 As their recruitment by labricants to aid in the suppression of the revolt of the eanuts of 1834 illustrates. 
179 Dufourt, op. cit., pp. 58-9. 
180 In fact, white collar workers in the silk industry received better than average, though scarcely excessive, 
salaries. Philippe is also told by his employer that his diploma in Advanced Commercial Studies does not prove 
that he is fitted to succeed in commerce: 'i1 fallait, comme les autres,« passer par la filiere ,.'. Ibid p. 27-8. 
181 See page 74. 
182 Laferrere. op. cit., pp. 97-8. Jean-Luc Pinal's study of the relationship between age and occupation also sup-
ports the hypothesis of exceptional upward mobility among white collar workers in the industry. (Pinol, Espace 
sociale, p. 51). 
183 P.Gric, op. cit,; interview with M. Roger Fulchiron. 
184 Dufourt, op. cit., p. 27. In 1987 I visited the office of a multi-national silk finn. which conformed almost ex-
actly to Dufourt's description. On the wall was an allegorical painting entitled 'Rien sans peine'. 
185 See page 75. 
186 ~ Vou ~o~jale, May, 1929: Continually on the: move, 'eyoluant un peu dans !£Ius les milieux, sans trop en 
subu I empremt , hiS broad mmd demanded an orgamzahon which would preserve thiS freedom of action. 
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reason for high religious practice among white collar workers. 187 A rare insight into 
hiring policy comes from a study of the Trayvou engineering factory at La Mulatiere. 
It was said that it was sufficient to signal one's piety to managing director Berthelon 
in order to be sure of employment. I88 It is surely significant that about a dozen em-
ployees of Trayvou turn up in the Federation republicaine, of whom the majority 
were white collar workers. 
Furthermore, Catholic values could be seen as aiding in the accumulation of 
the savings needed to set up on one's own, or simply for a comfortable retirement. 
The CFTC press describes its own adherents as 'sober and hard-working', and is full 
of tirades against a society which worshipped only pleasure. 189 That such views were 
often expressed in the context of attacks on the left suggests the inextricability of 
Catholicism, present or future status and political outlook. For white collar workers 
Catholicism and conservatism were quite simply the same thing. Hence the difficul-
ties experienced by conservatives in convincing their supporters that defence against 
socialism required transcendence of 'sterile quarrels'. 190 
It follows from this that deference to Catholic-liberal notables was dependent 
on the maintenance of a favourable economic climate and on the goodwill of the 
Church. And given the connection of religion and economics rebellion against elite 
leadership was likely to remain within certain limits. 
The Emergence of the CFTC 
The idea of the career open to talent was, as the quotation from Guerin suggests, in-
fluential in the CFTC,191 Yet Catholic unions also stressed the interests of employees 
as a category, although this was not incompatible with protection of promotion 
prospects. Changes in the social structures, in the nature of white collar work, and in 
the social practice of the Church came together to explain the new emphasis. 
Jean-Luc Pinol shows that before 1914 the expansion of white collar employ-
ment provided openings for sons of workers and shopkeepers.192 White collar work-
ers themselves had a significant chance of becoming merchants, and were protected 
against downward mobility. In the interwar period social structures became more 
187 Note the quasi-religious images of the final sentance in the quotation from Dufourt: master, servant, daily 
bread ... 
188 F. Robert, 'Trayvou 1909-39. Qualification, rationalisation et mobilite ouvriere', memoire de mallrise, Lyon 
II, 1986. Thanks to Franyois Robert for allowing me to see the interviews on which his study was based. 
189 fA Voix sociale, July-August, 1926: he continued, 'vieilles et vieux se rajeunissent pour s'assoir plus com-
modcment au banquet de la joie factice. Cheveux coupes des unes, tetes effeminees des autres; decolletes out-
rageantes, bras nus et pantalons eblouissantes: tout cela, c'est la livree des esclaves du dieu plaisir. L'jdeale de 
toUle femme reputee est de copier la courtisane. Tout homme distingue veut avoir I 'air d'un comique de casino'. 
190 See chapter two. 
191 La Voix Sociale, 1-1-1922. One writer argued that since in France every soldier carried a marshal's baton in 
hiS knapsack, and because most bosses had risen from the workforce, there could be no class struggle. Another de-
nted that it was a 'crime' to become a patron (La Voix Sociale, 21-6-1925). Courses in bookkeeping, languages etc. 
were offered by the CFTC in order to facilitate career moves. 
192 This and the following paragraph relies on J-L. Pinol, Mobililt!s el immobilismes, especially pp. 620-639 and 669-696. ' 
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rigid. Expansion of white collar employment ended, at least as far as males were con-
cerned. So there were fewer opportunities for working class self-improvement. Whilst 
a few white collar workers became commercial representatives or technicians, the 
chance of becoming an employer had almost disappeared. Higher education had now 
become the main route to a career in business, something which was open only to 
sons of the bourgeoisie.193 Descent into the factory proletariat was rarely the fate of 
white collar workers, but was nevertheless a possibility. In sum, an interwar white 
collar worker was more likely to have been born to a white collar family, and would 
probably remain a white collar worker all his life. 
Meanwhile white collar work became more subdivided and bureaucratic. A 
CFfC bank worker wrote of employees 'Maintenues dans une situation de misere, 
cantonnt!s dans une specialisation qui les laissent ignorantes des problemes finan-
cieres, ils sont Ie troupeau auquel on fait suer des fortunes pour les autres'.194 Typi-
cally, this quasi-marxist analysis of the alienation of 'proletaires en faux-col et en ve-
ston', was associated with protestations of probity, conscientiousness and fidelity to 
capitalism--another illustration of the ambiguity of white-collar consciousness. 195 
It could be that bureaucratization was associated with a growth in female white collar 
work, so status was also tied up with hostility to female employment. This throws 
light on the CFfC's preoccupation with the return of women to the home. 
All of this coincided with the formation of the CFTC in 1919. In Lyon there 
was a strong tradition of social Catholicism, though its preoccupations and goals were 
diverse and sometimes contradictory. On the one hand there was a conservative, once 
monarchist, tendency. Its most lasting product was the Corporation des employes de 
soierie, created in 1886, which was the first explicitly Catholic syndicate in France. It 
was the sole survivor of a tripartite body through which it had been intended to asso-
ciate merchants, weavers and employees. 196 This wing of the social Catholic move-
ment was linked to the Oeuvre des cercles, founded in response to the Commune by 
Albert de Mun. 
Also created at the turn of the century were Mme. Rochebilliard's Syndicats 
professionnels feminins. Her movement, the first female Catholic Union in France, at 
first shared the relatively progressive views of the Chronique, and was even tempted 
by the CGT. But lack of interest of the latter in female workers pushed it to the 
right. 197 
193 In J·L Pinol's first cohort (born 1872·75) 19% of sons of the bourgeoisie went into higher education. In the 
second cohort (born 1898 to 19(0) 53% did so. Figures for all other groups are 3% and 7% respectively. 
194 La Vou sociale, 21·6·1925. 
195 La Vou sociale, 23·8·1925. 
196 La Vou Sociale, July/August, 1926; Ponson, op. cit., p.176. 
197 Ponson, op. cit., p. 165; Roullet, op. cit. passim. 
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More progressive was the Chronique socia/e, whose role in the promotion of 
peasant consciousness has already been mentioned. 198 Since the Chronique found the 
majority of its sympathizers among white collar workers, it was a natural step for it to 
form a white collar union in 1912. Like the Corporation, it was affiliated on the na-
tionallevel to the Syndicat des employes de commerce et de l'industrie which was to 
form the core of the CFfC.t99 Re-formation of Catholic trades unions after the war 
was the work of the Chronique. Secretary-general Marius Gonin set up a secretariat 
for this purpose, and recruited the journalist Maurice Guerin to head it.2oo Not without 
difficulty Guerin managed to unite the two wings of social Catholicism. But the 
equivocal heritage of social Catholicism continued to divide the CFfC. This can be 
seen in both its sociology and ideology. 
It is necessary to begin by qualifying the picture of a movement dominated by 
white collar workers. In 1922 women represented at least 68% of CFfC members.201 
This is not at all typical of the CFfC nationally, and is perhaps due to the precocious 
implantation of female unions in Lyon.202 Many female adherents were engaged in 
manufacturing, especially textiles and clothing. But women played a subordinate role 
in the CFTC: all departmental leaders were male, and most of them were white collar 
workers. Female unions showed few signs of vitality. Of the male manual unions only 
that in engineering had more than a sporadic existence, but with only fifty-four mem-
bers in the region in 1922 it was numerically insignificant beside white collar unions. 
Since they were the backbone of the CFfC it will be necessary to look at the 
latter in more detail. Women were organized in the quaintly named Syndicat des 
dames employees, while men adhered to the Union syndicale des employes de la re-
gion lyonnaise. Both recruited (in theory) from all branches, except that the venerable 
Corporation formed an autonomous group. 
An idea of the CFfC's social base can be obtained from elections to 
Prud'homme councils in the arrondissement of Lyon.203 Before 1935 the CFTC pre-
sented candidates only for the two sections of the commercial colleges. In the first 
section, grouping travelling salesmen, bookkeepers, and bank employees, the CFTC 
was usually defeated by a CGT-CGTU carte1.204 The CGT's best performance was in 
the banks, whilst the CFfC could count on the backing of bookkeepers and travelling 
198 La Chronique Sociale was a revue, organ of the Secretariat Social and of the Federation des groupes d'etudes 
sociales. 
199 Ponson, op. cit., passim; Roullet op. cit., passim. These were not the only conservative or Catholic organiza-
tions. There was also a Unionfraternelle des employes de commerce, its name suggesting links with Leon Hannel. 
It did not adhere to the CFTC. 
200 On the recruitment of Guerin see M. Launay, these. pp. 1377-1384. 
201 A list of affiliated unions can be found in Appendix 3. See also Launay, these, pp. 1465-1469. The member-
ship figures quoted here refer to individuals who regularly paid their dues. 
202 Launay, these, p. 1488. Women were also over-represented in the region, but accounted for only 33% of the 
total. 
203 Results can be found in La Voir sociale. 
204 The only CFTC victory was in 1929. and was due to the right's election victory in 1928, and the sectarianism 
of the communists. 
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salesmen, as well as of a substantial minority of bank employees. 205 In the second 
section, in which the sales staff of the grands mag as ins and the office workers of the 
silk industry voted, a cartel of CFTC and its independent allies were some distance 
ahead of the CGT. The main source of CFTC votes was the soierie, while department 
stores supported the left. 
In Lyon as elsewhere in France, the CFTC presented no candidates in the 
white collar colleges of industrial sections. Only among technical staff in the engi-
neering and building industries did Catholic trades unions possess a small core of ac-
tivists. Most likely they had been recruited from former students of the Ecole 
d'apprentissage superieure, which had been founded jointly in 1920 by the CFTC and 
abbe Lamache, and which began to produce its first graduates in the mid-1920s.206 
Most were destined for the engineering, electrical and building industries, sectors 
which provided the members of a sub-section of the employe union of the CFTC, set 
up in 1927.207 
The overall picture is confirmed by a 1929 report which stated that re-
cruitment was satisfactory among VRP, bookkeepers and draughtsmen, but less so in 
the banks, the engineering industry, and department stores.208 Michel Launay's con-
clusion that the Catholic unions were most influential among proletarianized 'petits 
employes' does not apply to Lyon.209 CFTC support came disproportionately from 
higher grade employees. Some leaders would today be considered to be managers: 
Raoul Duclos of the white collar union, was chief accountant in a silk firm. 210 
It is hardly surprising that routine clerical and commercial employees should 
be attracted preferentially to the CGT. But apart from economic interest, milieu plays 
a part, for the loyalty of white collar workers in the industrial sector to the CGT could 
perhaps be explained by dispersal in proletarian areas. CFTC activists were drawn 
from white collar workers inhabiting the central areas where there was a strong bour-
geois presence, or from 'mixed' areas around the city centre. 211 
This is important, for unlike the CGT, CFTC activism was not based on the 
enterprise but on the parish. Many recruits were furnished by the parish-based 
Groupes d'etudes sociales, part of the Chronique socia/e's mini-empire:212 relations 
were so close that in 1926 fusion of CFTC and Cercles was envisaged. In May of the 
205 In 1937 La You Sociale described the banks as one of only two white collar sectors which supported the CGT 
be~ore. the upheaval of June 1936. The Societe Generale was an exception, for in el.ections to the governing body 
of Its Insurance fund, the CFfC gained 61 votes agaInst 45 to the CGT and 12 to Independents. Perhaps signifi-
cantly, the staff of this bank were among the last to join the 1925 strike. La You Sociale, November, 1925. 
206 Launay, these, pp. 1508-9. 
207 La You sociale, July/August, 1930. 
208 La Voix Sociale, November, 1929. 
209 M. Launay, La CITC. Origines et developpement. 1919-1940, Paris, 1986, p. 241. 
210 Launay, these, p. 1407. 
211 This hypothesis is supported by the geographical implantation of CFfC-employes. Its strongest sections were 
10 Perrache, Bellecour and the Croix Rousse. La You Sociale, March/April, 1926. 
212 For example, Georges Forestier, general secretary of the while collar union, had been a participant in the 
groupe d'e/udes of St Pierre des Terreaux, where he introduced Claudius Deriol to the Chronique. 
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same year, one study group voted to transform itself into a section of the CFfC white 
collar union.213 Only rarely did the CFTC possess an enterprise section. The excep-
tion was in certain of the big banks, thanks to the coincidence of a large number of 
employees with favourable parish circumstances. Comparison with the white collar 
membership of the PDP, which overlapped with that of the CFfC, suggests that just 
as many came from smaller banks, where bosses were notorious for their hostility to 
unions of any tint.214 The importance of parish structures to the CFTC also emerges 
from the fact that its more conservative wing, essentially the silk employees of Cor-
poration, drew support from the Oeuvre des cercles in the Croix Rousse. It can there-
fore be concluded that sociological factors, together with the general social pro-
gramme of the Church made Catholic trades unionism possible, but the ideological 
and sociological mix in the parishes determined the ideological direction of Catholic 
trades unionism. Both wings of the CFfC must be seen as responses to the same eco-
nomic problems. 
It should also be clear that militants were very much Catholic trades unionists. 
Since they were also disproportionately higher grade workers it is possible again to 
see the inextricability of Catholicism, status and conservatism. In the CFfC the hope 
of social mobility gave way to protection of acquired position, striking thus at the 
heart of the liberal consensus. This was true of both left and right wings of the move-
ment. Unavoidably this had a political impact, not least because CFTC, Chronique 
and Oeuvre des cercles were all part of a network which also included the Federation 
republicaine and the PDP.215 As in the JAC there is a potential ambiguity in the 
CFfC's attitude to religion, for in order to disseminate their Catholic view of the so-
cial question, the CFfC was ready to put aside doctrinal questions and collaborate 
with the communists. The result was the same combination of Catholicism and secu-
larism which paved the way for the Croix de Feu. 
The Ambiguities of Social Catholicism 
In the 1920s the majority view in the CFfC was supported by the white collar and 
engineering federations. Its most lucid exponent was Maurice Guerin.216 Contrary to 
the propaganda of the CGT and CGTV, the CFTC was not a bosses' union. It de-
fended the Eight Hour Law and agitated for social insurance institutions free from 
patronal control. The CFTC was particularly keen to defend the right of workers to a 
weekly rest day, and to ensure that salaries were high enough to encourage women to 
stay at home. On issues such as these the Christian trades unions were prepared to 
213 Launay, these, p. 1515-6. 
214 La Voix Socia/e, 15-7-1923, May 1927: 'La pratique [duJ devoir syndicale est souvent liee A la comprehension 
de ce devoir par las patrons catholiques eUll-memes'. 
215 See Chapter 6. 
216 La VOU: Sociale. 20-1-1924; Launay, La CFTC, p. 24. Guerin left Lyon for a national post in 1927, but re-
turned during the war. Hostilities over, he headed a successful MRP list in the 1945 elections. 
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collaborate with the CGT and CGTU, although the CFfC remained firm in its hostil-
ity to communism as an ideology.217 For the CFfC class conflict was to be contained 
by index linking of wages and institutionalized under the control of the state through a 
system of compulsory syndicalization and collective bargaining. Class struggle was 
an inevitable feature of modern society, but it did not have to be pursued to the 
death.218 
There is no need to dwell on the incompatibility of such ideas with Lyonnais 
liberalism.219 The CFfC did not talk in terms of 'classlessness', but saw classes as a 
fact of life. Equally apparent is that this democratic corporatism met at significant 
points with the ideas of modernising businessmen. Maurice Guerin welcomed ratio-
nalization as a means of diminishing the difficulty of work and of reducing the cost of 
goods-as long as the 'organized profession' ensured that harmful consequences 
were kept to a minimum.220 The CFfC could boast some practical success, for along 
with the CGT it signed the collective contract in the engineering industry in 1928. 221 
Yet the CFfC was scarcely the natural ally of the often anti-clerical metallur-
gical patronat. Catholic trades unions, to their annoyance, had at first been excluded 
from the negotiations for the collective contract of 1928. In what can only be a refer-
ence to anti-clericalism a spokesman for engineering draughtsmen denounced the 
hypocrisy of bosses who permitted marital infidelity and attendance at the cinema, but 
refused paid holidays.222 
The Catholic face of the CFfC was reinforced by the survival of an older va-
riety of social Catholicism, which identified defence of religion with the protection of 
an hierarchical and conservative social order. It was promoted by the Corporation of 
Auguste Gruffaz. Its presence in the CFfC is a little incongruous. Guerin seems to 
have achieved a united front of Catholic trades unions only at the cost of allowing the 
Corporation to retain its separate existence rather than merge into the white collar 
federation, and by making Gruffaz regional President. For Michel Launay, the con-
flict was essentially a misunderstanding. But closer examination reveals a genuine 
difference.223 
Gruffaz admitted to a theoretical preference for mixed patron-worker unions 
over the CFfC formula of independence. He was reluctant to use the term 'syndicate', 
217 La Voix socia/e, January, 1931. The communist federation was frequently more amenable to collaboration 
than was the anti-clerical CGT, which feared the CFTC as a rival. In March 1924 there was a six hour battle be-
tween CGT and CFTC activists at the Salles Grandris in Lyon. Launay, these, p. 1520. 
218 La Vou Socia/e, December, 1926. Guerin said 'je crois llia lutte des classes et llia paix sociale'. 
219 La Vou Socia/e, 12-3-1922. The main headline of the second issue of La Voix sociale (1-2-1922, was 'Le 
liberalisme economique lll'assaut du syndicalisme chretien'. 
220 La Vou socia/e, March 1927. Another militant proclaimed that 'Ie syndicalisme chretien doit moraliser la ra-
honalisation'. Edmond Weitz, on the other hand, opposed the idea of an 'echelle mobile' in a letter to fA VO/x So-
dale (October/November, 1926). 
221 See page 82. 
222 La Vou socia/e, October, 1930. Back in 1920 the CFTC had come into conflict with anticlerical yellow unions 
~the Confederation nationaie du travail) sponsored by the employers' associations in the building and engineering 
mdustries. Launay, these, pp. 1455-1457. 
223 Launay,these, pp. 1387-8, 1410, 1437-1441. 
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preferring 'profession' or 'corporation')24 He was suspicious of the 'furore' of unre-
strained economic progress, which threatened to disorganize these fundamental units 
of society, as well as ignoring the varied tastes of the French consumer.225 Thus his 
understanding of social mobility was a particular one. It did not mean that anyone 
could become an employer simply because he possessed the necessary capital. Rather 
one had to learn a trade through a laborious apprenticeship to a particular station. 226 
This was understood by Gruffaz's obituarist, who saw his special merit as having re-
mained an employe all his life, and never to have desired anything else. 227 Not sur-
prisingly the Corporation did little to improve the conditions of employees. For 
Gruffaz it was not merely occupancy of a post which should determine a salary, but 
the competence and moral worth of the person who occupied it. This can also be seen 
as a rejection of both market and collective determination of wages in favour of a 
Catholic notion of vocation. 
Gruffaz's views are rather close to thosefabricants who saw corporatism as a 
defence against the decline of the luxury industries.228 Gruffaz enjoyed a particularly 
close relationship with one such employer, Victor Perret, whose own senior employ-
ees appeared at meetings of the Corporation. The Corporation remained the 'faithful 
tenant' of the Association Catholique des patrons, which had been presided over in 
the early 1900s by Perret's father. Gruffaz was also a member of the Federation 
republicaine, of which Perret junior was President. Again the Church is important, for 
both Corporation and Federation recruited from groups affiliated to the Oeuvre de 
cerc/es, which were particularly strong in the Croix Rousse, home of the merchant-
manufacturing branch of the silk industry. Maurice Guerin roundly denounced the 
Oeuvre des cerc/es for denying workers the right to independent organization. They 
restrained the growth of the CFTC without affecting the CGT.229 It is then possible to 
see that amongst a minority in the Croix Rousse, liberal individualism had become 
Corporate self-regulation. 
In this relationship between trades union, political party and the parish it is 
possible to see how the critique of industrialization could merge with a wider suspi-
cion of the modern world. This also involved a resuscitation of the integrist, perhaps 
Legitimist, strand in the Lyonnais right which had retreated into the Church in the 
1870s and 1880s.230 Cardinal Maurin, Archbishop of Lyon, was himself sympathetic 
to it. His idea of syndicalism was not dissimilar from that of Gruffaz.231 In the early 
224 La Voix Sociale, October 1928, 21-10-23. 
225 La Voix Sociale, May, 1927; April, 1930. 
226 La VoixSociale, 16-12-1923, 10-5-1925. 
227 'Il fut un modele de fidelite, c'est 11 dire qu'il qu'il fut un employe modele et ne voulut jamais etre autre chose 
qu'employe [ ... J parce qu'iJ jugea 1es valeurs humaines d'apres une autre echelle'. La Voix sociale, 1937. 
228 See page 86 
229 La VoixSociale, September/October, 1926 and November, 1929 
230 See Chapter 2. 
231 Launay, La cnc, pp. 76-9. 
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1920s it was rumoured that Maurin had sought papal condemnation of the CFTC.232 
Marius Gonin did his best to facilitate relations between CFTC and Maurin, but the 
result was that one militant saw him as the 'surveillant du patron at lyonnais et de 
l'archeveche aupres des syndicats chretiens'.233 
To conclude this discussion it is worth asking how influential was the CFTC? 
The Lyon region is identified by Michel Launay as a bastion of Catholic trades 
unionism.234 A report of 1922 reveals that some 1,337 people regularly paid their 
dues.235 This figure rose to perhaps 5,000 members in 1935.236 It is not an insignifi-
cant figure, especially as it was concentrated in certain sectors. But it is not large in 
comparison with the CGT, which had some 30,000 members in the RhOne in 1935.237 
And once the initial enthusiasm of 1919-1920 had worn off, the CFTC experienced 
the same difficulties as the CGT.238 Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s La Voix 
Sociale complained of indifference. 
On the other hand, given that the 1920s did not provide favourable ground for 
trades unions of any type, membership should not be equated with real influence. 
CFTC militants could get themselves heard through the Catholic press, particularly 
the Croix du RhOne. In the bank strike of 1925 the CFTC manifestly spoke for a large 
number of employees, while elections for Prud'homme councils provided a wider au-
dience.239 
The record of the CFTC in industrial disputes is also mixed. It was formed in a 
context of anti-Bolshevik paranoia. It did not participate in the Union Civique, orga-
nized to break the railway strikes of 1920, while the employees federation was active 
in putting forward the grievances of bank staff. On the other hand, Marius Gonin rep-
resented the Chronique Sociale in the Union civique.240 Some CFTC unions were 
formed in the classic manner of 'yellow' unions, in the wake of bitter and unsuccess-
ful strikes.241 
Only the white collar unions ever played an autonomous role in labour rela-
tions. And even in this case the CFTC did not regard the strike as a first resort. Col-
laboration and moral force were preferable. The problem was that few outside the 
232 Launay, these, pp. 1493-1507. The rumour was groundless, but that high level meetings were necessary to 
dispel any doubts is revealing of the attitudes of some in the hierarchy. 
233 Archives de la Chronique Sociale, correspondence, 1930, quoted by M. Launay, La CFTC, p. 256. 
234 M. Launay, La CFTC,p. 217. 
235 At the same moment the white collar federation claimed 238 members in La Vou sociale. 
236 M. Launey suggests that in 1929 there were 100 more adherents than in 1922 in the region. These, p. 1519. 
But extrapolation from reliable membership figures for 1937, quoted in La CFTC, pp. 401-2, on the baSIS of the 
400% membership increase since 1935 claimed by the CFTC suggest the higher figure given here. 
237 Prost, op. cit., p. 212. 
238 Launay, these, pp. 1473-4. 
239 In the 1929 Prud 'homme elections the CFTC gained 559 votes in the two white collar colleges in which it pre-
sented candidates, and together with the reactionary USN, a further 329 in one of the railway categories. 
240 ADR, 1m 637. Some independent white collar unions were also involved, including Biard's Association des 
employes de commerce et de l'industrie, which was to contest consular elections in alliance with the CFTC. Par-
ticipation of the CFrC railwaymen in breaking the strikes was a source of sorrow to Guerin. (Launay, these. pp. 1422-3, 1448-1452). 
241 E. g. the OTL union in 1928, and a textile union in Thizy in 1931. 
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CFfC, either workers or bosses, set much store by negotiation. Unable to impose its 
own original line, the CFfC tended to oscillate between patronal and workers' posi-
tions.242 But if the CFTC's success in its own sphere was limited, we shall see that its 
ideas and the social forces to which it gave coherence had a definite political impact. 
Conclusion 
Maurice Moissonnier and Andre Boulmier argue that the creation of the Union 
Civique in 1919 marked a decisive stage in the formation of a monopoly capitalist 
bourgeoisie in Lyon. It dominated the petty bourgeoisie, and with Auguste Isaac as 
Minister of Commerce, it was closely linked to the state.243 It is true that postwar work-
ing class unrest provoked an impressive display of ruling class unity. Yet we have 
seen that by the end of the decade that unity was threatened. Even the formation of 
the Union Civique itself must be seen as an episode in the battle for hegemony within 
the ruling class. Although it united the Chamber of Commerce, the Chronique and 
AICA, the initiative had been taken by the CSIM President Tobie Rebatel. AICA also 
played a leading part. 
By the end of the 1920s it is possible to speak of a crisis of the liberal tradition 
of Lyon. Big businessmen like Henry Morel-Journel invoked liberal principles when 
home weaving or trades unionism was at issue. But he was also an enthusiastic sup-
porter of cartels. His commitment to mass production helped to undermine the unity 
of the silk industry. Merchant-manufacturers and medium factory owners in the silk 
industry were beginning to see corporatism as an alternative means of preserving in-
dividual initiative and skill on which flexible-production depended. In this they were 
backed by the conservative wing of the CFTC. Meanwhile elements in the metallurgi-
cal industry __ were moving towards social democracy similar to that of the CFTC. 
The following chapters will examine the political aspects of these changes. 
242 La Vou Sociale, 25-10-1925: After the unsuccessful bank strike of 1925 Guerin asked rhetorically: 'Pourquoi 
nous acharner A offrir aux patrons une collaboration qu'ils refusent obstinement? Pourquoi ne pas entrer resolu-
ment dans la lutle des classes dont on nous a donne un exemple parfait du cote droil<de la barricade!' Guerin's only 
response was to counsel perseverance in the face of the 'insolent triumph of the financial oligarchy'. 
243 pp. 106. 
Chapter five 
The sociology of the parliamentary right, 1928-36 
For Rene Remond the opposition of Federation Republicaine and Alliance democra-
tique derived from mentality and clientele. On the one hand the Federation 'rather 
faithfully expressed the state of mind, the convictions, and also the fears of a certain 
number of essentially rural areas, as yet hardly touched by economic evolution and 
remaining deeply attached to Old France'. On the other, the Alliance was 'the section 
of parliament which came closest to the leading circles of economy, of banking and 
finance. [ ... It] corresponded to a society quite different from the old rural society; it 
was the political expression of bourgeois France that emerged from the Revolution '.1 
Broadly speaking this characterization of the two major constituents of the 
parliamentary right is not unacceptable. As the Federation on the national level be-
came more conservative so it absorbed the electorate of the old monarchist right in the 
rural west. We shall see that in the Rhone too the Federation's militant base shifted 
towards the western mountains and the Beaujolais. Just as on the national level the 
Alliance was a largely urban party,2 so in the Rhone it was more or less confined to 
Lyon, where to some extent it took on the mantle of Aynardian Progressism. 
But if the focus is narrowed then the picture begins to look more complicated. 
Writing in 1930, Andre Siegfried recognized that the Federation included not only 
Catholic landowners,3 but also certain 'proud bourgeois dynasties', along with quasi-
feudal big businessmen. More complex still was the centre right, which Siegfried saw 
as attracted simultaneously towards the anti-clericalism of the left, and to the Catholi-
cism of the ruling class and of 'organized capitalism'. What is more, this tension was 
to be found within each of the several parliamentary groups of the centre right. 4 
In this chapter we shall see that Siegfried's emphasis on the inter-penetration 
of religion and politics is closer to the mark than is Remond's social determinism. 
True, Victor Perret declared his intention of uniting the possessing classes by fighting 
on the 'economic terrain'. But he also recognized that the bourgeoisie, especially the 
'bourgeoisie en place', might prove to be incapable of bringing about 'national recov-
ery', in which case it would be necessary to turn to 'popular elements'.s In fact Perret 
had a particular conception of the economic terrain, whilst his popular support de-
1 Remond, op. cit., pp. 268. 271. 
2 Irvine, op. cit., p. 25; R. Sansom, 'L' Alliance Mmocratique', in R Remond and 1 Bourdin, (eds.), La France et 
lesfranr;ais en 1938-39., Paris. 1978; D.O. Wileman. 'poE Flandin and the Alliance Dcmocratique, 1929-1939', 
FH, 1990, pp. 139-73. 
3 '11 n'y a pas en effet de commune, si petite soit-elle, ou l'eglise ne regroupe et n'organise une resistance; et 
p.artout ou il existe un chateau; une dynastie bourgeoise, bref un forme consciente d'aristocralie sociale, celte re-
sIstance trouve un appui', Andre Siegfried, Tableau des partis en France, Paris, 1930. pp.I72-173. 
4 Siegfried, op. cit.. 1930, pp. 179-80. 
5 AN 317 AP 84. 
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pended on religious ties. For these reasons Perret's establishment of control over the 
Federation was associated with a shift towards what might loosely be termed the 'old 
Catholic bourgeois elites' of the peninsula. These were linked by the Church to the 
private sector white collar workers of the Croix Rousse. This was part of a reaction 
against the reformist conservatism of the late 1920s, which Perret attributed to the 
'bourgeoisie en place'. The emergence of the PDP, meanwhile, reveals the alienation 
of Catholic intellectuals and white collar workers from the liberal tradition, a devel-
opment accounted for neither by Rene Remand nor Siegfried. 
Methods 
In this chapter the approach is quantitative. This does not mean that historical process 
has been reduced to what E.P. Thompson disparagingly refers to as a 'static geologi-
cal section'.6 Such a view depends on a false dichotomy between structure and 
agency, for as Anthony Giddens shows human activity is the very medium through 
which social structures are constituted and reconstituted, as well as transformed. If 
this is accepted then the distinction between 'quantitative' and 'qualitative' research 
breaks down: 'all quantitative data, when scrutinized, turn out to be composites of 
"qualitative" [ ... J interpretations, produced by situated researchers, coders, govern-
ment officials and others'.' It follows that methods which E. P. Thompson describes 
as appropriate to analysis of qualitative evidence are also relevant to quantitative 
data.8 
It is therefore appropriate to begin with a brief word on the methods used to 
reconstitute party memberships. The principal sources are accounts of political meet-
ings in the press-some 5,070 names were collected in this way. In the agglomera-
tion party organization usually corresponded to municipal arrondissements. Conve-
niently for our purposes electoral lists were maintained at this level, so it is possible to 
locate many of these sympathizers in them. In the suburbs party sections were orga-
nized at communal level, so it is a simple matter to find individuals in the corre-
sponding electoral lists. In the countryside, where party organization was sketchy, 
commune of residence is nearly always stated in the press. 
Electoral rolls give address, occupation, commune and date of birth. In Lyon 
and ViIleurbanne the polling district in which the individual resided is also given, 
which permits detailed spatial analysis. Armed with address, it is possible to obtain 
additional information from censuses (family size, name of employer) and other 
6 E.P. Thompson, The Poverty o/Theory and Other Essays, London, 1978, p. 239. 
7 A. Giddens, The ConstitUlion o/Society, Cambridge, 1984, p. 333; A. Giddens, Social Theory and Modern Soci-
ology, Cambridge, 1987. 
8 Thompson, op. cit., p. 220-2. If statistical evidence consists in reality of large amounts of qualitative data, then it 
can and must be interrogated for the contradictions and liaisons, dominant and subordinate elements, rising and 
falling energies evoked by Thompson. 
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sources such as the high society Tout-Lyon Annuaire (second homes, cerc/es). In this 
way it was possible to obtain the professions of some 70% of the original sample. 
This procedure is, of course, far from perfect. It is not possible to determine an 
individual's religious affiliation. For the Croix de Feu the method fails entirely to 
produce an adequate sample. Also, the method itself distorts the result. Specific 
problems will be indicated where they are relevant. 9 For the moment it is sufficient to 
note that there are two main sources of bias which pull in different directions. On the 
one hand the process of identification skews the sample. Put simply, an elderly bour-
geois or peasant is easier to locate than a young worker or student. Geographical or 
social mobility are the obvious reasons for this. On the other hand, identification de-
pends on quality of information given in the press. For reasons which are explained in 
Appendix 3, levels of identification are higher in suburban areas, which are mainly 
working class. To an unknown extent this compensates for the overrepresentation of 
the bourgeoisie. 
Membership 
The initial sample for 1928 to June 1936, before names are eliminated because of 
non-location in the electoral lists, is made up of 93% Federation, 5% PDP, and a mere 
3% lay centre right sympathizers. The proportion represented by the Federation is 
perhaps a little exaggerated, but judging by scattered indications in the party press and 
other sources, this is not too distant from the real situation. 
William Irvine equates Federation membership in France as a whole with the 
circulation of La Nation, the party journal. 10 Victor Perret revealed in 1927 that sub-
scriptions in the Rhone were approaching 2,000.11 But in the 1930s sales of the party 
organ stagnated while membership increased both nationally and in the Rhone. 12 Per-
haps the best indication of rising membership in the Rhone is the ability of the Feder-
ation to support its own weekly journal from June 1932. Extrapolation from the few 
communes in which readership of L'Union republicaine is known suggests a circula-
tion of 5,326. 13 This is not an unreasonably large figure, given that 1935-6 repre-
sented the peak of Federation influence. 14 It is given credence by the claim of the 
committee of the 6th arrondissement to have had several hundred members in 1932.15 
9 For a detailed discussion of these sources see Appendix 4 and Pinol. Mobililes el immobilismes, passim. 
10 Irvine, op. cit., p. 37. 
11 AN 317 AP 76. 2-5-1927, Perret to Marin. 
12 Jeanneney, de Wendel, pp. 428-9 reports that party membership rose from 3,000 in 1924 to 180,000 in 1938. 
13 Union republicaine, 10-2-1935,9-2-1936. Communes in which sales were particularly high were commend-
eded at party congresses in 1935 and 1936, showing for example that 700 copies were sold in the canton of 
Villeurbanne. The total was 1.105 copies in fourteen communes. These figures were projected onto the department 
as a whole by relating the.~e figures to my own sample of sympathizers. 
14 It is compatible with a known circulation of 4-5,000 in the region in 1940, a period when FR membership was 
considerably less than in 1936. 
15 L 'Union republicaine, 17-5-1932. 
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In 1930 and 193 1 the party youth group c la imed 2,000 members. 16 Such figures are 
doubtless much exaggerated. But it is safe to conclude that members hi p of the Feder-
ation in the Rhone was untypica lly high for a party of the parliamentary ri ght. 
Graph 4: Federation militants by yea r 
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As for evoluti on of membership over time, the onl y indi ca tor is o ur own sam-
ple. Graph 4 breaks down Federation sympathizers by year. As expec ted , peaks in ac-
tivity coincide with genera l ejections in 1928 and 1932. Conve rse ly, the low points 
are in 1930 and 1933, the onl y two years in which there were ne ithe r nati onal nor lo-
cal e lections. Surprisingly, in view of the probable ri se in party membership in the 
1930s, and of Victor Perret ' s conscious efforts to place party orga ni za ti on on a firmer 
footing, the hi ghest number of sympathi zers c ited was in 1928. This is explained 
largely by the holding of large congresses to choose cand idates in the four rural con-
stituencies in that year. 17 A four year running mea n, which e liminates the influence of 
general elections, suggests a hi gher level of Federation activity after 1932, when Per-
ret 's righti st ideas were more popular, and as hi s recruitment drive bore fr uit . But 
Soon the Federation faced competition fro m the Croix de Feu, and was a lready in de-
cl ine by 1936. 
The e lectoral success of the lay centre right in the interwar yea rs was depen-
dent more upon individ ual deputies than upon a large militant base. The only ava il -
ab le membership figure for the Alliance is e ighty adherents in J939. IR Since the 
source is an internal party one it is probably reliable. Membership had perhaps been 
greater in the early 1930s, but the Alliance had never been a mass party. 
16 For example. 2.000 members in 50 sections according to the NOl/vel/isle of 8-2- 1930. 2.000 in RO sections nc-
cording to the Nouveau Journal of 19-1-1931 . 
17 This wa~ because the previous e lection had been held under a departmenta l list system which made such con-
gresses unnecessary. In subsequent years they were less frequent hecause selection of sitting deputies was a for-
mality. 
18 Papers of the Alliance Democralique. Carton I . 
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The situation of the PDP was somewhat better. As a self-consciously demo-
cratic party the PDP was more open about its membership. In 1929 total income from 
subscriptions in all of the party's sections except the 3rd and 7th was published in the 
party press.19 From this it can be deduced that there were about 350 dues-paying 
members. In the following years the PDP experienced moderate growth. In 1933 the 
Cours section reported that it would soon break the 200 barrier. According to the 
party press 900 attended the F he federate of 1935.20 But it would be surprising if the 
number of PDP activists in the Rhone reached four figures. 21 Its leaders were pre-
pared to admit that 'notre federation n'a certes pas l'allant de certaines de nos 
voisines'.22 
Geographicallmpiantation 
Table 4 shows that between January 1928 and June 1936,23 a slender majority of all 
parties taken together was resident in the agglomeration.24 But just as conservative 
candidates did relatively better in the countryside in elections, so sympathizers were 
overrepresented relative to the registered electorate. The Federation was the most ru-
ral of the three parties; the PDP had minority support outside the agglomeration; the 
lay centre right almost none. 
Table 4: The Parliamentary Right in the RhOne, 1928 to June 
1936 (percent) 
Party Agglom.j Dept. I Total 
Federation 45 55 2968 
PDP 78 22 163 
Centre right 97 3 77 
Total 49 51 3208 
Electorate 65 35 236018 
19 Bulletin des Denwcrales Populaires du RhOne. 12-6-1929. Total amount was FI.I13. The press also gives the 
number of adherents in the 6th arrondissement (80) together with subscriptions. So it can be calculated that aver-
age dues were in the order of 4.3 francs, giving total membership of 259, to which CWl be added an estimated fur-
ther 90 adherents of the 3rd and 7th sections, making a total of 349. This guess is based on the knowledge that the 
3rd arrondissement was, along with the 5th and 6th. the main area of PDP recruitment. 
20 Trait d'Union des Democrales Populaires du RhOne, 1-3-35. July 1935. In the same year the journal claimed 
100 subscribers Wld 500 readers. 
21 Another indication of the influence of the PDP is the number of subscriptions--570 in 1935---to the Do-
minican journal Sept. Aline Coutrot. Un journal de Combat: Sept, Paris, 1971, p.197. Subscriptions to L'Aube 
numbered 510 in 1935. 507 in 1938. Franorois Mayeur, L 'Aube. Etude d'un journal d'opinion, 1932-1940. Paris, 
1966, p. 187. 
22 Nouveau Journal, 8-1-1936. 
23 June 1936 is used as a reference date because of the reorganization of the right after the victory of the Popular 
Front. 
24 For the following analyses, unless otherwise stated, fifteen communes have been treated as part of the agglom-
eration. To the eleven studied by Jean-Luc Pinol (Caluire et Cuire, Ste Foy, Pierre Benite, Oullins, La Mulatiere, 
Lyon, Villeurbanne, Vaulx en Velin, Venissieux, St Fons, and Bron), have been added three residential communes 
(Tassin la Demi Lune, Francheville, and Ecully), Wld one industrial commune (Sl Rambert rIle Barbe). 
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During the period in question the contribution of the agglomeration to the Federation 
sample grew from 43% in 1928 to 1931 to 49% in 1932 to June 1936. This is largely 
accounted for by the weight of delegates to the 1928 congresses referred to above.25 
But sympathizers in the city remained underrepresented in relation to the electorate as 
a whole. 
It is, however, probable that the means by which the sample was collected ex-
aggerates rural backing for the Federation. The reason is that the nature of political 
activity differs between the agglomeration and the rest of the department. In Lyon and 
the suburbs the great majority of names are drawn from accounts of party meetings 
and so allegiances are usually clear. But outside the city, thanks to the looseness of 
party organization, we have a hotchpotch of individuals drawn from two kinds of 
sources. On the one hand, members of Federation committees and attenders at party 
meetings. On the other, a larger group of delegates at meetings called to choose can-
didates, together with those who welcomed conservative candidates on pre-election 
tours to their commune--in both cases usually mayors or their deputies. At such 
times factional allegiance was normally subordinated to support for the unique can-
didate of the right. So it is possible that the sample includes many who were not Fed-
eration supporters. 
For these reasons it is necessary to divide the sample into two parts for many 
analyses. Outside the agglomeration all supporters of the parliamentary right (except 
the PDP, which was separately organized) are grouped together. In practice this is not 
a great disadvantage, for only two sympathizers of the Alliance democratique could 
positively be identified in the countryside. Even though Laurent Bonnevay, deputy for 
Tarare, had left the Federation for the Republicains de gauche26 in 1929, his support-
ers were mainly Federation sympathizers. It therefore seems reasonable to regard the 
resulting group as corresponding to the broadest definition of the Federation: Perret's 
organized wing, together with the notables and their clients who were loosely associ-
ated with it. 
The Department 
The geographical distribution of Federation sympathizers in absolute figures, shown 
in Map 5.1, is not especially revealing. Three remarks can be made. First, the pres-
ence of Federation sympathizers correlates positively with the distribution of the reg-
istered electorate.27 Second, sympathizers of the Federation were less numerous 
where the right was e1ectorally strong, that is in rural communes. The third feature of 
25 This is confirmed by the fact that there was no corresponding change in the composition of the Camilt de. 
parlemenlai of the Federation. 
26 A parliamentary group affiliated to the Alliance denwcralique. 
27 The correlation coefficient between number of militants and the registered electorate is fairly high. at .7191. 
The only two communes with more than 50 militants are Villefranche and Givors. the two largest communes out-
side the agglomeration. 
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the map is the evenness of imp1antation over much of the department. This reflects 
the nature of the sources and in turn the style of rural politics. The usual practice in an 
account of a rural political meeting or campaign tour was to cite one or two individu-
als as representatives of each commune-often the mayor--whatever the com-
mune's population. Smaller communes are therefore overrepresented. For this reason 
the effect of calculating the number of conservative sympathizers per 100 electors is 
simply to make communes with tiny popUlations, such as Moire with 131 inhabitants 
in 1936, stand out (see Map 5.2). That the conservative press felt obliged to pay so 
much attention to small-town mayors tells us much about the Federation. 
Table 5: Sympathizers of the Parliamentary Right by Region, 1931 
and 1933 (Percent) 
Region I 1930 I 1933 
Plateau Lyonnais 64 41 
Beaujolais viticole 26 42 
Monts du Lyonnais 7 15 
Monts du Beaujolais 2 2 
Total I 301 I 266 
The dual nature of the Federation--the co-existence of notables and party mili-
tants----can be seen in the implantation of sympathizers in 1930 and 1933, the only 
two years in which there were neither local nor national elections (Maps 5.3 and 5.4 
and Table 5). In such periods many notables had little to do with the Federation. 
Therefore it is possible to isolate the 'organized' Federation and to measure the im-
pact of Victor Perret's efforts to give the party a permanent structure. In 1930 Perret 
was disputing control with Fran~ois Peissel. But by 1933 he was triumphant. 
Clearly political activity in non-electoral periods was an affair of the more 
densely populated east of the department. But this is truer in 1930 than in 1933. In 
Table 5 it is possible to see a shift in activity away from the plateau, where the per-
centage of activists falls by about a third. This fall is only partially accounted for by a 
big drop in the number of sympathizers in industrial Givors.28 Within the boundaries 
of the plateau the Federation retreats towards the residential suburbs of the western 
agglomeration. 
Meanwhile the proportion of sympathizers in regions of more recent commit-
ment to the Republic grew. There is a doubling of the proportion of Federation sym-
pathizers in the Monts du Lyonnais. In 1931 they had been found in small industrial 
and market towns like St Symphorian sur Coise and St Foy l' Argentiere, and in a few 
agricultural communes; three years later the Federation was present in the majority of 
28lf Givors is not included, the proportion of sympathizers on the plateau falls from 60% in 1930 to 39% in 1933. 
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rural communities. Sympathizers are particularly numerous in the southern extremity 
of the ranges, where a short-lived intercommunal committee accounts for the high 
number of militants, and in the canton of St Laurent de Chamousset where Alexandre 
la Batie organized a number of meetings.29 
The Beaujolais also increases in importance. Within this area there is a shift 
towards the town of Villefranche and the rural communes of the canton of Anse, in 
contrast with the more even spread of 1930. This reflects on a smaller scale the shift 
from a type of politics in which each commune was represented by a notable, towards 
a party system. 
The Monts du Beaujolais are an exception to this pattern, for in neither 1930 
nor 1933 was there a significant number of militants in this area. But in late 1935 the 
Federation began to organize in Bonnevay's fief, confirming thus the move of the 
Federation away from the plateau. 
The same trends can be seen in the geographical implantation of the member-
ship of the Federation's Comite departemental (see Table 6 and Maps 5.5 and 5.6). 
Ruralization of the sympathizers of the Federation is reflected in the rising proportion 
who lived in less populous communes.30 In the Comite departemental, however, the 
proportion in less populous communes hardly increased at all. 31 This probably reflects 
the fact that leadership of the Federation remained in the hands of a wealthier and 
more urban elite. 
Table 6: Members of the Comite departemental of the Federation 
republicaine (Percent) 
Region I 1930 I 1933 
Plateau Lyonnais 62 43 
Monts du Lyonnais 15 22 
Monts du Beaujolais 14 19 
Beaujolais viticole 9 16 
Total I 65 I 58 
Thus the Federation under Victor Perret was shifting away from the historic centres of 
moderate Republicanism on the plateau towards largely rural formerly monarchist re-
gions. These were areas where the 'traditional' social authorities remained in control. 
But this happened at a time when the foundations of notable politics were becoming 
rather shaky. Indeed, Perret's establishment of control over the party can be seen (in 
2~ If comparison is made between all sympathizers present in 1928-31 and 1932-36, then the Mountains de-
clin~ither because Peissel's tours in Mountains were less reported by a hostile press, or because sympathy 
for Perret in mountains led to indifference to his rival. 
30 The percentage of sympathizers in communes of more than 1,500 inhabitants fell from 47% in 1930 to 34%. 
31 It rose from 52% to 53%. 
Sociology of the parliamentary right, 1928-36 107 
part) as a reaction to this crisis. Rather than 'democratizing' the Federation, the effect 
of Perret's activities was to prop up old modes of political organization. 
Related to the dissolution of notable politics was the rise of the PDP. From 
Map 5.7 it can be seen that the Beaujolais mountains were the main source of support 
for Christian democracy outside Lyon. Militants were most numerous in the canton of 
Thizy, especially in Cours.32 Presence in cotton towns was matched by a certain 
strength in other small and medium towns: Belleville, Villefranche, St Symphorian 
sur Coise and Vaugneray. But the PDP was almost entirely absent from agricultural 
communes; before the rise of the Croix de Feu notables were not subject to political 
challenge in rural areas. The importance of individual action in small parties is illus-
trated by the Vaugneray committee, which was animated by the family of an intel-
lectual from the milieu of the Chronique, Joseph Vialatoux. 
The Agglomeration 
Map 5.8 shows the distribution of militants and sympathizers of the Federation by 
polling district in Lyon and Villeurbanne. Implantation in suburban communes can be 
seen on Map 5.1. Just as the influence of the party reached into almost all the com-
munes of the department, so no part of the agglomeration was untouched. All the 
same, certain areas stand out. In older parts of the city they include most of the 5th, all 
but the central districts of the Croix Rousse, and parts of the 2nd (205 and 210). On 
the left bank the main area of strength is in the southern and eastern part of Villeur-
banne and adjacent districts of the 3rd and 6th arrondissements. Otherwise, only a few 
districts have more than average numbers of sympathizers, mainly located on the 
quais of the RhOne (702, 305,606 and 611). With the exception of the Croix Rousse 
these were either bourgeois or working class areas. 
What is most striking about the distribution of Federation sympathizers in ab-
solute terms is the degree of support in peripheral areas of the city, whether in prole-
tarian districts like Venissieux or residential communes like Caluire. Map 5.9 shows 
the number of militants per 1,000 electors in Lyon and Villeurbanne. All thirteen of 
the fifteen districts in which there were six or more sympathizers per thousand are in 
peripheral and often working class areas. In the 3rd and 7th arrondissements the dis-
tricts which lie beyond the Lyon-Geneva railway line stand out, as do the Croix 
Rousse, Vaise, and Perrache. In much of the centre of the city, except in certain bour-
geois districts, the Federation is relatively weak. Map 5.2 shows that militants are also 
very substantially overrepresented in suburban communes. 
But because of the manner in which the sample was constituted, the signifi-
cance of the Federation presence in suburban areas must not be exaggerated.33 In 
~2 PDP presence in the towns of the Monts du Beaujolais is part of a wider area of Christian demoLTatic influence 
m the textile towns of the Roannais. 
33 See page 101. 
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Lyon and Villeurbanne knowledge of po lling di stri ct is dependent upon identi ficat ion 
in the e lectora l li st, so not all sympathizers cited in the press ca n be mapped . But in 
suburban communes a ll names found in the sources are inc luded . Al so the sampl e in -
corporates many persons whose only contribution to the li fe of the Federation was to 
appea r on one of it li sts for muni c ipa l e lections. Thi s weights the sample because the 
number of councill ors per head of popul ation was much lower in Lyon than in the 
suburbs.34 These diffi culti es can be e li mina ted by us ing the arrondi ssements of Lyon 
and the commune of Villeurbanne as units of analys is rather than polling di stric ts, by 
re lating number of militants to the size of the e lec torate, and by us ing onl y th ose mil -
itants c ited in years in which the re were no e lec tions. 35 The influence of muni c ipal 
e lecti ons can be di sposed of by excluding campai gn peri ods from a nalysis. As in rural 
communes it is possible to iso late the impact of Victor Perret by comparin g 1930 with 
1933. 
The one di sadvantage of thi s procedure is th at the importance of the Feder,t-
ti on in proletarian suburban communes remain s exaggerated . The reason is the pres-
ence of large numbers of fore igne rs, none of whom were on the e lec toral reg iste r. It is 
not poss ible to resolve thi s problem by re lating sympa thi zers to popul atio n rather th an 
e lectorate because of cens us fraud in Lyon. 
Gra ph 5: Federation Militants in 1930 and )1)3336 
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34 In Lyon there were at leas t 1,800 elec tors for every counc illor. The reconJ is he ld by the 2nd arro nd issemcnt. 
where there were 2,640 electo rs per councillor in 1935. thanks to a blatant piece o f gerrymandering on the part of 
the Radical muni ipa li ty. there were 468 electors per councillor in Villcurbannc a nd 4R in Pierre-Benit". 
35 Ellllli nating o nly municipal electi on years (1929 and 1935) also prod uc"s II mUI" int clliga hle resul t. S ll hllrhan 
communes remain the most overre presented. 
36 The pa tt ern of support identifIed here is confir med by a remark in Union rcpllblicaine th at the 7th ar-
ro ndis semen t section. was not. unli ke sections in the fourth and 1st arro ndisscmcnt s. ab le to moun t la rgc fu nctions 
appealing to al l classes. 
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This is the basis on which Graph (?) was constructed. Under- and over-
representation are shown in terms of an index.37 A figure of 100 means that the pro-
portion of sympathizers in a given area is equal to the proportion of the total elec-
torate in that area. A figure of fifty means that half as many militants as expected 
were found, while 200 means that there are twice as many militants as expected. 
It is immediately apparent that the importance of suburban communes has been re-
duced.38 The only exceptions are the northern suburbs. This is due to the presence of 
an unusually large committee in the commune of Caluire. It was established in order 
to back the lengthy campaign of Fran~ois Peissel for the mayoralty of that commune. 
Once this aim had been achieved in May 1935 the committee declined. 
Otherwise, the most notable feature of the graph is the relative decline of Fed-
eration implantation on the left bank of the Rhone, that is in the area where Aynard 
had once found his chief supporters. This decline is evident in both the 3rd and 6th ar-
rondissements. The 6th was in 1930 the most overrepresented area of the city. The 
1930 Federation sample in the 6th is inflated by overlap with the lay centre right in an 
area where all strands in the right were federated in a non-partisan committee. In the 
course of 1930 the Federation organized its own pro-Perret section in the 6th. By 
1933 the Federation audience was much reduced. In the 3rd arrondissement the fall in 
the number of militants is probably to be explained by differentiation from the PDP. 
There is also a sharp decline in the importance of the 5th arrondissement. Growing 
antagonism between Federation and PDP is partly to blame here too. The 5th was also 
the only area apart from the 6th where the Alliance had any support. In 1933 the main 
areas of overrepresentation of Federation militants were all in the peninsula and the 
Croix Rousse: the space of the 'old bourgeoisie' and those to whom they were linked. 
The importance of the 1 st and 2nd would be greater still had the members of the Fed-
eration's satellite organizations in those arrondissements been included in the sam-
ple,39 
It is also interesting to note that turnover of sympathizers is considerably 
higher in working class and peripheral parts of the agglomeration. This is illustrated 
by Graph 6, which plots the average number of years in which an individual was cited 
in the press. All proletarian suburbs are grouped on the right of the graph, as are those 
parts of Lyon with significant working class populations (except the 5th). High 
turnover is partly due to the greater mobility of the popUlation at large in the suburbs, 
but is not the only explanation because Federation sympathizers were recruited 
37 This is calculated by dividing the percentage of adherents in a given area into the percentage of electors in that 
area and multiplying by 100. 
38 The south east banlieu comprises largely working class Bran. Venissieux and St Fons. together with Vaulx en 
Velin. a mixed agricultural and industrial commune. The South west banlieu also comprises mainly industrial 
Pierre Benite. La Mulatiere and Dullins. Four residential communes make up the western banlieu: Francheville. 
Ecully and Ta~sin and Ste. Foy. Finally. the northern suhurbs include Caluire et Cuire and St Rambert 
39 The Cercle des lravailleurs in the 1st; the Foyer de Perrache in the 2nd. 
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mainly from the locally born . All the arrondi ssements of Lyon show greater stabi lity. 
w ith the bourgeois western suburbs occupyi ng an inte rmedi ate position. The most as-
siduous militants were in the Croix Rousse. There will ofte n be occasion to note the 
deep roots of the Federation in that area . 
Graph 6: Mean Years of Activity in the Federation, the Ag-
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Thus the most active Federation militants were to be found in the heart of the com-
mune of Lyon. Within the latter the Federation was mov ing towards ' o ld ' Lyon . Thi s 
is true of both the bourgeois 2nd and the unsegregated 4th .40 Apart from invo lvemen t 
in older economic activities these di stricts have in common a hig h re li g io us prac ti ce. 
Examples are 404 and 408 in the Croix Rousse. In such areas the presence of private 
sector white collar workers, a re lati ve ly dense pari sh network, and a leave ning of 'o ld 
bourgeo is' exp la in the success of the Federation.41 In areas 0 11 the left bank wi th a 
similar social mix but a lower level of Church attendance and absence of 'old bour-
geo is', the Federation does less well. It fared especially badly in the pa.ri sh o f St 
Sacrement.42 In the early 1950s thi s parish had the lowest leve l of religious prac ti ce ill 
the c ity .43 
To sum up, it is poss ible to see the Federation in the agg lomeration as CO I11 -
pri sing three overlapping components. First, Pe rret 's party, which was inc reas ing ly 
Catholi c and traditionalist and resident mainly in the peninsula and Croix ROLi sse. 
Second a wider group of Perret sympathi zers who could be mobili zed at e lec tion time, 
and who often res ided in working class areas. Third, the re mnants of the o ld Federa 
40 To some ex ten t the 1st arrondi ssement is an exception. On the one hand the Federati on possessed a dedica ted 
and grow ing core of mil it ants (see Graph (7)). Rut the number of sympalhi7crs llluhili7,ed whcn clection ycars are 
cons idered was much lower than in the 2nd or 4th , The mos t likely explanatio n is Edouard Hen'iot. popu lar arnong 
the electorate at large. but detested by a dedica ted minority . Many of til " clites. meanwhi le were pushed t",vards 
Action jranraise, 
4 1 Sec Chapter s ix . 
42 Ro ughly polling districts 30 1. 302. 306. 307 and 308, 
43 Labbens. op, cit. . passim, 
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Map 5.16 
The Alliance democratique in central Lyon 
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tion. They had little to do with Victor Perret, but supported the Federation's candi-
dates at election time. The Federation of the 1930s was no longer the party of the dy-
namic industrial bourgeoisie of the Brotteaux as it had been in the days of Edouard 
Aynard. These changes parallel those observed in the rest of the department. 
They also help to explain the residence of the bulk of adherents of the lay 
centre right in the 6th arrondissement, mainly in districts 607 and 608. (See Map 
5.12). There is a scattering of sympathizers in the 2nd and 5th arrondissements, but 
Map 5.16 re-emphasizes the extent to which they were located in a small and wealthy 
area from the Place Edouard Quinet in the south to Place Puvis de Chavannes in the 
north and westwards along the cours Morand. This suggests a network of personal ties 
based on quartier.44 The contrast with the Federation emerges best from comparison 
of the elitist centre right with the cadres of the Federation (see Maps 5.14 and 5.15). 
Here the opposition between the left bank of the Rhone on the one hand and the 
presqu Tleis clear. The 2nd arrondissement has ten representatives on the Conseil in 
both periods, the 6th has four in the first period, six in the second. 
The geography of the PDP is also distinctive (see Map 5.13). It is easily expli-
cable in terms of Catholicism. The most important concentration is to be found in the 
de-Christianized and largely working class parish of St Sacrement. This could be due 
to the presence of an abbe democrate, of which there were a number on the left bank. 
But if we descend to a lower level of analysis, as on Map 5.17, it can be seen that sev-
eral adherents lived in or near a Catholic housing development, the Cite Rambaud. In 
the 2nd arrondissement PDP members lived in the area around the rue Sala, close to 
institutions like the Chronique and the Catholic University. Hence also the presence 
of militants in St Just and Point du Jour (districts 510 and 505), adjacent to the Basil-
ica of Fourviere. Finally, a few Christian democrats live in those parts of the Brot-
teaux where the lay centre right was strong, but where religious practice was also 
quite high. The PDP is almost entirely absent from working class areas of the ag-
glomeration. PDP implantation parallels that of the CFfC. 
Generations o/Conservatism 
Antonio Gramsci described French conservative parties in the early 1930s as 
'historico-political documents of the various phases of past French history, whose 
outdated terminology they continue to repeat'.45 It is easy to find evidence for this in 
the age profile of the parliamentary right. 
Not surprisingly for a new party, PDP sympathizers, with an average age of 
forty, are considerably younger than those of the Federation--of which the sup-
44 It is interesting to note, however, that supporters of the Centre right are rare in the wealthiest parts of the Brot-
teaux: the quais of the Rhone and the Boulevard des Belges (i.e. the northern boundary of district 611). 
45 Gramscl, op. cit .• p. 211. Rene Remond uses a similar metaphor, likening the right to 'a building on which each 
age has placed its mark, and which at first discourages the archeologist who wishes to date it'(Rcmond, op. cit.. p. 
22). 
Sociology of the parliamentary right, 192R-36 114 
porters are on average forty-nine. Equally marked is the contrast between the age 
pyramid s of the two parties, shown in Graph 7.46 The proporti on of Federatio n sy m-
pathi zers in each age group fall s fairly evenl y from 25% in the over s ixty category, to 
12% in the case of the under thirties. Nor is it surprising that Federati on leaders were 
older still (see Graph 8). In sharp contrast, only 5% of PDP sympathi zers were over 
sixty, while the pro porti on in their twenties is more than twice as grea t as in the Fed -
eration. 
...... 
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Graph 7: Age of Sympathizers 
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The age profile of the centre right is more complex. Average age, at fo rty-
seven, is only a little lower than in the FR. And as in the Federation those under forty 
are underrepresented . But it is indi viduals in their forti es (38%), and to a lesser ex tent 
their fifti es (1 9%). who stand out, not the over sixti es. Once aga in it is instructi ve to 
compare the centre right (Graph 7) with the ruling body of the Federation (Graph X). 
46 Age is calculated for the median year. 1932. Year of birth is known for 1.993 Federation . 106 POI'. and (ln ly 42 
sympath izers of the cen tre right. 
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The nota bl es of the centre right were a genera ti on younger than those of the Federa-
ti on. 
Graph 9: The Parliamentary Right in the Agglomeration: Age of 
Sympat.hizers 
.. 
Graph 9 compares the ages of sympathi zers in the agg lomeration with J-L. 
Pinol's sample of the Lyonnais e lectorate.47 Since all but two centre ri ght support ers 
lived in Lyon , its age pyramid is almost identica l to that for the department as a 
whole. To a lesser extent thi s is also true of the Christian democrats , of whom three 
quarters live in the agglomeration .48 The picture regarding the Federation is however 
significantly different from that in the department as a whole. Sympathi zers in the 
agglomeration, are on average five years younger than those in the rest of the depart-
ment. Graph 9 shows a fall in the representation of the over sixties from 25% in the 
department as a whole to 18% in the agglomeration . Conversely the age pyramid of 
the Federation in the rest of the department is an exaggerated vers ion of that in Graph 
7. It has a narrow base and broad peak, with the over sixti es representing one third of 
the total.49 The diss imilarities between the generational st.ructures of the Federati on in 
town and countryside are a function of the Federation 's dependence upon notables in 
much of the countryside. 
Victor Perret, through the creati on of a youth group, made a consc ious effort 
to broaden the appeal of the party. Yet age ing over time is apparent however the sa m-
pl e is broken down.50 rt is therefore tempting to link Victor Perret 's triumph in the 
Federation with a shift in the geographical bases of party support towards the space of 
47 Strict ly speaking such a compariso n is dubious, for my fi gures include militan ts from four suhurhan COllllllunes 
not inc luded in the Pi nol study. In practice the distortion is like ly to be vcry sma ll. 
48 Ne ither does the mean age of PDP sYlIlpathizcrs-40 in the agglolllera ti on. 39 in the res t Ill' the dc-
partme nt--vary much. 
4933% to be precise. 
50 Average age of party sympathizers in the department as a who le rose slightly from forty -nine in the years 192R 
to 1932. to fifty -one in the period 1932 to June 1936 . In the agg lomeration average age rose from 47 in the first 1'''_ 
r.,od to 49 in the second . In the departmen t corresponding figures arc 5 1 and 54. In the agg lomeration the prnpnr-
!ton of under thirties feU from 19 % in 1930 to 8% in 1933. 
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the old elites and to the older generation. This is partly correct, but must be qualified 
by taking into account the relations of the Federation with the far right. At first Per-
ret's organizational drive had depended partly on the new youth group, which flour-
ished especially in 1930. This, as we shall see, drew support from the young militants 
of the extreme right. Incapable of autonomous action at this time, the far right tended 
to back Perret for his uncompromising nationalism. Ageing of the Federation in 1933 
is partly explained by the near-disappearance of the far right and consequently of the 
Groupe des jeunes. Then in 1934 when the far right recovered it was under the leader-
ship of the fiercely independent Croix de Feu. The rise of La Rocque's league helps 
to explain the marked fall in the number of persons in their forties shown in Graph 9: 
this was the age group in which old soldiers were most common. None of this, how-
ever, contradicts the ageing of the Federation. 
What conclusions can be drawn from the contrasting age Structures of the 
three parties of the parliamentary right? It is difficult to make direct connections be-
tween age and any particular set of political attitudes. But the recruitment of the Fed-
eration among those who had reached maturity during the Dreyfus affair and the 
struggles between Church and state of the early twentieth century--those in their 
fifties or older in 1932--is surely significant, and does much to explain the politics 
of the Federation, especially under Victor Perret.51 The lay centre right was fairly 
well represented in the same age groups. In the interwar years the centre right can be 
seen as taking on the liberal-conservative mantle of Edouard Aynard. Hence the pres-
ence of one-time collaborators of Aynard such as Etienne Fougere, Laurent Bon-
nevay, and even Auguste Isaac. It is not surprising that polemics between Federation 
and Alliance sometimes took on an archaic tone. 
The Federation also appealed, though with decreasing success, to the war gen-
eration. Those most likely to have passed the war in the front line--perhaps 90% of 
some age groups--were in 1932 aged about thirty-four to fifty-three, ~~ age 
group which corresponds best to our forty-one to fifty category. Victor Perret, forty-
nine in 1932, spent the war in the artillery. The ideas he promoted in the interwar 
years were perhaps the logical result of the impact of trench warfare on a man with a 
background in the Catholic integrism and the ALP.53 It should, however, be noted that 
both the PDP and the centre right are more overrepresented in the forty-one to fifty 
age group. This warns against naive notions of generational conflict resulting from the 
war. As Antoine Prost argues, experience of combat was simply too common to form 
51 Jean-Luc Pinol. in a forthcoming publication. shows the longevity in politics of this generation. 
52 Prost, Les Anciens comballants. vol. II. pp. 1-18. 
53 Some of Perret's closest collaborators. such as Alexandre Bosse-Platiere (fifty in 1932). and Pierre Burgeot 
(forty-six). had also served in the trenches. 
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the basis of a coherent political movement, or even a common set of attitudes. 54 It 
may have shaped a generation, but it did so in a multitude of ways. 
This reminds us that the war also led to a conscious effort to overcome the re-
ligious quarrels of the 1900s. Many Alliance militants would have been unable to re-
member the passions unleashed by the Separation. This helps to explain discretion on 
the religious issue by a party in which there were many practicing, but anti-integrist, 
Catholics. Most members of the PDP had reached adulthood during the 1920s. Their 
experience was of the swan-song of state anti-clericalism under the Cartel, but also of 
the re-establishment of relations with the Vatican and the condemnation of Action 
Fran~aise. Many of those in their thirties and forties would have passed through the 
Groupes d'hudes of the Chronique in the pre-war years. PDP militants were a prod-
uct of a climate in which re-Christianization seemed feasible because of the decline of 
overt anti-clericalism. This helps again to explain their ambivalent attitude towards 
secularism. 
Thus the age structure of the parliamentary right confirms the notion of a right 
marked by the formative experiences of individual militants and sympathizers. Of 
course, the idea that there was, for example, a 'generation of 1900' with a common 
world view is not difficult to criticize. Nevertheless, if generation is brought into re-
lation with factors such as milieu, family background and profession, then it is an es-
sential concept. 
Origins 
The same considerations are relevant to other variables. Jean-Luc Pinol shows that 
'socia-geographic' origin of the electorate in the agglomeration--i.e. the rural or 
urban nature of the commune of birth and its location--cannot be analysed sepa-
rately from age and occupational structure. Young electors are much more likely to 
have been born in the agglomeration. 55 The nature of the immigrant popUlation also 
changes with age, for younger electors were more often born in 'urban' communes, 
while older electors originate more frequently in rural France. Also socia-geographic 
origin is related to occupation, in that natives of the agglomeration are quite strongly 
overrepresented among the elites, artisans, technicians, and white collar workers, es-
pecially those working in the silk industry. Rural recruitment was the rule in public 
service. Workers recruit more or less equally from both sources. 56 These problems 
become more complex when the rest of the department is taken into account. The 
peasantry is largely immobile. The significance of an individual having been born 
outside of his commune of residence differs between town and country. For these rea-
54 Prost, Les Ancien combattants, passim. 
55 Natives of the agglomeration represent 63% of those aged twenty-five or less. but only 28% of the over sixty-
fives. 
56 Pinol, Espace sociaie, pp. 24-46. 
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sons town and country will again be discussed separately and in both cases only in 
outline. 
For what its worth Table 7 shows the geographical origins of sympathizers of 
the parliamentary right in the whole department. Sample sizes for the Christian 
democrats, and in particular the centre right, are not large. But if we confine ourselves 
to the tendency, then certain features stand out. 
Table 7: Geographical Origins of Sympathizers of the Parlia-
mentary Right in the Rhone (percent) 
Party RhoneF hone-Alps Fmnce Total 
FR 67 23 10 1813 
PDP 61 22 17 82 
CentreRt. 50 40 11 38 
Not surprisingly conservative sympathizers are drawn largely from the locally born 
and therefore more deeply rooted part of the population. This is truest of the Federa-
tion, of which more than two thirds of sympathizers were born in the department. 
Given that the Federation alone had significant peasant support and the greater age of 
its sympathizers this is hardly surprising. It is more interesting therefore that 58% of 
Comire departemental members had been born in the department, in spite of its heavy 
weighting towards the older generation and lack of peasant farmers. 
The Agglomeration 
In Table 8 those sympathizers for whom commune of birth is known are broken down 
according to whether they were born in the agglomeration, the Rhone-Alps region57 
or elsewhere in France.58 All three parties are more Lyonnais than the electorate as a 
whole, confinning that integration into the city is a condition of involvement in party 
politics. Now that the peasantry are eliminated it is the PDP which is most Lyonnais: 
56% of its sympathizers were born in the agglomeration, compared to 39% in the 
electorate. Federation migrants, like those of the centre right, still originate in prefer-
ence from the hinterland of the agglomeration. In contrast Christian democrats were 
almost as likely to have been born in the rest of France as in the Rhone-Alps region. 
57 I.e. in the departments of the Rhone-Alps region proper (Rhone, Isere, Ain, Loire, Arde<.:he, Drome, Savoie, 
Haute Savoie) together with Jura, Haute Loire and Saone et Loire. 
58 Militants and sympathizers born outside France have heen excluded. They are statistically insignificant: II sym-
pathizers of the FR, one each in the PDP and Centre right samples. 
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Table 8: Party by Geographical Origin, 1928 to 
193659 (percent) 
Party I NTA IMRA IMFR I Tot 
PDP 56 23 21 62 
FR 46 39 15 775 
Centre Rt 46 46 8 37 
Electorate 39 43 19 
Graph 10: Percentage of Federation republicaine Sympathizers 
Born in the Agglomeration by Age 
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It would not, however, be wholly correct to contrast the Lyonnais origins of Christian 
democrats with the wider recruitment of the Federation and centre right. Since the 
proportion of natives of the agglomeration in the electorate declines with age, then the 
PDP, with its relatively low average age, would be expected to include fewer mi-
grants. That this is indeed the case is demonstrated by Graph 10, which shows the 
percentage of each age group in the Federation which had been born in the agglomer-
ation. The figure falls from 64% among those in their twenties, to 38% in the fifty-one 
to sixty age group, but rises again to 48% of the over sixties. Comparison with the 
electorate shows that natives of the agglomeration in the Federation are more or less 
equal to their part in the electorate as a whole for the youngest generation, but are 
considerably overrepresented among the over sixties.6o Thus, the Federation was very 
much a 'Lyonnais' party insofar as the older (and founding) generation was con-
cerned.61 Disappearance of overrepresentation of the Federation among younger Ly-
59 In order to facilitate comparison with the electorate of the agglomeration. the four communes not included in 
Jean-Luc pinors study will be eliminated from the analyses whil.:h follow. I.e. St·Rambert, Francheville. Tassin la 
Demi-Lune and Ecully. All the comparisons in this section are from Pinol, Espace social. pp. 2446. 
60 63% of electors of 25 or less were born in the city. Of the over sixties 48% were born in the agglomeration. 
compared to only 28% in the electorate. 
61 It is impossible to say with any conviction whether younger PDP sympathizers were more 'Lyonnais' than 
those of the Federation. For what its worth 63% of those FR members aged forty or less were born in Lyon. 
Sociology of the parliamentary right, 1928-36 120 
onnais probably reflects the growing appeal of PDP and CFfC to a generation which 
was urbanized and more likely to have been exposed to social Catholic teaching. 62 
The Federation perhaps relied more upon young members of immigrant families. 
Turning our attention to migrant sympathizers of the Federation, the first point 
to note is that they originate, broadly speaking from the traditional demographic basin 
of Lyon.63 Graph 11, ranks in order of importance the departments from which Feder-
ation sympathizers originated. Those departments which are overrepresented in rela-
tion to the electorate as a whole are shaded. Only those departments from which 1% 
or more of sympathizers originated are represented on the graph. 
Graph 11: Birthplace of Federation sympathizers by De-
partment, 1928 to June 1936 
The graph shows divergences from picture presented by Jean-Luc Pinol. Some of 
these, such as the overrepresentation of the Haute-Vienne, are intrinsically interesting, 
but of little relevance to our present purpose.64 It is more useful to ask whether those 
migrants sympathetic to the right were born in Catholic and right-leaning depart-
ments, for historians of the labour movement have often noted that class conscious-
ness was slow to develop among workers who had been born in such regions. Often 
they saw factory work as a step up the social hierarchy.65 The proposition could be 
62 Comparison of 1930 and 1933 suggests that before and after Perret's establishment of control the percentage of 
Lyonnais remained more or less stable. But in other years the proportion of natives of the agglomeration fluctuates 
widely. Why is a mystery. 
63 Jean-Luc Pinol shows that the area of recruitment to the city scarcely changed from the Revolution to the early 
1930s. Distance and ease of travel were its principle determinants. Espace social. pp. 24 ff. 
64 No less than five of the seven individuals concerned were involved in the builJing trades; their mean age was 
SIxty-fIve; two of them were quite substantial employers. 
~5 See for example. Lenard R. Berlanstein. 'The Formation of a Factory Labour Force: Rubber and Cable Workers 
In Bezons. France (1860-1914). JSH. IS. 1981-1982. 
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tested by comparing the birth places of migrants with voting patterns in the late nine-
teenth century. But the poor quality of electoral statistics makes this problematic. 66 
Comparison with the map of religious practice would perhaps be more revealing, but 
would be a time-consuming task. 
It would also be necessary to descend to a lower level of analysis. Smallness 
of sample size, however, makes Map 5.18, which shows the origin by commune of 
migrants from the Rhone, hard to interpret. 67 There is clearly a pattern, and one which 
diverges from that discovered by Jean-Luc Pino1.68 The most striking feature is the 
under-representation of the plateau and outer suburbs, which account for 48% of mi-
grants in the J-L. Pinal sample, but 40% of Federation migrants. The plateau would 
have been more underrepresented still had J-L. Pinal used natural rather than canton 
boundaries.69 Plateau migrants would most often have been small town artisans, the 
basis of Radicalism on the plateau. It can be concluded cautiously that migrant sym-
pathizers from the Rhone came from more Catholic and conservative areas. 
There is some evidence that rural and small-town social and religious attitudes 
and networks were transferred to the city. Laurent Bonnevay assiduously presided 
over the meetings in Lyon of the Association of Children of the Azergues Valley. 
Gilbert Garrier shows that in 1911 it was common for wealthy households in the 
vicinity of Bellecour to employ servants from their home villages, usually in the 
Beaujolais.70 But it is difficult, because of lack of evidence, to link this to political 
alignments. 
A little more light is thrown on the socio-geographic origins of conservative 
sympathizers by Table 9, which distinguishes between rural and urban communes of 
origin.11 Apart from the unsurprising fact that rural migrants were unlikely to come to 
Lyon from the more distant departments, the table shows that Federation migrants 
were more often born in rural communes than were those of either the lay centre right 
or the PDP. As the sample size for the centre right and PDP dwindles through succes-
sive subdivision to almost nothing, there is little more that can be said about the cen-
tre right and PDP. Nonetheless, relatively low rural recruitment of Christian democ-
racy, together with the high proportion of natives of Lyon among its supporters, and 
their geographical concentration in Lyon and medium sized towns, confIrms the urban 
66 In th~ absence of countrywide electoral statistics Fran'l'ois Goguel maps the. choices of deputies in key votes. 
Companson of Graph 11 with the monarchist nght reveals no correlation, but if the nght and centre majority of 
!ules Meline in 1893 is used-a majority comparable to the broader Progressist right--then the result is more 
mteresting. F. Goguel, Geographie des elections frant;aises sous la Iroisieme ella qualrieme republique, Paris, 
1970, pp. 34-35. 
6757 migrants are plotted on this map. 
68 Pinol, Espace poli/ique, pp. 43-45. Garrier, op. cit., passim. 
69 Four the nine Federation migrants classed as originating on the plateau were in reality mountain dwellers. 
70 Gilbert Garrier, op. cit., p. 486. For example, Henri Durieu, proprietor at Denice in the Beaujolais, had five ser-
vants, all of whom had been born in that commune. 
71 Conventionally those communes in which less than 2,000 of the population which lived in the chef-lieu are re-
garded. as ruraJ (not to be confused with agricultural). However, the necessary statistics, dividing communal popu-
latIOn mto concentrated and dispersed, are maccesslble. So I have been obhged to use lolal communal population 
m 1896 as an alternative criterion: those with more than 2,000 inhabitants are classed as urban. 
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horizons of the movement. On the other hand, although the centre right is a wholly 
urban movement in terms of geographical distribution, a significant proportion of its 
militants had been born in the countryside. 
Table 9: Party by Type of Commune of Origin, 1928-36 (p 
ercent) 
Rhone-Alps France 
Urb 1 Rur Urb I Rur 
FR 31 43 15 12 384 
PDP 29 25 33 12 24 
Centre right 37 47 16 - 19 
The Department 
Analysis of the socio-geographic origins of sympathizers resident in the rest of the 
department comes up against the obstacle of a lack of comparative data on the elec-
torate of department as a whole. We have to be content with partial comparison with 
samples from a few cantons. The sample consists of one in ten electors from the can-
tons of Tarare, St Laurent, Villefranche (excluding the commune of Villefranche), 
those communes of St Genis Laval which lie outside of the agglomeration,72 and six 
communes from the western and mountainous part of Mornant. It should be borne in 
mind that they were not chosen for their representativeness, but are simply those 
which had been sampled before a larger project was abandoned. 73 Graph 12 shows 
under- and overrepresentation by region of origin in the sample communes, while 
Table 10 gives figures for the whole of the department outside the agglomeration. 
Even more than in the agglomeration the Federation appeals to the more stable 
part of the population. Over half of sympathizers lived in the commune or canton in 
which they had been born. No less than 80% had been born in the Rhone, whereas in 
the agglomeration only 54% of sympathizers were natives of the department. More-
over, 52% were resident in the commune in which they had been born, while much of 
the intra-departmental mobility concerned very short distances.74 Of course, these 
contrasts are largely a function the Federation's peasant base in the countryside.75 
72 That is. the communes of Brindas. Brignais, Charly. St Genis Laval, Irigny. Vernaison and Vourles, to which 
have been attached one neighbouring commune from the canton of Mornant--Orlienas. 
73 Surprisingly, the geographical origins of Federation sympathizers in these communes and cantons are remark-
ably similar to those in the department as a whole. The only real difference is that there are rather more natives of 
the agglomeration in the sample than among Federation members in the department as a Whole. Of course, this 
does not mean that the sample of the electorate has the same approximation to the electorate as a whole. 
74 A sample from the electorate as a whole reveals that 37% of migrants in the canton of Villcfranche 
(Villefranche town excluded). were from Ain---presumably adjacent communes. A further 19% crune from 
SaOne et Loire. In the western canton of St Laurent de Chamousset nearly three quarters were from the neigh-
bouring Loire. 
75 15 out of 21 PDP sympathizers had also been born in the department. in spite of the weakness of Christian 
democracy among the agricultural population. 
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This confinns the importance of established peasant families to the Federation. In the 
commune of Messimy all twelve members of the conservative list in the municipal 
elections of 1935 had been born in the commune; four on the opposing list had been 
born elsewhere.76 
Graph 12: Origins of Federation republicaine sympathizers in 
selected communes 
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Table 10: Origins of the Federation republicaine. The de-
partment. 
Origin Percent 
Lives in commune of birth 52 
Migration within canton 8 
Migration within Rhone 12 
Agglomeration 9 
Rhone-Alps 14 
France 6 
TOlal 1065 
Also overrepresented are sympathizers who had been born in the ag-
glomeration: Lyon itself in the overwhelming majority of cases.77 Most of them were 
bourgeois. Map 5.19 shows that the majority resided in the grand banlieu, stretching 
from the Monts d'Or in the North to Givors in the south. More interesting is the scat-
tering of sympathizers in the rest of the department, for they appear to correspond 
with areas in which the organization of the Federation was less sketchy than usual, 
and where, moreover, Victor Perret found support. The Lyon-born are found in those 
76 Pin, op. cit.. p. 114. 
77 106 out of 111 were born in Lyon. 
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parts of the Beaujolais viticole from which Alexandre Bosse-Platiere drew much of 
his support. Others resided in the canton of Arbresle, which was the only rural area in 
which Perret's allies the Jeunesses patriotes were organized. Thirdly there are three 
natives of Lyon in the canton of St Laurent, two of whom were members of the 
Comire departemental.78 A number of cantonal congresses were organized in St Lau-
rent by Victor Perret's associate Alexandre La Batie, a landowner and ex-officer. La 
Batie lived in both the commune of Montromand and the 6th arrondissement of Lyon, 
where he was also a member of the Federation committee.79 
That over time the proportion of Federation sympathizers living in the com-
mune in which they had been born fell from 55% to 50% need not detain us, for it was 
a function of a similar drop in the recruitment of farmers to the party. More signifi-
cant perhaps is a fairly substantial rise in the proportion of migrants who had been 
born in rural communes (50% in 1928 to 1931; 60% in 1932 to June 1936). As in the 
city it seems that Victor Perret's rule over the Federation led to increase in the im-
portance of migrants of a rural background. 
This survey of the socio-geographic origins sympathizers of the parliamentary 
right leaves many questions unanswered, and others postponed until place of birth can 
be brought into relation with other influences on political behaviour. We can never-
theless conclude that at the level of leadership, in both the city and in those areas of 
the countryside where its organizational structures were more developed, the Federa-
tion was a party of the city-born individuals. Meanwhile the mass base of the party 
comprised a large number of people who had spent their lives in their commune of 
birth, and of individuals who had come to the city from rural communes. Christian 
democracy, on the other hand, recruited individuals who were much more accustomed 
to urban life. Once again this points to the dependence of the Federation on declining 
modes of social and political integration. 
Class structure of the Right 
There are three main problems involved in analysing the class structure of the right. 
The distortion caused by failure to ascertain the professions of some individuals has 
already been noted.8o The sources of bias are to some extent known and can be al-
lowed for. The second problem is the imprecision which follows from self-recording 
of profession in the electoral lists. The main difficulty is in distinguishing between 
artisans and employed craftsmen in trades such as shoemaking and carpentry. Trade 
directories permit the resolution of the majority of cases, but we are left with a resid-
ual category of 'workers or artisans'.81 Third, for some individuals we have to choose 
78 See page (1). 
79 He was not, however, a native of the agglomeration. 
80 See Appendix 4 and page 101. 
81 This is the solution adopted by Jean-Luc Pinol. Most likely those whose status remains unknown were workers, 
for artisans would surely have been !isled in trade directories. 
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between professions given in several sources. The solution adopted was to prefer the 
more up to date and precise information in the censuses, supplemented if necessary by 
trade directories. 82 
In the case of Graph 13 all sources have been combined in order to give the 
most accurate picture possible. There differences between the parties are almost cer-
tainly too large to be a product of the mode of sampling. The contemporary view of a 
centre right dominated by business appears to be valid. Merchants and industrialists. 
representing 26% of sympathizers, are easily the largest category. Together with se-
nior managers they represent no less than 40% of the total, while 54% were drawn 
from the ruling class in its broadest sense. 
The PDP, in contrast, is essentially a party of white collar workers; 50% of 
sympathizers are in the two categories of employees. As in the CFfC there is a bias 
towards higher grade employees. The PDP also draws much support from secondary 
school teachers and the liberal professions, confirming the appeal of social Catholi-
cism to the younger generation of Catholic intellectuals. And like the CFfC the PDP 
is relatively weak among manual workers. Complete absence of retired and inactive 
persons, together with the presence of a few students, reflects the age structure of the 
party. 
Graph 13: The Parliamentary Right by Social Class, 1928 to 
193583 (percent) 
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The Federation comes closest to being an inter-class party. It alone has a significant 
following among farmers, who with 30% of sympathizers represent the single most 
82 The professions included within each category can be found in Appendix 5. 
83 In order to make the best of small centre right sample the few individuals active in the period after June 1936 
have been added to this sample. The number of persons for whom profession is known therefore rises from 53 to 
58. The Federation sample consists of 2,088 persons. 
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important group. Second in importance are lower grade white collar workers. The 
Federation was the least bourgeois of the three parties. though it was quite well-repre-
sented among businessmen.84 The Federation did better than its rivals in categories 
where the right was electorally weak: small business (shopkeepers and artisans) and 
workers. There is some truth in the claim of Victor Perret that the party was a popular 
one, but it is probable that the weight of suburban communes in the sample reduces 
the importance of the bourgeoisie. 
At a global level it is, regrettably, not possible to compare the class profile of 
the parliamentary right with that of the left. The best which can be managed are two 
partial comparisons. The first is with the delegates to the executive committee of the 
Radical-Socialist party, as analysed by Serge Berstein.85 His figures for the Rhone are 
shown in Graph 14. Strictly speaking it would be more appropriate to place these in-
dividuals alongside the 'middle cadres' of the Federation. Furthermore, the categories 
used, by S Berstein, those of the Statistique genera/e, are not directly comparable to 
our own. But some points can be made. 
Graph 14: Delegates to the Executive Committee of the Radical-
Socialist Party in the RhOne by class, 1922 to 1938 
Like the Federation and centre right the Radicals are well represented among industri-
alists. This might result from a broader definition, but it nonetheless reminds us that 
the right had no monopoly on their allegiance. Radical support in the peasantry was 
significant, but did not match that of the right. It is also worth noting certain similari-
ties between Radicalism and the PDP. In both the largest category is the liberal pro-
84 The centre right included 54% of students, liberal professions, businessmen and senior managers, the PDP 31 %, 
and the Federation 19%. 
85 Berstein, His/oire du Par/i radicale, pp. 259-265. 
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fessions. 86 Both also drew support from the lower middle class--though the Radi-
cals were to a greater extent a party of the self-employed and civil servants. 
Graph 15: Candidates in Municipal Elections, Lyon, 1929 and 
1935 
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In the commune of Lyon it possible to make a further comparison of conser-
vative municipal council candidates87 in 1929 and 1935 with those of the Radicals 
and SFIO. Lists for these elections do not necessarily comprise a genuine sample of 
leading activists. The right usually included a token worker. But manipulation of 
party image had to be balanced against the desire of voters to be represented by their 
own kind, not to speak of the imperatives of faction fighting. 
Graph 14 shows that apart from the fact that lower grade white collar workers 
are more numerous than higher, perhaps because of the presence of PDP rep-
resentatives, the class profile of candidates is very similar to that of the Federation's 
departmental council. 88 In general, the breakdown of Radical candidates endorses 
Serge Berstein's figures, except that suspicions about the level of businessmen appear 
to be justified. Workers are quite well-represented, testifying to the continued impor-
tance of working class Republicanism. The SFIO is better represented than its rivals 
among artisans and waged manual workers. Rather more interesting is that socialists 
did about as well as the right among white collar workers of both grades, illustrating 
once more that salaried employees constitute the disputed middle ground of social 
86 Note. however, that Serge Berstein includes journalists with the liberal professions, a group I have categorised 
with higher grade white coUar workers. 
87 The right wing lists include a few centre right and PDP activists. 
88 See Graph 18. 
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politics. Lastly there were a significant number of professional people on socialist 
lists. But whereas lawyers were common in conservative and Radical parties. the so-
cialists were more likely to be academics--such as the economics professor and 
future Minister of Finance Andre Philip. 
A Bourgeois Right? 
So far we have seen that whilst the occupational structures of the parties considered 
differ substantially, all nevertheless recruit from a wide variety of groups. White col-
lar workers are particularly divided in their politics. What then is the relationship of 
the parliamentary right to the bourgeoisie? In particular there is the question of the 
relationship of the right to business. Jean-Noel Jeanneney concludes in his two studies 
of this question that the 'political realm is 'entirely autonomous from the economic 
sphere'.89 A response, of course, cannot be formulated solely in quantitative terms. 
Nevertheless, one way of looking at the question is to ask whether businessmen show 
a greater propensity to become involved in conservative political activity than do 
other social groups. 
Graph 16: The Parliamentary Right in the Aggiomeration90 by 
Class, 1928 to 1936 
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89 Jeanneney. Frant;ois de Wendel en Rtfpublique. p. 134. and L'Argent CacM, pp. 44-46. Part of his evidence is 
the relatively insignificant role of businessmen in Parliwnent-16% of dcpulJes m 1928.(sce M. Dogan, 'Les 
filieres de la carriere politique en France'. Revue fra~ais de sociologie. 3. 1967. pp. 468-492). In fact 16% is an 
extremely high figure given the proportion of businessmen in the population. And the figure for the right alone is 
much higher than 16%. 
90 In order to include the four western suburban communes in the analysis. I have added my own one in ten sam-
"Ie of their electorates to the figures of Jean-Luc Pinal. These communes are Francheville, Tassin Ie Demi Lune, 
Ecully and St Rambert. 
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The question is not difficult to answer for the agglomeration. In order to make 
sense of Graph 16 it should be borne in mind that in order to make possible 
comparison with the class structure of the electorate, profession on electoral list alone 
has been used. This explains the greater importance of the 'workers or artisans' 
category.91 Also, the contribution of the bourgeoisie declines when this source alone 
is used, because inscription at a young age does not take account of subsequent social 
mobility. A final point to be borne in mind is that municipal election years have been 
excluded from the analysis in the case of the Federation. Otherwise, the numerous 
peasants on the party's lists distorts the sample. 
The results are much as expected. In the Federation businessmen are the most 
overrepresented category, although the liberal professions are not far behind. There is 
a steady decrease moving down the social scale through the liberal professions, senior 
managers, higher and lower grade white collar workers. Like its rivals the Federation 
is underrepresented in categories where the left did well: workers or artisans, public 
services, small business and the manual working class. 
The only real anomaly is the strong showing of farmers in the Federation, 
even though municipal election years have been excluded.92 True, if profession is 
taken from census rather than electoral register, then the proportion of farmers de-
clines, reflecting the fact that inscription on electoral list often represents occupation 
on arrival in the city rather than current activity. All the same, political activity of 
farmers resident on the margins of the city remains surprisingly high. One explanation 
could be that in such a region only the wealthiest farmers could avoid selling off their 
land to developers.93 
For the rest of the department under- and over-representation can be calcu-
lated only for the indeterminately representative communes for which a survey of the 
electoral lists was carried out (see Graph 17).94 Here too businessmen, representing 
11 % of Federation sympathizers compared to 2% of the population, are easily the 
most overrepresented category. They are followed by the other bourgeois categories. 
Farmers make up almost half of rural sympathizers in absolute terms, but are a little 
less well represented than in the electorate at large. Both categories of white collar 
workers, in contrast to their position in the agglomeration, are underrepresented. As 
expected, small businessmen and especially workers also show little interest in the 
right 
However the sample is broken down businessmen show a greater propensity to 
become involved in the Federation and especially the centre right than any other 
91 'Workers or artisans' in the Federation fall from 9% when electoral list alone is used 10 1 % when all sources are 
used. 
92 There are. as we have seen, other reasons 100 for over-estimation of the number of sympathi7A!rs from the sub-
urbs. 
93 In Venissieux the Federaiton drew support from wealthy rose growers like Croibier-FIuttaz. 
94 See page 123. 
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social group. Were it not for the perverse refusal of historians like J-N. Jeanneney to 
accept that conservatism has anything to do with the defence of capitalism, the point 
would hardly be worth labouring. But in view of the small proportion of the total 
electorate who were involved in business, the real level of political commitment of 
employers must have been very high indeed. It is true that professionals are not far 
behind. Were all parties of left and right to be taken into account it is probable that no 
other group could match them for political consciousness. In the municipal elections 
of 1935 in Villeurbanne all three competing lists were led by doctors.95 But whereas 
Graph 17: Federation Sympathizers in Sample Communes by 
Class, 1928 to June 1936 
-
professionals were as attracted to the SFIO as to the Federation, businessmen were 
rather more choosy. Lawyers, academics and doctors, because of their training, 
functioned as professional politicians, so their importance was greater among the 
leaders of the Federation. 
Party Leaders 
Let us start with the 'middle cadres' of the Federation. Not surprisingly the class pro-
file of the Comite departemental of the Federation is substantially different to that of 
militants and sympathizers as a whole (see Graph 18). Now the ruling class represents 
45% of the total. Businessmen become the largest group. The retired, who include a 
number of semi-active businessmen, move into equal second place along with the lib-
eral professions. Senior managers, on the other hand, increase less dramati-
cally--from 4 to 5%. The main losers are farmers and workers: the former lose 
about half of their representation, the latter about three-quarters. 
95 Dr. GrandcIement for the PCF. Dr. Goujon for the SFIO and Dr. Gautheron for the Federation. 
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Graph 18: Social class of members of the Comite departementai, 
1928 to June 193696 
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Graph 19: Militants and Mayors in the Countryside, 1928 to June 
1926 
eo 
60 
40 
Percent 30 
20 
10 
Comit6 D6partemental 
O~~-u~~~~~~~~~~~~~--__ ~ 
10 
10 
40 
Percentao 
10 
10 
O~~~~~~~~4-~~~~~~~~~~ 
131 
Outside of the city it is essential to distinguish the cadres of the Federation proper 
from the notables who served as links between party and masses in rural areas. This 
can be done by comparing members of the Federation's ComiM departemental with 
pro-Federation mayors. Graph 19 shows that farmers are twice as numerous in the 
latter. The only other group to be better represented among mayors than in the Comite 
departemental is small businessmen, essentially shopkeepers and arti-
sans---doubtless as well-integrated into agricultural society as were farmers them-
96 Sample sizes are 171 for the Federation and 53 for the PDP. 
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selves. Business-mayors were a rarity in communes situated outside either the outer 
suburbs of Lyon, the small industrial towns of the Beaujolais mountains or the 
Brevenne Valley. Those businessmen who were mayors of rural communes some-
times benefited from exceptional notoriety. Such was the case with Fran~ois Gillet, 
mayor of Bully, birthplace of the founder of the dynasty. 
A sample of members of the departmental executive committee of the PDP, 
together with presidents and vice-presidents of local sections, shows the same shift 
towards the ruling class as in the Federation (see Graph 18). Businessmen substan-
tially increase their representation,97 while the liberal professions become the most 
numerous group. Yet with 35% of the total the ruling class is weaker than in the 
Federation. White collar workers remain very well represented, though lower grade 
employees decline relative to higher. 
Because sample size is limited it is not possible to produce a comparable 
graph for the centre right. Nonetheless, comparison of the class breakdown of the 
Comite departemental of the Federation with that of the centre right in Graph 13 is 
again revealing. Significant differences are once again the greater appeal of the Fed-
eration to farmers, and of the centre right to senior managers. Surprisingly, workers 
are better represented in the centre right than in the Comite departemental of the Fed-
eration, though numerical weakness may explain this. In other respects the graphs are 
similar, weighted towards the ruling class and especially businessmen. 
Table ll: Departmental leaders of the Parliamen-
tary right. 
I FR I CD I PDP 
AGR 3 - -
BUS 12 7 1 
SEM 2 5 
-
PRO 16 4 8 
WCI 2 2 1 
WCl 2 1 2 
PCO - - 1 
RET 5 1 
-
Total 42 20 13 
At the level of departmental leadership the role of the bourgeoisie becomes 
still more preponderant. But as Table 11 shows, each retains its specificity. In the 
Federation the liberal professions become the most important category. No doubt they 
alone possessed the leisure necessary for a position of responsibility in a relatively 
97 Six of the nine PDP business sympathizers are found among the leaders of the party. 
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well-structured party like the Federation. But involvement of businessmen remains 
considerable. Furthermore the five leaders of the Federation in the RhOne since its 
foundation--Aynard, Huvelin, Isaac, Peissel and Perret--had all been business-
men. 
In the centre right employers are the most numerous category. Again, with the 
exception of Dr. Augros, the party leaders were businessmen: Edmond Weitz, Etienne 
Fougere and Eugene Mansuy. It is also noteworthy that senior managers are more 
common in the inner circles of the centre right than in the Federation, just as they 
were at other levels of the party. Finally, the PDP was led almost entirely by members 
of the liberal professions. Both departmental leaders in our period--Jacques Tour-
ret and Charles Bryon--were lawyers. 
In spite of the bourgeois nature of the leadership of the three parties, we are 
still not wholly justified in concluding that we are in the presence of a bourgeois right. 
There are two ways of looking at the problem. It is, on the one hand, possible to stress 
the very significant over-representation of businessmen among sympathizers, and 
their still greater proportion in the party leadership. On the other, the numerical pre-
dominance of non-bourgeois groups could be stressed. In fact, the two perspectives 
are not mutually exclusive. It is possible to say that the Federation is a bourgeois and 
a capitalist party, but also to give due weight to its dependence upon non-bourgeois 
groups for support. Since the economic interests of the latter did not always coincide 
with those of the elites, who were themselves divided on fundamental issues, we are 
obliged to look at non-economic ways of defining the right. The need to secure mass 
support gives any conservative party a certain autonomy from the capitalism. 
Businessmen 
For the moment, however, our task is to continue with the quantitative analysis, and to 
look more closely at the nature of the social groups who supported the right, begin-
ning with businessmen. 
First, was there a relationship between scale of enterprise and support for any 
of the right wing parties? Evidence from trade directories and the press makes it safe 
to assume that those classed as businessmen in the sample were mainly at the head of 
substantial concerns. That a great number describe themselves in the electoral lists as 
either 'negociant' or 'industrial' is another reason for confidence, for small business-
men in France had good fiscal reasons for not exaggerating their importance. We have 
also seen that as a rule small business preferred the left. 98 
98 Radical candidates for the municipal council of Lyon in 1929 include the President of the trade association of 
pork butchers. and Jean Veuillez. President of the Syndicate of Hoteliers. and representative of small traders in the 
Chamber of Commerce. Artisans. on. the other hand. appear to have been split between Radicals and the SFIO. In 
the 1929 municipal elections one socialist candidate described himself as director of a carpenters' cooperative. 
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It is more difficult to distinguish between medium and large firms, or between 
monopoly and non-monoploly capital. All that can be said is that Federation sympa-
thizers included a significant number of businessmen of substantial importance, some 
of whom were genuine representatives of monopoly capital. Auguste Isaac's interests 
included the PLM and the board of the Suez Company, reputedly the most lucrative 
directorship in France. Also present are Edmund Gillet and his son-in-law Henry 
Balay, boss of a Gillet subsidiary, the Societe de colorantes de France. It would be 
possible to give perhaps a dozen or more such examples. The main point is that al-
though such people constitute a small proportion of total adherents, big capitalists 
were extremely rare in the electorate as a whole. Probably, however, the capture of 
the Federation by Victor Perret involved a loss of influence by such elite business-
men.99 Whilst, for example, the Gillet family had a representative in the sample 
throughout the 1930s, monopoly capitalists did not occupy leading positions in the 
Federation as they had in previous decades. 
Increasingly typical of business support for the Federation was the medium to 
large family firm, of which Victor Perret's own luxury silk manufacturing business 
provides a good example. Smaller family flrms are also present. The building trades, 
and wine, coal and fruit wholesalers in the countryside, stand out in this respect. But 
the centre of gravity probably lies with medium to large businessmen, especially 
when their infrequency in the electorate is taken into account. 
In spite of the smallness of the sample big businessmen were proportionately 
more prominent in the centre right. There were two bankers. tOO Edmond Weitz's own 
firm was a societe anonyme, and he sat on the boards of steelmaking, brewing and 
housing companies. Some of these big capitalists, including Auguste Isaac, turned to 
the Alliance out of disgust at the policies of Victor Perret. Bosses of medium firms 
were also present. Etienne Fougere was at the head of a large family firm, while Eu-
gene Mansuy ran a wholesale pottery enterprise. Only one centre right businessman 
was definitely identifiable as the head of a small firm. The PDP, in contrast, recruited 
no businessman of any real importance. Fran~ois Perrier, owner of a small tie making 
concern, is representative. 
In Chapter four it was argued that conflict within business is to be explained at 
least as much by sector of activity as by size of enterprise. It was suggested that engi-
neering and some large silk employers were influenced by the neo-capitalist ideas 
popular in the late 1920s, and that these in turn provided a link to the lay centre right. 
Meanwhile, the modishness of neo-capitalism, provoked a 'traditionalist' reaction led 
by employers in the merchant-manufacturing branch of the silk industry, and which 
was expressed through Victor Perret's wing of the Federation. 
99 See Chapter 6. 
tOO Paul Valayer and Daniel Isaac. 
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If the hypothesis is correct, then we ought to find supporting evidence in the 
backgrounds of business sympathizers of the parties in question. Smallness of sample 
size, however, means that quantitative testing of the proposition is feasible only for 
the Federation. Using trade directories it is possible to determine with some accuracy 
the sector of activity of all but a few businessmen in that party.lOl They are broken 
down in Graph 20. 102 A guide to the sectoral breakdown of businessmen in the popu-
lation as a whole is provided by charting the number of establishments employing six 
or more workers, as recorded in the census of 1936. Given the dubious nature of Ly-
onnais censuses, the absence of an automatic relationship between number of 
establishments and number of businessmen, and the failure to identify the sector of 
activity of some Federation businessmen, this can only be a rough guide. 
Graph 20: Industrialists of the Federation by sector of activ-
ity 
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Graph 20 supports the hypothesis that the Federation has a special relationship 
with certain parts of the textile industry. The backward cotton manufacturers of the 
Beaujolais mountains are well represented. What is more, cotton manufacturers were 
almost unanimous in opting for Victor Perret in his quarrel with Laurent Bonnevay 
101 That is individuals defined as businessmen when all sources are brought together. 
102 The categories used are based on those of the S/alis/ique genera/e. The category 'other industrial' groups 
those Whose sector of activity is unknown. together with one or two minority activities which are difficult to clas-
sity. Commercial enterprises have been grouped together in order to avoid unnecessary complication of the graph. 
DIvision of the silk industry into commercial and industrial branches is problematic. Commissionnaires en soieries 
and negocianls en soies are regarded as commercial. Marchands de soie and [abrican/s de soieries are cla.~sed a.~ 
industrialists. 
Sociology of the parliamentary right, 1928-36 136 
after 1934. 103 Beaujolais cotton manufacturers were also numerous among the sup-
porters of Action Fran~aise, of which the ideas were close to those of Victor Perret. 
The cotton merchants of Villefranche provide an exception to this pattern. Like busi-
nessmen in the Beaujolais mountains they were Catholic and socially conservative. 
But a long struggle with the crypto-royalist landowning aristocracy of the surrounding 
countryside pushed them towards the centre right. 
Given that most silk ftrms produced a mixture of products, often using both 
factories andfa~ormiers, it is difficult to make sense of the allegiances of the silk in-
dustry. All the same, there is some evidence that the Federation was favoured by the 
more traditional sectors of the fabrique. Of the twenty-seven fabricallts known to 
have sympathized with the Federation, nineteen can be found in the membership lists 
of the SFS.I04 Seven of them (plus at least one of the non-unionized), were members 
of Group One, of which the President was Victor Perret himself. lOS Firms in this 
group used gold and silver thread and highly skilled labour to produce braid and 
church decorations.106 They had much to lose from the decline of a certain kind of 
production and consumption. They were most numerous in the Croix Rousse. 
The other silk employers were mainly at the head of family firms. Eight had 
factories of their own. None of them were particularly noted for their commitment to 
industrial or social progress. 107 We saw in chapter four that a growing number of 
medium and small factory owners put some of their work out to fa~ollniers, and were 
increasingly suspicious of headlong industrialization. It is also significant that 
whereas a large number of fabricants supported the Federation, only two of their 
hereditary enemies, the gros far;onniers, are known to have backed the party. One of 
these, President of the Syndicat des tisseurs mecanique Jean Monamy, was a on the 
far left of the party. He was more likely to be found at meetings of the CFfC than the 
Federation. 
Finally, there is qualitative evidence of the Catholic and conservative atmo-
sphere in the silk industry. A pro-Radical fabricant wrote to Senator Justin Godart, 
that 'vu mes idees politiques je n'ai pas bien roreilIe du milieu dans lequel 
j'opere',l08 The Nouvelliste, and Nouveau journal, both sympathetic to the Federa-
tion, frequently echoed the concerns of the silk industry. 
~03 .Perhaps significantly one of only three businessmen who backed Bonnevay made metal combs for the weav-
109 lOdustry. That Emile Dauriere was also an arrondissement counCillor might, however. be of greater signifi-
cance. 
104 Bulletin annuel du Syndicat des fubricants de soieries de Lyon. 1928 and 1935. These list one or more sections 
of the syndicat to which each finn had adhered. 
105 Furthermore. 6 of these 8 produced only this kind of cloth. Only one in tcn of all mcmbers of Group One in 
1928 did so. 
106 A typical product was a portrait of King Albert of Belgium. the work of Perret's company. 
107 The one possible exception is the presence of Sonncry·Cottet, a member of the board of the Manufacture des 
velnurs el peluches. 
108 Godart Papers. Carton 1. Fructus to Godart, 28·9·1935. 
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Some fabricants did, however, support either the Radicals or the lay centre 
right Although it is dangerous to generalize from individual cases, it is surely signifi-
cant that Etienne Fougere, Vice-president of Redressment /ranrais should also have 
led the centre right in Lyon in the 1920s. Also among the supporters of the centre 
right was Pierre Clayette, son-in-law of the innovative Henry Bertrand and manager 
of the family fIrm. The latter had at one time been a supporter of Edouard Aynard, 
which illustrates again that the Alliance took on the mantle of the pre-war Federation. 
The Federation, as predicted, is quite signifIcantly under-represented in the 
metallurgical sector. Since however there are only a dozen businessmen in the centre 
right sample it is not possible to test quantitatively the hypothesis of a link between 
engineering and the centre right. Only one out of twelve centre right businessmen are 
known to have been metallurgists. All the same the evidence for such a link is com-
pelling. In the first place there is the presence at the head of the Alliance of Weitz, 
President until 1936 of the CSIM. It is unlikely that Weitz's political activities would 
have been tolerated had he not reflected widely held views among engineers. Fur-
thermore, Weitz emphasized publicly the connection between his economic and po-
litical activities. At a meeting of the Mascaraud Committee in 1928 Weitz described 
himself as spokesman of both metallurgists and the Alliance, going on to claim that 
engineering was, in contrast to the 'feudal' silk industry, 'the most democratic of in-
dustries '. As far as is known his view of the engineering industry was contested by 
no-one.109 
There is scattered evidence that the engineering industry'S sympathies went to 
the Radicals as well as to the centre right. Lyon fl!publicain, a pro-Radical daily, 
showed greater interest in the fortunes of the engineering industry. In December 1935 
a series of special reports on this industry were written by Guy Aroud, a journalist 
who had recently passed from the Alliance to the Radicals. One or two leading Radi-
cals were metallurgists. Philippe Vermorel, head of a firm making agricultural im-
plements in Villefranche, was a Radical senator in the 1920s. Fran~ois Grammont, 
boss of an electrical and telephone company, was a Radical candidate in the 6th ar-
rondissement of Lyon in the elections of 1936. 
Without further research it is difficult to comment in detail on the other sec-
tors represented on Graph 20. Most of the commercial employers were at the head of 
larger concerns. Perhaps typical is Julien de Poumeyrol, a wholesaler of medicinal 
herbs and for some years president of the UCS. Wine wholesalers were numerous in 
the areas around the entrep6ts of Vaise.110 There are also a number of extremely 
wealthy traders, such as the silk importer Charles Mouterde. The only generalization 
109 Nouvellisle, 6-3-1928. 
110 A few were also found in rural areas. with the exception of the wine-growing area, where wine merchants 
were traditionally the rivals of large landowners. 
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that it is possible to make is that commercial interests had little interest in progressive 
industrial and social ideas, and favoured a liberal economic order. 
After the textile industries, the most important industrial sector is building and 
construction. A possible explanation is a somewhat loose definition of what consti-
tutes an industrial concern, for all those referred to in the sources as 'entrepreneurs' 
are classed in this way. But in many cases there is clear evidence that these were 
larger than average firms. Many were limited liability companies. That larger firms 
favoured the Federation is perhaps confirmed by the fact that Pierre Roiret, President 
of the Chambre syndicale du Bdtiment and a member of the Chamber of Commerce, 
endorsed the Federation's candidate in the 7th arrondissement in 1932. It is possible 
that building employers were pushed to the right by their long conflict with the pow-
erful anarcho-syndicalist Cartel du Mtiment. 111 Medium and large firms may also 
have been alienated from the Radicals by conflict with small masters, often accused 
of undermining patronal solidarity during the strikes. 
In sum, the pattern of business support for the parliamentary right confirms the 
analysis of business politics presented in Chapter four. This is not to argue that con-
flicts within the Federation or between Federation and centre right can be reduced to 
the question of neo-capitalism, only that it was part of what was at issue. There are 
too many exceptions for this to have been the case. There were metallurgists who 
were both Catholics and supporters of the Federation, such as the steelmaking Prenat 
family in Givors. Marius Berliet, perhaps the most modernist of all Lyonnais busi-
nessmen, was a Legitimist. We have also seen that there were fabricants who were 
Radicals and anti-clericals. As we saw in Chapter four conservative reformism and 
the resistance to it was most effective where it coincided with cultural cleavages in 
the business class. 
Senior Managers 
We have already seen that senior managers and engineers make up a greater propor-
tion of centre right than Federation militants. It seems reasonable to conclude that 
there was within the centre right a tacit alliance of dynamic businessmen and the 
cadres of the modem enterprise. But a significant number of engineers and managers 
also supported the Federation. There is some evidence that in both cases politics and 
religion bound them to employers in a partnership in which the businessmen were 
dominant. In consequence organizations of engineers and managers were as politi-
cally divided as the patronat. It should be noted, however, that this division did not 
match that between traditionalist and modem industries, for engineers were rare in the 
older industries. Sectoral breakdown of pro-Federation engineers and managers 
IlIOn the Cartel du bdtiment see M. Moissonier, 'Le Cartel du baliment', Cahiers de rIns/illll Mallrice Thorez 
1980. ' 
Sociology of the parliamentary right, 1928-36 139 
shows that they were found in large silk and artificial fibre firms, chemical factories 
like Rhone-Poulenc and in metallurgical establishments like Berliet. Rather the divi-
sion was cultural and religious. 
Direct influence of employers over managers was probably rare. The example 
of the Trayvoux engineering factory was given in Chapter four is perhaps an excep-
tion. 112 Several representatives of the senior management of the pro-Federation press 
turn up amongst that party's sympathizers, including, for example, Antoine Jouve, 
head of publicity at the Nouveau journal. 113 Probably this kind of influence was 
mainly confined to small and medium firms. 114 
It is more likely that patronal and political hegemony was established indi-
rectly through mixed employer-engineer associations. Often these were societies of 
former pupils of engineering schools, which shows once again the contribution of ed-
ucation, social mobility and religion to conservative politics. In the metallurgical in-
dustry employers and Radical politicians patronized a Societe amicale des chefs de 
service, chefs d'atelier et contremaftres, while the rival Catholic syndicate of metal-
lurgical employers, sponsored an association of former pupils of the Ecole 
d'apprentissage superieure, run by abbe Lamache. 1I5 We saw in Chapter four that this 
school made a special efforts to produce draughtsmen for the engineering industry. 
USIC, the strongest general association of engineers was a social Catholic association 
which made no distinction between employers and employees. 
There is hardly any evidence in the political sphere that engineers and man-
agers saw themselves as a group with special interests. Claudius Chaland, an engineer 
at the chemical firm Givaudan-Lavirotte, was a leading member of USIC, as well as 
President of the Federation's youth group and Vice-president of the committee of the 
3rd arrondissement. But he made no mention of the interests of his profession before 
1936. Professional associations often discussed general issues. At the meeting of the 
Societe amicale mentioned above, the main topic of discussion was Japanese compe-
tition.1I6 USIC was concerned with defence of the status of engineering qualifica-
tions.1I7 In the short term this elitism reinforced the identity of engineers with their 
112 Robert, op. cit., passim. 
113 It might be more than coincidental that three Catholic and conseIVative engineers turn up at a small engineer· 
ing firm, the Chantiers de Gerland. One was Louis Chassagnon, brother of the bishop of Autun. The other two 
were Croix de Feu and PSF militants. 
114 Marc Maurice describes this kind of situation, where patron and en~ineer work side· by-side, in a relatively 
small firm, with a clear dichotomy between workers and the patron and hIS collaborators, as 'pre-administrative'. 
Marc Maurice, 'L'evolution du travail et du syndicalisme chez les cadres', MS, 61, 1967, pp. 47-64, especially pp. 
60-62. See also I. Kolboom, 'Patronat et cadres: la contribution patronale 11 Ia formation du groupe des cadres', 
MS, 121, 1982, pp. 71-95, especially p. 72. 
115 It is significant that the activities of the Societe amicale were reported in the pro-centre right (at that time) 
Lyon Republicain, 29-1-34, whereas meetings of the rival Catholic association were reported in the Nouvellisle, 2-
11-1929,31-10-30. 
116 Maurice, op. cit., pp. 49-50. Maurice argues that engineers were a 'mere appendage of the patronal' before 
1936. 
117 La Chronique social, March, 1934. 
Sociology of the parliamentary right, 1928-36 140 
employers. 118 Put in the longer term this corporatism provided a bridge to the Croix 
de Feu and PSF. 
White collar workers 
In view of the absence of comparative data it is not really possible at this stage to say 
much that has not already been said about the other social groups which supported the 
parliamentary right. The general characteristics of party sympathisers usually hold for 
each group taken separately. At this stage it is necessary only to say something of 
white collar workers and peasants. 
Federation white collar workers are older than both those in the electorate as a 
whole and those in the PDP. The former are overrepresented in the 4th and 5th ar-
rondissements, the latter in the 3rd, 5th and 6th. PDP white collar workers are consid-
erably more likely to have been born in the agglomeration that those of the Federa-
tion, and are less likely to have migrated from rural communes. 119 
It may be concluded that the Federation depended for recruitment upon the 
transfer of deferential Catholic attitudes from the countryside into areas like the Croix 
Rousse where parish politics were dominated by the 'old bourgeoisie'. Perhaps typi-
cal was the President of the Corporation of silk employees Albert Gruffaz. He lived 
on the slopes of the Croix Rousse, and had born in the rural commune of Bonneguete 
in Haute Savoie in 1868. Gruffaz had been initiated into the virtues of the Franciscans 
by his uncle.!t should nevertheless be born in mind that even Federation sympathisers 
are somewhat more likely than the electorate in general to be native born or to have 
originated from urban France. So equal emphasis must be placed upon the survival of 
deferential attitudes within Lyonnais society itself. 
Workers 
The pattern of working class support for the Federation is broadly similar to that of 
the white collar workers. Federation workers are older than those in the electorate in 
general, but in terms of birthplace they are broadly similar to the electorate. Many 
Federation workers had migrated to Lyon from small rural communes. But many oth-
ers were of Lyonnais origin. This takes on a particular significance in suburban com-
munes like Venissieux, where electoral lists obscure the massive presence of foreign 
immigrants. In such communes Federation members were an isolated Lyonnais mi-
nority. This lends significance to the circulation of the popular racist weekly Lyoll 
passe-partout in the suburbs. 120 On the other hand, it is likely that all parties recruited 
their militants from among the locally born. 
118 Kolboom, 'Les cadres', p. 72. 
119 62% of PDP employees were born in the agglomeration compared to 43% of those in the Federation. 
120 Videlier, op. cit., pp. 176-7. Immigrants comprised 44% of the population in 1931. 
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The Peasantry 
It is difficult to learn much about the nature of peasant support for the Federation 
from the sources used. Electoral lists usually describe all those engaged in agricultural 
pursuits as 'cultivateurs'. Most often the only additional information is whether or not 
the individual concerned was a 'patron'. This is all that is known of 63% of those in 
the sample. 121 'Patrons', are, however, almost certainly overrepresented in relation to 
the electorate at large, which suggests that political activity was reserved for heads of 
households. 
Proprietors (19%) are of far greater importance than tenants (1 %). Because the 
conservative vote was often very high in areas where tenants were most numerous, 
this may simply mean that the Federation had no need of active support of any kind in 
such communes. Or it may mean that tenants, for reasons of prestige, were less likely 
to advertise their status in the census. But the difference is so large that it must be 
concluded that ownership of property was a condition of notability and involvement 
in rural politics. Winegrowers are also rare in the Federation sample. This is again due 
in part to the imprecision of the sources. 
We have no indication of the sizes of farms owned by Federation sym-
pathisers. The right in rural areas was led by substantial landowners. The most promi-
nent were Alexandre Bosse-Platiere, the Comte Guy de Saint-Laumer of Corcelles 
(Beaujeu) and the Comte Vivien de Lescure, Conseiller general of St Laurent. Such 
men were often prominent in agricultural syndicates and cornices. But by far the bulk 
of Federation sympathisers were medium to large peasant proprietors. The example of 
Jean Parrel in Messimy has been referred to on several occasions. Another example is 
the Badoil family of Yzeron. Four family members turn up in the sample, of which 
one was mayor of the commune. 
Conclusion 
To sum up, the Federation was in the 1930s less and less the instrument of liberal 
bankers and factory owners like Edouard Aynard. Its militant base was no longer of 
be found on the plateau or in the Brotteaux, but from Perrache to the Croix Rousse in 
Lyon, and in small rural communes in the mountains and the Beaujolais. These were 
areas where representatives of a declining elites were influential: aristocratic large 
landowners, excluded from the USE; commercial and merchant-manufacturing elites, 
especially in the silk industry. Their influence depended on religion, typically exer-
cised either over the passive peasantry of the mountains, or the deferential white col-
lar workers of the Croix Rousse. Whereas the leaders of the Federation were bour-
geois and most often Lyonnais, the mass of sympathisers were white collar workers or 
peasants. Most of the former lived in their commune of birth, while many of the latter 
12141 % were 'cultivateurs' and 'patrons'; 22% were 'cultivateurs' alone. 
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had been born in small rural communes, perhaps situated in areas of high religious 
practice. The contrast between older supporters in which the Lyon-born were overrep-
resented and a younger generation in which rural migrants were relatively more 
common is indicative of reliance upon religious ties. Many of the latter were recruited 
from working class suburbs, and do not seem to have become deeply involved in 
party activities. That Federation militants were older than those in rival parties, and 
increasingly so, is illustrative of crisis. 
As the Federation shifted to the right certain of its former leaders turned to the 
lay centre right, which began to challenge the Federation in the Brotteaux. Here they 
met with businessmen and senior managers for whom anti-clericalism and reformism 
went together. In the 3rd and 5th arrondissements the Federation was challenged by 
the PDP. The latter was largely the political prolongation of the social Catholic 
movement, which drew support from young urbanized white collar workers. 
Chapter six 
Notables, mass parties and the Church 
In this chapter we shall see how in the late 1920s and early 1930s the elitist F edera-
tion rtlpublicaine of liberal notables like Edouard Aynard and August Isaac was reor-
ganized by Victor Perret. Institutional change cannot, however, be isolated from a 
broader crisis of bourgeois society. Perret's target was the Aynardian political and 
economic elite. His stated intention was to mobilize a popular and national opposition 
against what he saw as 'Ia bourgeoisie en place', through a renovation of the struc-
tures of the Federation. This was a programme which in some respects resembled that 
of the radical right in its appeal to a 'national opposition'. But Perret's reconstructed 
Federation was itself dominated, as we have seen, by elitist Catholic landowners and 
bourgeois who sought to contain social and economic change. In the countryside the 
Federation merely formalized the ties of notables to the party. In Lyon the parishes 
were the means by which a mass following was integrated. There were contacts be-
tween the Federation and leagues like the Jeuflesses patriotes, but Perret sought to en-
sure that the latter remained subordinate. 
All the same, the radicalization of the Federation helped to prepare the way for 
the reappearance of the extreme right in the mid-1930s. Another result of Perret's ef-
forts was institutionalization of intra-conservative conflict. Those who resented Per-
ret's authoritarianism or social policies often turned towards the loose groupings of 
the lay centre right. Others saw in the PDP a genuinely democratic party committed to 
social reform. 
Notables 
Invocation of the influence of 'notables' upon political behaviour in France is often a 
substitute for serious analysis. It appears possible to cut through the tangle of re-
gional, class and religious loyalties by putting everything down to 'personalities'. But 
carefully defined, the concept of 'notable politics' is a useful one. It can be taken to 
signify two things. It can mean that an individual, perhaps a Catholic landowner, is 
accepted as a leader because of who he is rather than because of his policies. Alterna-
tively, a notable could be a deputy who makes use of state patronage in order to build 
a position which depends upon services rendered rather than ideology. The history of 
the early Third Republic is often written in terms of the replacement of the first kind 
of notable by the second. As long as this is related to social and ideological context it 
is a plausible view. 
It is not difficult to see the extent to which Radical influence in the RhOne de-
pended upon state patronage. In Clochemer/e, the position of Radical Senator 
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Barthelemy Piechut depends on careful cultivation of personal networks. In spite of 
his anti-clericalism he marries his daughter to an impoverished aristocrat, which put 
him in a position 'd'arbitrer tous les petits conflits, entre Ie Saone et les Monts 
d' Azergues', and permitted him to combine the advantages of old and new notables.! 
No doubt Chevallier had in mind Radical politicians such as Senator Camille Rolland, 
who was able to use his position as a doctor to create a network of sympathies even in 
the Catholic canton of St Symphorian.2 In Lyon politics were dominated by ex-Prime 
Minister Edouard Herriot. Mayor of Lyon for fifty years, and from 1937 a conseiller 
general, Herriot is a classic example of how accumulation of mandates could bring 
the power of Paris to the provinces.3 
The use of patronage was also open to the centre right. Laurent Bonnevay, 
Deputy for Tarare, was able to exploit the pivotal position of the centre right in par-
liament. Even the moderate wing of the Federation, represented by Fran~ois Peissel, 
had access to government favour.4 It was for these reasons that conservative pressure 
groups like the USE and the Chamber of Commerce tended to work with the moder-
ate right. This is also why the moderate right, tended to distrust mass organization, 
which would have tied its hands. The route to power both for the Federation of Ay-
nard and Isaac and for the lay centre right in the interwar years was through personal 
influence. The style of Auguste Isaac, which one commentator described as that of an 
English 'milord', was a radically different from that of Victor Perret.5 
During the period when his friend Louis Marin was Minister of Pensions 
(1926-1928), Perret made full use of the advantages this opened up. lie reassured 
Marin that he only passed on those requests for assistance which were either 
'justifiable' or which possessed 'vraiement un interet direct pour des amis fideles et 
devoues, ce qui est Ie cas aujourd nui'. 6 The problem, however, was that the Federa-
1 Chevallier, op. cit.. pp.408·9. 
2 Gric, op. cit., p. 198. Camille Rolland's home commune of Brignais had been poised between left and right until 
10 1929 he was elected to the Senate. In !935 the nght constItuted a list for the mUnicIpal electIOns only with great 
difficulty. A report of 1941 concluded that 'Ia population etant en forte majorite agricole, la frontiere entre ces 
deux partis politiques n'etait pas tres marquee. Ces questions de personnes et d'intcrcts locaux, jouent un grand 
role dans les elections locales (ADR 4m Conseils municipaux, dossier Brignais). 
3 The mayor of Lyon enjoyed close relations with a succession of prefects. Emile Bo\laert, named to the Rhone in 
Fehruary 1934 by a government of which Herriot was a member, had previously been chef de cabinel in Herriot's 
1932 administration, and would go on to be a Radical deputy after the war. An astonishing confirmation of Her-
riot's popUlarity came in 1931. In order to free himself from dependence in the municipal council on the malevo-
lent neutrality of the SFIO, Herriot resigned and presented himself for election in the Socialist stronghold of the 
3rd arrofdissement. The socialists were crushed. (Herstein, op. cit., pp. 179-181). 
4 AN F 13 261: during the campaign for the 1932 election the prefect commented 'La bonhomie souriante de M. 
Peissel, les demarches qu'il n 'a jamais menagees, lui assureront un succes qui semhle peu douteux -. Jean-Baptiste 
Delonne too stressed to the electors his role in bringing water and electricity to the countryside. Le Nouvel/iSle, 5. 
1-1932. 
5 Gric, op. cit., p. 60. 
6 Marin Papers 76, Perrct to Marin. 16-2-1928 and 21-2-1928, 30-8-1927. On another occasion Perret wrote to 
Marin to ask him to prevent the transfer of a tax collector's office from a commune adjacent to St Vincent de Reins 
(Lamure), where Perret had a summer residence. to Cours: ce serait d'un poids enonne pour nos idees et pour 
nous-memes, d'autant plus que ce percepteur et de nos amis'. Success would be all the more savoured, Perrct con-
tmued, because the affair concerned Laurent Bonnevay's constituency. Neither was Perret ahove lohhying on his 
own hehalf--he wrote to both Louis Marin and Minister of Commerce Georges Honncfous to complllin that the 
latter had not awarded him the Legion of Honour. Carton 76, Perret to Marin 20-8-1929, Perret to Bonnafnus 19-
8-1929. • 
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tion was rarely in government. Perret's followers had to be content with exploiting lo-
cal notoriety. Thus in the legislative election of 1932 the conseiller ghuJral Alexandre 
Bosse-Platiere gained 42% of the vote in his own commune of Lucenay, compared to 
16% in the constituency as a whole. 
Victor Perret could also depend on the support of an older kind of notable. In 
the mountains and in parts of the Beaujolais some conservatives were elected because 
of who they were, as much as because of their politics. The family of the Marquis de 
Gayardon de Fenoyl, for example, occupied the mayoralty of St Foy I' Argentiere for 
much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Comte de Lescure, cOllseiller 
general for the canton of St Laurent de Chamousset was personally affronted when a 
Radical list defeated him in municipal elections in Chambost-Longessaigne in 1935. 7 
Paternalist relationships were buttressed by the Church. In the Beaujolais Guy 
de Saint-Laumer operated a Clochemerle style alliance with the clergy. The mountain 
commune of Montromand was administered for many years by the local priest, who 
occupied the position of secretary to absentee mayor Alexandre La Batie. A prefec-
toral survey of the political situation recorded concern that the secretary-priest had 
threatened to close cafes which opened during mass. 8 As well as the Church, 
landowners relied on prosperous peasant mayors for their influence upon the wider 
electorate. A campaign meeting for the 1928 election at St Symphorian market was 
described by the press as 'a veritable plenary assembly of mayors'. 9 
But we have seen in previous chapters that notables could no longer rely au-
tomatically on deference. Indeed, it is possible to speak of a general crisis of notable 
politics in the 1930s, stretching beyond the right into the Radical Party. This became 
manifest in the elections of 1936, when Herriot was deeply wounded by failure to win 
on the first ballot. to Meanwhile Laurent Bonnevay saw two fifths of his 1932 vote 
desert to Victor Perret. Bonnevay prevailed only with Radical support. There were 
ideological limits beyond which even Herriot and Bonnevay could not go. The former 
had alienated his electorate by his support for deflation; the latter by his flirtation with 
the PopUlar Front. Even before these crisis years, notability had never been sufficient. 
Julien Riboud's investiture by eight of the canton of Monsols's eleven mayors was in-
sufficient to prevent ignominious defeat in the cantonates of 1934. Victor Perret 
failed to build a position in the commune of St Bonnet Ie Troncy, even though he 
owned a summer residence there and was an employer of local weavers. II 
7 ADR 4m conseils mll1icipaux, dossier 5t Laurent de Chamousset. In Bully, a plateau commune, the Gillets had 
an unshakable grip on the municipal council. Edmond Gillet was succeeded ~s mayor In 1931 by Bizot, a relative 
through marriage who ~pent most of his time in Paris. (ADR 4m conseils mumcipaux, dossier l'Arbresle). 
8 ADI{ 4m, conseils nllIlicipaux, dossier St Laurent de Chamousset, report of 9·5·1941. L 'Union republicaine, 30. 
4·1933. In Dueme (St Symphorian) mayor Villard was criticized for excessive subservience to the cure and the 
clencal party. (ADR 4m, conseils m/nicipaux, dossier St Symphorian sur COIse. report of November 1940). 
9 Le Nouveau Journal, 15-4.1932. 
1U M. Soulie, La vie politique d'Edouard Herriot, Paris, 1962. 
II He secured election to the municipal council in I 925--1he only mandate he ever held-but was oustL-d five 
years later. 
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Victor Perret's reorganization of the Federation must be seen in the context of 
this crisis. Deference to the 'traditional authorities' could not be counted upon outside 
of certain areas, and was not certain even there. Perret's extremism meanwhile closed 
off the possibility of using government patronage, which was available only to the 
Radicals and to the despised moderate right. 
The Federation republicaine 
In the 1930s the Federation republicaine du RhOne became, in the words of William 
Irvine, the 'organizational showpiece of the party'.12 This transformation was sub-
stantially the work of Victor Perret. Aged forty-seven in 1930, he was the son of a 
jabricant de soieries and leading figure in the ALP.13 Whether Perret junior was ever 
a member of the ALP is unknown. But what is certain is that after servke in the ar-
tillery during the war he was attracted by the intransigent nationalism of Louis 
Marin. 14 
Victor Perret was held up as an example to Federation members in France as a 
whole: 'sa popularite meritee est due, pour une large part, au fait qu'il reste et restera 
toujours Ie prototype de militant, mettant ses forces et son travail, avec un desin-
teressement total, au service de ses idees'. 15 Thanks to his unceasing activism Perret 
rose rapidly in the party hierarchy, struggling for ascendency with Fran~ois Peissel, 
President in the Rhone from 1925. 16 On the latter's election as deputy in 1928 Perret 
took on the position of 'active president', and became President in his own right in 
December 1931. In mid-1932, after a crisis provoked by the refusal of Peissel and his 
ally Antoine Salles to sit with the Federation's group in the Chamber of Deputies, 
Perret's control over the Federation became absolute. In the summer of the previous 
year he had become a member of the national Executive Committee. Given that he 
never held a significant electoral mandate, Perret's rise to a position where he was a 
minor player on the national scene is remarkable in a party of elues like the Federa-
tion. 
Doubtless Perret's preoccupation with organization was derived from family 
involvement in the ALP.17 Bosse-Platiere was another with roots in the party of De 
Mun and Piou. The ALP itself, had survived in the Rhone until 1929, when, under the 
influence of its most reactionary members, it was dissolved into the short-lived Ligue 
des droits de la nation. The ALP had sent fifty delegates to the congress of 1928 
which chose Peissel as the conservative candidate in the constituency of l' Arbresle. 
12 Irvine. op. cit.. pp. 39-41. 
13 Perret had been a member of the Federation committee of the 4th arrondissement since its foundation in 1910. 
14 On Louis Marin see Irvine op. cit.. pp. 6-12. 
15 Marin papers 78. cutting from La Nation. 
An article in I 'Union Republicaine descrihes him thus: 'De taille moyenne. large d'epaules. donnant une extraordi-
naire impression de force et de vitalite. M. Perret a Ie physique de lutteur. 11 en a aussi nune.' 
16 Marin Papers 82. Perret to Marin. 28-2-1924: Perret already hoa.~ts of his success in propagating the party faith. 
17 On the organization of the ALP see B.F. Martin, Count Albert de Mun: Paladin of the Republic. North Car-
ohna. 1978. pp. 161-2. See also mfra. Chapter two. 
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But after this date it is impossible to distinguish ALP militants in the countryside 
from sympathizers of the FR. There was a similarity in the structure of the two par-
ties: leaders drawn from the Catholic elites mobilized a popular following through an 
alliance with the Church. 
Victor Perret's aims were made clear at a meeting of the National Council of 
the Federation in September 1929. He attributed disquiet in the party to 'des par-
lementaires qui viennent sans cesse donner leur opinion a laquelle ni personne, ni la 
presse ne contredit'. Going on to speak of 'national recovery', he argued, 'si on ne 
peut pas Ie faire avec la bourgeoisie, et particulierement la bourgeoisie en place, il 
faudra avec des elements populaires'.18 On another occasion he argued that 'les di-
rections de trois ou quatre hommes ont vecu. Ce sont ceux qui se devouent qui 
doivent diriger'.19 In the Lyonnais context this meant the mobilization of the people 
against an unrepresentative clique. 
How successful was Victor Perret? In electoral terms he had a negative impact 
on the Federation, for his turn to the right was a major cause of the rise of the centre 
right. Perret himself recognized that he was an electoral liability, withdrawing his 
candidacy for the 1935 Senate elections in order to make the Federation list more at-
tractive to centrists.20 In sociological terms we have seen that the Federation recruited 
more widely than its rivals. But the ruling classes were overrepresented; leadership 
was increasingly dominated by 'old bourgeois' and landowners, while the party's 
mass base was unstable and passive. 
In organizational terms too the results of Perret's activities were mixed. There 
was a complex network of organizations. At the summit of the Federation was a bu-
reau of about twenty-five persons, elected by secret ballot from the 100 member COIl-
sei! departemelltal. Below this was a 500 member Comite departemental which rarely 
met. The base was made up of committees, theoretically present in all communes and 
cantons of the department, as well as in each of the municipal arrondissements of 
Lyon. The seven committees of Lyon also sent delegates to a central committee. De-
pendent organizations, included a Comite d'ouvriers et employes, a Groupe des je-
unes, several social centres, two groups dedicated to providing the children of the un-
der-privileged with holidays,21 a boules federation, Solidarite scolaire which sup-
18 Marin Papers 84, 'resume of Perret's intelVention'. 
19 L'Union republicaine, 9-2-1936. In Villefranche Alexandre Bosse-Platicre puhlidy attacked domination of the 
Federation by deputies who too readily attributed their success to the cleverness of their campaigns, the astuteness 
of their manoeuvres, and the services they had rendered. Like Perret he added an anti-bourgeois note, denouncing 
'une certaine elite qui vit sur elle-meme. Sans etre des aristocratcs ses memhres ne mclent pas au vrai peuple. lis se 
voient. se recevaient. frequentant toujours les gens du meme condition sociale. [ ... 1 lis ont pour nous, les militants, 
une certaine pitie dedaigneuse'. (L 'Union Republicaine, 11-9-1932,7-1-1934, 12-5-1935). 
20317 AP 76. Perret to Marin. 22-8-1935. 
21 The TUleJaire du premier arrondissement, and the Oeuvre des en/anJs a la montagne in the 2nd arrondissement. 
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ported private schools in the 2nd arrondissement, and two smaIl concerns which pro-
vided cheap housing.22 
Table 12. Committees of the F~dlration republicaine 
Committee Date of Formation 
1st arrdt. ?1905 
2nd arrdt. 1893 
3rd arrdt. ? 
4th arrdt. 1910 
5th arrdt. 1928 
6th arrdt. 1930 
7th arrdt. 1930 
Villcurbrume 1926 
Venissicux 1928 
La Mulaticre 1930 
StFons 1934 
Villcfranche 1932 
Tarare 1936 
Perret's part in alI this was impressive. As Table 12 demonstrates, his presidency saw 
the extension of the Federation's organization from the presqu'ile and Croix Rousse 
to the left bank of the RhOne, to working class suburbs and to ViIIefranche and 
Tarare. It was seen in the previous chapter that membership of the Federation rose 
quite substantially in the early 1930s. If the labels adopted by candidates during 
legislative elections are taken as an indicator, then Perret had some success in disci-
plining the right. In 1936, if Peissel and Salles are counted as adherents of the Feder-
ation, it was for the first time present in all fourteen constituencies in the RhOne. And 
for the first time a true party man, in the person of Pierre Burgeot in the 6th ar-
rondissement, was victorious.23 
Perret's impact upon the Federation is beyond dispute. Yet his success was in-
complete. In the first place, tightening of party structures contributed to intensifica-
tion of conflict with rival strands in the right. In Lyon's 'red belt' the FR organized on 
virgin territory. In the 5th, 6th and 7th arrondissements, and in Villefranche and 
Tarare, new FR committees were set up alongside older conservative organizations 
which had shown few signs of life outside of electoral periods, and which were sup-
posed to federate all republicans.24 Conflict was most serious in the 6th arrondisse-
22 The Cites jardins de la Federation republicaine provided twenty lots in the 5th arrondissement. There was also 
the Societe cooperative de construction in Villcurbanne. 
23 [,Union republiclline, 28-6-1936. Burgeot was by all accounts a rather colourless character, entirely loyal to 
Victor Perret. He was, according to a police report, selected as candidate only because no one else came forward. 
ADR Elections legisllllives, 1936,22-2-1936. 
24 The new committee of the Federation in the 7th was 'en remplacement de l'Union des comites, organisme 
puremcnt electorale et qui n'a au 7e arrondissement de raison d'ctre qu'en periode electorale'. Le Nouvellujour-
nal.2-12-1930. 
Notables, mass parties and the Church 149 
ment, where all tendencies had hitherto been federated in the Union des comites 
republica ins. 
Within the Federation too there was much resistance to the imposition of dis-
cipline.25 Committees were not the democratic structures of party propaganda. 26 On 
the contrary, Perret's rise in the Federation was accompanied by increasing authori-
tarianism. Elections to bureaux of committees were never contested. With the pur-
chase of the Nouveau journal by the Nouvelliste in 1931 conflict within the Federa-
tion was no longer reported by the conservative press. Union republicaifle did its best 
to gloss over conflkt.27 
Authoritarianism was one of the reasons for the departure of Laurent Bon-
nevay from the Federation. He contrasted Perret, with his 'esprit de la petite chapelle, 
ret son] autocratisme de direction', with the tolerance of Edouard Aynard. 28 Bon-
nevay's views had much to do with the need to safeguard a patiently constructed 
client network. Perret for his part included a 'struggle against organized parties' 
among his principal grievances against the Deputy of Tarare.29 In 1932 the refusal of 
Salles and Peissel to join the Federation's parliamentary group prompted another 
controversy over party discipline. Their action provoked a diatribe from Bosse-
Platiere against the egoism of deputies who believed themselves to have been elected 
through their own efforts.30 
The outcome of this crisis, however, illustrates the limits of Perret's reach. 
The bureau departemental decided unanimously, with the backing of the four con-
seWers generaux of Peissel's constituency, to suspend all activity with the renegades 
until they returned to the fold. It was strongly hinted that there would be no ba<:king 
for Salles and Peisse1 in the elections of 1936. These sanctions had no practical effect. 
They were not announced to the public. Both deputies continued to attend Federation 
meetings.31 
The relative helplessness of the Federation when confronted with a Bonnevay, 
Peissel or Salles, is reflected in the implantation of its committees. The party claimed 
in 1929 to have committees in all thirty-three cantons in the department, as well as in 
150 of its 269 communes.32 Yet the press mentions the existence of no more than 
thirty-six committees outside the commune of Lyon from 1928 to May 1936, of 
25 Marin papers 76. manusLTipt of an article for insertion in La Nation. In 1926 the pages of this usually dull peri-
odical had been enlivened by a polemic between Louis Marin and Laurent Bonnevay. One of the latter's 
grievances wa.~ the attempt of Marin. and by implication Perret. to discipline the party: 'Aujourd'hui il parait qu'on 
Vtlut unifier ce parti et meme la federation qui n 'est pas un parti. On edicte un doctnnel On vous encercle dans un 
programme! Sur toute matiere on apporte des dogrnes. Et pas un question n'appurait qui ne recouve im-
mediatement des solutions imperatives. On est pret a repn:ndre les formules du Syllabus [ ... J'. 
26 L 'Union dpub/imine, 9-2-1936. 
27 L 'Union republimine. October 1932: Constant Bonnard resigned from the bureau of the 4th committee in 1934. 
citing differences over means. not ends. 
2R L'Union repub/icaine. 6-1-1935. 
29 L'Union dpub/imine. 23-12-1934. 
30 See footnote 19. 
31 AN 317 AP 80. Perret to Marin. 10-6-1932. 
32 Le Nouvel/iSle. 19-3-1929. 
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which five were cantonal committees. Of these only a handful showed any sign of life 
in five or more years: those in the seven arrondissements of Lyon, ViIIeurbanne, 
Venissieux and Oullins in the agglomeration, and the cantonal committees of Con-
drieu and Neuville sur Saone. From Maps and 6.1 and 6.2 it can be seen that Perret's 
organizational efforts had little impact beyond the grande ban lieu of Lyon. Commit-
tees in rural communes were exceptional. These were often animated by individuals 
with links to the agglomeration.33 
In reality Perret's Federation consisted of a sort of cartel which included nota-
bles in the Beaujolais, the mountains and the 2nd arrondissement of Lyon, together 
with Perret's own network of committees. 
We saw in the previous chapter that Perret's rise in the Federation was associ-
ated with a shift towards the mountains and Beaujolais. But this was not accompanied 
by a similar spread of the organized Federation to these areas . Landowners like 
Alexandre La Batie and Guy de Saint-Laumer wrote in the Federation press and par-
ticipated in its ruling circles. But they did not set up permanent party committees. 
Public activity was limited to the odd public meeting in the cantonal chef-lieu. These 
were run on strictly hierarchical lines. In a meeting at St. Laurent in 1933 the village 
cure sat on the platform alongside La Batie and all of the canton's mayors. 34 In other 
words the spread of the Federation to the mountains and the Beaujolais involved the 
formalisation of established relationships at a time when they were coming under 
threat. 
In Lyon too a modified form of notable politics survived in some areas. We 
shall see that notable politics remained the norm in the centre right. Of more rele-
vance to our present purpose is that the committee of the 2nd arrondissement re-
mained independent of the Federation. Desire to maintain distance from Perret was 
partly due to the fact that this was the only part of the city where the right consistently 
won elections. Consequently elues like Antoine Salles were dominant. Monthly 
meetings consisted accounts of the general political situation, usually delivered by 
Salles, followed by speeches from members of municipal and local councils on mat-
ters such as the circulation of traffic. Furthermore, in a constituency which had re-
mained marginal into the mid-1920s, Antoine Salles attempted to maintain an above 
party image.35 In fact, most committee members were sympathizers of Victor Perret, 
as would be expected in an area where the 'old bourgeoisie' were well represented. 36 
In the longer term, especially after the Croix de Feu and PSF directly challenged the 
33 See Chapterfive. 
34 L'Union TI!publicaine. 30-4-1933. 
35 For this rca~on Salles joined Peissel in refusing to join the Federaiton group in the Chrunhcr in 1932, even 
though his views were well to the right of those of Peissel. 
36 Interview with Monsieur H.C .. Fehruary 1987. Even Johannes Mercier. a memhcr of the Alliance and munici-
pal councillor. was a firm supporter of Perrct. 
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Federation, the committee of the 2nd arrondissement allied itself ever more explicitly 
with Perret. 
On the plateau meanwhile Perret's wing of the Federation was less influential. 
Franc;ois Peissel remained in charge. Deference was the rule here too, but it depended 
less on allegiance to traditional authorities than upon the conservatism of satisfied and 
prosperous peasants, skilfully maintained by Franc;ois Peissel's patronage. His candi-
dacy was automatically renewed in 1932 and 1936 by assemblies of communal dele-
gates, most of whom were either mayors or their deputies. 37 Yet on the plateau even 
more than in the mountains, deference had its limits. One of the few Federation com-
mittees on the plateau was led by Jean-Marie Parrel, a figure with close links to the 
JAC. Parrel was loyal to Victor Perret, but many younger jacistes were to turn to the 
Croix de Feu. 
The role of the elites 
The purpose of this and the following section is to look more closely at the distribu-
tion of power within the Federation. We saw in the previous chapter that those with 
authority were much more likely to be drawn from the ruling class. Neither peasant 
mayors, nor working class adherents in Venissieux were able to penetrate the leader-
ship of the Federation. We have seen that certain types of businessmen were very 
favourable to the Federation. But does this mean that they were able to determine its 
actions? 
Victor Perret's correspondence with Marin shows that he regarded income 
from business as essential. The Federation's accounts for the 1936 elections show that 
Perret received money from two national sources. Some came from the notorious 
Union des interhs economiques (UIE), an organization sponsored by the Comite des 
forges and other rather conservative businessmen. On the first round the deputies 
Salles and Peissel, (now back in the Federation fold), received 10,000 francs each, 
while Perret himself, the only other beneficiary, got 5,000 to assist in his fight against 
Bonnevay. Business money was forthcoming only where a candidate was sufficiently 
right wing, and where he stood a chance of winning. It was not distributed indiscrimi-
nately, as is sometimes claimed. 
The second source was the Federation in Paris, which gave an equal sum to 
the same three candidates on the first ballot. For the second ballot the VIE gave 
nothing at all. But the Federation found a further 5,000 for three particularly im-
portant campaigns. It is interesting that Pierre Burgeot, who won the 6th arrondisse-
ment from the Radicals, received money only on the second round--few had ex-
pected him to survive the first ballot. 38 
37,Nouveau Journal, 7-3-1932: 366 delegates at I'Arbresle were mandated by 69 communes (L'Union repuhli-
calne,6-3-1936), 
38 AN 317 AP 81. 
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Most Federation candidates were reliant on donations from local business, 
channelled through the Federation. For example Perret received 25,000 francs from an 
unnamed donor to fight the Senate elections of 1926.39 From the sparse evidence 
available it appears that local banking circles were the chief source of money. The 
national Budget Commission of the Federation included two sons of Edouard Aynard 
together with Oscar Cambefort, all of whom were members of the board of the Ay-
nard family bank.40 
The Federation's financiers were not afraid to use their influence. In 1929 Au-
guste Isaac, who was close to the bankers cited above, warned Jean Guiter41 that the 
Federation would regret its lack of regard [sic] for the public finances when next it 
asked for funds.42 Such pressure was sometimes successful. In the summer of 1935 
Perret was taken to task (in private) by Isaac for an article he had written in the Union 
republicaine, in which he had detected a rather improbable conspiracy of oil compa-
nies, banks and insurance companies against the Federation. Isaac demanded an ex-
planation for sentiments more usually associated with communists.43 Perret was 
clearly worried by the letter, for he informed Louis Marin that Isaac still had consid-
erable influence in Lyonnais financial circles ('sur la place de Lyon') We went on to 
inform his leader that 
II est certain que je n'ose pas dire ce que je pense des "banques" - car si elles m 'abandonnaient 
11 Lyon - 'JIll deviendrais je??'l [sic I Quel malheur de ne pas eire riche et indcpendant com-
pletement. 
It is difficult to know whether Perret was referring to the independence of the Federa-
tion or to personal difficulties with the banks, for since 1931 Perret's own business 
had been in a precarious position. In October of that year he had offered to take on the 
task of liaising between the Federation and its departmental sections during the forth-
coming elections in return for a subsidy which would help him get through the reces-
sion with his dignity intact. Revealingly, he goes on to say 
Je ne veux rien demander ici. car je ~ais d'avance Ie prix qu'on me. ferait paye~ Ie I~~indre ap-
pui et j'aime mieux vendre rna chemise que ceder un pouce de terram et d'une Idee .. 
What is clear is that money was not given without strings, and that Perret was con-
scious of limits beyond which he could not go. He did not repeat his 1935 attack on 
the banks. A party like the Federation did not have the autonomy from the elites 
which would have derived from possession of a genuine mass membership. 
39317 AP 76. Perret to Marin 23-10-1926. 
40317 AP 75. 
41 National secretary of the Federation. 
42317 AP 73. dossier Young Plan. 
43 317 AP 76. (there are two cartons with this numher. whatever the archivists might say). Isaac to Perret, 18-8-
1935. L 'Union republicaine. 18-8-1935. 
44 317 AP 76 (second carton). Perret to Marin, 22-8-35. 
45317 AP 76.16-7-1931. In 1933 an illegible correpondant of Marin reports that one of his relatives would soon 
be obliged to withdraw certain finacial guarantees from Perret's finn. He asks if the Federation can do anything. 
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All the same the position of big business was not the same as it had been in the 
days when liberal businessmen like Aynard, Isaac and Jean Coignet had combined 
leadership of the Chamber of Commerce with leadership of the Federation and par-
liamentary careers. We saw in Chapter five that elite businessmen like Gillet and 
Isaac played a declining role in the party. Relations between the Chamber of Com-
merce and the Federation also became more distant from the late 1920s. It would ap-
pear that by the early 1930s financial pressure was the only way in which the liberal 
elite could influence the Federation. Out of sympathy with the political ideas of Vic-
tor Perret, big business turned instead to the moderate right and even conservative 
Radicals to lobby on their behalf. The attitude of Henry Morel-Journel is symbolic of 
the changing relationship between big business and politics in Lyon. He still regarded 
the step from Chamber to politics as a natural. Before he became President he had 
written pessimistically in his diary, 'Avec rna position et mes facultes, j'aurais pu 
avoir des vi sees plus hautes, me «mettre en avant» pour la presidence de la Chambre 
de Commerce (qui est a portee de rna main), puis faire de la politique etc .... '. Al-
though Morel-Journel did subsequently become President of the Chamber, he did not 
move into politics.46 
Just as the days when politics had been the preserve of a narrow elite of busi-
ness politicians had gone, so conservative organization could no longer be seen as an 
outgrowth of elite sociability. Before World War One what were known in Britain as 
gentlemen's clubs had played a central role in the sociability of the Lyonnais elites. 
There had been a marked difference in the geography, sociology and political atmo-
sphere of the main cerc/es.47 Broadly speaking the clientele of the Cerc/e de ['union 
corresponded to the leadership of the Federation, while the Cerc/e de Commerce was 
closer to the Radicals and lay centre right. It is, moreover, possible to see some per-
sonal links with those parties.48 In the 1930s twelve Federation militants were mem-
bers of the Cercle de rUnion, against only three who were members of the Cerc/e de 
Commerce. One of the latter, Jean Coignet, had doubtless joined in the days when it 
had been the Federation which had grouped the progressive bourgeoisie. 
But what is most striking is that so few Federation activists spent their 
evenings at either cercle. Those who did so were often an older generation of business 
politicians like Isaac--those who had collaborated with Aynard. Henry Morel-
Journel reveals that he attended a weekly 'economists lunch' at the Cercle de ['union, 
where he met such figures as Auguste and Humbert Isaac, Jean Coignet. Edmond 
Gillet and Oscar Cambeforte. Business and politics were the staple conversation.49 
41\ fournal dHenry Morel-fournel. 11-11-1932. 
47 On cercles see J-L. Pinnl. Mobililf!S f!1 immobilismes. pp. 225-264. 
4& Our source is the Annuuire de TOW-Lyon. 
49 fournal dHenry Morel-fournel. 16-6-1929.2-7-1930. 
Notables, mass parties and the Church 154 
But none of the leading figures in the Federation in the 1930s were members of either 
cercle, not even Victor Perret himself.50 
Only in the case of the 2nd arrondissement can this conclusion be qualified, 
for deputy Salles along with two leading committee members were adherents of the 
Cercle de rUnion. This is another confirmation that the in this area politics remained 
the preserve of the 'old bourgeoisie' of merchants and lawyers. 
In the 1930s it was rentiers, lawyers and owners of largeish but often old-
fashioned family firms, like that of Victor Perret himself, which dominated the Feder-
ation. The latter were excluded from influence in the Chamber of commerce, and 
were not quite wealthy enough to join the Cercle de rUnion. Rather their social life 
centred on the parish, which was also the chief field of their political action and their 
means of mobilizing a mass following. 
The Federation and the conservative masses 
An article in ru nion nJpublicaine in 1932 by Jean Deschanet describes the party-run 
social centres of the SFIO and Radical propaganda in local cafes. We, Deschanet 
lamented, have the reputation of frequenting cafes only in electoral periods. He pro-
posed that committees should organize 'aperitifs dominicaux' in cafes.51 The bour-
geois and patriarchal nature of his solution is plain. It was supposed to take advantage 
of a time when 'Le dimanche matin, notamment pendant que la bourgeoise se livre 
autour de son fourneau, de son rechaud, a de savantes preparations culinaires, son 
homme, souvent flanque d'un ou deux rejetons turbulents, s'en va lire son journal en 
presence d 'un mandarin-citron ou retrouver des copains a tel cafe, dont il est 
I'habitue'. In the days of Edouard Aynard lack of contact with the masses would not 
have been regarded as a problem. What is interesting here is that even in Perret's Fed-
eration there was no real attempt to propagandize directly the wider public. Rather 
Victor Perret attempted to create a mass party by strengthening links with the Church. 
Of course, the Catholic hierarchy did not descend into the arena of party poli-
tics. All the same, Catholics could have been in little doubt as to Maurin's views on 
how they should vote. His pastoral letter for the 1932 elections urged Catholics to 
vote for those who were prepared to help the Church re-conquer its lost rights. 52 Since 
both the Alliance democratique and the PDP were inclined to accept the status quo, 
Maurin could only be advising a vote for the Federation. In case his meaning was un-
clear, he went on to remind Catholics that without the Church the temporal power 
could not see clearly, and was incapable of barring the road to disorder. 53 
50 Perret did belong to the Aula Club de RhOne. but this new institution cannot be linked to a political tendency. 
51 L'Union republicaine. 10-7-1932.3-7-1932. Only in the 6th arrondissement was the idea ulken up. 
52 'Les electeurs auront bientot, en France. a choisir leurs reprcsentants. Nous leur rappelons instamment qu'il est 
obligatoire pour eux dans la mesure ou ils peuvent, d'envoyer au parlement des hommes qui non seulement ne 
porternnt aucun prejudice a la religion. mais qui s'emploieront a reconqucrir. avec prudence sans doute. mais aussi 
avec fermete.les droits et les lihertes qu'on nous a injustement ravis: 
53 Le Nouvel/isle. 25-1-1932. 
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Further than this the hierarchy did not go. But there is much evidence of per-
sonal ties between Church and Federation. Victor Perret himself was deeply religious; 
his brother was an abbe in the parish of St Fran~ois de Sales; another militant in the 
seventh arrondissement, Louis Chassagnon. was brother of the bishop of Autun. Sev-
eral sympathizers received papal decorations for their activity on behalf of the 
Church.54 It is true that few of the most senior laity were involved in the Federation. 55 
Many of the latter remained crypto-royalist and integrist in their sympathies. But po-
litically impotent. they provided tacit support for the Federation. Furthermore. at the 
same time as the Federation moved to the right the hierarchy was in the process of re-
newing its mode of intervention in the secular world. 
This can be seen in the links between the Federation and the Oeuvre des eer-
eles.56 According to Claudius Deriol, interviewed in 1987, its parish groups were an 
essential source of recruits for the party. He also stated that the parish clergy were 
generally favourable to the Federation.57 Federation municipal councillors such as 
Charles Bennier and Paul Montrochet in the 2nd arrondissement patronized the eer-
eles. Relations between party and eereles were especially close. Deriol suggests. in 
the 4th arrondissement. where Victor Perret himself was Vice-president of the Cerele 
paroissiale of St Bruno-the President was a cousin of his. Jean Michaud. presi-
dent of the Cerele St Augustine attended several meetings of the FR committee in the 
Croix Rousse in the late 1920s and early 1930s.58 For the average eerc/e member. the 
main points of contact with the Federation were beloue and boules tournaments orga-
nized by the latter. 59 
These contacts reveal much about the changing nature of the Federation. The 
circles were the offspring of De Mun's Oeuvre des eerdes ouvriers. founded in 1872. 
In 190R. in recognition of a limited proletarian participation. the reference to workers 
was quietly dropped. In the years before WWl the Oeuvre des eerdes had vegetated; 
there were in 1908 no more than about 20 circles. grouping around 600 men.60 After 
54 For example, Victor Berard and M. Plass"n, both of the 7th arrondissement, received respectively the Order of 
St Gregory the Great and the Croix pro ecelecsia 1'1 ponliface . The secretary of the seventh cummittee said 
'plusieurs entre nous s'occupent de la maniere Ie plus active d'oeuvres diverses, paroissiales, sociales mutualistes, 
etc. [ ... J' 
55 One exception is the Comte de la Sparre, a Beaujolais winegrower and duyen of the Faculle calholique. 
56 Variously known as cereles d'hommes, groupes d'hammes, or cereles paroissa/t's. 
57 Interview with Claudius Deriol, 16-8-1987. M. Dcriol is a former journalist, who was active in the PDP, the 
Chronique, and the CFTC: La Federalion republicaine, elle est dans les paroisses, et il y avait une vieille tradition. 
II y avait des groupes dllOmmes, justement, des cercles d'hommes qui nntamment?i Lyon etaient tres forts encore 
un peu partout; qui etaient des cercles alors ou on joue au cartes et on joue aux boules [ ... ] Alors ~a tous les di-
manehes, to utes les fCtes-les gens ?i l'epoque n'avaient pas de voitures. Ella Federation rel'ub/icaine etaient 
tres appuyee la-dessus; dans la Croix Rousse, sur Ie plateau c'est une grande tradition, on jnue au houles [ ... J'. 
58 Another example is M. Bougerol, President of the Pa/riOle de SI Denis, who turned up at Federation meetings 
in the 4th in 1937 and 1938. Su~h examples could be multiplied. 
59 'Ces manifestations semblent n'avoir pour but qu'une distraction. En realite elles sont les modes de pmpagande 
presque les plus feconds, car elles rassemblent des hommes qui n'ont pas tnujours nos opinions, el aupres desqucls 
la simplicite de I'accueil; la franchise de l'amitie, la cordialitc de Is camaraderie sont souvent, pour les attirer a 
nnus, des aimants plus aelifs que les discours' (L 'Union repub/icaine, 9-2-1936). 
60 For the pre-war history of this movement see Ponson, op. cit., pp. 42·45. His estimate of membership was cnn-
firmed by Joseph LUlOien-Brun, who spoke of twenty cercles in 1914. 
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the war the movement experienced substantial growth. In 1933 it claimed 5-6,000 
thousand adherents in forty-two groups.61 Increased opportunity for leisure following 
the Eight Hour Law might have been one reason for this expansion. 
In the 1930s the Oeuvre des cercles was still marked by the integrism of its 
founders. 62 One of its traditional functions had been to protect healthy Catholic is-
lands from contagion by anti-clericals and socialists: hence the preoccupation with 
organization of leisure. The cercles also attempted to influence the political opinions 
of their members. A speech by Joseph Lucien-Brun, President of the Oeuvre des cer-
cles in Lyon and its suburbs from 1908 until his death in 1929, contrasted the sterile 
dogmatism of socialists with the practical charity of Catholics. 63 Lucien-Brun, an ex-
Legitimist, had been a leading member of ALP before 1914, remained politically ac-
tive, and was mayor of Curis au Mont d'Or. A look at his eleven fellow bureau mem-
bers confirms that in the 1930s the Oeuvre des cercles had not shed its reactionary 
past. Four were nobles, and three can be identified as prominent members of Action 
/ranraise. 64 
This, however, did not prevent collaboration with the Federation, for in the 
1920s the Church had begun to rethink the means by which it defended its interests. 
Nadine-Josette Chaline, in a study of the Catholicism in Normandy, argues that for-
mation of general Castelnau's Federation nationale catholique (FNC) , which played 
an important part in agitation against the Cartel des gauches, was the turning point. 
The Church abandoned the myth of a fundamentally Catholic population from which 
it was necessary only to eliminate Jews, Freemasons and Protestants in order to re-
store the Church's position. It now recognized that Catholicism was a minority 
movement, which was obliged to capitalize on its speciai advantages. Hence the func-
tion of the FNC as a kind of religious pressure group. 65 
In the Rhone the Ligue de defense catholique, set up with Maurin's help in 
1917, affiliated to the FNC on its foundation. By 1933 it claimed 24,000 members in 
145 sections, of which fifty functioned 'normaUy'.66 It is plausible that in Lyon the 
FNC overlapped with the Oeuvre des cercles. Leaders were recruited from the same 
milieu. Charles Jacquier, the first President, was a former Legitimist; his successor 
was another royalist, Gabriel Perrin. Comte Louis de Longevialle, leader of the Action 
franraise in the Beaujolais, was a prominent member of both organizations. Meetings 
of the Ligue de defense catholique, like those of the Oeuvre des cercles, were also at-
61 Nouvel/iSle. 6-5-1933. 6.o(X) in fifty-two groups were claimed in 1937 (Nouveuujournul. 6-3-1937). 
62 See chapteT fnur. 
63 Nouvel/iSle. 19-3-1928. 
64 Count Louis de Longevialle. president of the AF group in Villefranche, Colonel Delorme. and Henry de 
Moinecourt, a journalist on La Republique lyonnais. 
65 Nadine-Josette Chaline Des CllIholiques normllnds sous la Troisibne rt!publique. Crises. combats. renouveaux. 
Roanne/Le Coteau. Iyg5. passim and pp. 243-45. In the longer term emphasis was put more on rechristianization. 
In 1937 the Ligue de defense catholique hecame the diocesan union of Aclion calholique. 
66 Nouvellisle. 2Y-5-1930. 20-11-1933. 
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tended by members of the Federation, from Peissel to Perret. The latter's brother con-
ducted mass at a journee des cadres of the league in 1933. 
Besides using the Church, the Federation attempted to use links with the Je-
unesses patriotes to mobilize support. Victor Perret sometimes joined JP leader Tait-
tinger on the platform at its meetings.67 On one occasion a writer in the JP journal re-
ferred to league and Federation as 'sister organizations. pursuing the same goals'.68 
Contacts were closest at the end of the 1920s when Taittinger, taking account of the 
relative stability after the fall of the Cartel. decided that parliamentary action was the 
only possible way forward. He therefore ordered JP militants to collaborate with the 
Centre de propagande des rffpub/icains natiollaux of Henri de Kerillis. The aim of 
this body was to create a united conservative party.69 
For the Federation the most significant result of collaboration was the creation 
of a party youth group. Founded in 1929 by Roger Fulchiron, a close ally of Victor 
Perret,70 it had originated four years previously in agitation against the appointment to 
the Parisian law faculty of Georges Scelle. Fulchiron himself had taken the initiative 
of extending the agitation to Lyon, creating a group of National Republican Students, 
with links to both FR and JP.71 On his return from military service in 1929 Fulchiron 
secured the backing of Louis Marin, Victor Perret. Pierre Taittinger and the JP for his 
new venture. The youth group played an important part in Perret's reorganization of 
the party, obtaining a sizable membership. and preparing the way for new sections of 
the party proper. 
Victor Perret saw the leagues as occupying a subordinate role. His dominance 
over the JP was doubtless favoured by common recruitment in the parish network. 72 
Control from above was taken for granted by Roger Fulchiron. In 1930 he disclaimed 
any intention to create yet another organization, let alone a new league. On the con-
trary, 'notre seul but c'est de renforcer les merveilleux comites d'anciens militants, de 
leur enr61er des recrues et de dresser leurs jeunes troupes'. 73 
Links between the JP and the Federation were not, however, unproblematic. 
For a number of reasons Perret was distrustful of all leagues. One was that he saw 
them as disorganizing the right and draining money and troops from the Federation. 74 
67 AN F7 13235, report of 18-1-1929; LeNouveliisle, 22-11-1932. 
68 L 'Alerle, August 1929. 
69 Soucy. Fascism, lhe First Wave, ch. 8. 
70317 AP 76, Perret descrihed him in a letter to Louis Marin a.~ 'un de ces jcunes sur lesquels Ie parti peut fonder 
des espoirs scrieux. and declared his intention to add him to his departmental bureau, which he intended to rejuve-
nate. 
71 This account of the origins of the Groupe des jeunes is based on an interview with M. Roger Fulchiron. 11-2-
1987. For the student rioL~ of March 1925, see Eugen Weher, AClionjraru,;aise: Royalism and reaclion in Twenti· 
eth century France, Stanford, 1969, pp. 157-8. 
72 See Chapter 9. 
73 Le Nouveau journal, 17-9-1930. 
74 Emile Burc~ of L'Ordre earned a rebuke from Perret for having suggested the creation of a league to back 
Tardieu in forthcoming elections: 'lis nous embCtcnt taus avec leurs 1igues--car ils drainent de I'argent, entral-
nent les imbeciles au detriment de notre parti. Je m'empresse de vous supplcer de ne pas inventer encore quelque 
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In private he let it be known that Kerillis's Centre de propagande could not be ef-
fective as long as it aimed to replace the Federation, and criticized everyone else in 
spite of its own lack of mandate or competence. 75 A second reason was that in the late 
1920s Kerillis and Taittinger were associated with Tardieu's conservative reformism, 
to which Perret was radically opposed. Those in the league who were closest politi-
cally to Perret were, unfortunately adepts of a violent street politics which Perret 
feared would get out of hand. After the arrest of one JP militant, Perret wrote to Tait-
tinger: 'I had foreseen this affair and for some time I have been warning your friends 
in Lyon and yourself to rid yourselves of him. Not only was I not listened to, but on 
every occasion my counsel of prudence and my friendly observations were nearly al-
ways [sic] interpreted as expressing animosity or enmity:76 Indeed, even the most 
moderate of the JP saw the league as uniting and by implication leading the right. 77 
In the end Perret saw the activism of the leagues as a threat to his version of 
the social and political hierarchy. But Perret was a prisoner of his own goal of mobi-
lizing the 'popular classes' against the establishment, just as he was constrained by 
his links with the Church. Perret's critique of the vulnerability of the right to the indi-
vidualism and selfishness of its leaders was echoed by the leagues and could poten-
tially be turned against him. 
The Centre Right 
We have already seen that the centre right was dependent on the personal positions of 
deputies--above all Laurent Bonnevay. Son of a conseiller general, he had repre-
sented the Beaujolais mountains in Chamber of Deputies and Senate since 1902.78 
Like earlier Republicans with their promises of railways, he offered running water 
and electricity to outlying regions.79 He joined no other party after his departure from 
the Federation, though he sat in parliament with the more left-leaning of the Alliance 
democratique's two groups, the Republicaills de gauche. His organization consisted 
simply of a small committee in Tarare to which the mayors of rural communes were 
invited for the purpose of unanimously endorsing candidates. Bonnevay saw himself 
as an almost mystical emanation of the republicanism of 'la France profonde'. Again 
he resembled the early Republicans in seeing a direct relationship between the people 
and their elected representatives, unmediated by parties, or any other body.80 His 
histoire qui va drainer de l'argent et ficher du desordre partout, nous avons deja assez d'ennuis avec L'Echo de 
Paris [i.e. Kerillis) (AN 317 AP 76. 9-7-1930, Perret to Sure). 
75317 AP 76. Perret to Paul Gand. 22-4-1930. 
76317 AP 7. Perret to Taittinger. 19-4-1929. 
77 L'Unionjram;aise. 9-3-1929. 
78 Bonnevay was deputy from 1902 to 1924. Following the defeat of the conservative list in that year, he was 
elected to the Senate. On the return of saUl in d'arrondissement in 1928 he once more became deputy. 
79 Le Petit nWnla[?nard de Tarare, 19-7-1931,27-7-1931. The latter edition published a letter from the Minislly of 
Agriculture. informing of the grant of a suhsidy for electrification. 
80 Le Peli, Monlagnard de Tarare. 4-1~-1931: 'Les principcs directeurs de nolIe pulilique ont surgi sponlanernent 
de nolIe sol et de no lIe race haut hcauJohlls. Nous ne sommes pas alles les chercher dans des organisations elcc-
lorales centralisees OU nous ne les aurions renconlres qU'aUenues. dilues, entoures de reticences et de reserves'. 
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major concern was that ideology should not disrupt the network of favours he had 
constructed. 
The organizational structures of the lay centre right were just as loose in the 
rest of the department. When Deputy Jean-Baptiste Delorme left the Federation for 
the Alliance in 1931 he made no effort to set up a rival organization in his con-
stituency, merely relying on a handful of friends when the time for re-election came 
in 1932. By far the strongest lay centre right committee in the agglomeration was in 
the 6th arrondissement of Lyon, but even this body could not match the vitality of its 
Federation rival. The same was true on the national level, although From time to time 
the party leadership declared its intention to organize a 'broad democratic conser-
vative party'.81 
The structure of the Alliance facilitated domination by a wealthy elite. It is 
probable that from the mid-1920s the centre right competed for finance from the same 
banking milieu as the Federation. Auguste Isaac's presence at the odd Alliance gath-
ering would suggest this. It is known too that Perret, thanks to competition from Eti-
enne Fougere, had great difficulty in obtaining money for the 1926 Senate elections, 
and was annoyed by Fougere's attempts to obtain money for Redressementjram;ais in 
Lyon.82 It is also significant that four centre right activists, including Weitz and 
Fougere were members of the same club, the Cercle de commerce, previously noted 
for its contrast to the more conservative and Catholic Cercle de runion. The lay cen-
tre right possessed even less autonomy from the ruling class than the Federation. 
Business domination of the centre right should not, however, be exaggerated. 
Indeed, the role of elites in the centre right appears to have altered at the beginning of 
the 1930s. Edmond Weitz withdrew from active politics in 1930, concentrating his ef-
forts on the Chamber of Commerce.83 Fougere's role in politics in Lyon was much 
reduced after he was elected Deputy of the Loire in 1928. Big businessmen remained 
numerous in the Alliance, but leadership passed to Eugene Mansuy, a pottery mer-
chant and to Dr. Augros. This is a reminder that the Alliance also appealed to the con-
servative wing of the anti-clerical bourgeoisie, as well as to a business elite disillu-
sioned with the Federation by Perret's growing influence. 
Anti-clericalism in turn was a potential link to the masses. But in fact the cen-
tre right made no attempt to mobilise the people. Where lay institutions played a role 
81 See D Wileman. 'poE Flandin and the Alliance derlwcratique 1929-1939', Freru:h History. 4, 1990. pp. 139-
172'. 
82317 AP 76, Perret to Marin, 23-10-1926: 'rai r~u hier un cheque de 25,000 Frs. de qui vous savez ... pour nos 
elections senatoriales. La victoire est donc complete; sans notre F ... [sic] national. [i.e. Fougere]. tout ceJa aurait 
ete evite'. Perret adds, 'J'apprends 11 J'instant que F ... vient la semaine prochaine ici faire une rafle avec Ie groupe 
Mercier I ... ]'; J-N. Jeanneney. de Wendel. p. 445 notes the tendency of business money to go to the centre right; 
Wileman. op. cit., reports F1andin's concern that dependence upon big business compromised his independence. 
83 fournal d'Henry Morel-fournel. 14-6-1929. Weitz informend Morel-Journel that he intended giving up his 
promising political career to focus upon the Chamber of Commerce. 
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in politicisation it was the Radicals who profited.84 There is, on the other hand, some 
evidence of a link between the lay centre right and Protestantism. Small reformed 
communities existed in the Beaujolais and in Lyon. They were dominated by a few 
patrician families, although in the nineteenth century the social base of Protestantism 
had widened due to immigration from the Drome and Cevennes. 85 Protestantism in 
Lyon had always been on the advanced wing of bourgeois politics, feeding into Radi-
calism and even socialism as well as into the centre right.86 Edouard Aynard too had 
counted a few Protestants among his associates. Three leaders of the centre right were 
Protestants: Edmond Weitz. president of the Alliance has already been mentioned. 
Guy Aroud, who passed from the Alliance to the Radicals was from a well-known 
Protestant family. Jean Lambert was an Independent Radical of the 6th arrondisse-
ment. In 1936 the Federation in the 6th made a special appeal to Protestant voters, 
who it was said had traditionally voted for Lambert. 87 It may also be significant that 
the New Temple, headquarters of Protestantism in Lyon. was sited in the Brotteaux. 
Doubtless Protestantism reinforced cleavages within the right. There is, how-
ever, hardly any evidence that Protestantism itself was a political issue, either be-
tween left and right, or within the right. 88 Neither is there any evidence that either Al-
liance or Independent Radicals was a 'Protestant party'. On the contrary, several lead-
ers of the Alliance were practicing Catholics. Etienne Fougere had long been active in 
the promotion of Catholic education. Laurent Bonnevay was a Jesuit educated 
Catholic who in his youth had been associated with the Chronique. 89 Like the Feder-
ation in the days of Aynard the centre right preached toleration and avoided too close 
an identification with either clericalism or anti-clericalism. 
This was part of a wider distrust of mass politics. In 1933 two young lawyers, 
Robert Cuilleret and Rene Bouteille. created an Alliance youth group in Lyon, which 
for a brief period showed a liveliness uncharacteristic of the parent organization. Its 
intentions were unclear, for it promised to obey the counsels of the wise men of the 
party. but also announced itself as the equivalent of the Radical 'Young Turks'.90 
Even though in 1933 Pierre-Etienne Flandin. the new party President had launched 
yet another organizational drive. the movement failed to attract the sponsorship of a 
84 Gric, op. cit., p. 132-3, de~crihes Paul Massimi, Radical deputy of the 7th arrondissement thus: 'Capitaliste 
heureux, M. Paul Massimi est un philanthrope; il fait profiter des benefices de sa maison les associations scolaires, 
socialcs, sportives de sa circonscription, toute en amcliorant la situation de son personnel. Dans Ie domaine de la 
bienfaisance, Ie depute de VIle est intelligcmment et discrctcment aide par Mme. Massimi; elle sait fort bien dis-
cerner les oeuvres prives interessants qu' ecarte la politique officielle, mais que Ie coeur d 'une femme ne saurait 
ignorer. 
85 H. Bruston, 'Le Protestantisme Lyonnais', in Rn'ue de Psych%gie des Peupies, 1958; G. Le Bras, Eludes de 
socioiogie reiigieuse, Paris? p.376. 
86 Note also that the Protestant economics professor Andre Philip was the fITst practising Christian to be clcted as 
an SFIO deputy. 
87 Le Nouvel/iSle, 3-5-1936. 
88 The appeal to Lambert's voters is the only known political reference to Protestantism in the entire period 
89 Ponson, op. cit., p. 105-6. Bonnevay's daughter married a son of the Legitimist Jacquier. Eugene Mansuy, his 
successor as leader of the Alliance in the 6th arrondissement, was a former Sil/onisl. Antoine Guinet had bt.'Cn a 
member of the governing body of the Facu/lt? calhoiiqlle. 
90 See the two surviving issues of the group's paper, the Sud-esl repub/icain, October and November, 1933. 
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national leader. Both Flandin and Paul Reynaud refused to accept the honorary presi-
dency.91 
How is this combination of elitism and hostility to ideology to be interpreted? 
It is insufficient to see the centre right as a relic of an outmoded style of politics, 
doomed to disappear in the modern period, for 'notable parties' have shown consid-
erable capacity for survival in France.92 It is more convincing to see the centre right 
(and indeed the centre in a more general sense), less in party terms than as a strategic 
location within social and political relations. We have already seen that for deputies 
like Laurent Bonnevay the centre right was a means of access to government patron-
age. Similarly it was a location through which interest groups like the Chamber of 
Commerce, the USE, and a host of bodies like the veterans' movement could make 
contact with the state. It was also possible in the centre right for groups with quite dif-
ferent aims to draw together the various strands of French politics. It was possible to 
build alliances by blurring the normal cleavages between capital and labour, industry 
and agriculture, big and small business, clericals and anti-clericals. For these reasons 
formal structures and ideology were a hindrance. Consequently the centre right was 
made of people with diverse backgrounds, ranging from Catholic bankers whose fa-
thers had backed the Federation, to anti-clerical civil servants who had quarrelled 
with the Radicals. Often the discourse of the centre right consisted of little more than 
a celebration of its central position in political life. 93 
Social Catholicism and the PDP 
For Jean Raymond-Laurent the PDP was an organization of notables.94 But another 
national leader, Marcel PreSlot, emphasized that 'a la difference des autres partis de 
droite et du centre, Ie PDP se caracterise par sa croissance quasi-spontanee et comme 
par en bas. Elle est l'oeuvre reellement democratique et populaire de militants obscurs 
et devoues [ ... ],.95 The PDP may have been a small party, but its principles of organi-
zation were unlike those of Federation or Alliance. Its local organizations were known 
as 'sections', a term borrowed from the left implying both democratic discussion and 
submission to majority opinion. This contrasts with the connotations of secretiveness 
and elitism in the term 'committee'. Like the left the PDP was open about differences 
in opinion in its meetings.96 This reflects its acceptance of social conflict and their de-
sire to institutionalize it, whereas the Federation and Alliance clung to the myth of a 
91 Papers of Paul Reynaud. Thanks to Julien Jackson for this infonnation. Papers of the Alliana d,lmocrmique. 
carton I. Reynaud refused the honour on the advice of a local notable Julien Riboud. 
92 This is the implication of W.o. Irvine's work. 
93 Le Sud-est republicain. October 1933: the principal preoccupation of the journal of the Alliance youth group 
was a critique of 'I a politique en ligne hrisee'. 
94 Raymond-Laurent, op.cit.. p. 96. This conclusion is echoed by R.E.M. Irvine. Christian Democracy in France. 
London. 1973. pp. 41 ff. 
95 Bul/elin des 'Democrales populaires' (Region Lyonnais). January 1929. 
96 For example the section of the 3rd arrondissement witnessed a debate between a shopkeeper and a white collar 
worker on the issue of purchasing cooperatives. Le Nouveau journal. 14-4-1931. 
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unique national interest, and attributed division to the dissolvant propaganda of politi-
cians and/or foreigners. 
In terms of party membership and votes the PDP was only moderately suc-
cessful. But the PDP is significant because it formed part of a network of sodal 
Catholicism which included the Chronique sociaie, the CFTC, certain reviews, and 
which reached into the Federation. 
Jean Raymond-Laurent correctly stresses the independence of the PDP, which 
aimed to end the connection between the Church and political reaction. 97 Neverthe-
less the PDP was deeply imbricated in the life of the Church. Claudius Deriol de-
scribed PDP sections as 'des bandes paroissiaux' (in contrast to the Jeune rt!puh/ique, 
whose members 'frequentaient Ie bistro autant que la sacristie'). The PDP could not 
match the influence of the Federation in the parishes. Most priests supported the Fed-
eration, but many abbes favoured the PDP. Dominicans, with their democratic tradi-
tion, were prominent, as were those who had been members of the Sil/on. 98 Sympa-
thetic clergy were often attached to the parish-based Cercles d'etudes sociales. These 
offshoots of the Chronique sociale frequently led to involvement in the PDP. Whereas 
the Federation mobilized a relatively passive rank and file through encadrement of 
leisure activities, the PDP grew out of democratic discussion groups. No doubt this 
confirmed Auguste Isaac's fear of allowing young abbes to counsel youths of eigh-
teen to twenty years, when both were ignorant of economic matters.99 
Claudius Deriol is typical of PDP militants. He was introduced to the 
Chronique by a former Sillan member, Fran~ois Perrier, who was also animator of 
the PDP's youth group. In the Cercle d'etude of St Pierre des Terreaux, Deriol, then 
a young bank employee, met Georges Forestier of the CFTC. Deriol went on to be-
come editorial secretary of La Voix socia/e. He also presided over a support group for 
the Dominican journal, Sept, which was particularly active in Lyon. 100 
From a rather different background was BenOIt Carteron, an activist in the 
Catholic mutual aid movement who joined the CFTC while working in the office of 
his father's salted meat factory at St Symphorian. In 1933 he set up his own business. 
In following year he became president of a PDP section in his home commune. 
Carteron was to succeed Laurent Bonnevay as president of the Conseil general in 
1957.101 
97 Raymond-Laurent. op. cit .. p. 76: 'lis [les dcmocratcs populairesl distinguent rigoureusement entre Ie spirituel 
et Ie tempore!. Jarnais ils ne demanderent de directives. ni mcme de conseils. II la hierarchie religieuse. ct ceBe-ci 
ne cherche nuBement II les influencer'. Claudius Deriol confirms that in Lyon the PDP was unable to count on the 
support of Cardinal Maurin. 
9S Interview with Claudius Derio!, 18-6-1987: 'Les cures etaient II la Federation republicaine. et puis lI.,s abhes 
etaient au PDP [ ... J On comptait un peu dans ces milieux. surement, mais c'etait pas aussi solide. II y avait Ie 
rcseaux dominil:ain. qui ctait tilftement implante ( ... 1'. 
99 Auguste Isaac. Journal. 28-7-1928. quoted in Ponson. op. cit.. p. 316. 
100 Interview with Claudius Deriol. 15-6-1987. 18-6-1987. 
For the Amis de Sepl. see Coutrot. op. cit.. p. 196. 
101 Interview with Benoit Cru1eron in Aloul Rhone. September-Ol:lober. 1988. 
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There are many other examples of the links between the PDP and the social 
Catholic network, which it would be tedious to enumerate. 102 Suffice it to note that 
Jacques Tourret, founding president of the PDP federation of the Rhone, left the party 
to succeed Marius Gonin as Secretary-General of the Semaines socia/es in 1938. 
It is important not to exaggerate either the affinity between Chronique and the 
PDP or the homogeneity of the political views of Chronique activists. There was a 
range of opinion in the Chronique. One member of the editorial board, Henri Franchet 
went from the local leadership of the ALP to show a strong sympathy for the Croix de 
Feu and PSF.103 Christian Ponson indicates that the events of 6th February 1934 were 
at the origin of divergences of opinion within the Chrollique. I04 There were also a 
minority of sympathizers of the centre left Jeune rtJpub/ique in the Groupes 
d'hudes. 105 
But if supporters of either moderate left or extreme right were rare, links be-
tween the Chronique, the Federation and the PDP are of greater significance. There 
were two key figures. The first was Marius Gonin. He insisted that the Chrollique it-
self remain apolitica1. 106 But whilst too much cannot be read into the fact that he was 
a subscriber to the journal of the Federation,107 Gonin's role in the local press is a dif-
ferent matter. In the 1920s he was managing director of the Nouveau journal and ed-
itor of Sa/ut public. Both dailies were sympathetic to the left wing of the Federation 
and to the moderate right more generally. 108 
The second key figure is Fran~ois Peissel, a link between PDP and Federa-
tion. He was not the only Federation e/u to attend PDP meetings. In September 1934 a 
number of Federation municipal councillors attended a PDP fete de la famille held at 
the Foyer de PerracheY'R Their presence derived less from conviction than from 
recognition of the electoral value of remaining on good terms with the PDP. But for 
Fran~ois Peissel, whose ties to the CFTC have already been noted, it was more a 
matter of conviction. When in 1932 Peissel refused to join the Federation group in the 
102 CFTC speakers were common at PDP meetings: Georges Forestier himself spoke to the 3rd section on the 
'Statut legal des employes' (Nouveau jour/Ull. 20-3-1930). Felix Channcttant and Dr Biot. both PDP activist~, 
were active in the Chronique's commission mixle and the Cercle d'elUdes met/icales respectively. The PDP itsclf 
organized 'Cerclcs d'etudes militants'. 
103 Not to be confused with a Croix de Feu/PSF activist of the same name. 
104 Christian Ponson. 'La Chronique sociale de Lyon en 1940'. in Eglises 1'1 chretiens dIms la deuxieme guerre 
numdiale. Lyon. 1981. p. 28. 
105 Interview with Claudius DenDI. 18-6-1987. Denol remembered frequent disputes between himself and the lo-
cal leader of Sangnier's league. Avenin. which often continued in the strcct. On one occasion memhcrs of the JR 
stormed the platform at a PUP meeting. 
106 Ponson, op. cit.. p. 27. Claudius Deriol tells us that propaganda for the PDP had to be 'tres officieull', but ex-
aggerates when he says that Gonin had 'un espece d'allergie pour la politique'. We saw in Chapter four that Gonin 
was somewhat too far to the right for some CFTC militants. 
107 Ponson, art. cit .• p. 30. C. Ponson also notes that on the occasion of the Senmine socia Ie held at Lyon in 1926 
there wa~ for the first time a sign of rapprochement between Gonin and the integrist right. This may, however. 
have bcen conjunctural. for in 1926 there was. in opposition to the Cartel. an exceptional degree of conservative 
unity. At ahout the same time Gonin was admitted to the Congregation des messieurs de Lyon. 
108 Archives de la Chroniqlle sociale. malic 3. dossiers Nouveau journal. and Sallll public especially rcport and 
Ictterof 6-11-1930, signed hy Gonin. 
}Cf9 Le Nouveau Journal. 9-2-1934. See also Le Nouveau Journal 7-2-1935. and Le Nouvel/iSle 14-10-1928. 
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chamber, it was to follow Georges Pernot, national leader of the pro-PDP tendency in 
the Federation'! JO 
Victor Perret, for whom the PDP were 'red fish in holy water', was never seen 
at a PDP gathering.1l1 He commented to Louis Marin that the Semaine sociale of 
Nancy in 1926 was 'un peu demagogique'.112 There were, however, some elements of 
the social Catholic movement which did support Perret's wing of the Federation. The 
most important were sections of the JAC and those sympathetic to it, such as Jean-
Marie Parrel. One leader of the Catholic engineers' union USIC was also a pro-Perret 
Federation activist. But whether it was linked to the left or the right of the Federation, 
social Catholicism was a source of instability, for it brought together religious and so-
cial tensions in the right. 
Conclusion 
By 1935 little was left of the elitist Federation founded by Edouard Aynard. His pro-
tege, Auguste Isaac, resigned from the party of which he had once been national 
president in 1929. Typically he asked that this be kept secret from the rank and file. 113 
Victor Perret had succeeded in removing the Federation from the grip of the 
'bourgeoisie en place'. But the Federation remained a hybrid party, combining revi-
talised notable politics in parts of the countryside and the 2nd arrondissement with a 
wider audience mobilized through the parishes. Collaboration with the Oeuvre des 
cercles restored in some measure the influence of a section of the elites which had 
been marginalized since the end of the nineteenth century. It is possible to trace a line 
from intransigent Orleanism and Legitimism through the ALP to Victor Perret. 
Perret derived what ability he had to ignore the complaints of Isaac from al-
liances with JP and Church. But this reduced his room for manoeuvre in other direc-
tions. First, Perret's criticisms of the organizational incoherence of the right were 
taken up by sections of the extreme right, thereby threatening his hierarchical view of 
society. Second, the Federation was a prisoner of the Catholic-anticlerical conflict. It 
was perceived by the wider public as a clerical party, and consequently as a tool of 
reactionary elites. Conflict within the Church was also imported into the Federation. 
This is why the growth of social Catholicism and the PDP posed so many problems 
for the Federation. Dispersal of the right was accompanied by, and partly caused by 
fragmentation of the political unity of Catholicism. 
1 JO Irvine, op. cit., p. 13. Salles also joined the Groupe Pernot, but he was considerably to the right of Peissel. His 
adhesion was no doubt a tHetical one, for in this period Perret's extreme nationalism was not elcctorally profitable. 
A third key figure is Jules Maire, proprietor and editor of Le Petit montagnClrd de Tarare. Until 1935 
Maire was a member of the departmental committee of the Fl{. Yet the columns of his paper frequently induded 
reprints from Le Petit dernncrClle. and on his resignation from the Federation. Maire announced his intention to set 
up a section of the POP in Tarare. 
III According to Claudius Dcriol Victor Perret was Tennemi numcro un' for the PDP. 
112 AN 311 AP 16, Perretto Marin. 9-8-1921. 
113 AN 311 AP 13. Isaac to Guiter. s.d. ?1929 'Je ne vous demande pas de la dire tout haut en public mais je ne 
vous defend pas de la faire connaltre 11 nos plus vieuJt amis'. ' 
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To sum up, whilst the difficult adaptation of elitist conservatism to mass poli-
tics was an important component in the realignment of the Lyonnais right, it is insuf-
ficient to see reorganization separately from parish politics, and from the efforts of 
sections of the ruling class to resist social and economic change. In the late 1920s and 
early 1930s these issues crystallized around the question of whether or not the Federa-
tion should back the conservative reformism of Andre Tardieu. 
Chapter seven 
The parliamentary right and conservative reformism 
The parliamentary right in the Rhone faced three related problems. First, it had to 
overcome its electoral weakness. In practice this meant that it had to find a way of 
either winning over the Radical electorate or of enmeshing the party itself in a perma-
nent alliance. Second, it had to cope with a nascent mobilization of rank and file con-
servatives, evident in the CFTC, the PDP and other offshoots of social Catholicism. 
Third, it had to find a way of reconciling competing factions of the ruling class. 
Similar problems were faced by the right nationally. Indeed, open conflict 
within the Lyonnais right was precipitated by the attempt of Andre Tardieu and other 
centre right politicians to put an end to the chronic instability of French politics. 
Tardieu aimed to realize the old conservative dream of a broad conservative party on 
the British model. The results in both France and the Rhone were the opposite of 
those counted upon. By 1932 the disintegration of conservative politics which later 
led to the rise of the leagues was already underway. 
Conservative Reformism 
The right wing administrations of 1928 to 1932 had the best reforming record of any 
Third Republican governments prior to the Popular Front. For once there was consid-
erable room for manoeuvre. The right had won an overall majority in the elections of 
April 1928. In the Rhone too the elections had been a triumph for the right, which 
won four seats. In addition Victor Augagneur, one-time socialist mayor of Lyon, won 
the 7th arrondissement on a nationalist platform. 1 Meanwhile the Radicals and so-
cialists were at each others throats. Herriot's quarrel with his socialist allies in the 
municipal council of Lyon delighted modrJres everywhere. Communist adoption of 
the 'class against class' tactic further divided the left. 
The economy was expanding. The state budget was consequently in surplus. 
This helped to create an audience for partisans of expansion and modernization in 
business and political spheres. Even a bastion of orthodoxy like the Camire des 
Forges was not totally averse to change.2 In Lyon the progressives Fougere and 
Charbin presided over the SFS. Tardieu's service at the Ministry of Agriculture reas-
1 The right won three out of fnur rural constituencies: Bonnevay won the Beaujolais mountains; Peissel won Lyon 
r Arbresle and J-B. Delorme won Givors. Salles won the 2nd arrondissement. Augagneur sat with Clemencist na-
tionalists like Franklin-Bouillon in parliament. His victory was a personal one. for in his death in 1930 the seat re-
verted to the Radicals. 
2 In 1927 the relatively progressive Lambert-Ribot took over leadership of the Comile des forges. There were also 
leadership changes in the coal ?wners association .. (Martin Fine. 'Toward Corporatism. The Movement for Capital 
Lahour Concillallon tn France. Ph. D. TheSIS. WlsconslO. 1971). Pnor to the elections Mercier had reassured the 
forgemastersfnd his conservative rival. the VIE. that Redressement fraru;ais wanted a government of the right. not 
the centre (F 13 240. reports of 3-12-1927. 17-12-1927. 16-12-1927). See also Jeanneney. De Wendel. pp. 375-6). 
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sured the rural world. In the Rhone even conservative spokesmen for agriculture like 
Felix Garcin admired the reformist Tardieu. 
There is no need to go further into the details of national politics. Suffice it to 
say that reform is most often associated with the Tardieu ministries of October 1929 
to December 1930.3 For one historian they epitomized the neo-capitalist movement 
for renovation'.4 Ernest Mercier was admitted to the inner circles of government.5 In 
fact, reform began under Poincare, whose decision to stabilize the Franc at a rela-
tively low level shortly after the elections was a first victory for the modernisers.6 
Renovation continued after Tardieu's fall under Pierre Laval. All the same, the former 
was the most coherent exponent of conservative reformism. His programme included 
five components.7 
1. Tardieu took up ideas on the reform of the state current in right wing circles since 
the days of Millerand. He favoured a single round first past the post voting system. He 
reduced the number of ministers in his cabinet, refused to consult the parties on the 
formation of his government, and promised to make frequent use of the question of 
confidence to reinforce his authority. He collaborated with KeriIlis's Centre de pro-
pagande, which he saw as the means to create a united conservative party. In sum 
these measures were rather timid. Tardieu had not yet become the authoritarian of the 
mid-1930s.8 He did make use of secret government funds to finance the Croix de Feu. 
But at this stage the goal was renovation of constitutional conservatism. 
2. The reformed state was to playa more interventionist role in the economy.9 The 
central measure was a 'National Re-tooling Plan'. It was an ambitious programme of 
public works, including rural electrification, water purification, and improvements to 
the telephone network. The intention was to bind the clientele of the Radicals to the 
right, whilst providing opportunities for industry. Tardieu was not in any sense a 
Keynsian avant la lettre. Retooling was to be financed out of tax surpluses. 10 
3. Wage-earners would be won over by social reform. A long overdue Social Insur-
ance Act was voted in 1928, with rectifications in 1930. 11 In 1932 a Family Al-
lowances Act was passed. Also a product of this period was Loucheur's law facilitat-
3 Laval then took over the premiership until February 1932. when Tardieu resumed the job of President of the 
Council. 
4 Kuisel. Capitalism. p. 90. 
5 Kuisel. Mercier. p. 55. 
6 Jeanneney. De Wendel. pp. 321-354. 380-408. 
7 To rationalize the poliCies of this period in this way is to some extent artificial. for they were the outcome of a 
complex process of bargaining and compromise. For a good summary of the aims of Tardieu see J-M. Mayeur. La 
vie politique sous la Troisieme Republique, Paris, Seuil, 1984, pp. 291-293, and Monique Clague 'Vision and my-
opia in the new politics of Andre Tardieu', FHS, 81973. 
8 Taratowsky, 'La droite et 1'6tat', in Cahiers de l'institut Maurice Thorez. 1978, p. 129. 
9 Kuisel. Capitalism, pp. 66-69, 91: the young under-secretary for economic affairs, Andre Fran<r<>is-Poncet 
claimed that the state had a duty to guide and enliven private economic activity. Poincare and Mercier worked to-
gether to encourage the creation of a national oil refining industry. 
10 Clague op. cit.. passim. 
11 It was accepted on condition that it be modified to take account of the needs of agriculture. Appropriate rectifi-
cations were passed in 1930. and the legislation implemented in July of that year. 
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ing the building of low rent accommodation. These measures were accompanied by 
vigorous repression of the communists, carried out by the Prefect of Police Chiappe. 
4. In an effort to improve human capital, secondary education became free in 1930 to 
1933. The government looked favourably upon the idea of creating a single track sec-
ondary school system, the ecole unique. 
5. Briand remained Foreign Minister throughout the period. His policy of rap-
prochement with Germany was accompanied by encouragement of international eco-
nomic collaboration. His project for a European tariff union was warmly received in 
exporting circles.12 One purpose of Briand's foreign policy was to reinforce the eco-
nomic prosperity on which Tardieu pinned his hopes. 
In sum, Tardieu's reforms were designed to use economic prosperity and so-
cial reform to integrate wage earners into a broad conservative consensus led by pro-
gressive businessmen and politicians. Economic interest would transcend outdated 
quarrels about religion. This can be seen partly as a reassertion of the optimistic lib-
eral-republican attitudes of the 1870s and 1880s against the increasingly Malthusian 
demands of some interests in the 1920s.13 But unlike the early republicans Tardieu re-
alized that the promise of social mobility was an inadequate guarantor of the loyalties 
of the working class and lower middle class to the Republic. He was well aware that 
this represented a major shift in the socio-political foundations of the Republic to-
wards the working class, away from small business and the peasantry. But it was 
hoped that national retooling would keep the peasantry happy. Electrification of the 
countryside can be seen in the same way as railways in the 1870s: a means of con-
vincing the peasantry that economic progress offered new possibilities, not decline. 
By 1931, however, the high hopes of 1928 had begun to evaporate. Tardieu 
fell from power in December 1930. Nazi gains and economic crisis in Germany put 
paid to the hopes of Briand. It was unfortunate too that the high point of the neo-cap-
italist movement in France coincided with the first signs that the world economic cri-
sis would not spare France. As a result employers rapidly lost their enthusiasm for so-
cial reform. The Social Insurance Act was passed against the wishes of most of 
French industry. Tardieu's retooling plan was converted into a conventional public 
works programme. 
Even without these difficulties it is unlikely that Tardieu would have suc-
ceeded. He failed to persuade the Radicals to accept the position of junior partners in 
a right wing coalition. No doubt they feared Tardieu's openly expressed intention of 
stripping the party of either its clientele or its left wing tradition. 14 
12 Fridenson, op. cit., p. 52. 
13 See Chapter 1. 
14 On Tardieu and the Ra~ica1s see Berstein. Histoire du Parti Ral!ical. pp. 154-169; Clague. op. cit.. p. 110. Even 
the most moderate of Radicals never ceased to regard Tardleu as a grand chef reachonnaire '. 
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Perhaps more seriously, Tardieu's own coalition showed signs of breaking up. 
In Parliament the right wing of the Federation began to destabilize the majority once 
Marin had been evicted from the cabinet in October 1928. Marin and his forge master 
friends de Wendel and de Warren led the opposition. Open conflict erupted in the 
summer of 1929 when Poincare's government proposed ratification of the Mellon-
Beranger and Churchill-Caillaux accords on war debts, which had been negotiated in 
1926, but never submitted to Parliament for ratification. The debate over ratification 
took place against the background of negotiations over German reparations. In July 
Marin and fifteen other Federation members threw their party into crisis by voting 
against ratification. Three months later Marin's vote ensured the fall of the Briand 
government, which had just negotiated at the Hague an agreement whereby France 
would begin to evacuate the Rhineland once the Young Plan for reparations had been 
ratified by the Germans. 
For Jean-Noel Jeanneney the central problem was that Marin and his follow-
ers, unlike the rest of the Federation put nationalism above the need to preserve the 
Union nationale as a bulwark of social order. 15 In line with his organizational thesis 
William Irvine minimizes the ideological issue, stressing instead the resistance of 
deputies to Marin's attempts to discipline them. 16 There is no doubting the fear of re-
newed international conflict after the slaughter of the Great War. We have seen that in 
the Rhone organization was a key issue in conservative politics. But neither issue can 
be isolated from the government's programme as a whole. Marin and his allies at-
tacked the entire range of reforms. Indeed, discontent about issues such as unwilling-
ness to cut taxes and a projected reform of secondary education was rather more 
widespread in the Federation than was hostility to Briand's foreign policy. 
Above all the Federation opposed the Social Insurance Acts. Since this was a 
major issue in politics throughout the interwar period it is worth explaining what was 
at stake. Very few in the Federation opposed compulsory social insurance in princi-
ple--agricultural interests were the main exception. Conflict was over the form of 
the law. Simplifying greatly, the government proposed a regime in which wage earn-
ers would be obliged to adhere to a caisse d'assurance. They were to be run jointly by 
employee, employer and state with standard contributions in all industries. Those who 
did not adhere to an existing body, and the majority were not expected to do so, 
would become members of the caisse departementale. 
Those who opposed the law preferred a system which would be run entirely by 
existing mutual aid societies. More often than not these had been created by employ-
ers. Since these bodies would be empowered to set their own levels of contribution 
this solution was particularly favoured by those employers with high labour 
15 Jeanneney. De Wendel. pp. 415435. 
16 Irvine, op. cit., p. 51. 
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costs--hence the opposition of forgemasters like de Warren and de Wendel in the 
Federation. Mutual aid societies were also favoured by the Church, which saw them 
as essential to its charitable functions. What was at stake then was not just the prof-
itability of agriculture and certain industries, but an important means of social and 
ideological control. The Federation was split over the question. In 1930 many of its 
deputies voted in favour of Xavier Vall at's proposal for mutualization. In other 
words, the Social Insurance Law brought together both religious and economic ten-
sions within the right, epitomized, as we saw in Chapter one, by the Catholic forge-
manster de Wendel. 
There was also extra-parliamentary opposition to the Social Insurance Law. 
Discontent was evident in two groups. The Federation des contribuables mobilised 
shopkeepers and small business, while Defense paysan, led by Henri Dorgeres ex-
pressed peasant discontent In 1930 the two organizations formed a common front to 
oppose the Social Insurance Act. Whereas the taxpayers' movement recruited from 
both Radical and conservative voters, Defense paysan took its support wholly from 
the right. In both movements mobilization of the rank and file of the right against 
their own leaders co-existed with manipulation by sections of the elites. 17 Both orga-
nizations had a fascist tone. I8 
Tardieu's reforms resulted in conflicts within the conservative majority, and 
caused many rank and file conservatives (and even Radicals) to reject their traditional 
leaders. It is here that one has to locate the origins of the crisis which led to the emer-
gence of the leagues in the mid-1930s. 
Organized Business and Agriculture 
The best way to approach the development of this crisis in the Rhone is to begin with 
the most important of the organized interests in the department--the USE and the 
Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber, and to a lesser extent the USE, were the heirs 
of the liberal tradition of Aynard. Leaders like Riboud of the USE and Morel-!ournel 
of the Chamber were therefore attracted to the lay centre right. Because of the centre 
right's quasi-permanent presence in government, the USE and Chamber also had 
practical reasons for working with the moderates. Conservative reformism repre-
sented therefore a double crisis for these bodies. Tardieu's efforts to discipline the 
right threatened the personal contacts on which lobbying depended, while social re-
form represented a break with the liberal tradition. 
In accordance with its laissez-faire tradition the Chamber had consistently op-
posed social reform. In 1927 the idea of compulsory paid holidays was rejected on the 
grounds that it would have an adverse affect on competitiveness. Only market forces 
17 The conservative deputy Fran~is d'Harcourt saw Dorgeres as an employee on F3,OOO per month. 
18 P Ory. 'Le Dorgc!isme. Institution et discours d'un colere paysan', RHMC, 1975, pp. 168·190; W Hoisington 
Jr., Taxpayer Revoll In France, Stanford, 1973. 
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could determine whether or not employers granted holidays.19 Not surprisingly, 
Chamber of Commerce publications are full of criticisms of the Social Insurance 
Acts.20 In the privacy of the Chamber the reasons for opposition were candidly ex-
pressed. It was regretted that the idea of mutualism had been discarded, 'd' autant plus 
qu'il ne faut pas perdre de vue que les risques divers sont tres variables suivant les 
professions. Mais on a voulu faire du principe de l'unite de l'assurance une regIe ab-
solue'.21 A spokesman for the dyeing industry argued that existing mutual aid 
schemes, because they were mutual, kept down the sickness rate and encouraged the 
loyalty of workers, especially immigrants, to the enterprise.22 
All of this is in accordance with the liberal tradition. But in fact the attitude of 
the Chamber of Commerce to conservative reformism was complex. This was partly 
because aspects of government policy were in accordance with the liberal tradition. 
The silk industry, with the backing of the Chamber, implied approval for Briand's 
foreign policy in its appeal for implementation of the Young Plan as a means of 
fending off the international economic crisis.23 
This in turn implied maintaining Briand in the Cabinet, opposition to Marin's 
destabilization of the government, and in consequence a tacit acceptance of social re-
form. This is a reminder that although the liberal-silk majority in the Chamber was 
more or less united in opposing the explicitly reformist challenge of Edmund Weitz, 
some questioned aspects of liberalism. Concrete evidence can be seen in the response 
of the Chamber to the idea of family allowances. It was to be regretted that taxation 
should replace private initiative. But the Chamber reluctantly approved compulsory 
allowances because 'certain large concerns, especially in the building industry', be-
lieved that their own private schemes put them at a cost disadvantage compared to 
those firms which did not pay allowances.24 The attitude of big business was that if 
there had to be social reform, then it must be applied to small firms as well as large. 
In this the Chamber differed from medium and small firms, who WOUld, in an ideal 
world, have preferred no insurance system at all. These differences resurfaced on sev-
eral occasions. 
Flexibility can also be detected in the Chamber's response to other aspects of 
government policy.25 In line with liberal orthodoxy the Chamber demanded tax 
19 CRCCL, 1927, pp. 306-8. 
20 Jangot, speaking for building employers, saw it as a 'class law' which would end up as a burden to society as a 
whole (CRCCL, 1929, p. 703); Attale Guigou, on behalf of thefabricanls de soieries, feared that 'aujourd'hui les 
Assurances Sociales peuvent faire mutre des vocations de malades professionnelles; demain les allocations cho-
mage, si eUes sont distribuees sans discernement semeront les germes du mal terrible qui sevit sur la nation voi-
sine' (CRCCL, 1930, pp. 583-4). 
21 PVCCL, 16-2-1928. 
22 CRCCL, 1928, p. 674. 
23 CRCCL, 1929, p. 601. 
24 PVCCL, 24-10-29. 
25 One example is that some in the silk industry complained that stabilization of the Franc at too high a level 
harmed exports. But it was accepted that fixed exchange rates were an index of business confidence (CReCL, 
1928, pp. 662-3). 
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cutS.26 Yet the Chamber welcomed Tardieu's plan for national retooling on condition 
that it did not involve new taxes, and that it involved 'true public works'. Even liber-
als could not resist public spending upon themselves.27 
The result of such hesitation was an implicit tension within the liberal bloc 
between the largest firms and the rest This fits with the growing political isolation of 
big business in Lyon that has been noted on several occasions. It was opposed in prin-
ciple to aspects of government policy, especially social insurance, but was pushed to-
wards the centre right by three pressures: a pragmatic wish to come to terms with re-
form; the fact that the centre right was the route to influence upon the state, and the 
fact that the Federation was increasingly in the hands of reactionaries like Perret. This 
in turn helps to understand the significance of Victor Perret's suspicion of 'la bour-
geoisie en place'. 
Some of this holds true for the USE. We have seen that President Felix Garcin 
maintained good personal relations with Tardieu. He campaigned for him in the USE 
bulletin, while Tardieu obtained information on the political situation in the Rhone 
from Garcin.28 This was in spite of the fact that Garcin taught political economy at 
the Catholic University, and was managing director of the Nouvelliste, a rather ex-
treme opponent of Tardieu. This paradox can be reconciled by the fact that Oarcin's 
support for Tardieu was an outgrowth of the lobbying practices of the USE, and by 
Tardieu's responsiveness to the demands of agriculture.29 Oarcin's sympathy for the 
conservative leader was not incompatible with hostility to social reform. Garcin was 
vocal in the campaign for a non-compulsory system of social insurance for agricul-
ture. His attitudes are analogous to those of Vice-president Julien Riboud, antipathetic 
to social reform, but also attracted to the centre right--in this case also by the Ay-
nardian republicanism of his family. 
The USE's politics then were more advanced than its views on the social 
question. This reinforced the nascent gap between the rank and file and the leaders of 
the USE. The USE's hostility to social reform contrasted with the peasant spokesman 
Jean-Marie Parrers advocacy of a system of compulsory allowances financed by the 
state.30 Parrel turned therefore to the 'anti-establishment' followers of Victor Perret. 
But peasant views were scarcely better represented there, which perhaps explains why 
younger peasants were more interested in the Croix de Feu. 
26 CRCCL, 1929, p. 623. This was another reason to oppose social insurance and f~unily allowances. 
27 PVCCL, 2-10-1930. On these grounds the Chamber rejected the version of the bill which emerged from the 
Radical dominated finance commission, which had the double disadvantage of being more costly and more rural. 
28 Gayet, op. cit., pp. 99-110. Garcin, although managing director of Le Nouvellisle, appears to have exerted little 
influence over its political line. 
29 Barra!, op. cit., pp. 222-230: He was responsible for strengthening protectionism and for measures to maintain 
the prices of wine and wheat. 
30 Pin, op. cit., p. 83: in 1932 he failed to gain acceptance for this idea from his colleagues in the Chamber of 
Agriculture. 
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Both Chamber of Commerce and USE combined liberalism and social conser-
vatism with a willingness to adapt these principles to practical realities. Neither were 
wholly in tune with the dominant political tendencies in RhOne conservatism. Neither 
the reformism of Fran~ois Peissel, nor the Malthusianism of some right wing-Radicals 
nor the traditionalism of Victor Perret entirely suited them. The lay centre right was 
their only possible political home. 
The Centre Right and Tardieu 
The problem was that the centre right, in spite of the defection of certain deputies to 
it, was an ineffective political force. It consisted of a coalition of independents like 
Bonnevay, Independent Radicals, and the Alliance democratique, which agreed on 
little more than the value of centrism, democracy and Republicanism. The question 
becomes even more complex if we include the PDP in the centre right, and remember 
the proximity of Fran~ois Peissel's wing of the Federation to it. In this section we will 
look at the lay centre right. It can be seen as consisting of three components, each 
with differing attitudes to conservative reformism. 
The first was composed of the remnants of the liberal tradition, which com-
bined Republicanism, economic liberalism and a tolerant Catholicism. August Isaac is 
representative for his links both with Aynard and the Chamber of Commerce.31 Isaac 
resigned from the Federation in 1929, although he kept his resignation secret, contin-
ued to occupy the position of Honorary President, and even attended the presentation 
of the Legion of Honour to Victor Perret. Subsequently he was not politically active, 
but he did attend an occasional meeting held by the Alliance. 
Isaac's views were made plain in his letter of resignation from the Federation, 
which came in the midst of the crisis caused by the attacks of Marin and Perret on 
Tardieu and Briand.32 His grievances can be grouped under three headings. First 
. Isaac was a supporter of the Locarno Treaty.33 Rather pessimistically he asked what 
alternative there was for a country which had been abandoned by its allies, had un-
dertaken a hasty demobilization in 1918, which possessed the mere skeleton of an 
army, and in which pacifism had been stirred up by anti-militarist teachers. More 
positively, he called for a 'modern foreign policy', in which young people would get 
to know each other in order to learn to settle together the economic questions which 
are the causes of international conflict. 
Continuing the liberal theme Isaac denounced the Federation for not having 
done enough to prevent 'the pillage of public finances'. Its deputies were charged 
with supporting veterans' pensions, salary increases for civil servants and social in-
31 See Chapter 4. Henry Morel-Iournel regarded himself as Isaac's own choice for the presidency of the Chamber. 
32 Isaac said of Victor Perret that his 'idolization of Marin makes one laugh'. 
33317 AP 82, National Council meeting of 24-1O-1925.lsaac and Marin had disagreed over Locarno from the be-
ginning. 
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surance. Businessmen, he said, would be reluctant to contribute to a party which had 
so little regard for public finances. Here the target is the Federation left, rather than 
Perret and Marin, who were as opposed to these measures as he. 
Finally, Isaac attacked the political line of the Federation: 'On m'a dit que 
Marin veut menager les patriotes d'origine monarchique qui sont dans nos rangs et se 
sont fait elire sous notre drapeau republicaine et avec notre argent'. 34 
Isaac then spoke from the position of a political republican and economic lib-
eral. As such he was as opposed to conservative reformism as to Victor Perret's brand 
of nationalism. His views are similar to those of Julien Riboud. Riboud broke with the 
Federation after its bureau had refused to accept his proposal for a motion to the Na-
tional Council of the Federation in October 1929. In it he followed Isaac in calling for 
maintenance of the Federation in its 'centre!centre-right tradition', tax cuts, mutual-
ization of social insurance, and 'international pacification'. His demand for a policy 
of self-sufficiency in wheat illustrates the importance of the centre right to sectional 
interests.35 In 1932, following Victor Perret's final victory over Fran~ois Peissel, Ri-
boud resigned from the Federation. 
Another who could trace his roots into moderate Republicanism was Laurent 
Bonnevay. But he differed from Isaac and Riboud in that whilst remaining faithful to 
Aynard's Republicanism, he was further to the left on social issues. He was a firm 
supporter of the whole range of Tardieu's reforms. His resignation from the Federa-
tion in 1927 had been provoked by a quarrel with Louis Marin over the Locamo 
treaties. He also campaigned in favour of Social Insurance and cheap housing.36 He 
parted company from Tardieu only in his rejection of party discipline. But Bonnevay 
argued that loose party organization would permit him to pursue his own ideas on the 
social question free from the interference of reactionaries like Perret. 37 Bonnevay in 
fact forms a link between liberal Republicanism, modern reformist conservatism, and 
social Catholicism, for in his youth he had been associated with the Groupes d'erudes. 
The second, and perhaps least influential, element in the lay centre right over-
lapped with the Radical Party. It comprised the anti-clerical and Republican wing of 
the conservative bourgeoisie, weaker in Lyon than in other cities because of the 
Catholicism of most employers. The existence of a small minority of progressive fab-
ricants non-usiniers, such as Joseph Fructus, B. J. Van Gelder and Eugene Schulz has 
already been referred to. Schulz claimed in the Mascaraud Committee to represent a 
'liberal bourgeoisie', which recognised the dependence of commerce upon the pur-
34317 AP 73, Isaac to Guiter, 19-4-1930: 'Je me demande s'jJ ne vaudrait pas mieux essayer de leur faire com-
prendre qu'iJ n'y a plus rien de commun entre notre temps et celui de Louis XVI ou de Napoleon [ ... j'. 
35317 AP 73. Riboud to Guiter. 5-10-1929. 
36 Le Nouvel/iSle, 2-10-1928. For the Nouvellisle Bonnevay was one of those politicians who believed that clever-
ness consisted in disarming adversaries by giving them satisfaction on all points (15-5-1926). 
37 317 AP 76, Bonnevay article from La Nation. 1926. 
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chasing power of the masses.38 But Schulz and his friends were ambiguous in their 
attitude towards conservative reformism, for he and his allies were merchant 
manufacturers who saw collaboration with the Radicals as a means of preserving the 
artisanate on which they depended. Hence Schulz's readiness to echo Radical denun-
ciations of big capital. 
The third strand in the lay centre right is represented by progressive employ-
ers. These included certainfabricant-usilliers like Etienne Fougere, and above all rep-
resentatives of the engineering industry like Edmund Weitz. We have seen that this 
group had often emerged from the pro-Radical and anti-clerical petty bourgeoisie. 
Fougere and Weitz were virtually alone among employers in accepting the Social In-
surance Law. Fougere voted for it in Parliament. Like all defenders of the law Weitz 
accepted that it was not perfect, but went on to say that the engineering industry was 
preparing for the implementation of the law in the 'widest and most loyal sense'. Un-
like other business leaders he did not demand a delay in its introduction.39 He also 
called for Herriot to break with the SFIO and take the lead in a movement for 'reform 
and democracy'.40 In the elections of 1928 Guy Aroud, whose proximity to the engi-
neering industry has been noted, campaigned in the 7th arrondissement for reform. He 
called for a 'republique syndicale', to be brought about by 'les jeunes equipes'. He 
was thinking of a sort of democratic corporatism.41 
Given the differences in traditions and aims of the various components of the 
centre right there was much room for misunderstanding. This is illustrated by a quar-
rel provoked by Weitz's resignation from the Mascaraud Committee. The immediate 
cause was a speech by Schulz, who had not only urged Republicans to defend the 
'idee laYque' and freedom of trade, but also to be on their guard against 'Ie danger 
pressant de Ia nouvelle feodalite qui s'eleve sur Ie pavois porte par les grands trusts, 
les cartels et la haute finance'.42 On the face of it there is little here to antagonize a 
Protestant and moderate reformist like Weitz. But Weitz claimed that as leader of 
both the Alliance democratique and 
representant de la mecanique, la plus democratique des industries, j'ai eu en son temps aussi. 
mieux qu'un membre de celie Fabrique Iyonnaise qui a eleve sa prosperite sur I'exploitation 
des tisseurs ?I rayOn et des manipulateurs des tissues, Ie droit de denoncer les mCfaits de celie 
fcodalite industrielle qu'elle reprcsente encore et que je travaille tous les jours?l demolir. 
Les realisations sociales que rai poursuivi, tant pour mon compte que pour 
l'industrie qui m 'a fait l'honneur de me placer ?I sa tete, les contrats que j'ai negocie avec nos 
ouvriers, me donnaient aussi, mieux qu'un patron qui n'a meme pas un ouvrier et qui n'est pas 
adherent a nos caisses d' assurances sociales, quelque titre ?I dCfendre une politique pour laque-
38 Bulletin mensuel du commerce, de l'industrie et de l' agriculture, January-March, 1928. 
39 CRCCL, 1929, p. 697. 
40 Nouveau journal, 7-7-1928. 
41 Nouveau journal, 26-4-1928. 
42 BMCIA, January!March, 1928. 
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depuis ving! ans preche I'exernple.43 
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Weitz's outburst provoked a reply from Etienne Fougere and Paul Charbin. who in 
their capacities respectively as honorary and current Presidents of the SFS asked why 
Weitz had to cite 'injurious and false opinions about the greatest of Lyonnais indus-
tries of which the supremacy in Lyon has always been so difficult for him to ac-
cept?'44 
This incident is revealing of the multiple conflicts within the Lyonnais bour-
geoisie and more particularly within the centre right. Businessmen nourished in the 
same Republican tradition were driven apart by the way in which economic and ide-
ological issues were related in their minds. Thus Weitz felt that a representative of the 
Jabrique had no right to lay claim to the leadership of progressive employers. for he 
identified the industry as a whole with Catholicism, anti-Republicanism and social re-
action. The result was that Weitz quarreled with Etienne Fougere, whose economic 
views were similar to his own, and with Schulz whose anti-clericalism he shared, but 
whose lack of sympathy with genuine social reform he condemned. 
It is hardly surprising then that the lay centre right hardly played a effective 
role in the conflicts precipitated by conservative reformism. It was held together only 
by a commitment to republican democracy. or in other words by an agreed framework 
for resolving differences. In the late nineteenth century this had been sufficient to 
make liberal republicanism an effective political force. But by the late 1920s there 
were hard choices to be made over economic issues. partly because of the greater im-
portance of interest groups in politics. Furthermore. liberalism was losing its effec-
tiveness as a means of integrating a popular constituency into the right. 
Christian democracy and Tardieu 
More coherent support for conservative reformism came from the Catholic moderate 
right. More precisely, there was a sort of reformist cartel consisting of Peissel. the 
Federation left. the PDP and CFTC. Within this cartel can be detected both pressure 
from the rank and file of the right and the efforts of notables like Peissel to create a 
new conservative consensus. 
Only in times of extreme crisis did the CFTC pronounce in favour of an indi-
vidual ministry. Hence backing for Poincare in 1926. But support for Poincare was 
conditional upon the demand that workers alone should not bear the burden of defla-
tion. and that the government commit itself to social reform.45 As we saw in Chapter 
four the dominant wing in the CFTC was committed to economic advance, industri-
43 Nouvelliste. 5-3-1928. 
44 Le Nouvelliste. 6-3-1928. 
45 La voix sociale. August/September, 1926. 
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alization and reform. Above all the CFTC supported social insurance. The idea that 
social insurance should be controlled by mutual aid societies was rejected: 'les assur-
ances faites par l'industrie, Ie commerce ou les administrations privees [sont] un 
moyen de reduire nos salaires de base et de rogner notre liberte'.46 In accordance with 
its corporatist doctrine the CFTC would have preferred 'truly professional' control of 
social insurance. But rather than see employers pervert this idea, they accepted the 
government's statist approach.47 
More attentive to the broader aims of Tardieu's policy was the PDP. In March 
1930 it approved Tardieu's reforming second administration, which it was hoped 
would ensure the passage of the budget and Social Insurance Law, and continue to 
search for international peace.48 In particular the party emphasised foreign policy, 
without forgetting the relationship between international pacification and prosperity. 49 
Defense of the League of Nations was, of course, a special concern of the Papacy. 
Among its members the PDP in the Rhone counted a translator at the headquarters of 
the League in Geneva. 
In some respects the PDP parted company with Tardieu. There is a petty bour-
geois tone to its ideas. Federal president Jacques Tourret summarized the three prin-
ciples of the party as individual liberty, individual property and abolition of privi-
leges. PDP discourse often resembled that of the Radicals. But the language in which 
it was expressed did not. Although like Tardieu the PDP believed in religious pacifi-
cation,50 its reformism was expressed in the vocabulary of social Catholicism. The 
call, for example, for 'une RepubJique vraiment nationale, ordonnee et reforma-
trice',51 could have been taken from the propaganda of the Federation. Not surpris-
ingly therefore, the natural allies of the PDP, the reformists in the SPIO, CGT and 
Radical Party, tended to dismiss it as clerical and reactionary. For this reason, the 
PDP itself was unlikely to achieve very much. But the ideas of the PDP were influ-
ential to the extent that they had penetrated the progressive wing of the Federation. 
In this respect the key figures were Laurent Bonnevay, and above all Franc;ois 
Peisse1.52 In his youth a Catholic trades unionist, Peissel had much in common with 
the PDP. He was engaged in principle to abrogate the lay laws, but he regarded the 
notion of combat on that terrain as a trap set by the left. 53 He preferred a consensus 
around economic prosperity rather than religion. His ideas on social reform were very 
46 La voix sociale, 15·7·1923. Some in the CFrC were even hostile to the notion of a special optional regime for 
agriculture (La voix sociale, November, 1929, resolution of the Syndical des cheminots). 
47 La voix sociale, December, 1928, (Georges Forestier). 
48 Nouveau Journal, 9·3·1930. 
49 Nouveau Jou,"'/I, 31·5·1931: in 1931 the PDP demanded 'securite de la territoire, en attendant que la Societe 
des nations et la federation economique et politi que des etats d'Europe garantissent 11 tous la paix'. 
50 Nouveau Journal, 7·1·1928, 31·5·1931. 
51 Nouveau Journal, 31·5·1931. 
52 Peissel and Bonnevay collaborated politically throughout the whole of the period. In 1926 Peissel, as President 
of the Federation in the Rhone, had managed to persuade Marin not to expel Bonnevay from the Federation. See 
317 AP 76, Peissel to Marin, 18·5·1926; Marin to Peissel, 185·1926. 53 Nouveau Journal, 24·5·1928. 
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advanced for a member of the Federation. He proposed a system of binding concilia-
tion and arbitration in industrial disputes and collaboration with the CGT as a means 
of drawing it into the system.54 Social Insurance was seen as making up for the inade-
quacies of mutual aid societies. 55 Peissel also favoured the 'Locarno spirit' in foreign 
affairs.56 Where Peissel differed from the PDP was in a greater stress on anti-social-
ism, financial orthodoxy (in theory at least) and national defence. 
Peissel's interventions in the crisis of the Federation show that he perceived 
links between foreign and other aspects of government policy. Shortly after Marin's 
vote against ratification, Peissellaid out his views in a letter to Jean Guiter. He argued 
that what was really at stake was the question of whether the Federation was a party 
of government or opposition. Electoral victory had given the right a unique chance. 
Freed from dependence on the Radicals it was possible to 'assainir I 'Ecole publique 
en y faisant rentrer l'esprit nationale, pratiquer une politique de degrevements fi-
nanciers, d'amortissement de notre dette perpetuelle, permettant en 1932 les conver-
sions necessaires, organiser la defense de nos frontieres, mettre en route les As-
surances Sociales, continuer a s'appuyer sur la confiance envers les destinees de notre 
Pays en pratiquant une politique de paix interieure, sauvegarder l'ordre publique con-
tre les menees anti-sociales des revolutionnaires'. To convince Marin, Peissel accen-
tuated the right wing side of his programme.57 But the main point is that Peissel saw a 
connection between ratification and the remodelling of France. It is not simply that he 
valued social order more than national security, as Jeanneney would have it. It is also 
significant that Peissel should oppose government proposals for secondary education 
on the grounds that the present system of private scholarships was adequate. Peissel 
was no more capable of setting aside old rancours than any other conservative. This 
can be seen more clearly in the opposition to conservative reform. 
The reaction against conservative reformism 
Victor Perret's wing of the Federation consisted of an alliance of those hostile to con-
servative reformism. 58 They included certain aristocratic landowners, often denied a 
voice in the USE their fathers had helped to found, the heads of family businesses, es-
pecially in the 'traditional' sectors of the economy; doctors worried by the prospect of 
becoming fonctionnaires and white collar workers, many of whom were excluded 
from the benefits of the law.59 Also hostile to Tardieu, from the point of view of its 
54 Nouveau Journal. 5-3-1929. Many in the Federation regarded the CGT as illegal. 
55 Nouveau Journal, 24-3-1929. 
56 Nouveau Journal. 14-12-1929. 
57317 AP 73. Peissel to Guiter, 6-9-1929. It is interesting to note that Peissel sees the ancestors of the Federation 
in the Moral Order period. not in the moderate Rcpuhlicanism of the Opportunists. 
58 VOU: sociale. June. 1928, identified a coalition of big farmers, certain representatives of industry and commerce. 
the Ligue des Palrioles, doctors and the communists against social insurance. 
59 Essentially the wing of the CFTC represented by Gruffaz. See, for example his views on revaluation of the 
Franc. Against the partisans ~f modernization he evo.ked 'les craints justifiees de nos syndiques, employes. ouvri-
ers de la regIOn Iyonnats qUi en se pnvent des sallsfactlOns les plus ICgitimes. ont pu et su realiser quelques 
economies' (La vou: sociale. June. 1928). 
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peculiar combination of Orleanist liberalism and elitism with Catholic integrism, was 
the Nouvelliste. 
Warning against the possibility that Federation sympathisers might surrender 
to the mystique of Tardieu, just as they had to Clemence au and Poincare, Perret made 
clear his backing for Louis Marin at the National Council of the Federation in 
September 1929. He rejected the demands of 'les elements militants' that the Federa-
tion should make clear its support for the current Briand government. 60 Perret argued 
that the Federation could give no such guarantee to a ministry responsible for 
'financial demagogy', social insurance, a cowardly foreign policy, and reform of sec-
ondary education. He went on to condemn the unhealthy influence of the party's par-
liamentarians and the tendentious influence of the press, which in turn was in the pay 
of government and business.61 Foreign policy was only part of the question. 
It is possible to see the coming together of three tensions. 62 First, an institu-
tional question: Perret appealed to a new kind of pseudo-democratic activism against 
the old style notable politics symbolised by 'certain deputies'. Second, social conflict: 
Perret spoke for sections of the ruling class and petty bourgeoisie who were dismayed 
by the general evolution of the economy and the particular evolution of the govern-
ment policy. Third, ideological conflict. Perret claimed to represent a national oppo-
sition to an establishment which had failed in its mission. These three elements give 
meaning to Perret's intention to renovate France with the help of 'popular elements' 
rather than the 'bourgeoisie en place'.63 
Like Tardieu, Perret's goal was to remake the French bourgeoisie and to re-de-
fine its relations with the rest of society, ultimately creating a stable conservative 
majority. Having dealt in the previous chapter with organization, the ideological as-
pect of Perret's strategy will be the subject of this section. In an interview marking his 
accession to the Presidency of the Federation in the Rhone in 1931 Perret said 
'L'experience de douze ans m'a montre qu'il est possible d'attirer ~ nous beaucoup de 
sympathisants et d'hesitants en essayant de faire disparaltre peu a peu la politique 
pure pour transporter les debats sur Ie terrain economique par I 'etude de 
I 'organisation de travail, de la production, de Ia corporation. 64 
Take first his politics. Perret's desire to unify the right by fighting on eco-
nomic ground was nothing new. This had been the aim of Motte and Aynard in the 
pre-war Federation and since then of Tardieu. Party politics would be laid aside in the 
60 A few weeks later the votes of Marin and his friends ensured Briand's fall. thereby throwing the Federation into 
confusion. Jeanneney. De Wendel. pp. 424-428. argues that Marin et. al. had not really wanted to ovenhrow 
Briand. but were taken by surprise by the left's opposition to him. Perret's intervention shows that overthrow had 
been on the agenda before the event. 
61317 AP 73. minutes of Conseil nationale. 28·9-1929. 
62 For this argument I have drawn upon Geoff Eley. 'Conservatives and Radical Nationalists in Gennany: the pro-
duction of fascist potentials. 1912 to 1928'. in M Blinkhorn (ed.). Fascists and Conservatives: The Radical Right 
and the Establishment in Twentieth Century E,uope. London. 1990. pp. 50-70. 
63 317 AP 73. minutes of Conseil national. 28-9-1929. 
64 Le Nouvel/iste. 23-12-1931. 
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interests of a common defence of private property and the general economic interest. 
Another portrait of Perret associates involvement in business with an ability to stand 
above party politics.65 The assumption is that businessmen are involved in the resolu-
tion of purely practical problems, free from the shackles of ideology, and that their 
interest is identical with the general good. 
This meant overcoming the clericaVanticlerical divisions in the right, and con-
vincing Radical voters that their real interest lay in defending private property, not in 
joining the socialists in an anti-capitalist and anti-clerical alliance. Whereas Tardieu 
sought to win over the Radicals through public works, prosperity and neutrality on the 
religious question, Perret's strategy was more negative. He was contemptuous of 
those who disguised themselves as leftists in a vain attempt to win Radical sympa-
thies.66 As Bosse-Platiere put it, the Radicals had simply to understand that the only 
meaningful conflict was between the Federation and the SFIO.67 The underlying as-
sumption was that peasants and small businessmen voted for the Radicals only be-
cause they had been duped. All the right had to do was to lay before them the eco-
nomic verities. The only concession to Radical ideological sensibilities was to stress 
the Republicanism of the Federation. 68 Bosse-Platiere was frequently mocked in the 
Actionfranr;aise press for his fear of being taken for a royalist. 
The economic truth according to Perret owed something to the liberal tradi-
tion. He was often presented as an heroic individual struggling against adversity in 
both economic and political life: 'Aide-toi, Ie ciel t'aidera pourrait servir de devise a 
cette existence mouvementee et courageuse qui a de quoi tenter un romancier'. It was 
said that Perret had been sent to work as a weaver because of the collapse of the fam-
ily fIrm, but that through hard work he had been able to rebuild the family fortune. 69 
Perret was held to personify self-reliance, hard work and social mobility. The first is-
sue of L'Union republicaine adds to this liberalism an 'absolute respect for property', 
liberty of conscience teaching, press and association. Government interference in the 
economy, high taxes and unbalanced budgets were an anathema to Perret. Even in the 
depths of the depression, when so many were turning to corporatism, Perret protested 
'Nous sommes de la classe des liberaux impenitents; nous croyons que la liberte du 
commerce et des echanges, la liberte des initiatives dans tous les domaines, corre-
65 'Cet homme vice president du syndicat de la soierie de Lyon, conseiller de commerce exterieure de la France 
n'a que peu de goat pour la politique proprement dite'. Cutting from Gringoire, undated, in 317 AP 77/8. The pre: 
viously quoted interview also stresses Perret's Vice-presidency of the SFS. 
66 Perret in Reveil du Beaujolais, 24 -3-1931. 
67 L'Union republicaine, 19-6-1932. 
68 L'Union republicaine, 1-5-1932. Bosse-Platiere wrote: 'Le Beaujolais est profondement rcpublicain de convic-
tion. Je partage, sans aucune reserve, ses sentiments'. 
69 Cutting from Gringoire, 317 AP 77/8. This story could not be conflllTled. It was taken up by the PPF among 
others. 
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spondent mieux aux facultes natives de notre peuple'.70 Neither did Perret ever con-
sider that economic or technological progress could be halted. 71 
Yet Perret's economic views were ambiguous. The influence of the Legitimist 
tradition, transmitted via the ALP can be seen in the above-quoted interview, where 
Perret states the need to study the organization of work, production and the corpora-
tion,72 He called for mixed employer-worker syndicates and for the representation of 
social forces in parliament.73 We have, however, to wait until the regular appearance 
of L'Union rf!/Jublicaine in 1932 to understand precisely what is meant by corpo-
ratism: 
Depuis que Ie monde est monde, Ie bonheur vrai ne peut exister sans l'education de la famille, 
l'instruction choisie et dirigee par elle. Ie travail consciencieux, I' effort perseverant, Ie respect 
des anciens. de la hierarch ie, de la tradition, I'organisation corporative de la profession, la dis-
cipline consentie. Ie contentement de son sort SIUlS envie ou ambition dcmesuree, I'esperance 
reflechie de la reussite progressive et merite. la bonte envers les malheureux. I'amour de son 
foyer, de sa Patrie et la croyance qui conditionne tout.74 
This is very different from Edouard Aynard's view of an elite constantly renewed by 
social mobility. There is a natural social order ordained by God and transmitted in the 
form of tradition to each generation. Respect for its values is learned in the family, the 
basic unit in a hierarchy which also comprises profession, generation and at the sum-
mit the nation. 
Perret's views owed much to the conditions of his own branch of the silk in-
dustry. What he understood by corporatism was essentially the protection of skilled 
labour. He pursued this goal in the Chambre des metiers de fa soie, of which he was 
Director. Perret was especially interested in training young women to embroider the 
fine silks produced by his own firm. When he called for the return of women to the 
home he did not have in mind the bourgeois ideal of the non-working woman. On the 
contrary, return to the family workshop would permit the wife to work alongside hus-
band and children, thereby reconciling family and professional duties. 75 In his classes 
young women were to be educated in the history of embroidery, the goals of their in-
dustry, the problem of foreign competition, and the need for intelligent collaboration 
between employers and unions. This would accomplish the task of 'moralization' and 
social pacification.76 
In sum, the Federation's corporatism was fairly limited. It amounted to little 
more than paternalist control of labour and protection of certain endangered craft'>. 
70 L 'Union republicaine, 17-2-1935. 
71 L'Union republicaine. 18-3-1934: He used the centenary of Jacquard's death to state that 'it is impossible to 
limit or put a stnp to progress in any of its forms ... One could not with impunity destroy productive capacity of any 
snrt as long as the majority of humlUl beings lacked everything' .. 
n See page 179. 
73 Nouvel/isle. 12-1-1929; L 'Union republicaine 17-4-1931. 
74 L'Union republicaine, 24-7-1932. 
75 L'Union republicaine, 8-12-1935. Perret on the suhject of female suffrage: 'Nous croyons par exemple. que les 
ateliers familiaux. Ie retour generallll'artisanat, seront des formules d'avenir qui arrachant la femme 1Il'usine de-
modee et fennee. la maintiendra 11 son foyer, travaillant avec son mari et ses enfants, tout en VaqUlUlt aux soins de 
menage'. See also L 'Union republicaine. 17-7-1932. 
76 L'Union republicaine. 9-10-1932. 
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Nonetheless, its incompatibility with the liberal principles simultaneously evoked by 
Perret is plain, especially as he spoke of the desirability of a return to artisan produc-
tion, at least for those industries where mass production was not essential. 77 Perret 
never really gave doctrinal consistency to his views, though he sometimes spoke as if 
the laws of supply and demand would function properly only if businessmen and oth-
ers moderated their desire for material gain in the interests of the common good. In 
other words there is a 'natural' level of demand, which businessmen ignore only at 
great risk. It is of course unrealistic to expect logical consistency in an ideology. Am-
biguity is precisely what gives it integrative effectiveness. In this case it integrated by 
reconciling corporatism with the liberal tradition of Lyon. 
Along with his desire to remake France in the image of the silk braid and em-
broidery industry, Perret's views were shaped by a certain view of religion. His 
Catholicism was expressed with reserve, thanks to his desire to fight on economic ter-
rain. Apart from those occasions when the Church was directly attacked, it can be 
detected more in his language than in the narrowly political content of what he said. 
For this reason it is interesting to look at the hierarchy's views on the social insurance 
question. 
For Cardinal Maurin the interests of religion were at stake. Certain influential 
persons intended to use social insurance to de-Christianize France. The Church could 
not allow an improvement in the material well-being of the workers to harm their 
spiritual interests. A director of a communal insurance fund, who might even be a 
teacher, would wield enormous power. The faithful must therefore set up their own 
funds. A Catholic employee of such a caisse, thanks to his contacts with families at 
times of crisis, would be able to provide information to the priest. 78 Maurin did, not, 
however, distinguish religious from social issues, for he also argued that mutualized 
social insurance would promote entente between bosses and workers.79 
In its statements on social insurance the Church defended a particular concep-
tion of society. It coincided with the views of certain of the elites. More particularly, 
it coincided with Victor Perret's views as an employer and President of the Federa-
tion, a party dependent for contact with the masses upon Catholic notables and the 
Church. Perret must be seen as an individual inserted into overlapping net-
works-religious, political and economic. 
The third component of Perret's ideology was his nationalism. Again, nation-
alism cannot be reduced to economic or any other interest. The slaughter of the 
77 317 AP 82/3. In 1934 Perret again called for a return to family workshops for all but certain concerns. But he 
admitted that realization would he complex and difficult. 
78 Semaine religieuse, 19-1-1929. 
79 Semaine religieuse, 22-3-1929: 'II ne m'aurait pas deplu que, pour les assurances sociates comme cela s'est 
heureusement produit il y a quelques annees pour Ies charges de famille et de compensation, I'initiative vint des 
patron~ eux-me~es au ~ue, tout aux moins, Ie ~rincipe de I'obligation legalement etabli, on confiat ilia profession 
eUe meme Ie som de S orgamser au moyen dune entente entre patrons et ouvners. Le metier forme bien une 
grande famille el il n'y a rien de beau comme I'accord et la collaboration des classes sur Ie terrain sociale'. 
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trenches was a formative experience for pacifists and supporters of national defence 
alike. This, should not, however, prevent us from seeing that nationalism possessed an 
integrative function. For Perret the nation was the supreme focus of loyalty beyond 
family and profession. Bosse-Platiere's mystical definition of the nation as an intan-
gible link between individuals and classes brings this out. 80 We have here the familiar 
right wing view that political divisions are artificial constructs which divide a funda-
mentally united people, visible, for example, in the fraternity of the trenches. 
Aside from the rather obvious point, Perret's nationalism possessed an oppo-
sitional character. Commenting on the arrival in power of Hitler, Perret asked whether 
our 'ostriches' in Parliament would finally comprehend? He went on to quote 
Kipling: 'my sons are dead because our leaders lied'.81 On the contrary his national-
ism contests the legitimacy of those who believed the national interest to demand rap-
prochement with Germany. The same challenge is implicit in the appeal to 'the peo-
ple' against the 'bourgeoisie en place'. The nationalism of the Federation was an in-
tervention in a contested ideological terrain. 82 
Perret's appeal to the nation has to be seen in connection with a certain 
pseudo-egalitarianism. This did not mean the egalitarianism of the Republic: Bosse-
Platiere rejected the notion that the nation was a sum of material interests, referring 
instead to the French as a 'race'.83 Alexandre La Batie saw the hierarchical organiza-
tion of the army as analogous to the democracy from which it emanated. The army 
was an inter-class organization which attenuated the social inequalities of a regime 
which 'claims to be founded on equality of rights and duties'. What La Batie means 
by equality is common submission to discipline. Thus military service provided the 
unity which had once been derived from the monarchy. 84 
In its nationalism, pseudo-egalitarianism and anti-elitism the Federation 
showed its opposition to the status quo. Popular legitimacy is, of course, evoked in a 
symbolic sense. For all that Perret trumpeted the democratic basis of the reorganised 
Federation, it remained a hybrid of old style notable and more modern forms of po-
litical involvement. Nationalist leagues were to be kept in a subordinate position. 
Neither did the Federation offer much in the way of social reform. Social questions 
were rarely discussed in the party press.85 Certainly the Federation claimed to accept 
the social doctrine of the Church. The first issue of L 'Union republicaine called for 
'practical refo~s which would profit the mass of workers', but gave no further de-
80 L 'Union rep.ublicaine. 14-4-1935: [I~ nati?nalisml. 'nous nous decouvrons une unite de vue avec des gens dont 
nous nous pensIons separes par des bameres rnfranchlssables et dont nous decouvrons qu'ils ont avec nous des at-
taches et une ame commune'. 
81 L 'Union republicaine. 21-5-1933. 
82 E. Laclau. 'Fascist Ideology', in Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory. My argument draws heavily on G. 
Eley. Reshaping the German Right. Yale. 1980. chapter 5. 
83 L 'Union republicaine. 14-4-1935. 
84 L 'Union republicaine. 29-7-1934. 
85 L 'Union rt1publicaine. 1-1-1933. 
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tails.86 Rather, populism should be seen as an expression of the discontent of certain 
sections of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie at the direction of government pol-
icy, a discontent in which it is difficult to disentangle religious, economic and social 
concerns. Rather than overthrow of the regime, Perret's goal was a parliamentary al-
liance with the Radicals in a subordinate position.87 
Yet populism had an importance in its own right. It opened an organizational 
and ideological space in which anti-parliamentary leagues could operate. Victor Per-
ret's challenge to the notables was to rebound against him. His own committees were 
penetrated by extremists.88 For the time being, however, the populism of the Federa-
tion neutralized the far right. This is perhaps why neither the Federation des con-
tribuables nor Defense paysan were able to establish themselves in the Rhone in this 
period. Elsewhere they had formed the cutting edge of opposition to reform. 
The difference in the Rhone was that a conservative and Catholic bourgeoisie, 
with considerable organizational resources at its disposal in the parishes, was able to 
take the lead in opposition to Tardieu. This in turn led to the re-surfacing of the Le-
gitimist and integrist strand in the Lyonnais right, though altered by the contact of 
royalism with the pre-war radical right. This is why Laurent Bonnevay identified 
Marin and his supporters with the Chambre introuvable, Charles X and the Comte de 
Chambord.89 
Perret's Victory 
At first, Perret's views had only a limited resonance outside of the circles already re-
ferred to. A motion submitted to the National Council in October 1929 reflected Peis-
sel's position in its entirety. The motion urged that the Federation refrain from desta-
bilising the majority of 1928. 90 Hostility to Marin reached a peak after he had par-
ticipated in the overthrow of Briand in October, 1929. Perret defended Marin in pub-
lic debates with Peissel.91 But in private even he was doubtful. 'Hundreds' of sub-
scriptions to La Nation were cancelled. Marin's partisans in Lyon dared not utter his 
name. The great majority of naive militants, said Perret, took the word of those whose 
election they had made possible. Perret advised Marin to make a tactical withdrawal. 
Otherwise, if Marin lost the Presidency Perret himself would have had to submit to 
86 L 'Union republicaine, 15-5-1931. For one militant this was because the reforms in the party programme were 
not to be used for demagogic purposes. 
87 The is shown by prominence given to parliamentary news in L 'Union republicain. 
88 For example the JP member and future Croix de Feu leader Louis Marchal was able to replace a Federation 
member as candidate in the 7th arrondissement in the 1928 general election, and stand on an anti-parliamentarian 
platform. 
89317 AP 76, Bonnevay article in La Nation. 
90317 AP 73, Peissel to Marin, 5-10-1929. It called for defence of French interests, international understanding, 
and 'une large politique d'ententes economiques et douanieres, preface indispensable a une plus grande collabora-
tion europeen'. In domestic policy the it called for improvement and implementation of the Social Insurance Act 
on the date fixed by the law, rather than give in to business demands for staged introduction. Peissel nevertheless, 
urged Marin to avoid discussion at the forthcoming National Council in order to present a united front 
91 Nouveau Journal, 14-12-1929. 
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the will of the majority in Lyon.92 The weakness of Perret's position is shown by the 
fact that in January 1930 he pledged his support for the new Tardieu cabinet, even 
though Briand remained a member of it.93 Some months later, to Perret's horror 
deputy Jean-Baptiste Delorme resigned from the Federation.94 
Yet by mid-1931 the tide was turning. Local sections began to vote motions in 
support of Marin.95 Five months later Peisse1 gave up the Presidency of the Rhone 
Federation to Perret, ostensibly because of pressure of work.96 The new balance of 
forces is illustrated by three disputes which occurred in 1931 and 1932. 
The first was the refusal of Peissel and Salles to sit with the Federation's par-
liamentary group after the elections of 1932. For Perret this was a betrayal of the Fed-
eration and its militants.97 Peissel's defence of the autonomy of deputies was insuffi-
cient to prevent the Comite directeur. presided by Perret himself. from banning all as-
sistance to Salles and Peissel as long as they remained in the dissident group.98 The 
Federation stopped short of expulsion.99 At least two Committee members supported 
Salles and Peissel, criticising the rightwards turn of the Federation. 100 Nevertheless, 
Perret's enhanced influence in the Federation is unmistakable. And after 1932 Peissel 
shifted rapidly towards the right, although he did not completely lose touch with the 
Federation left. Salles had in any case been close to Perret, supporting Peissel only for 
tactical reasons. 
The second conflict took place in the Beaujolais, part of a long struggle be-
tween the business notables of Villefranche and the rural militants represented by 
Alexandre Bosse-Platiere. In 1931 the former had been able to sabotage the creation 
of a Federation youth group in Villefranche. Bosse-Platiere meanwhile was evicted 
from his post as political editor of the local journal, the Reveil du Beaujolais. 101 Sur-
prisingly, in 1932 Bosse-Platiere was selected by the Union des republicains, an in-
dependent body, to carry the flag of the right in the elections of 1932. Yet he found 
himself faced by a dissident candidate, the Villefranche businessman Ernest 
Planche. 102 In the course of the campaign even Bosse-Platiere's own committee de-
serted him. In the election Planche outdistanced his conservative rival, forcing Bosse-
92317 AP 73, Perret to Marin, 23-12-1929. Marin, a touchy character, appears to have taken this advice badly, for 
he refused to keep up his correspondance with Perret. 
93 Le Nouvelliste, 18-1-1930. 
94 Delorme's decision might have owed something to the fact that he had been elected only because of the divi-
sion of the opposition. If he was to be re-elected he would need Radical votes. 
95 Le Nouvelliste, 27-6-1931. The most important was that of the Central Committee of Lyon sections in July 
1931. Another example is a motion fromthe 6th arrondissement, reprinted in Le Nouvellisle, 
96 Nouveau journal, 20-12-1931. 
97 L 'Union republicaine, 26-6-1932. 
98 L'Union republicaine, 17-7-1932; 317 AP 73, Perret to Marin, 10-6-1932. 
99317 AP 73, A Damaz to Guiter, 22-6-1932: 'tout en etant tres severe pour I'acte accompli [ ... J je suis dans ce 
que je crais etre I'interet de la Federation republicaine, contre Ie principe d'exc1usions'. 
100 317 AP 73, Charbin to Guiter, 25-6-1932. One, Alexandre Charbin wrote 'voici 16 Parlementaires qui sont 
menaces des foudres des elements intransigeants de la Federation republicaine, dont I'evolution vers I'extreme 
draite est par trap sensible depuis quelques annees' The other opponent of sanctions was Julien Ribaud. 
101 ADR Cour de Justice de Lyon, report of 1945. 
102 Revei/ du Beaujolais, 16-3-1932; L 'Union republicaine, 26-6-1932. 
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Platiere's withdrawal. Yet soon after the election Bosse-Platiere was able to create a 
section of the Federation in the constituency. In September 1933 the old Union des 
republicains dissolved itself and ceded its property to the Federation. 103 
The third conflict related to control of the press. Thanks to the acquired posi-
tion of the Nouvelliste it had always been difficult for moderates to get their views 
across. Several attempts to set up a rival had failed. The most recent was the Nouveau 
journal, which had been created in 1924. According to managing director Marius Go-
nin, it was 'Ie seul [journallyonnais] a se tenir franchement dans la ligne du ministere 
[Tardieu),.I04 Although Victor Perret was a member, the board was heavily weighted 
towards the left Federation and centre right: Frant;ois Peissel and Etienne Fougere 
were both members. 105 In spite of the backing of several wealthy industrialists the 
Nouveau journal's circulation of 40,000 was thirty per cent too low to cover its 
costs.106 By the spring of 1931, with the arrival of the economic crisis, the situation of 
the Nouveau journal was critical.107 Negotiations with press magnates Pierre Laval 
and Raymond Patenotre took place, but the outcome was that the Nouvelliste took 
over the paper in December.108 The Nouveau journal became in effect the Nouvelliste 
with a different editorial. A few months before a general election the Nouvelliste was 
'more than ever master of the political battle field '.109 
From the point of view of the moderate right the timing could not have been 
worse, for in November 1931 Pierre Laval had sold Lyon republicain to the Radical 
Raymond Patenotre, who immediately ceased to insert conservative communiques. 110 
Moderates, to the disgust of Peissel, Cozon and Gonin, were left only with the unin-
spiring evening paper Salut public. 11 1 In a time of economic hardship Salut public's 
bourgeois clientele, seeing it as a luxury, tended to stop buying it. 112 To compound 
the difficulties of the moderates the Federation began to publish L 'Union republicaine 
in April 1932. The party's new journal was personally owned by Victor Perret. It did 
not open up its columns to his rivals. 
103 L'Union republicaine. 20-11-1932.11-9-1932, 10-9-1933. 
104 Fonds Gonin 3. report of Marius Gonin. 6-11-1930. 
105 Fonds Gonin 3. report of 19-12-1925. Also on the board were Federation moderates like Alexandre Charbin 
and Lucien Cozon. 
1 06 Fonds Gonin 3. report of November. 1929. It lacked the capital to invest in equipment necessary to produce a 
paper of the highest quality; advertisers were reluctant to commit themselves to a paper with an apparently bleak 
future. Several appeals were made to industrialists--on one occasion Charles Gillet gave no less than 400.000 
francs. 
107 Fonds Gonin 3. Gonin report, 13-4-1931. 
108 Fonds Gonin 3. for details see Falaize to Gonin. 7-12-31. Cozon to Gonin 8-4-1932 and 19-3-1932. 
109 Fonds Gonin. Falaize to Gonin. 7-12-31. 
110 Fonds Gonin. Cozon report, 19-3-1932: as Lucien Cozon. a Federation moderate. put it: 'La caracteristique 
presente de la presse du ~at~n a Lyon-par suite.de I'evolution simultan~e. et en sen~ contraire. du Nouveau 
journal et du Lyon rffpubllcam--est Presse de drolte. Presse de gauche. Rlen au centre. See also Fred Kupfer-
man. Laval. 1883-1945. Paris. 1987. pp. 65-9. 
111 It enjoyed the dubious reputation of being a Lyonnais Journal des debats--'peu lu et ne [faisant] pas ses 
frais'. 
112 Fonds Gonin. Gonin report. undated. 11931: Cozon attempted to persuade Humbert Isaac. managing director 
of Salut public to launch a morning paper. but he was reluctant to take the risk (Cozon to Gonin. 6-1-1932, H. 
Isaac to Cozon. 7-2-1932). 
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The reasons for Perret's victory are those evoked at the beginning of the 
chapter to account for the disappointments of Tardieu: economic crisis and the resur-
gence of international tension. l13 The victory of the Cartel in 1932 also explains a 
shift to the right. There are also local factors to be taken into account. Perret's reorga-
nization of the Federation had perhaps begun to bear fruit. Fran~ois Peissel (like J-B. 
Delorme) was in a weak position, representing an essentially rural constituency which 
in the end gained very little from reform. Hence his shift to the right and the attraction 
of peasant constituents like Parrel to Victor Perret. Bonnevay, in a similar position, 
reacted rather differently, moving further to the left, forming closer links with the 
PDP and encroaching on the ground of the Radicals, to the horror of many of his sup-
porters. 
The chronic weakness and division of the lay centre right in Lyon must also be 
taken into account. What is more, once the effects of the economic crisis began to be 
felt even Edmund Weitz began to back away from reform. In a report to the Chamber 
of Commerce of 1930 Weitz called for a halt to reform. 114 After 1930 he played no 
visible political role, though he continued to struggle against the 'silk establishment' 
in the Chamber of Commerce until at least 1934. One he became Deputy of the Loire 
in 1928, Etienne Fougere, also played a less active role in Lyon. Guy Aroud, who 
retained his progressive views, deserted to the Radical-Socialists, while continuing to 
speak in Lyon nJpublicain for the engineering industry. The Alliance adapted only 
with difficulty to the effacement of Weitz and Fougere. A new departmental leader-
ship was installed in January 1931 under Dr. Augros. But in subsequent years the Al-
liance was more than ever riven by faction fighting. 115 
Conclusion 
Both Andre Tardieu and Victor Perret set out to unite the right by asserting the pri-
macy of economic interest. Clearly both failed, for the right was defeated in 1932 
both nationally and in Lyon where it lost one of its three seats. 116 It is conceivable 
that Perret's establishment of control over the Federation contributed to the enormous 
Radical gains of that year. Certainly the vote for the centre right increased substan-
tially, though this was partly due to the dissidence of J-B. Delorme who stood for the 
Alliance rather than the Federation which had backed him in 1928. 
Perret's purpose was subverted by the religious question. Where politicians 
muted their Catholicism, the Nouvelliste, probably read by most of his supporters, re-
113 See page 168. 
114 CRCCL, 1930, p.624: 'La loi sur les Assurances sociales n'est pas encore integre dans I'economie industrielle 
que Ie legislateur nous men~~ de nouvelles depenses: conges payes, [ ... J L'extension de la legislation des mal-
adies professionnelles a la slhcose et a certains tuberculoses, malgre l'incertitude des diagnostiques ouvrant la 
porte a to us les ahus [ ... J'. 
115 Gric, op. cit., p. 251. 
116 That of J-B. Delorme, who held Givors. 
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mained committed to the re-Christianization of France. 117 Perret"'s organizational re-
liance upon the Church limited the Federation"'s ability to become a genuine mass 
party. It also made the Federation vulnerable to the influence of the social Catholi-
cism of the CFfC and JAC. In any case Perret"'s himself was unable to separate poli-
tics, economics and religion. Consequently his Catholicism was betrayed in the in the 
vocabulary used to explain problems which he perceived to be merely technical. For 
people brought up in the Radical tradition Catholicism was in turn inseparable from 
the economic interests of the 'industrial feudalism .... 
Related to this point is that even in narrowly economic terms, Perret's views 
were particular. We have seen that they had a very specific appeal to groups which 
were fearful of the development of a mass production economy, just as Perret himself 
was. In the end, the Federation failed in its effort to remake the right because it was 
incapable of producing a platform capable of transcending class and religious bound-
aries. Perret, like Tardieu, came to grief on the two great issues which divided the 
French bourgeoisie: attitude to industrialization and the religious question. It may 
have appeared after the elections of 1932 that conservatives were united around Per-
ret's hardline position. But the economic crisis showed that this was not the case. 
117 LeNouvellisle. 1-1-1929. 
Chapter eight 
The parliamentary right and the economic crisis 
When business in the Rhone began to feel the full effects of the slump in 1930 and 
1931 the right was already in crisis. The elites were divided; they faced difficulties in 
dealing with the reformist aspirations of a part of their rank and file and were heading 
for electoral disaster. It is also possible to detect a nascent authoritarianism in the 
populism of Victor Perret Unity of the right was apparently restored by increasing 
sympathy for Perret's hard-line position, especially after the return of the Cartel in 
1932, and by the campaign for deflation. 
Yet economic crisis aggravated existing tensions and created new ones. There 
was a mobilization of the lower middle class. The J AC expanded. The CFTC opposed 
deflation and was attracted to aspects of the Popular Front programme. Small busi-
ness, mainly Radical in sympathy, mobilized in favour of tax cuts, questioned the le-
gitimacy of the Chamber of Commerce, and began to turn to the far right Meanwhile, 
there was a realignment within big business. Faced with terminal crisis the unity of 
the silk interest, already strained, collapsed completely. Large firms, whose ambigu-
ous attitude to social reform and state intervention has been noted, moved towards 
corporatism. In so doing the gap between silk and big engineering fIrms narrowed. 
One consequence was to reinforce the impression that the Chamber of Commerce was 
merely a tool in the hands big business, in which the voice of medium and small fIrms 
was never heard. 
These problems were compounded by the activation of an enormous number 
of pressure groups. From 1931 newspapers were filled with press releases from such 
groups. They reveal an immense range of conflicts which it would be tedious to enu-
merate--Iandlords against tenants, small millers against large, consumers against 
tradesmen, veterans against the Ministry of Pensions-to name but a few. At the 
same time professional groups, from students to market gardeners, became concerned 
with restricting access to their fields of activity. 
As for the parties, the centre right remained isolated from the masses and riven 
by faction fIghting; the Federation and PDP took on the appearance of lobbies for 
special interests--merchant-manufacturers and Catholic white collar workers re-
spectively. By 1936 it was clear that the Parliamentary right had no solution either to 
the recession or to the re-emergence of a threat from the left in 1934. In other words, 
the political and economic elites had been discredited, and the process of negotiation 
which is essential to democracy had broken down. This was the context in which the 
growth of the leagues, with their combination of hostility to the establishment, anti-
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liberalism, corporatism and authoritarianism, occurred. These processes can be ob-
served both in the Rhone and in national politics 
The Economic Crisis 
It is often argued that fascism could not have taken root in France because economic 
difficulties were not as great as in Germany or Italy. 1 One can, however, question the 
notion of a direct connection between economic crisis and fascism. The United States 
went through a depression of an intensity that was at least equal to that of Germany 
without experiencing a significant fascist threat. Of course, no-one would argue that 
economic crisis alone produces fascism. But once it is accepted that the impact of the 
depression has to be brought into relation with ideological, political and social con-
text, then a more sophisticated view of economic crisis is required. This cannot be 
obtained simply by counting the number of unemployed or bankruptcies. 
All the same, economic crisis does playa part in the genesis of fascism. So we 
are obliged to ask how serious it was. International comparison of a vague notion like 
this is fraught with difficulties. In Germany industrial production fell at its worst to 
58% of its 1928 level in 1932. In France the bottom of the slump came in 1935, when 
industrial production fell to 75%. This is a significant though not enormous difference 
which is perhaps compensated by the much greater length of the French crisis. Closer 
analysis of the Rhone, moreover, reveals that for employers the economic crisis was a 
traumatic experience. Wage earners fared rather less badly. Peasants were somewhat 
cushioned from the slump's effects in the Rhone, but nonetheless had considerable 
cause for discontent. In France as a whole the agricultural crisis was perhaps more se-
vere than in Germany. 
In the Rhone export industries were first to be affected by the crisis. Com-
plaints came first from the silk industry when certain markets for luxury goods were 
closed as a result of stabilization of the Franc in 1928.2 By the end of the year there 
were signs of falling orders in several industries, but as yet nothing to indicate what 
was ahead} At the end of 1930 Albert Cotte, President of the Union des marchands 
de soie, attributed the lesser gravity of the crisis in France to "natural prudence and 
national savings".4 
Yet in his next report Cotte spoke of "a disastrous year, which had begun 
badly and ended still worse". In 1931 a crisis developed from which the Jabrique 
never truly recovered.5 Its fate was determined by massive over-production of raw 
1 See for example, Pierre Milza, op. cit., pp. 114-5; Remond, op. cit., pp. 293-4. 
2 CRCCL, pp. 662-3. Perier report. 
3 Por example: chemicals, CRCCL, 1928, p. 677; silk, pp. 625-6. Most employers were preoccupied with a short-
age of labour. In the engineering industry exports began to fall in 1929, but more workers were taken on, so home 
demand must have compensated (CRCCL, 1929, pp. 672-4). 
4 CRCCL, 1930, report of Cotte. Dyeing appears to have been worst affected, for its work-force fell by 20 to 25% 
(CRCCL, 1930, p. 606-610). 
5 CRCCL, 1931. pp. 527-552. The police reported general concem at the end of 1931 (AN p7 13 040,3-12-1931). 
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and spun silk in Japan and of woven cloth in the USA. Japanese dumping in the 
French market became worrisome. Additional downward pressure on prices came 
from expansion in the use of rayon. When used in the industry ' s mainstay crepes, the 
average customer could no longer differentiate it from natural silk. Besides these 
structural problems the industry suffered from contingent difficulties like the growth 
in protectionism, a decline in the purchasing power of the east due to a fall in the 
value of silver, and a simplification of female dress. 6 
Graph 21 Value of French silk exports. Base 100 = 1928 
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The gravity of the crisis in the silk industry is difficult to overestimate. Graph 
21 shows that the value of French silk exports, most of them originating from Lyon, 
had plunged by 1935 to ten percent of their 1928 value.7 The home market could not 
compensate. Only imperial markets continued to provide significant outlets. Turnover 
fell by 80%.8 An indication of the level of bankruptcies comes from the huge fall in 
membership of the SFS from 725 in 1929 to 300 in 1937.9 In the dyeing sector, where 
turnover was at about 25% of its 1928 level in the mid-1930s, the number of fIrms in 
the arrondissement of Lyon fell from 119 to 69.10 Marchands de soie, thanks to their 
dependence on the health of world trade, were still more vulnerable to bankruptcy. 
A regional survey in January 1932 put unemployment in all textile industries 
at 25% (see Table 13). After this date things must have got considerably worse. A 
figure of 35% was cited for silk weaving in 1934.11 The number of workers employed 
6 Laferrere, op.cit. , pp. 217-8; CRCCL, 1930, pp. 567, 644; CRCCL 1931, p.557. 
7 Value of silk exports given in CRCCL deflated by cost of living index in Lyon. This index, based on the prices 
of nineteen essential goods plus wine, gas and oil, is hardly ideal. The industry itself reported in 1934 that 10lal 
production at stable pri ces was at 20% of its 1928 level. 
8 Relative decline of the siJk industry is shown by the fact that it accounted for 11 % of French exports in 1928, but 
only 5% in 1935. 
9 CRCSF, 1928 and 1937: a drop of 60%. 
10 CRCCL, 1937, pp. 415-7. 
11 Lyon replIb licain, 26-9-1934. Geni, op. cit., p. 112, stated that in 1935 60% of looms were not working. Bon-
nevi lle, op. ci t, p. speaks of numerous closures of weaving factories in Villeurbanne. 
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in the dying industry was reduced by no less than 55% between 1928 and 1934. Those 
who remained were on short time. 12 
Table 13: Unemployment in the Lyon region in January 1932 (percent)13 
Textiles 25 Leather 14 
Metal working 22 Transport 10 
Building 21 Sales staff 10 
CJlass/cerarnics 19 Office staff 7 
Wood 19 Food 7 
Clothing 15 Printing 3 
The gravity of the crisis in the silk industry was variable. Lyon retained its ad-
vantages in the production of natural silk cloths. But some specialities were virtually 
eliminated. Worst affected perhaps was Victor Perret's sector, silk braids and church 
decorations, badly hit in 1931 by tariffs in Britain and India.14 Difficulties were also 
great in the production of cheap rayon crepes. Since the range of such cloths was very 
narrow competition was pushed to extremes, with consequences to which we shall 
return in a moment. 15 French production of rayon thread rose during this period from 
20 million kilograms in 1931 to 26 million in 1933. But since prices were falling there 
was a substantial thinning in the ranks of small and medium producers of artificial fi-
bres. There were eleven factories in the agglomeration in 1929, but only six in 1935. 
These were operating at about 30 to 50% below capacity. 16 
In the silk industry, and in certain other lUXury industries such as shoes and 
leather, a whole mode of production had been shown to be wanting.17 Lyonnais pro-
ducers paid the price for technical backwardness, for in the 1920s they had simply in-
corporated rayon into the old flexible structures of the silk industry, using it to in-
crease the variety of cloths. 18 Export possibilities in the 1920s had masked this weak-
ness. So fabricants found themselves ill-prepared to compete in the new market for 
standardized rayon mixtures. Dyers too suffered because rayon products required less 
specialized treatment, and so could be dyed and finished anywhere in France. 
The long term future of the metallurgical industries was not in doubt. All the 
same, the depression was severely felt. Turnover fell from 2.2 billion francs in 1930 
to less than one billion in 1934.19 General activity was reckoned to have declined by 
12 CRCCL, 1934, p. 378. 
13 Nouvelliste, January 1932. 
14 CRCCL, 1931,581; Nouvelliste, 5-3-1931: Its spokesman stated "cette fois c'est la «morte», nous pouvons, je 
crois, dire, sans crainte d'exageration, que notre belle industrie, jadis si prospere, «n'existe plus»; l'atelier familial 
est desert, 1 'usine a ferme ses porles, Ie personnel des bureaux est reduit a sa plus simple expression". 
15 CRCCL, 1931,577. By the mid-1930s most of those looms which continued to function wove rayon and cotton 
mixtures alone. 
16 A Pinton, "La soie artificielle a Lyon en 1935", ER, 1936, 17, pp. 104-7. 
17 In the shoe and leather industries, cheap mass produced shoes with rubber soles, often imported from 
Czechoslovakia. had overturned the semi-luxury methods of the French. 
18 CRCCL, 1929, p. 644: Louis Gueneau said that the rise of rayon Us 'est produite avec une intensite, avec une ra-
pidite si differentes de celles du passe en matieres textiles qu'on est deconcerte". 
19 CRCCL, 1933, 390-398. 
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40 to 50% by 1935.20 As Graph (?) shows, employment fell from a peak of 46,318 in 
1929 to 26,432 in 1935--a drop of 43%. 
Graph 22: Employment in the engineering industry in the 
Rhone, 1927.3921 
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Foreign competition, above all German, and the end of rural electrification 
were the most often cited causes. But local factors also intervened. Worst hit of all 
were those making machinery for the silk and dying industries. In this sector the work 
force had fallen by 55% and turnover by 75% in 1935.22 Also badly affected were en-
gineering firms making heavier machinery. Since raw materials made up the largest 
part of their costs they found themselves vulnerable to competition from concentra-
tions of engineering factories in steel producing areas such as the Lorraine. A notable 
victim of this problem was Edmond Weitz, who was obliged to sell out to the Barras 
group in 1936.23 Best able to cope with the crisis were highly capitalized fums in the 
electricity industry. But even here experience was variable. 24 Petrier, Tissot & Ram-
baud had at first been badly hit by the halt in rural electrification, but managed a cer-
tain recovery through technical innovation.25 On the other hand the Compagnie 
d'electro mecanique, reported substantial falls in employment, volume of production 
and turnover.26 
It would be possible to describe an equally grave crisis in other sectors.27 
Among the worst hit was the shoe industry, where the work force fell from 5,000 in 
20 Lyon republicain, 15-12-1935. 
21 Source: annual reports in CRCCL. 
22 Interview with Emile Giscard, Lyon republicain, 29-12-1935. Guy Aroud and Charles Cabaud, President of the 
metal traders' association attributed the crisis as a whole to the problems of the silk industry (Lyon republicain, 15-
12-1935). 
23 Laferrere, op. cit., p. 300, CRCCL, Lyon republicain, 15-12-1935,29-12-1935. Weitz also lacked the capital to 
maintain the stocks necessary for quick delivery. 
24 Dumont in Lyon republicain, 29-12-1935. 
25 Lyon republicain, 29-12-1935: at Petrier, Tissot & Rambaud turnover had fallen substantially, but it was now 
possible to produce the same volum~ with 20% fewer workers. The manager of Cables de Lyon stated that wise fi-
nancial management and membershIp of a cartel ensured that the company had been experienced no crisis at all. 
26 Lyon republicain, 29-12-1935. 
27 The figures are from CRCCL. 
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1930 to 2,000 in 1935. Only firms making cheap shoes prospered.28 The building in-
dustry lost about 4,000 of the 10,000 workers it had employed in 1930. Rather than 
multiply endlessly such examples, suffice it to say that only a few industries such as 
printing, gas and electricity supply passed through the crisis with no difficulties at all. 
Also, one whole region, that of Villefranche, appears to have more or less escaped 
damage. The reasons for this are not clear. 
There is then plenty of evidence that for employers the crisis was a traumatic 
experience. This fits with the picture in France as a whole. Using 1928 as a base, 
profits, adjusted for falling prices, fell by 18%. Real wages, on the other hand, fell by 
6%.29 That the crisis did not lead to the creation of a pool of unemployed could be 
seen as compounding the difficulties of employers, especially as throughout the de-
pression there were complaints of a shortage of skilled labour.30 This meant that in 
France the left did not suffer from the deep divisions between employed and unem-
ployed, socialists and communists, which did so much to handicap the German labour 
movement. 
Turning our attention to the impact of the slump upon those receiving salaries 
and wages, caution must first be expressed about the use of official figures to measure 
unemployment. The number of those receiving benefits from municipal funds reached 
a peak of 14,639 in March 1935, perhaps 6% of the workforce. But women were not 
included; not all of the unemployed received benefit;31 some returned to their vil-
lages; immigrant workers were repatriated while others set up as artisans;32 unem-
ployed rural weavers lived off their meagre plots of land. Above all official figures do 
not reflect the prevalence of short-time working. In the 1932 report quoted above it 
was stated that only 41 % of employees worked a full forty-eight hour week. This is 
why official figures do not square with the sort of figures seen in Table 13.33 
Of particular interest is the impact of the recession on white collar workers. In 
the 1920s white collar work ceased to be the key to social mobility that it had been 
before the Great War. Economic crisis accentuated this development. The precise 
level of white collar unemployment is difficult to assess. But there is considerable 
qualitative evidence of difficulties. Table 13 shows that in 1932, not the worst year, 
seven percent of office staff and ten percent of sales staff were unemployed (see page 
192). In some sectors unemployment was probably greater. The Union des marchands 
de soies reported that by 1935 its members had laid off 200 of the 700 they had em-
28 CRCCL, p. 616-20. 
29 Sauvy, op. cit, p. 137. In Germany they fell by 14%. 
30 For example, Bulletin des soies, 18-4-1936. Engineers made the same complaint. 
31 To qualify for benefit it was necessary to have lived for six months in a given commune. 
32 Nouveau journal, 15-11-1938. According to official figures the number of foreigners in the Rhone fell by 6,660 
between 1930.and 1932. The figures were ~ri&inally compiled by the conseil.general. The number dropped much 
more substantially from 1935 when legal limIts were placed on the proportion of foreigners who could be em-
ployed. 
33 Nouvelliste, 21-3-1932. 
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ployed in 1929. Most of these would have been office workers. In 1933 Claudius 
Deriol wrote in La Voix sociale that white collar employees had been touched by 
unemployment rather later than manual workers, but had not avoided the problem in 
the long term. In a sample of twenty eight Lyon firms the number of office workers 
had fallen by 28% between 1929 and 1932. He added that for white collar workers 
unemployment was all the more disturbing because of its adverse affects on career 
structure. He also reported that salaries had declined by 30%.34 There is also evidence 
to suggest that many engineers had been affected by unemployment. In 1933 on the 
initiative of Herriot the Chamber of Commerce set up a fund to aid those engineers 
who had been embarrassed by the crisis.35 
In the countryside the impact of the crisis was variable. Worst affected were 
those dependent upon market production. As in industry the turning point was in 
1931, when the prices of wine, milk and fruit, three of the main products of the 
Rhone, collapsed. The chief features of the crisis are well known-over-produc-
tion, falling urban demand, falling exchange value of agricultural goods, and foreign 
competition--and need not be rehearsed here. A~ for the specific effects of the 
crisis on the Rhone, we are much less well informed.37 
Most is known of the Beaujolais. Prices collapsed as a result of the poor qual-
ity harvest of 1931. Beaujolais producers were also vulnerable to competition from 
French North Africa, where a more favourable terrain permitted greater mechaniza-
tion of production. Large growers had to cope with rising labour costs and by the need 
to offer more attractive contracts to ever scarcer share-croppers. For small and 
medium proprietors income from wine sales was wholly absorbed by production 
costs. Labour for the vintage had to be paid from the sale of milk, fodder and cere-
als.38 
Next to nothing is known of the experience of peasants in the rest of the de-
partment. From 1931 fruit growers began to complain of the closure of German mar-
kets and of Italian competition.39 Milk producers in the mountains suffered falling 
prices from 1931. There were fears of a return of the indebtedness which had affected 
the peasantry before World War One.40 Some turned to more profitable vegetable 
growing, thereby increasing competition in an industry suffering from the rivalry of 
Brittany, Italy and North Africa. Since Lyonnais soils were not suited to vegetables 
34 Voix sociale. July/August. 1933. Deriol used the expression "filiere" to refer to career structure. Vou sociale. 
October and December. 1934. reported that in order to facilitate lay-offs the practice of paying office and sales 
staff by the hour spread. while in the banks time keeping and supelVision were tightened up. 
35 PVCCL, 29-6-1933. 
36 Barra!. op. cit., pp. 218-221. 
37 In Gilbert Garrier's study of the peasantry of the Rhone the impact of the depression is all but obscured by a fo-
cus upon long term developments. Furthermore, he relies heavily on price series, which are of rather poor quality 
in the interwar years.7 
38 Garrier. op. cit.. pp. 596-598, 602-605. Burel, op. cit., p. 52. 
39 Nouvelliste. 14-3-1931. 
40 Garrier, op. cit., pp. 612-614. 
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and products were of low quality, market gardeners were badly placed to meet this 
competition.41 
In periods of falling profits peasants could either abandon their farms, or they 
could turn to subsistence farming. Given the down-turn in the industrial labour mar-
ket, and given that self-sufficiency was not an easy option in a period when peasants 
were becoming dependent on loans, this was not an enviable choice. All the same, 
outside of the Beaujolais and a few communes which had gone over almost entirely to 
wine or fruit production, the possibility of retreating into subsistence farming does 
seem to have blunted to some extent the effect of the crisis.42 Furthermore, the Rhone 
peasantry benefited from the fact that the region was not self-sufficient in grain, 
which meant that wheat prices were higher than elsewhere. This is why producers 
large and small in the Rhone were opposed to a minimum price for wheat, since it 
threatened to homogenize the French market. 43 All of this helps to explain why eco-
nomic crisis led at first to the radicalization of the peasantry only in the Beaujolais, 
where small proprietors and even some share-croppers turned to socialism and coop-
eratives. 
To sum up, the impact of the crisis was greatest upon business large and small, 
though other groups also experienced hardship. But the slump is important also be-
cause it affected a right which was already divided culturally, politically, economi-
cally and socially. It engendered ferocious competition at all levels of society: be-
tween firms for scarce markets, and between individuals for jobs. 
From Liberalism to Corporatism 
In the following sections we will look at the impact of the crisis upon interest group 
politics before June 1936. We will see the development of corporatism and authori-
tarianism which pre-disposed many to view favourably the leagues. Our starting point 
will be conflicts within the ruling class. There were two main issues. The first, pro-
tectionism, was more or less confined to the Rhone and to the few areas where free 
trading interests remained powerful. The second, and most important, centred on the 
question of state intervention in economy, and involved debates about liberalism and 
corporatism. 
Protectionism 
Protectionism can be dealt with fairly briefly. Before the economic crisis agricultural 
syndicates had been more or less alone in demanding increased tariffs. Most industrial 
interests accepted that the prosperity of the region depended upon the maintenance of 
41 Jeantet and Willemain, op. cit., p. 225. 
42 This was the view of an editorialist in the Nouvelliste, 22-8-1935. 
43 Nouvel/iste. 19-7-1934. 
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the silk industry~ s foreign outlets. This was true even of the engineering industry, al-
though it was increasingly reliant on the home market. 44 
During the depression industrialists, led by engineers, increasingly tended to 
side with agriculture. In 1931 ajabricant denounced, in the name of economic liber-
alism, the protectionism of "certains milieux agricoles fran~ais et certains groupe-
ments industriels dont Ie march6 interieur constitue Ie d6bouche essentiel".45 Within 
the Chamber Edmund Weitz clashed with the free trade majority on several occa-
sions.46 Weitz went as far as to demand that public contracts be reserved for local in-
dustrialists. His reasoning is revealing of attitudes in this period: since a closed econ-
omy was imposed on us by such interests as agriculture and the coal industry, then 
engineers were obliged to get on as best they could in this poisoned atmosphere: 
"primo vivere"!47 
Relations between exporters and agricultural syndicates also declined. In the 
privacy of the Chamber of Commerce in 1931 a new tariff on imported maize was de-
nounced as "an unjustifiable privilege for agriculture".48 The agricultural press was 
full of denunciations of industry.49 In 1934 the debate reached the daily press when 
the SFS published an open letter to Prime Minister Doumergue in which it was 
claimed that "personne ne saurait soutenir que les interets de commerce et de 
l~industrie et, plus particulierement des commer~ants et industriels exportateurs, ont 
ete l~objet des preoccupations gouvernementales comme c~est Ie cas pour la produc-
tion agricole". 50 
The issue is complicated by the fact that although it remained convinced that 
there could be no real recovery until free trade was restored, the Chamber of Com-
merce had since 1932 been agitating for limitations on Japanese imports of rayon 
goods.51 The Chamber~s readiness to break with liberal principles in order to protect 
the silk industry shows that it was falling victim to the logic of social politics in the 
economic crisis. Rather than represent the general commercial interest of the region, 
44 CRCCL, 1928, p. 697. In 1928 Edmund Weitz rejected the idea of lower tariff barriers, but opposed what he 
saw as excessive demands of agricultural interests for greater protection. 
45 CRCCL, 1931, p. 562-3. 
46 PVCCL, 3-7-1930; 13-11-1930 and 14-11-1935. Both representatives of engineering favoured retaliation 
against the American Hawley-Smoot tariff of July 1930. In 1931 and again in 1935 Weitz spoke out in the Cham-
ber against the Chamber's efforts to lobby the government in favour of free trade. 
47 CRCCL, 1931,597. 
48 PVCCL, 13-11-1930. Attacks on protectionist raw silk producers in the Cevennes were particularly virulent 
(CRCCL, 1930, p. 568). 
49 L'Agriculteur du sud-est, 2-5-1935, claimed that the interests of wine-growers had always been sacrificed to 
those of big business. . 
50 Lyon rI!publicain. 19-9-1934. The letter provoked an angry rejoinder from Felix Garcin on behalf of the Union 
du sud-est. Rather pertinently he asked what the silk industry itself would say were the representatives of agricul-
ture to demand the reduction of contingents on Japanese rayon in order to sell rice to the Indochinese (Nouvelliste, 
25-9-1934). 
51 PVCCL, 10-11-1932,30-3-1933, 18-1-1934,28-2-1935. Costs were so low in Japan, claimed Henry Morel-
Journel. that it was possible for the Japanese to purchase thrown rayon in France, weave it in Japan and then re-ex-
port it to French Indo-China. Th~ politic~l objections of a government fearful of offending Japan should be over-
ridden. The questIOn was exceedmgly delicate, because measures against Japanese competition in Indochina risked 
closing the colonies' own export markets in Japan and occupied China. 
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the Chamber must have appeared to many to be a mere extension of the silk lobby, 
especially as the demands of other industries for protection were rejected by the 
Chamber in the name of liberalism.52 The Chamber's position as arbiter of the general 
interest was compromised. 
The question of protection for the silk: industry also undermined the unity of 
the Jabrique, for it was the largest capital intensive firms which were most likely to 
produce the threatened cheap rayon goods. Luxury traders like Perret were more in-
terested in re-opening world markets. Big silk ftrms therefore moved closer to the po-
sition of the engineering industry, and even to that of agriculture. Yet the possibility 
of realignment on this basis was undermined by the fact that all businessmen were 
united in the belief that state aid to agriculture artificially increased the price of 
bread.53 The obstacles to agreement on any issue in the mid-1930s were immense. 
A final point is that all sides in the dispute over protection believed the state to 
be in the hands of their opponents.54 Hence the demand common to a wide variety of 
groups that the state reassert its independence. This provides a link between interest 
group conflict and politics proper. 
Corporatism 
The debate over protectionism shows that economic liberalism was one of the first ca-
sualties of the depression. In its place there flourished a variety of alternatives vari-
ously referred to as the "organized profession", the "directed economy" or 
"corporatism". Historians have usually passed rapidly over corporatism, particularly 
where business politics are concerned. Richard Kuisel, for example, sees it as a vague 
academic doctrine in which few employers were interested. 55 In reality corporatism is 
one of the keys to understanding the period, for it is a concept which links the social, 
economic, ideological and political. Certainly it was an ambiguous notion--this 
was part of its appeal. But this should not prevent us from recognising that it was, like 
nationalism, a contested ideology, to which a variety of groups struggled to give 
meaning. 
Before proceeding further a preliminary clarification of terms is called for. 
Many contemporaries distinguished the "organized profession" from "corporatism". 
But in practice the distinction meant little. The term "entente" was often taken to 
mean merely a binding agreement between ftrms, without wider implications for the 
organization of society. But in practice this distinction was difficult to sustain. In 
what follows "corporatism" is used as a generic term. Beyond that, as far as possible, 
52 PVCCL 16-2-1933: the wood trade saw its demands for quotas rejected on the grounds that the industry was al-
ready sufficiently protected. The silk industry justified itself by distinguishing a general tariff from temporary 
contingents, and by claiming that Japanese competition was unfair. 
53 Nouvelliste, 19-4-1934. Vautheret of the Fabricants de soieries stressed the accord of protectionists and free 
traders on this issue. 
54 See page 197. 
55 Kuisel, Capitalism, pp. 102-4: R. Vinen. The Politics of French Business. 1936-1945. Cambridge, 1991, p. 55. 
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the vocabulary of the participants has been respected. Corporatism is understood to 
mean a belief in self-government by professional bodies, whose decisions are legally 
binding. As such it is distinguished from voluntary agreements such as cartels, ac-
ceptable to many liberals, and from the statism of social democracy. Indeed, corpo-
ratism purports to be a middle way between etatism and liberalism. 
In practice there was little agreement on the nature of corporatism. First, there 
was the question of whether membership of corporative bodies should be compulsory. 
If not, then the profession would be directed by existing employers' associations. The 
big firms which dominated these associations therefore opposed compulsion. In effect 
corporatism meant giving these bodies legal backing for their views on such matters 
as prices and working conditions. Compulsory membership was more likely to be 
favoured by medium and small fIrms and by representatives of peasant proprietors. 
The second issue, which was often only implied in the sphere of interest group 
politics, was the question of the compatibility of corporatism with democracy. We 
shall see that although corporatists generally presented their ideas as an alternative to 
statism, they were in practice, thanks to the circumstances in which corporatism 
arose, permanently vulnerable to authoritarianism. 
The third issue is the attitude of corporatists to economic progress. Historians 
have generally followed Alfred Sauvy in seeing corporatism as Malthusian.56 Often 
the intention was indeed to curb industrialization. But corporatism could also be anti-
Malthusian. It was seen by some as a means of overcoming the "unfair" competition 
of artisans, which was in turn a result of their privileged position in the Third Repub-
lic. This was another source of anti-parliamentarianism. 
Corporatism in the engineering industry 
Foremost amongst those calling for "organization of the profession" were rep-
resentatives of the engineering industry. We are not well-informed on the details of 
their projects, but some general points can be made. Engineers had moved away from 
the democratic corporatism of the 1920s now that wage cuts had become a priority. 
Collaboration with trades unions was no longer viewed with favour. In December 
1933 engineering employers unilaterally denounced the collective contract of 1928, 
citing the economic crisis as justification. 57 But engineers adapted their ideas to new 
circumstances. Their view of the profession organisee shows certain continuities with 
the democratic corporatism of the 1920s, while simultaneously showing a tendency 
towards authoritarianism. That engineers preferred the term "profession organisee" to 
"corporatism", which they associated with the extreme right, can be seen as evidence 
56 Jackson, op. cit., pp. 95-6, sees the Marchandeau Bill of 1935 as an example of restrictive practices. Discussing 
the "entente professionelle" in the shoe industry introduced in 1936 Alfred Sauvy quotes his former patron Paul 
Reynaud on the subject of "la republique de semelles percees" (A Sauvy, Histoire economique de la France entre 
les deux guerres, 4 vols., Paris, 1965-1967, pp. 371-2). 
57 Vo,x socia Ie, December 1933 and February 1934. 
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of the Republican roots of their ideas. Among the flrst to agitate for organization of 
the profession were foundry operators. For this group the profession organisee was a 
democratic alternative both to Mussolini's corporatism and to extreme liberalism. For 
Emile Giscard, director of a a firm making machinery for the textile industry, ententes 
would have to be introduced, "sinon nous allons au suicide ou a l'etatisme". 
All the same the organized profession implied limitations on individual liberty 
and a new role for the state. Indeed, engineers were rather more favourable to state 
intervention than were many other employers. The ambiguity of corporatism is illus-
trated by an exchange between Guy Aroud and Edmund Weitz in Lyon republicain: 
Aroud: En somme vous souhaitez que l'Etat se souci d'imposer de l'ordre dans l'anarchie 
pft!sente par des mesures de compensation et d'organisation des marches. C'est l'economie 
dirigee. 
Weitz: Mais oui; OU au moins organisee par les groupements professionnels sous Ie contr61e et 
l'autorite de l'Etat.58 
Weitz stressed the self-governing role of the profession, but in effect he was asking 
for state backing for the decisions of his syndicate. 59 This is more or less what the 
government offered in the abortive Marchandeau project of 1935, which provided for 
legal enforceability of industrial cartels, and which Weitz whole-heartedly ap-
proved.6o Weitz's corporatism was that of big business--a means for highly capi-
talized flrms to ensure remunerative production in a period of falling prices. In the ab-
sence of sufflcient documentation it is not possible to analyse conflicts within the 
metallurgical industry over the meaning of corporatism. But there are hints that some 
ftrms had different views. Founders, a sector of small and medium employers, were 
most vociferous in their demands for corporatism. That a new founders section of the 
engineering employer's association was formed in 1934 suggests discontent within 
this group.61 Finally, whilst engineers shared the pessimistic industrial outlook of 
the 1930s,62 their attitudes were not Malthusian in a simple sense. An enquiry carried 
out for Lyon repubUcain found that engineers were unanimous in rejecting the notion 
that state or corporation should impose restrictions on the output of machines. On the 
contrary, the interviewees declared that only renovation of machinery and meticulous 
organization of work had permitted them to struggle against foreign competition.63 C. 
Pionchon of a flrm making car gearing told Aroud, "Quelle folie de vouloir arreter Ie 
progres technique. Le progres technique cree des besoins nouveaux. [ ... ] Au contraire, 
58 Lyon republicain, 15-12-1935. 
59 Lyon republicain. 29-12-1935. Georges Villiers, future president of the post war CNPF, called frankly for 
''l'economie dirigee". 
60 PVCCL. 14-2-1935. On the Marchandeau project see below p. 203; EJ. Massoubre, op. cit.. passim; O. de 
Magondeaux. Les En/enles indUSlrielles obligaloires en France. Paris. 1937. 
61 Nouvellisle, 13-6-1934. 
62 For example. C. Pionchon: "We are going back to a pre-1914 situation. I don't know if that's "normal". But it's 
happening!". Lyon rep.ub,licain, 2?-12-1935. Demands for preferential treatment in the awarding of state contracts 
must be seen as a restnchve practIce. 
63 Lyon republicain, 15-12-1935. There was. Aroud reported. a consensus that rationalization permitted produc-
tion of the same volume of goods with 30% fewer workers. 
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il faut creer sans cesse".64 On the contrary corporatism was a means of encouraging 
production and safeguarding investment by putting an end to falling prices. For the 
engineering industry the main problem was that purchases were insufficient in a pe-
riod of falling prices to permit profitable mass production. 65 
Corporatism in the silk industry 
In the case of the silk industry it is rather easier to make sense of conflicting views of 
corporatism. The crisis in the silk industry led to led to extreme competition within a 
narrow market for mass produced rayon mixtures. Large firms could adapt to this by 
two means. They could take advantage of Lyon's reputation for luxury goods to gain 
an advantage in the market for cheap goods. Hence sponsorship of a law forbidding 
the use of the label "artificial silk" on rayon goods. It was felt that the confusion 
caused by this appellation worked against the reputation of the fabrique as a whole. 
Second, big firms advocated greater industrialization of weaving. This could be 
achieved by investment in more efficient looms and by better organization of work, 
especially through the double or triple shift system.66 
Falling prices were the main obstacle to this strategy.67 Big firms blamed 
"unfair" competition from home weavers for the collapse of prices. Thus Vautheret, 
President of the SFS, echoed all the conventional homilies on the moral value of the 
family workshop. But, he argued, thanks to the democratization of silk and rayon 
cloths family workshops now produced the same articles as factory producers. It was 
therefore unfair that artisans should enjoy exemption from the turnover tax, pay in-
come tax at a lower rate, avoid the jurisdiction of the labour inspectorate, and not be 
obliged to pay social insurance contributions.68 Vautheret's depiction of the inhuman 
working conditions in rural workshops was a far cry from the utopianism of Victor 
Perret. 
Corporatism, or an "entente", was seen by big firms as a means of equalising 
conditions in the industry.69 In the Chamber of Commerce one member argued that if 
an entente imposed limits on production it would force small rums out of business, to 
which Paul Char bin replied that small and medium rums had coped with the crisis 
64 Lyon republicain, 29-12-1935. Similarly, in the Chamber of Commerce Edmund Weitz was alarmed by the 
possiblity that ententes would have the power to destroy excess capacity. PVCCL, 25-10-1934. 
65 Lyon republicain, 15-12-1935. 
66 Report of Vautheret in CRCCL, 1932, p. 285-291; PVCCL, 22-3-1932. 
67 CRCCL, 1930, 552-3: at first it was hoped that falling prices would eliminate competition and thereby raise 
~~~~hives Godart, carton 1, Vautheret to Godart, 5-11-1934: "En voici Ie tableaux: usines strictement 
con troles, ecrases par les charges, entraines a des tarifs de fayon ruineux pour Ie patron, avec des salaires de 
famine pour l'ouvrier, en face des. ateliers a domicile, exempts de la pi up art des charges et compensant par un ho-
raire prolonge Ie taux bas des salrures. 
69 Archives Godart, carton 1, Humbert Isaac to Minister of Commerce, 13-10-1935: "L'institution de l'accord 
professionnel n'est vraiment demande que par un petit nombre de gros producteurs d'articles de grande consom-
malion. [ ... J Actuellement, certains de ceux qui se plaignent Ie plus de la surproduction son gent a installer des 
metiers automatiques dont Ie rendement est enorme". 
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much more successfully because their costs were 10wer.7° In October 1934 the argu-
ments for an entente were presented to a government enquiry into the industry. It 
would set a minimum price (tarif) for the weaving of cloth by jw;onniers. Financed by 
a tax levied on raw materials, the entente would purchase, and perhaps even destroy, 
any looms which came onto the market. The creation of new factories would be con-
trolled, the working day limited, new markets sought out, merchandise stocked, and 
new techniques would be perfected.71 It was assumed by many that social laws would 
also be extended to home weavers, but in fact this was the subject of a separate cam-
paign. 
The pro-entente jabricants found allies in other branches of the industry. 72 
Strongest in their support for an entente were the gros jw;onniers. Like jabricants 
usiniers, these large sub-contractors complained bitterly of competition from home 
weavers. Having failed to secure a tarif from the jabricants non-usiniers who pro-
vided them with orders, the gros jar;onniers attempted without success from 1931 to 
1933 to set up a consortium, which would set its own tarif.73 As the leader of the gros 
ja~onniers put it, "QueUe cercle vicieux dont on ne pourra sortir que par un vigoureux 
coup de rein". He went on to explain that the only solution was to appeal to the state 
for regulation of home workshops, and for the means to destroy excess capacity. 74 
Second, the idea of an entente was backed by marchands de soie, whose pro-
duction of rayon thread was equally compromised by artisan competition. This group 
included the powerful figure of the President of the Chamber of Commerce, Henry 
Morel-Journel, whose view was influenced by his position as a large producer of 
rayon.75 According to an opponent of the entente, Morel-Journel's affairs had been af-
fected by the unwillingness of Courtaulds, newly established at Calais, to join the 
French artificial textile cartel. He hoped, therefore, that a successful entente in the 
jabrique would set a precedent for production of rayon thread. 76 
The motives of the supporters of the entente were sometimes, but not neces-
sarily, Malthusian. The efforts of big weavers to remove artisanal competitors has to 
be seen in the context of the state's own protection of the artisanate. Opponents of the 
entente described it as a means of restricting industrial progress, and evoked the free 
play of market forces. Yet they expected market forces to function within a regime 
where small production was privileged. 
70 PVCCL. 24-1-1935. 
71 Details from a circular of the SFS. 10-9-1935. in Archives Godart, carton 1. 
72 Debates in the Chamber of Commerce reveal that nearly all industrialists in Lyon supported the idea of en-
tentes. PVCCL. 14-2-1935. 
73 Nouveau journal. 1-11-1931; Nouvel/isle. 26-11-1931. 29-11-1931; Voix sociale. July 1932. 
74 Lyon republicain. 20-4-1935. Already in 1932fabricanls and grosfa~onniers had formed a common commit-
tee. This. according to Vautheret was an historic rapprochement of hereditary enemies. It can be supposed that fab-
ricanls non-usiniers. as opposed as ever to a minimum tariff. were less than happy (CRCCL. 1932. p. 287). 
75 PVCCL. 30-10-1935 and 14-11-1935; CRCCL. 1935. He informed the Chamber of Commerce that such a 
compulsory entente was even more necessary for production of rayon 
76 Archives Godart, carton 1. Eymard to Van Gelder. 4-11-1935. 
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Continuities between the entente and the modernizing views of the late 1920s 
can also be seen in attitudes to state and trades unions. Proponents of the project gen-
erally presented it as an alternative to government action.77 Yet not only did the state 
have representatives in the arbitration committee of the entente, but the COT would 
have been involved.78 Probably big business would have preferred to limit the role of 
government, and to keep the COT out altogether. Indeed, it was hoped that an entente 
would lead to a more supple application of the Eight Hour Law. But if this was the 
price of an entente, then big business was ready pay it. And if there had to be social 
reform, then it must be applied to all. 
A more genuine reformism was evident among gros far;onniers, a product of 
their long struggle for a tarif. Monomy, leader of their Lyon section, claimed that the 
entente was inspired by Papal encyclicals on the social question. In July 1932 the gros 
far;onniers and the CFfC reached an agreement on matters such as length of the 
working day, numbers of looms that a worker could operate and extension of social 
insurance to home workers. These attitudes owe much to the historic opposition of 
gros jar;onniers to merchant manufacturers, which pushed them to the left. 79 
Through the national textile employers' association the silk industry joined 
with cotton interests from the Nord in petitioning the Ministry of Commerce for an 
obligatory entente. The Ministry agreed to the request, which in January 1935 saw the 
light of day as the loi Marchandeau. By this time its provisions had been extended to 
cover all branches of industry. In Parliament, however, the bill was substantially 
amended, giving the Minister of Commerce a greater role in implementing ententes, 
and worse still incorporating some of the demands of the trades unions. As a result 
most employers, with the significant exception of the Lyonnais, lost interest in the 
bill. The majority of French employers were no doubt relieved when it became lost in 
the intricacies of the Senate.80 
In Lyon the silk industry did not give up the fight. It profited from the grant of 
special powers to Pierre Laval in June 1935 to request a decree law, which was duly 
issued on last day of October. It was to be implemented on condition that it was ap-
proved by a majority of two thirds of the members of each of the three syndicates 
concemed--the SFS, the marchands de sole and the gros jar;onniers. Each majority 
also had to possess three-quarters of the capacity of their respective branches. For this 
reason non-usinier members of the SFS could not vote. By this time, however, oppo-
77 PVCCL, 14-2-1935. Henry Morel-Journel argued that unless the present proposition, which allowed the profes-
sion itself to take the initiative, was accepted, then the alternative would be measures analogous to those of Presi-
dent Roosevelt. 
78 Archives Godart, carton 1, Er~ard to Van Gelder, 4-11-1935. As one slightly hysterical opponent of the en-
tente put it, "non seulement Ie Ml~lstere du Commerce est representi dans Ie soviet qui doit presider aux destinees 
des ententes professionnelles malS encore Ie Ministere du Travail s'est infiltre dans ce meme comite par la 
presence d'un delegue et. d'aulre part. I: .. ) il y aurait un delegue ouvrier et certainement, il y en aura plusieurs: 
probablement un representant chaque reglOn de tissage. C' est donc la socialisation complete de noire induslrie". 
79 Voix sociale, July, 1932, November 1935. 
80 Massoubre, op. cit., passim. 
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sition to the project had grown. When the vote took place it was accepted by the 
marchands de soie and gros jat;onniers, but was rejected by a enoughjabricants for 
the accord to fail. 81 Table 14 shows that the cause of failure was the opposition of 
smaller jabricants usiniers. The minority of marchands de soies82 and gros jat;onniers 
who voted against were also smaller than average. 
Humbert Isaac, director of a fIrm with 137 looms, is perhaps representative of 
smaller jabricants usiniers. His views appear to have been be fairly widely shared, for 
they form the basis of the propaganda of the committee set up to oppose the accord. 
As would be expected of a son of Auguste Isaac, he believed that "la loi etemellement 
vrai de roffre et de la demande est encore la meilleure regIe que l'on puisse trouver 
pour determiner Ie prix d'un ouvrage comme celui d'un marchand age". All that Isaac 
expected of the state was that it reduce taxes, make greater efforts to protect exports, 
and enforce bankruptcy laws more rigourously.83 Consequently he was opposed to the 
prospect of state or trades union interference in labour questions. 84 
Table 14: Result of referendum on the institution of an entente in the silk industry.85 
For Against Abstained 
Fabricants 71 37 10 
Average looms 223 139 181 
Gros fa~onniers 186 3 -
Average looms 81 50 -
Marchands de soie 100 26 -
Average spindles 6,470 5,808 
-
Isaac's liberalism was not, however, the classical liberalism of Edouard Aynard. He 
believed the longevity of the crisis to be due to the unwillingness of employers to ob-
serve correctly the laws of supply and demand. He appealed to his fellow business-
men to regulate production in accordance with possibilities for sales, and to aim not 
for the highest, but for the most profitable turnover. Hence his criticism of those big 
firms whose enormous capital investment was responsible for over-production.86 In 
the same spirit Isaac condemned certain gros jat;onniers who added to over-produc-
81 For a summary of the story of the entente see Geni, op. cit., pp. 112-141. 
82 It could be that in this branch throwers of natural silk were less favourable than those like Morel-Iournel who 
also produced rayon. Henry Morel-Iournel reported in his diary on 29-4-1932 that there had been disagreement in 
the Union des Marchands de Soie over this issue. 
83 Archives Godart, carton 1, rapport Isaac, 13-10-1935. 
84 Archives Godart, carton 1, A circular from Comite de defense, 12-11-1935, inspired by Isaac, stated, "Certes 
nous sommes sans animosite a [l'egard des syndicats), mais l'experience nous a enseigne que Ie mieux etait de 
nous entendre directement avec notre personnel". 
85 CReCL, 1935, p. 148. 
86 See footnote 69. A circular of the Comire de defence asked "Pourquoi les commertrants prudents feraient-ils las 
frais de ceux qui ont vu trop grande?". An article in Salut public, 20-11-1935, of which Isaac was managing di-
rector, took up the same argument 
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tion by speculatively producing cloth on their own account, and then dumping it on 
the market. These weavers, he said, ought to decide whether they were fabricants or 
fw;onniers. 87 Clearly such views are a violation of the law that progress is achieved 
by the pursuit of individual interest, with the "hidden hand" taking care of the rest. 
Isaac assumes that there is a "normal level" of demand. This is not too far removed 
from Victor Perret's view of a world where everyone knew their place. Firms like 
Isaac's used thefa90n system, as well as their own factories, to weave cloth.88 
This brings us to the opposition of fabricants non-usiniers to the accord. For 
the Nouvelliste, their fear of a tarif and for the survival of the artisanate was the main 
source of opposition to the entente.89 The entente was all the more galling to fabri-
cants non-usiniers because they were not permitted to take part in the referendum. 90 
As President of the gold braid and church decoration section of the SFS, Vic-
tor Perret's views are relevant. Perret was not, as we have seen, opposed in principle 
to corporatism. 91 Yet had dismissed out of hand the Marchandeau project, which he 
saw as an unwarranted intrusion of the state into professional affairs. His interest as a 
fabricant non-usinier comes through in his statement that "nous ne voudrions pas que 
disparaissent les petites entreprises a base familiale au profit des trusts et des car-
tels".92 His views had not changed at the time of the referendum, although signifi-
cantly he was now far less forthright in expressing them. An entente could operate 
only after all members of a profession had been obliged to join a syndicate.93 This is a 
contradictory position in that compulsory syndicalization itself implied prior action by 
the state. But the essential point is that compulsory membership must be seen in the 
context of Perret's opposition to an entente managed by big business. This was under-
stood by big factory owners: Paul Charbin saw the Marchandeau project as a means 
of avoiding compulsory syndicalization.94 
It is interesting to note that not all fabricants non-usiniers accepted Perret's 
corporatism. The minority of anti-clerical centristfabricants agreed that the projected 
entente was the work of big firms "qui s'interesse peu a l'artisanat". B. J. Van Gelder 
agreed too that application of social legislation to these workshops, a tarif, and the 
87 Archives Godart, carton I, rapport Isaac, 13-10-1935. 
88 Similarly Isaac senior idealised the lot of rural weavers: after work "elle respire l'aire de la campagne, eUe 
aper\X>it la silhouette des montagnes, et peut aller cueillir des fleurs dans son jardin. (Isaac, op. cit., p. 101). 
89 Nouvelliste, 5-12-1935. 
90 Archives Godart, carton I, Gros [a~onniers, on the other hand were permitted a vote, even though since they 
purchased no raw material ~e.y would. not be paying the tax. Se~ ~Iso a .resolution of the Chambre syndicale de la 
[abrique de Tarare, complammg that It was not allowed to particIpate 10 the vote, and Fructus to Godart, 16-12-
1935: "je vois que la question de fond est une lutte contre Ie metier d'artisanat". 
91 This is partly why opposition to the entente manifested itself at such a late stage, only when the details became 
known. Journal d'Henry Morel-Journel, 18-10-1935: the opponents "ils n'ont pas bronche pendant les huit mois 
ou les autres elaboraient avec Ie ministere leur projet". Another reason was that it was only known at a late stage 
that only possessors of fixed capital would be permitted to vote. 
92 L 'Union republicaine. 17-2-1935. 
93 L 'Union republicaine. 24-11-1935. 
94 PVCCL, 25-10-1934. Henry Morel-lournel also saw a combination of ententes, state backing and private ini-
tiative as an alternative to corporatism, Lyon republicain, 27-10-1935. 
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proposed tax would deal a decisive blow to the artisanate.95 Indeed, he used the ex-
ample of his own firm to show that the entente was a threat to the whole system of 
flexible production. Year round weaving of cheap fabrics for the east, made possible 
by low costs, was the only means of keeping in action looms which were also capable 
of producing certain kinds of luxury silks when fashion demanded.96 But at this point 
Van Gelder parted company with Victor Perret. His solution was a minimum wage in 
the silk industry, to be set by the government.97 This would take the question out of 
the hands of "personalities". The assumption was that a professional body, whether in 
the form of the abortive entente or of Perret's compulsory syndicalism would be 
dominated by his political opponents.98 
Although the participants in the debate over the entente differed in ideological 
and economic points of view, all shared a consciousness that the self-regulation of the 
liberal economy had broken down. All recognized that if equilibrium were to be re-
stored then external intervention was required. Isaac relied simply on an appeal to re-
spect laws which no longer worked of their own accord. For Fructus the state would 
have to intervene. Victor Perret clung to the belief that the profession could govern it-
self, but presupposed legal obligation to join a syndicate. The supporters of the en-
tente wanted the decisions of syndicates to be given legal sanction. With the excep-
tion of that favoured by Isaac, all of these options implied compulsion and authority. 
Moreover, the fiasco of the entente professionelle in the silk industry in-
creased the potential for authoritarianism by demonstrating that interests within the 
silk industry were more or less incapable of settling their own differences. With the 
failure of the entente positions became even more irreconcilable. Disheartened, Ferier 
made known his resignation as President of the SFS, which had been decided in prin-
ciple before the referendum had even taken place.99 Significantly Ferier was replaced 
by Jean Barioz, the first non-usinier to head the syndicate for many years. The gros 
fa(onniers meanwhile rallied to the demands of the CaT for a statutory forty hour 
week, abolition of shift working and a minimum wage. Divisions among employers 
were such that they prevented even unity against the Popular Front. Horrified, fabri-
cants agreed rapidly to a minimum tarif. But the agreement had no hope of sticking 
and was in any case rapidly over-taken by the events of June 1936.100 
95 un serait vraiment penible de voir ces artisans qui ont un ou deux metiers (rarement trois) chez eux, etre obliges 
de travailler sous un controle et une reglementation qui, s'ils sont bon dans une grande usine sont completement 
arbitraires vis ?l vis d'un particulier" 
96 Archives Godart, carton I, Fructus to Godart, 28-9-1935, 30-9-1935; Motion of Group II of the SFS, (Articles 
pour l'Orient), 26-10-1935. 
97 Not a tariff, which would penalise non-usiniers, but a minimum wage to be applied to the whole industry. 
98 Archives Godart, carton I, Fructus to Godart, 16-12-1935: "Voyons d'abord Ia question ouvriere, et non avec 
un tarif de f~on, mais avec un minimum de salaire horaire - cela est plus de I'ordre du Iegislateur, que de I'ordre 
des personnalites qui n'ont pas, ou plus Ie droit de parler au nom d'une collectivite qui Ies a desapprouves". 
99 Journal d'Henry Morel-lournel, 18-10-1935. 
100 Bulletin des soies, 25-4-1936. 
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Organized Agriculture, Prices and Corporatism 
In Chapter three it was shown that the liberal elites who dominated the USE were 
from 1929 challenged by the JAC, which made progress amongst young medium 
peasant proprietors on the plateau and in the mountains. From 1933 representatives of 
this group began to win places in the USE, which at the same time abandoned liber-
alism in favour of corporatism. The context was increased conflict between the con-
servative peasantry and the elites, resulting from the depression. 
In a speech of 1935 Jean-Marie Parrel made clear his hostility to the industrial 
methods of large farmers, which he felt would destroy savings, the family, and the 
spirit of initiative which characterized small property.lOl Parrel was implicitly refer-
ring to a series of conflicts over pricing policy, especially concerning grain and 
wine. 102 
Even though the Rhone was not a major grain producing department, wheat 
prices were nonetheless an issue. Most peasants produced some grain, while there 
were also a few large producers such as Julien Riboud. The central problem was that 
the USE opposed the minimum wheat price voted by Parliament in July 1933, and 
called for a return to the free market, though in the long term it was hoped that the or-
ganized profession would take over responsibility for grain prices. 103 But when in 
December 1934 the Aandin government abolished the minimum price, it became 
clear that the views of small peasants were rather different. Whilst the pro-Radical 
peasantry, were entirely opposed to the ending of price controls, conservative peas-
ants demanded that the return to a free market be gradual. 104 In the short term Parrel 
was even prepared to accept the "economie dirigee", which in effect meant keeping 
the minimum price.105 Like the leaders of the USE he saw organization of the pro-
fession as the ideal solution. 
A parallel conflict can be seen in the Beaujolais wine growing region. After 
World War One large growers in the Beaujolais had replanted their vineyards with 
more productive hybrids. 106 Rather like big silk manufacturers, large growers hoped 
to get through the depression by making greater use of productive hybrids, by adding 
alcohol to wine, but nonetheless profiting from the renown of Beaujolais wines. 107 An 
organization of small producers of good quality wines, protested that hybrids had de-
formed the taste for the gamay. Eighty per cent of vignerons, it was said, were in 
favour of ripping up hybrids.108 Small growers in France as a whole won a victory 
101 L'Union republicaine, 31-3-1935. Similarly Jean Napoly, a small winegrower from Pommiers also called for 
organization of the peasantry. 
102 It is possible, and even probable, that there was also tension between tenants and landlords, as there was in 
Brittany. More research would be needed to confirm this. 
103 See, for example, Julien Riboud's talk to the Societe d'economie politique, reported in Union republicaine, 
17-2-1935. Agriculteur du sud-est, 24-12-1934. 
104 Agricuileur du sud-est, 24-12-1934; L'Union republicaine, December 1934. 
105 Union republicaine, 31-3-1935. 
106 See Chapter3. 
107 Nouvelliste, 11-12-1934. 
108 Nouvelliste, 13-12-1934. 
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with Statut viticole voted by a conservative government in 1931. This included re-
strictions on the sugaring of wine, limits on new plantations, taxes on high producers, 
and even the banning of irrigation after July. Legislation was later modified to include 
a range of exceptions for small growers. In 1934 inspection of cellars was autho-
rized. 109 In the Beaujolais small growers, still not satisfied, demanded that hybrids be 
ripped up. These measures, and especially the demand for arrachage of hybrids, were 
bitterly resented by large growers.t lO It was argued that hybrids were merely an 
"insurance" planted alongside high quality vines. These views were echoed by the 
USE. To a greater extent than in the case of grain the conflict between big and small 
producers coincided with the division between left and right. But many conservative 
peasants also produced wine, and so this issue tended to reinforce discord within the 
right. 
Corporatism was a central issue in conflicts over pricing. At its origins the 
USE had subscribed to a paternalist version of corporatism founded on natural hierar-
chy. But as the USE in the 1920s became a pressure group operating within the Re-
public, it turned to liberalism. Its only real contact with its peasant base was now 
through commercial activities.1 11 With the onset of the economic crisis this kind of 
syndicalism was called into question, not least because the financial operations of 
agricultural associations all over France were compromised by the recession. 112 This 
offered an opportunity to militants formed in the JAC. 
In the national sphere the rise of the JAC coincided with a renovation of the 
methods of the notables who led conservative syndicates. In 1934 a new generation of 
leaders, such as Le Roy Ladurie and Salleron, transformed the loosely organized 
Union central des syndicats agricoles, a part of the empire of the conservative Societe 
des agricu/teurs de France, into the Union nationale des syndicats agricoles (UNSA). 
Leaders were still mainly large landowners, but they were prepared to see greater in-
volvement of the base.l13 A parallel process of adaptation took place in the USE, 
which adhered immediately to the UNSA. President Felix Garcin spoke of the need to 
make sap rise from the roots to nourish the leaves.114 The USE had traditionally 
maintained good relations with the ancestors of the JAC, the Groupes d'etudes ru-
rales.1l5 Therefore the USE was well-placed to co-opt JAC militants like Claudius 
Delorme, Benoit Aurion and Jean Nove-Josserand as "auditors" of its conseil 
109 Barral, pp. 
110 Nouvel/iSle, 7-2-31. Most would have agreed with the Nouvellisle's view that the tax on production was noth-
ing more than an attack on large growers. 
111 M. C. Cleary, op. cit., pp. 48-51, shows that the same was true elsewhere in France: "Many regional unions 
were, first and foremost, powerful financial bodies". The same applies in Brittany, cf. Berger, op. cit., p. 84. For 
the Rhone: A. Pin, op. cit., p. 71. 
112 Cleary, op. cit., pp. 72-4. In the canton of Vaugneray, for example, the USE purchasing co-op saw its turnover 
fall by 65% between 1929 and 1932 (A Pin, op. cit, p. 71. 
113 Cleary, op. cit, p. 73; Barral, op. cit., p. 233. 
114 Pin, op. cit., p. 73. 
115 Folliet, op. cit., p. 46. 
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d'administration" .116 Jean Parrel too owed his rise to leaders of the USE such as 
Julien Riboud. 117 
Garcin also rallied to the corporatism of the UNSA. Slogans like "Le regime 
corporatif est Ie seul maniere de ne pas aller du liberalisme au socialisme" adorned 
the title page of L 'Agriculteur du sud-est.U8 For Garcin conversion to corporatism 
was pragmatic. It was an affront to the liberalism of a man who taught political econ-
omy at the Faculte catholique and managed the Nouvelliste. Garcin embraced corpo-
ratism only in order to hold together the rural interest. 119 Other USE leaders were 
more sincere, but this should not obscure the integrative function of corporatism. 120 
It meant different, but nevertheless precise, things to different groups. Like big 
businessmen, USE leaders saw corporatism as giving the syndicate legal backing for 
its decisions. 121 Thus Saint-Olive defined corporatism as voluntary adhesion to the 
syndicate, but the legal right of the syndicate to impose prices on all. 122 For these rea-
sons the Marchandeau law was at first approved by the USE, though the amended 
project was rejected as statist. 123 Jean-Marie Parrel, like the JAC, saw corporatism 
differently: it was a means of modernising small farms through co-operation. This 
would be achieved by creating syndicates which were not just purchasing coopera-
tives, but the basis of an organization of small producers. 124 It is not clear whether or 
not Parrel believed in compulsory syndicalization, but it is certain that his ideas repre-
sented a challenge to the establishment. Corporatism, then, was meant to overcome 
increased conflict in the rural world. 
There is one interesting exception to the broad appeal of corporatism-that 
of large wine growers, who demanded a return to the free market. 125 Partly this was 
because liberal principles were a useful weapon against a system of regulation that 
was already in place. But in fact there was no real practical alternative to the free 
market. State intervention was unacceptable because of the influence of small growers 
and large producers of vin ordinaire on government policy. Any professional body 
would have been dominated by the same groups. The situation of large growers 
matches in many ways that of pro-corporatist silk manufacturers like Victor Perret. 
116 Gayet, op. cit., p. 70 ff. 
117 Pin, op. cit., passim. 
118 Agriculleur du sud-est, 28-7-1935. 
119 Gayet, op. cit, pp 92-95,118-9. 
120 Berger, op. cit., pp. 120-129. 
121 Berger, op. cit., pp. 120-129. 
122 Nouvellisle, 6-4-1936: "Tout en laissant a chacun Ie droit d'adherer ou non aux syndicats, il faut que la profes-
sion organisee par des organes distinct des syndicats, mais emmenant au moins partiellement d'eux, soit a meme 
de regIer, de discipliner les rapports de ses membres avec Ie commerce, d'imposer a tous la loi du bien commun 
professionnel et de sanctionner ceux qui, par malheur, se soustrait a leur devoir envers la collectivite". The Nou-
velliste itself, 21-6-1930 and 28-6-1935, had much the same idea, the notion that all producers could be organized 
was rejected. The USE dominated Chamber of Agriculture resolved that ententes were a good idea, but that the 
peasantry were not ready for compulsory corporate organization (Nouvelliste, 25-12-1935). 
123 Union republicaine, 17-2-1936; Lyon republicain, 22-2-1935. 
124 L 'Union republicaine, 31-3-1935. Similarly Jean Napoly, a small winegrower from Pommiers, called for or-
ganization of the peasantry. 
125 Nouvellisle, 30-7-1930; 11-12-1934. Union republicaine, 15-9-1935. They were not above demanding state 
credits to enable growers to get through bad years. 
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He would have preferred in theory some sort of corporate organization, but since the 
only realisable form of organization of the profession would have been in the hands of 
big business, he tended to fall back on liberalism. Ironically then, whereas the aristo-
crats who had originally founded the USE looked to market forces, the more bour-
geois leaders of the movement in the 1930s turned to the profession organisee. 
Corporatism and authoritarianism 
It is possible to see around corporatism the coalescence of a new conservative al-
liance. It included employers in both the engineering and silk industries, and indeed in 
most industries. Corporatism appealed also big landowners and to sections of the 
peasantry. We shall see that it was also embraced by the CFfC. But the cement of this 
new alliance was of a special type, in that the negotiation, compromise and consent 
which had characterized the old liberal consensus on the right was now replaced by an 
ideology in which coercion was central. The root of the problem was the impact of 
economic crisis upon a divided society. 
There was in a crisis of legitimacy of bodies which purported to represent the 
general interest. In the Chamber of Commerce the amicable sittings of the 1920s, 
gave way to the acrimony in the 1930s. Doubtless this is why President CelIe in 1932 
passed on a warning from the Parisian Chamber against "la multiplicite des organisa-
tions commerciales qui arrivent par leurs demarches repetees et parfois divergents a 
nuire au interets du commerce".126 On important issues the Chamber could either say 
nothing at all or it could take sides. In the fIrst case it risked being seen as irrelevant; 
in the second as partial. Thus during the conflict over the entente the Chamber 
adopted an attitude of neutrality.127 Yet within the Chamber President Morel-lournel 
lobbied for the entente~s extension to rayon production. 128 What is more, Morel-lour-
nel headed a pro-entente delegation to the Mayor of Lyon. Morel-lournel was also 
attacked for having set up an artificial fIbre factory in Britain. This was widely seen as 
unethical for a person charged with defending Lyonnais industry.129 The Chamber~s 
position as an essential prop of the liberal consensus was fatally damaged in the early 
1930s.130 Similarly, the legitimacy of the USE was threatened by conflict between 
peasants and elites. 
Corporatism was one response to this crisis. The underlying assumption of 
corporatists was that there is a single professional and national interest. Conflict must 
126 PVCCL. 13-10-1932. 
127 Archives Godart, carton I, Eymard to Van Gelder, 4-11-1935; PVCCL, 17-10-1935: Morel-Iournel stressed 
that the question would have to be settled on the professional level. 
128 PVCCL. 30-10-35,14-11-1935. Lyon republicain, 10-11-1935 for meeting with Herriot 
129 Archives Godart, carton I, Eymard to Van Gelder. 4-11-1935 and report on Morel-lournel of group 3 (Haute 
nouveaute) of the Syndicat desfabricants. 
130 The Chamber of Commerce's position on deflation was equally contradictory: in Apri11934 it refused to pass 
on to the government a request from candle makers for tax reductions on the grounds that it would aggravate bud-
getary disequilibrium. Yet at its next sitting the Chamber approved the idea of tax concessions for export indus-
tries! PVCCL, 22-4-1934, 8-2-1934. 
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therefore come from outside the profession. The source could either be liberalism, 
which preaches individualism and selfishness, or socialism, which permits interests 
alien to the profession to intervene via the state. All that was necessary was for people 
to recognize the primacy of the profession, and harmony would be restored. But in 
practice authoritarianism is implicit in corporatist doctrine. This is because there is in 
reality no single professional interest. Indeed, were there such an interest there would 
be no need for a corporation. Corporatists always stopped short of defining the inter-
est of a profession. Instead they mystified the problem and smuggled coercion into a 
communitarian argument. 131 Thus big silk firms and the USE demanded legal en-
forceability of ententes, while Victor Perret assumed a legal obligation to join en-
tentes. Others demanded "depoliticization of trades unions" as a precondition of cor-
poratism. Corporatism is a form of authoritarianism masquerading as self-govern-
ment. It re-unites a divided society by coercion and because it takes advantage of the 
ability of special interests to identify their own concerns with those of the collectivity. 
Authoritarianism also derived from a crisis of the state, for it too appeared to 
be incapable of arbitrating conflict. In various disputes described above all parties de-
nounced the grip of opposed interests upon the government. For Henry Morel-Journel 
businessmen were "the least among electors", but "first among taxpayers" .132 He at-
tributed the excessive number of pro-artisan bills before the Chamber of Deputies to 
"electoral interest" in this category.133 Victor Perret saw the loi Marchandeau as evi-
dence of the interference of the sectional interests which dominated Parliament in af-
fairs which did not concern them. 134 Business leaders were doubtless confirmed in 
their views by Laval's response to a free trade delegation from the Chamber of Com-
merce that he would be instantly overthrown were he to touch a single agricultural 
quota. 135 Many more examples could be given. 
The essential point is that the collapse of existing methods of resolving differ-
ences, together with belief in the partiality of the government, led to demands for 
restoration of the independence and authority of the state. Thus the Chamber of 
Commerce accepted its own impotence in a motion to the government on the subject 
of deflation. The motion was a chance for the Chamber to have its say, "non precise-
ment sur Ie detail des projets de redressement financier au sujet desquels il serait dif-
ficile de se mettre d'accord mais sur la methode indispensable pour arriver a ce re-
dressement". The means were an end to "la politique de concessions perpetuelles sac-
rifiant !'interet general a la cohue desordonnee des appetits particuliers", and to 
"l'abandon par les gouvernements de l'arbitrage souverain que l'Etat doit exercer en-
131 Berger, op. cit., pp. 120-9. 
132 CRCCL, 1935,69-73. 
133 PVCCL, 30-4-1936. 
134L'Union republicaine, 17-2-1935. 
135 PVCCL, 14-11-1935. 
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tre les interets antagonistes",136 In the privacy of his diary Henry More1-Journel went 
beyond anti-parliamentarianism, writing that "Ie mal est a l'origine dans l'election au 
suffrage universel".137 Of course, business did not conceive of the independence of 
the state in abstract terms. It was assumed that a "neutral" state would protect partic-
ular interests. Most importantly, it would put an end to the agitation of the left. 138 
A fmal point is that corporatism and authoritarianism embraced groups which 
had in the past formed part of the liberal hegemony--the USE and the Chamber of 
Commerce. No doubt this could be rationalized as drawing upon the associationist 
side of liberalism, and by pointing out that liberalism in Lyon had always accorded a 
large place to the family as a regulatory influence. Henry Morel-Journel's elitism too 
is reminiscent of Orleanist distrust of the masses. But what is most interesting is that 
corporatism and authoritarianism did not simply represent the updating of a Legit-
imist tradition, but drew upon liberalism. Ironically, those closest to the Legitimist 
tradition--the landowners of the Beaujolais--stood by a market philosophy. 
Even Victor Perret tended in practice to mute his corporatism. 
The Mobilization of the lower middle class 
Corporatism and authoritarianism functioned as a means of reconciling competing 
interests in the ruling class. But it was also designed also to contain the discontent of 
the peasantry. In this section we shall see that there was in the early 1930s a parallel 
crisis in the relations of the elites with white collar workers and small business. In the 
former case it was a question of rank and file supporters of the right who were at-
tracted by the social programme of the left. In the latter a part of the rank 'lnd file of 
the left had become detached from its traditional leaders. 
Catholic Trades Unions and the Slump 
Between 1932 and 1936 the CFTC's relationship to the right became ever more com-
plex. On the one hand the new hostility of the right to social reform, its commitment 
to deflation, and the attractiveness of the social programme of the Popular Front 
widened the gulf between Catholic trades unionists and the conservative elites. On the 
other, the nature of the CFTC's Catholicism and the anti-clericalism of the left en-
sured that the CFTC remained within the right wing bloc. Moreover, some white col-
lar workers were attracted to the far right. 
136 PVCCL, 19-1-1933. 
137 lournal d'Henry Morel-loUTnel, 14-5-1936. At about the same time in the Chamber of Commerce Morel-
Journel denounced a proposed reform of the national Chambers of Commerce movement on the grounds that it 
would produce a body "ou jouerait la loi du nombre qui n'a deja pas donne de si bons resultats dans d'autres do-
maines' (PVCCL, 13-2-1936). 
138 Lyon republicain, 29-12-1935: As a boss in the engineering industry put it, "il suffit que les journaux annon-
cent des echauffourees de rues entre gens de droite et de gauche, des discussions parlementaires etc., que Ie cour-
rier commerciale diminue de 30%". 
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During the recession, like so many other groups, the CFfC intensified its ef-
forts to protect the material interests of its members. Voix sociale is full of reports of 
violations of the Eight Hour Law and of non-application of the Social Insurance Act. 
Catholic trades unionists were particularly active in opposing demands from shop-
keepers for Sunday opening, revealing thereby some of the ideological and material 
barriers to a united movement of the lower middle class. 139 The CFfC demanded that 
police and labour inspectorate be given greater power to enforce industrial legislation, 
and that workers' delegates watch over conditions in their own factories. 140 Above all 
the CFfC demanded the a forty hour week without loss of pay as a means of com-
bating unemployment. 
Graph 23: Strikes in the Rhone, 1929 to 1938141 
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The CFfC were also pushed to the left by the fact that once the right had re-
turned to power in February 1934 it seconded the efforts of employers to roll back so-
cial insurance legislation. Thus in June 1935 the CFfC pledged itself to defend social 
insurance from a plan to divert some of its resources into national retooling. 142 There 
was, then, a significant degree of convergence between the CFTC and the demands of 
the CGT and CGTV as far as practical issues were concerned. 
The CFfC also participated in a moderate improvement in the fortunes of 
trades unions in general from 1934. As Graph 23 shows the number of strikes in the 
Rhone was very low from 1930 to 1935. Employers faced little resistance as they cut 
wages and rationalized work practices. A rare exception was a bitter strike of 2,500 
workers in the blanket industry of Cours, Thizy and Pont Trambouze in 1931.143 But 
139 Vou sociale, March and December 1933, March 1934. 
140 Vou sociale, November. 1934. 
141 Bulletin du Ministere de travail. Figures for 1936 do not include the month of June, in which there were 505 
strikes in the Rhone; those for 1938 cover only January to September. 
142 Vousociale, June 1935. 
143 Oric, op. cit, pp. 206-7; Vou Sociale. March. April, May, 1931. 10 1933 a mere twelve stoppages were re-
ported. 
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in 1934 and 1935 there was a small increase in strike activity and in the fIrst five 
months of 1936 alone there were thirteen stoppages. Furthermore, from 1934 there 
were a number of strikes which were notable for the scale of the enterprises con-
cerned, for the degree of support among the workforce and for the advanced nature of 
the demands of the strikers. There were two victorious strikes at the Gillet factories in 
1934 and 1935, as a result of which wage cuts were withdrawn. 144 In the spring of 
1936 BerHet workers demanded wage rises, called into question the system of indi-
vidual contracts, and demanded an end to time and motion studies. On this occasion 
the workers failed, but those sacked during the dispute were able to invade the factory 
and precipitate a successful strike in June 1936,145 
In the present context what is important is the impact of these developments 
upon the CFTC. Catholic trades unions had if anything been worse affected by reces-
sion than the CGT or CGTU,146 The Prudnomrne elections of 1932 saw the CFTC 
lose most of the gains of 1929,147 But at the end of 1935 CFTC activists began to re-
port success in recruiting new members. In the Prud nomrne elections of December 
1935, the CFTC lost one of its seats, but gained votes as participation levels in-
creased.148 The extent to which white collar workers were involved in strikes is diffI-
cult to gauge. A judicial report states that the BerHet strike was supported by all white 
collar workers below the level of chef d'atelier. On the other hand Marius BerHet's 
biographer claimed that drawers had worked at home during the stoppage. 
There is also evidence that the CFTC was radicalized by the new climate in 
the factories. In the Cours blanket dispute of 1931 the CFTC had from the beginning 
been willing to accept the principle of wage cuts. It ended up organising a new 
"professional" union. 149 Yet four years later the CFTC joined with the CGTU in the 
strike committee at Gillet, merely adding its own special demand for a paritary com-
mission. Similarly, whereas at the time of the Doumergue deflation in March 1934 the 
CFTC had shown little sympathy for the protestations of fonctionnaires,150 by the 
time of Laval's measures the CFTC declared its solidarity with civil servants and 
railwaymen.151 
144 Details of the strike come from Vou sociale, June and July/August 1935 and Lyon republicain. Humanite, 9-
5-1936: "Gillet, battu dans les teinturiers et apprets de la region lyonnaise en 1935, doit etre ecrase dans les usines 
meurtriers de ~abrication de Bayonne". 
145 AN BBI 3010, various reports of the procureur-general, March and April 1936. Saint-Loup, op. cit., pp. 
205-214. There were also reports in the press of successful opposition to wage cuts in other engineering factories 
in 1935 (Lyon republicain, 23-3-1935). There was a lengthy stoppage at the SASE artificial fibre factory at Vau1i; 
Here too there were demands for suppression of the Bedeaux piece rate system and for better hygiene (AN BB 
3010). 
146 On the impact of the depression on membership of the COT and COTU see Prost, La CGT, pp. 33-37. 
147 Vou sociale, November, 1932. 
148 Vou sociale, October and December, 1935. 
149 VouMociale, March, April, May, 1931. 
150 Vou sociale, April 1934: the CFTC merely adopted the relatively moderate view that cuts should be achieved 
through sackings, not wage reductions. Only the CFTC-PTT complained of cuts. 
151 Vou sociale, September 1935. 
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Yet if the CFfC endorsed the material programme of the Popular Front it 
never approved of its political platform. Catholic trades unions always remained 
within the conservative bloc. The principal reason for this is that Catholicism re-
mained a barrier to cooperation with the left. The dependence of the CFfC upon the 
parishes ruled out close alliance with anti-clericals. It is significant that the Jeune 
rt?pub/ique alone among Catholic organizations adhered to the Popular Front, for it 
was less dependent on the parish network. More important, white collar unionism, 
whether of the left or right, is always likely to be concerned with protection of "career 
structure". The CFfC appealed to those white collar workers who saw Catholicism as 
inseparable from defence of social and professional status. Just as Catholic values had 
at one time been seen as essential to social mobility, so in the new conditions of the 
1930s they were inseparable from protection against proletarianization. 
The nature of the strikes of 1934 to May 1936 reinforced such fears. From this 
point onwards the self-confidence of the trades unions was clearly related to success 
of the left in linking anti-fascism, the govemmenes deflationary programme and the 
efforts of employers to cut wages. 152 The CFfC would in any case have been worried 
by the politicization of strikes. But it was all the more so because the anti-fascists' de-
fence of the Republic led them to identify the leagues with what they saw as the 
regime's hereditary enemies, including the Church. The anti-fascist journal La Fleche 
made no distinction between progressive and conservative Catholics. 153 Conse-
quently, there were a number of incidents between anti-fascists and Catholics. 154 In 
such an atmosphere it is not surprising that Catholic trades unions expressed reserva-
tions about the political overtones of the Gillet strikes. 155 Relations were most prob-
lematic in the building trade, where the main trades union was marked by revolution-
ary syndicalism and a ferocious anti-clericalism. The "main tendue" to Catholics of 
Maurice Thorez during the election campaign of 1936 came too late to make any dif-
ference. 
The CFfC's corporatist ideology was another source of ambiguity. Corpo-
ratism was certainly seen by CFfC leaders as a progressive ideology. They saw the 
Marchandeau law and the putative entente in the silk industry as a chance to imple-
ment their ideas on collective contracts, to set up an unemployment fund, and to se-
cure strong CFfC representation in the commission designed to arbitrate disputes. 156 
152 Lyon repuh/icain, 5-7-1935: "II ne suffit pas de vouloir defendre les libertes publics pour empecher Ie fas-
cisme de passer. 11 est indispensable de lutter en meme temps pour faire aboutir les revendications indispensables". 
On the formation of the Popular Front in Villeurbanne see M. Moissonier, "Front populaire et identite communiste 
a Villeurbanne, 1933-6", CHIRM, 24, 1986, pp. 57-82. The second Gillet strike coincided with a major peace rally 
organized by the left, at which support was expressed for the Gillet workers. 
153 La Fleche, 1-12-1934. 
154 ADR 4m 236, 3-7-1934: incidents between 1,000 antifascists meeting at the boulodrome Melleret and 
Catholics holding a gymnastic camp nearby. 
155 Vou socia/e, June, 1935; february 1934 for condemnation of the antifascist general strike of that year. 
156 Archives Godart, carton I, CFrC to Minister of Commerce, 15-10-1935. Voix sociale, February, 1935: "No us 
considchons ce projet comme i'annonce de cette organisation de la production, et donc de la profession, que nous 
desirons tant" (R. Duclos). 
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CFfC corporatism can be distinguished from authoritarian versions of the doctrine by 
the acceptance of the primacy of parliament and of the principle of free choice of 
syndicate. 157 
Yet the corporatism of the CFfC also contained a potential for author-
itarianism. Corporatism was a means of restraining competition for jobs. Access to 
white collar status would be limited by giving employees a role in recruitment, by 
giving syndicates the power to regulate female employment, and by banning the 
holding of more than one job.15S In a more general sense the function of CFfC corpo-
ratism was to reconcile a society divided between capital and labour. To this end it 
contained both a moral appeal for class collaboration and an element of coercion, for 
membership of a syndicate was to be compulsory.159 CFfC leaders avoided the ques-
tion of what they would do were the COT to refuse syndical liberty. Furthermore, 
CFfC doctrine participated in a wider pre-occupation with the breakdown of national 
unity. So it was possible for Catholic white collar workers less well versed in the 
intricacies of social Catholic thought to see an overlap between CFfC corporatism 
and the anti-democratic version of the leagues. It was possible to see in the leagues an 
alternative way of reconciling the anti-communism and anti-capitalism of white collar 
workers, and of achieving the goal of class harmony by coercion rather than consent. 
Many young white collar workers joined the Croix de Feu. 
The ambiguity of the CFfC~s position is further emphasized by the persis-
tence of the conservative strand of white collar unionism associated with Auguste 
Gruffaz. During the crisis Oruffaz remained suspicious of industrialization, but added 
a new anti-capitalist note to his discourse. It was those employers who had over-in-
vested during the 1920s, he argued, who were now cutting wages. 160 He attacked the 
/abricants non-usiniers who employed most of his own members for their exploitation 
of /a90nniers and for their opposition to the entente in the silk industry.161 Even the 
most deferential wing of the CFTC appeared to have become detached from its lead-
ers. In the event Victor Perret's populism and the strength of the Oeuvre des cercles 
in the Croix Rousse, where the Corporation was strongest, kept these employees 
within the Federation fold, but the conflict is nonetheless illustrative of the crisis at 
grass roots level of the right, and of a crisis which could lead in several directions. 
To sum up, the CFTC showed signs in 1934 and 1935 of detachment from the 
conservative elites. The CFTC leadership continued to hold to a difficult position on 
the margins of the right. But some of the rank and file, and above all perhaps some of 
157 Launey, op. cit., pp. 306-313. 
158 Voix sociale, June, 1935. 
159 Vou sociale, January, 1933. 
160 Voixsociale, December, 1930, February 1931. 
161 Voix sociale, September and December, 1933; December, 1935. 
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the potential audience of the CFTC, resolved the difficulties of their position by turn-
ing to the far right. 
Small Business 
During the economic crisis there was a flowering of organizations purporting to rep-
resent small business. Small business generally supported the left, but it is neverthe-
less important to discuss this movement. This is because a significant minority of 
small businessmen did back the right. Indeed, the right was not without influence in 
its professional organizations.162 Secondly, the small business movement was part of 
a crisis of professional organizations, which ultimately affected the Chamber of 
Commerce. A third reason is that there were signs that small businessmen were shift-
ing away from the Radical-Socialist orbit to the far right. Before proceeding any fur-
ther it should be noted that we are concerned mainly with shopkeepers and small 
businessmen. Artisans usually kept apart from shopkeeper and small business move-
ments. 
In Chapter four we saw that small business organizations were well-integrated 
into the business establishment. The ACS, the most representative small business or-
ganization, collaborated with the big business dominated UCS in presenting lists in 
professional elections. Moreover, the ACS shared the alarm of the Chamber of Com-
merce at the establishment of a Chambre des metiers in the early 1930s. The ACS 
feared that if the demand of food retailers for admission to the latter were to be ac-
cepted then they might become a forum for small business in general. 163 As long as 
the economic situation was favourable, small business was happy to go along with the 
liberal ethos of the Chamber. After all, Radical politicians like Herriot shared its lib-
eralism, especially in financial matters. The mode of election of the Chamber meant 
that it could be seen by democrats as the legitimate representative of the general in-
terest. In prosperous times less-well off small businessmen took little interest in pro-
fessional organizations, which were dominated by fairly substantial employers. 
In the early 1930s this relationship broke down. Shopkeepers in particular be-
came increasingly concerned with sectional interests. One reason is that shopkeepers 
were blamed by both employers and workers for the failure of falls in retail prices to 
match those in wholesale prices. 164 Business saw excessive prices as preventing com-
pression of wages. In an effort to keep down their wage bills many employers orga-
162 Whereas the Federation de l'alimenlalion was pro-Radical, the Syndical des commerr;anls detail/anls de Lyon 
(affiliated to the Federation du sud-est des commerr;ants detaillants), leaned more to the right Both wings of the 
shopkeeper movement were affiliated to the ACS. 
163 PVCCL, 19-6-1930, 26-3-1936; 14-5-1936: At the time of the organization of the Rhone Chamber of Trades 
in the winter of 1935 to 1936 Delzeux showed himself as keen as anyone in the Chamber of Commerce to limit its 
role. The Chamber of Commerce, like the Ministry of Commerce, expressed fears that the Cahamber of Trades 
would arrogate to itself the task of speaking for all petty commerce. They were particularly opposed to the possible 
inclusion of grocers and butchers, "parce qu'ils apparaissent comme de trop grande personnages". 
164 The Prefect's monthly reports routinely mention dislike of profiteering shopkeepers. 
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nized consumer co-operatives,165 These were a particular target of shopkeepers, who 
demanded that their tax privileges be ended. Shopkeeper anti-capitalism was rein-
forced by resentment of "prix uniques". Whilst it is true that shopkeepers shared with 
big business the desire for cuts in government spending, agreement ended at that 
point. The main goal of shopkeepers was abolition of the turnover tax and its re-
placement by a production tax--an idea to which industrialists were naturally op-
posed. Moreover, tax reductions were scarcely compatible with balancing the budget, 
which was, in theory at least, the goal of deflation. 166 
At the same time as small business became more conscious of its material in-
terests the Chamber of Commerce became a less credible representative of the general 
interest. Delzeux redoubled his efforts to push the demands of small business in the 
Chamber, gaining motions against prix unics l67, a commitment to fiscal equality of 
cooperatives,168 and condemnation of competition from travelling shops.169 But 
Delzeux had less success on the question of tax reform, perhaps the most important 
issue of all. In any case it is doubtful whether pious motions from the Chamber of 
Commerce could have defused shopkeeper agitation. 
In these circumstances anti-capitalism might well have reinforced the links of 
small businessmen with the left. Discontent of shopkeepers, no doubt, is one reason 
for Radical gains in the elections of 1932. Yet once in power the Radicals did little to 
satisfy this part of their constituency. Partly this was because, as Serge Berstein 
shows, the demands of the various components of the Cartel majority were wholly 
contradictory)70 Small business believed that cuts in government spending should be 
achieved principally by reducing the salaries of civil servants. Civil servants opposed 
deflation altogether. 171 
Small business protest began in the winter of 1931-2. From the beginning the 
running was made by a new organization, the Union/ederafe des Commerr;ants, arti-
sans et petits industriels de fa Croix Rousse (UF). Shopkeepers in this area appear to 
have been particularly hard-hit by the crisis, perhaps because it came on top of a 
growing tendency of the residents of this area to shop in the centre of the city as 
transport facilities were improved. The UF held its first propaganda meeting in Febru-
ary 1932, reputedly attracting an audience of 1,000 persons.172 A month later a mem-
bership of 450 in the 1st and 4th arrondissements was claimed)73 Small business ag-
165 For a defence of these bodies see PVCCL, 12-4-1934. 
166 For a fairly typical statement of small business demands see Journal de Villefranche, 9-1-1932. 
167 CRCCL, 1934, p. 271-2; PVCCL, 8-2-1934. 
168 PVCCL, 30-4-1931. 
169 PVCCL, 14-2-1935. 
170 BeTst~n, op. cit., pp. 230-6. 
171 AN F 13 040, 3-11-32: "Commer~ants et industrie\s d'une part, travailleurs et fonctionnaires d'autre part af-
frontent leurs points de vue nettement antagonistes dans Ie do maine financier [ ... J."; 1-12-1935. 
172 Nouvelliste, 26-2-1932. 
173 Nouvelliste, 26-3-1932. 
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itation was not, therefore, simply a reaction to the electoral victory of the Cartel in 
May 1932. Already the movement had an anti-parliamentarian tone. 174 
In the winter of 1932 and 1933, against the background of governmental 
paralysis over the financial question, protest moved onto the streets. In September 
1932 the UF took the lead in formation of a Front economique, which grouped asso-
ciations in several other parts of Lyon and the suburbs. The UF itself extended its or-
ganization to the suburbs. The Front organized its fust big demonstration in Septem-
ber 1932, when a reputed 5,000 demonstrated in the streets of the Brotteaux,175 At 
another demonstration in January 1933 there were a number of arrests for seditious 
cries.176 Early in March a joint appeal by the Front economique and the right wing 
Federation des commer~ants detail/ants for a half-day closure of shops met with an 
unexpected success. 
This journee inaugurated a series of demonstrations which coincided with the 
peak of a national campaign by small business. l77 In the Rhone the movement was 
patronized not only by the Front unique, but by all of the main business associations, 
including the pro-Radical Federation d'alimentation, the ACS, the UCS, AICA and 
even the USE. Only the Chamber of Commerce stood aside, having been warned by 
the government to do so.178 
Soon, however, a gap appeared between the Front unique and its moderate al-
lies. Already in February the latter had appealed to shopkeepers not to heed a call for 
a closure of shops on the 16th.179 On this occasion the plan was abandoned. But on 
the next national day of action, on 28 May 1933, the Front unique was able to demon-
strate the strength of its support While the moderates wanted to confine the protest to 
a poster campaign, the Front unique planned mass meetings at Bellecour in the 
morning, closures in the afternoon, and then a further meeting in the evening. The 
Prefect banned the morning parade. But the Bellecour demonstration took place any-
way. The Front unique claimed 1,000 demonstrators in the morning, and another 
3,000 in the evening. The call for shop closures in the afternoon also appears to have 
been fairly well supported. ISO 
174 Nouvelliste, 2-2-1932. During the election campaign a meeting of shopkeepers in the 6th arrondissement, 
close to the UF, warned that "sachant par experience ce que valent les promesses cHectorales, l'engagement solen-
nel de recourir a des mesures exceptionnelles [i.e. a tax strike] si un meilleur amenagement des lois fiscales n'est 
pas rapidement vote''. 
175 Nouvelliste, 16-9-1932. 
176 Nouvelliste, 30-1-1933. 
177 Hardly anything is known of the small business movement. See Hoisington, op. cit., passim, and Jackson, op. 
CIt., pp. 65-6. 
178 PVCCL, 30-3-1933. 
179 Nouveau journal, 16-2-1933: "poursuivre sans motifs nouveaux la campagne qui a ete commence serait creer 
dans les esprits et sur la voie publique une agitation qui ne pourrait qu'etre prejudiciable aux interets du commerce 
et compro~ettrait meme leur cause " 
180 AN F 13 040, 1-6-33 As the police put it "Ie Front unique a tente de faire une manifestation de rue desor-
donne"; Nouvelliste, 29-5-1933. 
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Once the budget had been voted the agitation died down. Small business agi-
tation did notresume again until the spring of 1935, and then on a lesser level. 181 But 
the underlying causes of discontent had not disappeared, and had in fact been chan-
nelled into political action. Neither had the hostility of the UF to the established rep-
resentatives of small business diminished. 
In November 1935 the Union put forward candidates for the two seats in the 
retail section of the Chamber of Commerce. This was the first time an election to the 
Chamber had ever been contested. Marcel Perdriel, President of the UF, accused the 
UCS and ACS of attempting to monopolize the elections,182 while the latter declared 
that "la question [est] de savoir si les partisans de la sage sse dans l' ordre 
l'emporteront sur les tenants de la demagogie".183 By the standards of professional 
elections the campaign was bitterly fought. 184 On the first ballot the UF's two candi-
dates were a mere III votes behind the sitting members, who gained 1,227 votes.185 
The latter, however, were elected on the second round. One explanation for defeat is 
that the election had taken place on 19th December, at a time when many small 
shopkeepers were retained in their shops by the Christmas rush. 186 
The UF also became involved in politics proper. In May 1935 it put forward 
lists for the municipal elections in the 1st and 4th arrondissements. They obtained re-
spectable scores in the 4th especially. Then in the 1936 general elections the UF pre-
sented the pharmacist Alfred Elmigar for the Croix Rousse. Elmigar gained a cred-
itable 18% of the vote on the first round, coming fourth behind the SPIO, the Radicals 
and the Federation. But to general astonishment Elmigar won on the second ballot. 
The Federation's candidate withdrew in Elmigar's favour, while the left vote was split 
between Radicals and SPIO.187 
Elmigar's victory may have been something of a freak, but it dramatizes the 
importance of the small business movement. It shows the extent to which politics had 
degenerated into a struggle between sectional interests. The propaganda of the shop-
keepers movement contained little besides narrow economic demands. Only anti-par-
liamentarianism and a hint of corporatism gave the movement a wider appeal. Even 
then the sentiments expressed were not sophisticated: "nos elues se sont toujours mo-
ques ... , et se moquent encore de nos legitimes revendications".188 For shopkeepers, 
181 The occasion was the financial crisis which provoked the fall of Flandin. 
182 Lyon republicain, 24-11-1935. Our 6,000 members, he claimed, have the right to be represented. 
183 Nouveau Journal, 12-12-1935, 16-12-1935. 
184 Nouveau Journal, 21-12-1935: "une campagne d'une violence et d'un acharnement jusqu'alors inconnues en 
matiere d'elections commerciales". 
185 These are averages of the votes gained by each side. Only half as many people had voted in the previous elec-
tions in 1934. 
186 ADR 8 Mp 103 for results of election; ADR 8Mp 105 for letter of UnionfMerale to Prefect, 7-12-1935. 
187 ADR (not coded) elections of 1936: The commissaire divisionnaire, finger as ever on the political pulse of the 
city had said of Elmigar, "influence politique presque nulIe -Aucune chance d'elre elue". (12-3-1936). 
188 Nouvelliste, 16-9-1932. 
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parliamentarians were in the pockets of civil servants and landlords. 189 The UF there-
fore echoed calls for restoration of the independence of the state, but simultaneously 
demanded greater representation of the middle classes in parliament. 190 Similarly, in 
his election address Elmigar expressed his intention to be the deputy of all: "vous re-
jeterez cette distinction, bonne pour les enfants, entre rouge et blanc". Yet he went on 
to demand a series of special measures for the silk industry, particularly for the hard-
hit church ornament and braid industry.191 
The small business movement is also significant in political terms. According 
to William Hoisington the peculiarity of the Ligue des contribuables was that it 
brought together a leadership drawn from the extreme right with a rank and file drawn 
from Radicalism. 192 Although W. Hoisington produces no evidence to support the 
latter part of his contention, it is nonetheless a plausible argument. In the Rhone the 
equivalent of the Ligue des contribuables was the UFo 
The police noted that among the leaders of the Front unique in the demonstra-
tions of May 1933 were a number of personalities belonging to Actionjran9aise.193 
Cross checking in our own files reveals two leading royalist militants, one of whom 
was Jean Goirand a 35 year old wholesale paper merchant. 194 Of greater significance 
was that mirror merchant Marcel Perdriel, President of the UF, was a prominent ac-
tivist in the Croix de Feu, and had at one time been a royalist. 
Something can be learned of the rank and file of the UF from election results. 
In 1936 the Radicals lost more votes in the Croix Rousse, where Elmigar presented 
himself, than anywhere else in the agglomeration.195 Since the Federation vote re-
mained more or less stable, it can be assumed that the lost votes were distributed be-
tween Elmigar and the left.196 How many of Elmigar's voters were small business-
men is difficult to say. But it is noticeable that Elmigar's best scores were in the pop-
ular central districts of the Croix Rousse, and that he did least well where workers 
were relatively numerous (401) and where the bourgeoisie were over represented 
(408). It can also be seen from the results of the 1935 Chamber of Commerce elec-
tions that the UF support came largely from retailers resident in less wealthy areas. Its 
best scores were in the popular 1st, 3rd and 4th arrondissements.197 This accords with 
189 In 1935 there was much friction between shopkeepers and landlords. The latter, especially after Laval decreed 
a 10% rent reduction, believed Parliament to be over-responsive to the needs of shopkeepers, forgetting the illig-
itimate profits made by many of them during the war. Nouvelliste, 17-12-1932. 
190 Nouveau journal, 9-10-1931 (Comite de defense des interets du quartier de la Part Dieu. 
191 Nouvelliste, 3-5-1936. 
192 Hoisi~ton, op. cit., passim. 
193 ANF 13040,1-6-1933. 
194 AN F7 13 205, 17-11-1928; ADR 4m 244, June, 1936. Goirand was characterized by the police as "tres vio-
lenten. The other was Besson, a chemical manufacturor. 
195 They fell from 44% of the registered electorate to just 17%. 
196 The right wing vote fell from 21 to 20%, whereas in the rest of the city it had risen a little-tactical voting 
for Elmigar? 
197 ADR 8 Mp, 103. In the commune of Lyon the UF scored less than 10% of the vote in the three ar-
rondissements where the ruling classes were over represented, the 2nd, 5th and 6th. The UF gained only 11 % and 
9% of the respectively in the proletarian 7th arrondissement and Villeurbanne. On the other hand the UF did well 
in proletarian areas such as Givors and Oullins. 
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the pattern of closures in May 1933: shutters were rarely down in the best shops of the 
centre or the rue Republique, whereas the movement was better followed in Vaise, La 
Guillotiere and the Brotteaux.198 
Thus a section of the Radical electorate flirted with proto-fascism. This was a 
development pregnant with possibilities for the regime. Yet with time the left appears 
to have taken more interest in the UF, probably because of the shock of 6th February 
and because Radical hands were freed by the collapse of the Cartel. In May 1934 a 
number of Radical and SFIO deputies attended a rally in favour of rent controls. 199 In 
the 1935 municipal elections the UF list fused with that of the SFlO on the second 
ballot. Right wing influence did not disappear. Alfred Elmigar had at one time been a 
member of the Federation republicaine. He opposed the Popular Front, and in Par-
liament he sat with the centre right. Croix de Feu activist Marcel Perdriel was suffi-
ciently well placed in the Union to be selected as its candidate to the Chamber of 
Commerce. So if the immediate danger of defection of a part of the Radical electorate 
had gone, the UF was still characterized by an extraordinary flux in its political alle-
giances. The assumption of Rene Remond that the Republican tradition was automati-
cally a barrier to fascism must be called into question. 
From interest politics to party politics 
The purpose of the three sections which follow is to discuss the fortunes of the par-
liamentary right in the midst of a deep crisis of civil society. How did it adapt to (or 
aggravate) the breakdown of consensus, the growth of authoritarianism and corpo-
ratism, the new alignment emerging in business politics, and the discontent of peas-
ants, white collar workers and small business? The parliamentary right proved inca-
pable of transcending these problems, either in the Rhone or nationally. 
Victor Perret: "chef des poIiticiens fascistes du Rhone?"200 
From 1932 Victor Perret consolidated his position in the Federation. Fran~ois Peissel 
and especially Antoine Salles were much closer to Perret than they had been when the 
right had been in power. Thanks to the depression, the victory of the Cartel and the 
subsequent governmental instability there was a rightwards shift in conservative 
opinion. 
Perret's programme for the general election of 1932 was familiar in its basic 
strategy: to create a broad conservative alliance by placing economics and hence the 
national interest above party politics. The national economic interest now required 
far-reaching cuts in government expenditure. But this was only part of a wider pro-
gramme, for the new conjuncture appeared to offer the opportunity to roll back the re-
198 Nouvelliste, 29-5-1933. 
199 Lyon republicain, 14-5-1934. 200 Bonnevay, Nouvelliste, 27-10-1935. 
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forms of the Tardieu years, and to put into practice some of the long nurtured projects 
of the Federation right. One particular goal was revision of the Social Insurance Law 
along mutualist lines.201 After the election Perret's tone hardened. Simplifying some-
what, there were two stages to the radicalization of the Federation. At first Perret was 
confident that his programme, albeit authoritarian, could be realized by a parliamen-
tary majority--a Union nationale. The tone hardened in the wake of the riots of 6th 
February 1934, then from mid-1934, thanks to the failure of Domergue's Union na-
tionale government, parliamentarianism was abandoned. 
For Perret there were two obstacles to deflation: Parliament and the CGT. If 
civil servants resisted deflation, then the answer was energetic repression of their 
"revolutionary" unions, seen as a state within a state.202 Similar reasoning was ap-
plied to the social insurance laws. The great mistake was that they had been 
"transportees sur Ie terrain de politique pure; la demagogie aidant, elles ont ete votees 
dans Ie plus grande desordre, sans que soient ecoutes utilement les gens competents 
qui avaient ales appliquer".203 In both cases the fundamental idea was that in order to 
enforce the general interest then state authority must be restored. 204 
From 1933 the Federation demonstrated a growing interest in constitutional 
reform. Federation propagandists protested that revision of the constitution was a 
means of saving the Republic by eliminating abuses.205 So it is worth looking briefly 
at exactly what reform entailed. 
The Federation's views were set out by Charles Gautheron, President of the 
party's Villeurbanne committee. The central purpose was to free the state from the 
"dictatorship" of parliament", where sectional interests such as the CGT, civil service 
unions and corrupt deputies reigned supreme. Not only therefore would parliament be 
downgraded, but civil service trades unions, the backbone of the CGT, would be 
abolished. Parliament would be emasculated by losing the power to initiate financial 
measures, and perhaps any legislation at all. The key to the new constitution would be 
a much strengthened presidency, which would have the right of dissolution, to call 
referenda and perhaps the sole right to propose laws. The president would be elected 
by a college of 1,000 consisting of parliamentarians (reduced in number) sitting to-
gether with representatives of "the competences", i.e. Chambers of Commerce, agri-
cultural organizations, the universities, and the "working class" (the CGT would by 
this time have been greatly weakened). Finally, Gautheron detailed a series of nar-
201 Nouveau Journal, 6-4-1932. 
202 Union republicaine, 30-10-1932. 
203 Union republicaine, 27-5-1934. 
204 Union republicaine, 19-2-1933: Perret wrote, "l'opinion publique est tres severe pour ce qui reste du regime 
parlementaire". 
205 Irvine, op. cit., p. 101. William Irvine cites a Perret article of 1935, "Le parlementisme", where he argued that 
"elimination of parliamentarianism" was the fITst goal of Frenchmen. W. Irvine correctly argues that in this article 
Perret's alternative is not anti-democratic. But this article needs to be placed in the context of his wider pro-
gramme. And even this article could be interpreted, as Perret must have been aware, as a call for a new 6th Febru-
ary. 
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rowly constitutional measures such as female suffrage, proportional representation, 
family suffrage, obligatory voting, and reduction in the numbers of deputies, all of 
which, it was assumed, would permanently exclude the left from power.206 
Clearly Gautheron's programme does not break entirely with the elective prin-
ciple. Measures like proportional representation were on the face of it democratic, but 
their impact was limited by making the President the real focus of power. The latter 
would be chosen not only by parliament, but by professional associations of the ruling 
class, who would also have a say in he formulation of legislation. Just as interest 
groups appealed simultaneously to general and sectional interests, so too did the Fed-
eration. Trades unions would be suppressed and Chambers of Commerce given a role 
in government, all in the interest of restoring state authority. Gautheron's claim that 
this was a Republican programme rests on an unspoken divorce of Republic and 
democracy. The Federation protested its loyalty to the Republic, but it never mounted 
a defence of democracy. This mystification is one which is encountered in all the con-
stitutional projects of the far right. 
At this stage, however, the Federation still believed that its ideas could be im-
plemented by winning a majority in Parliament. There was an implicit appeal to the 
precedent of the collapse of the Cartel and the return of Poincare in 1926.207 This was 
not, however, incompatible with exploitation of the Stavisky scandal, or with predic-
tions of a confrontation between public opinion, at last mobilized, and the Cartel. The 
riots of 6th February were for Perret "l'expression de la colere populaire", evidence 
that "per sonne ne veut plus de la Republique des camarades, personne ne veut plus 
des tripotages, des combinaisons, des etouffements, et des gouvernements des par-
tis".208 
The subsequent resignation of Daladier and the return to power of the right 
under Gaston Doumerge seemed to offer the chance to implement the Federation's 
programme, for the notion of a link between deflation and reform of the state was 
widely accepted on the right in France as a whole, and was also the object of a cam-
paign on the part of business interests.209 In the Rhone the tone of Chamber of Com-
merce motions became openly politica1.210 AICA too questioned the parliamentary 
206 Union republicaine, 23-4-1933, 30-4-1933, 20-8-1933. Union republicaine, 11-2-1934. For Claudius Chal-
land, President of the 3rd arron~iss.em~nt committee, the essential problem was not simply to rescue the public fi-
nances, but to reform the conshtutlOn 10 a way that would prevent the recurrence of "surprises" such as those of 
1924 and 1932. 
207 Union republicaine, 22-10-1933. In October 1933 Perret wrote that "nous continuerons la bataille jusqu'a la 
victoire souhaite qui est pour nous «1'Union nationale»". 
208 Union republicaine, 11-2-1934. 
209 Jackson, op. cit., pp. 88-92. Margairaz, op. cit, passim; The Nouvelliste, 23-4-1934 linked constitutional re-
form, deflation and reform of labour legislation. 
210 ~VCCL,. 8-2-1934. On ~th February the Chamber of Com~erce se!lt a telegram to Doumergue, thanking him 
for hiS devotion and express 109 the hope that he would succeed 10 restonng peace and harmony in France. 
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regime, hoping that moral force would be sufficient to bring about the necessary re-
forms.211 
The Federation insisted that the inquiry into the Stavisky affair be widened 
into a veritable purge. He personally urged Minister of Justice Tardieu that 
"l'occasion est unique je crois de pousser a fond la grande nettoyage".212 The notion 
of "Staviskites" was defined widely enough to include those guilty of the murder of 
patriots on 6th February, revolutionary teachers and civil service unions. The 
"cleansing" would also include a "definitive break with the SFIo.213 Nevertheless, 
Perret still believed that the purge could be carried out by the Union nationale.214 
But by the summer of 1934 the Federation was clearly tiring of parliamentary 
methods. In the Reveil du Beaujolais Alexandre Bosse-Platiere wrote that Tardieu had 
been duped into joining the government, thereby earning an angry rebuke from 
Tardieu himself.215 In August 1934 Victor Perret denounced those who continued to 
believe in the myth of a "national truce". The reasons for this disillusion are not spe-
cific to the Rhone. In the mind of Victor Perret the aggravation of the economic crisis 
in spite of the Doumergue deflation and Radical opposition to Doumergue' s weak 
programme of constitutional reform were linked. Perret felt that Doumergue's funda-
mental mistake had been to include the Radicals in the government, but did not ex-
plain how a government could be formed without them.216 He stated merely that had 
the programme of purges outlined above been carried out, then the Cartel would have 
disappeared definitively.217 On the fall of Doumergue Perret warned the party: "de 
telles trahisons ne resteront pas impunies".218 
Another reason for Perret's disillusion with the Union nationale is the rap-
prochement of socialists and communists and the formation of the Front commun in 
July 1934. This posed an electoral threat to the right, for the communists made gains 
in the cantonales of October 1934. Furthermore, the left engaged in a systematic 
campaign of disruption of meetings of the leagues, which occasionally spilled over 
into attacks on the parliamentary right. The most serious was at a gathering held 
jointly by the Federation and the Alliance for the local elections of October 1934 at a 
211 Johannes Dupraz in Bulletins et documents l'AICA, November 1934, reprinted in La Republique lyonnaise, 6-
1-1934. 
212 Tardieu papers, AN AP 324 13, Perret to Tardieu, 24-7-1934. Or Perret to Tardieu, 19-7-1934: "surtout ne 
Hichez pas ses coquins, car, comme vous Ie dits si bien, ils ne vous Hkherez place si vous etiez a leur place. Entin, 
la confiance ne reviendra pas, tant que justice ne sera pas fait et justice complete [.,.]. 
213 Union republicaine, 26-8-1934. 
214 Union republicaine, 25-3-1934. 
215 Reveil du Beaujolais, 25-7-1935, 1-8-1934. AN 324 AP 13, Tardieu wrote to Perret, 18-8-1934: "On me 
communique un article du Reveil du Beaujolais, completement idiot en meme temps que discourtois et on me dit 
que Ie signataire serait votre representant pour Ie Beaujolais". Perret agreed that the article had not been opportune. 
But he implied that Bosse-Platiere had been unable to forget Tardieu's lack of support for the Federation during 
the previous Parliament. 
216 Jeanneney, De Wendel, p. 483: De Wendel put fowrward the same view, which to de Peyerhimoff meant 
"either inflation or dictatorship. De Wendel replied: "C'est la conclusion a laquelle je suis arrive dcpuis un bon 
moment deja". 
217 Union republicaine, 26-8-1934. 
218 Union republicaine, 18-11-1934. But Perret had not been above a secret electoral deal with Edouard Herriot 
for the cantonales of October, 1934 (AN 317 AP Perret to Marin, 4-1-1937), 
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cafe in the 6th arrondissement. About 100 left wingers invaded the cafe. The meeting 
degenerated as chairs were thrown and windows smashed. Shots were fIred, probably 
by the communists. There were a number of injuries, some serious, but only two peo-
ple were slightly hurt by gunshots.219 In July Perret had already denounced the gov-
ernment for permitting such a campaign.220 Were this to continue, Perret warned, 
conservatives would take the law into their own hands: 
Nous ne laisserons pas faire cela. Nous avons conscience de notre devoir d' eclairer les masses, 
de leur dire la verite, toute la verite, et s'it persiste dans son attitude presente, nous nous or-
ganiserons pour assurer nous memes la defense de nos libertes, car nous ne pouvons accepter 
plus longtemps de voir assommer presque chaque jour, des hommes, des jeunes gens, dont Ie 
seul crime et d'user de leur liberte de citoyen.221 
Perret was to repeat such apocalyptic threats on several occasions during the next 
eighteen months.222 The prospect of a reunifIed CGT provoked him to write that 
"I 'heure approche ou tous les coupables et les responsables auront a rendre compte de 
leurs actes criminels. La haute cour, la prison, la destitution civique sont des chati-
ments Iegaux et democratiques".223 
In view of such threats it is scarcely surprising that Laurent Bonnevay should 
refer to Perret as "chef des politiciens fascistes du Rhone". As evidence for such a 
charge one could point to authoritarianism, the appeal to violence, anti-communism, 
and an undercurrent of xenophobia and even anti-semitism.224 There is also an anti-
elitist and anti-capitalist element in Federation propaganda. The social and political 
establishment were held responsible for failure to deal with the economic crisis, con-
stitutional reform, the threat from the left and the revived German menace. In July 
1934 Perret noted the "total lack of initiative and enterprise among our statesmen".225 
He had little faith in the Doumerge government, and less in those of Flandin or 
Laval. 226 Big business was denounced for favouring dubious political combinations 
for short-term gain.227 Perret argued that the Federation's own programme had been 
frustrated by a conspiracy of oil companies, banks and insurance companies.228 Vic-
tor Perret, as our discussion of the entente in the silk industry showed, had good rea-
219 AN F2 2667, report of 1-10-1934; Lyon republicain, 2-10-1934. 3-10-1934; Union republicaine, 7-10-1934. 
One witness whose car had been hit by a stray bullet claimed to have heard thirty shots. The police estimated four 
at most. For the Nouvelliste, 5-10-1934, the demonstration had been "minutely prepared. 
220 "[Le gouvernementllaisse se developper en effet, sur tous les points du territoire, les mefaits du «Front com-
mun» dont Ie but avoue est d'empecher toute reunion publique ou privee organisee par les republicains nationaux, 
mais dont la pensee secrete est de proceder a des essais de revolution". 
221 Union republicaine, 15-7-1934. 
222 For example, Union republicaine, 15-7-1934, 15-9-1935: "tous les gens propres et honnetes de ce pays, tous 
les vrais republicains s'uniront pour exiger les rHormes indispensables dont la premiere sera la destruction du 
«Parlementarisme». 
223 Union republicaine, 6-10-1935. 
224 Union republicaine, 14-4-1935: Leon Blum was "ntre invisible mais toujours present,le maIfaiteur ne, Ie juif 
internationale a J'esprit destructeur, au coeur haineux,le plus grand exploiteur de la misere humaine". 
225 Union republicaine, 15-7-1934. 
226 On Flandin, Union republicaine" 24-2-1935: ula faiblesse de notre Premier Ministre actuel depasse tout imagi-
nation". Perret was more sympathetIc to Laval, but he too was to be denounced for permitting trades union activ-
ity, for dirigism and for being too sympathetic to the Radicals (Union republicaine, 18-8-1935). 
227 Union republicaine, 26-8-1934. 
228 Union republicain.e, 18-8-1935. This was the article to which as we saw in the previous chapter, Auguste Isaac 
took such great exceptIOn. 
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son for disliking the "puissances d~argent". And he was in personal difficulties with 
the banks. 
In sum, it is possible to see in Perret~ s brand of conservatism the combination 
of violence, anti-communism, reaction and hostility to the establishment which char-
acterizes fascism. But for two reasons it stops short of fascism. The fIrst is the Feder-
ation was hardly suited to be either the vehicle for a popular mobilization or the in-
strument of a fascist dictatorship. The existence of such a party is essential to fascism, 
for it is seen by members as the means by which a new national elite will take power 
from the discredited establishment In organizational terms Perret~s party was a re-
vamped notable party. It was a part of the establishment, albeit a marginal one. So for 
all Perret's populism he was himself vulnerable to the attacks of still more radical 
spokesmen of the people. 
Relations between the Federation and the leagues confirm this point. Certainly 
the violence of Perret~s language sanctioned their activity. There were some contacts 
between Federation and leagues. The party's Villeurbanne committee claimed in 
March 1934 to be taking the lead in the formation of a "Front National".229 Perret~s 
followers precipitated a crisis in the Federation by their refusal to vote a Conseil 
general motion for disarmament of the leagues on the grounds that it failed to con-
demn simultaneously the arming of the left.230 
Yet collaboration between Federation and leagues was surprisingly limited 
between 1932 and 1936. Federation attendance at meetings of the IP was less com-
mon than in previous years.231 One reason might be that in 1935 the IP, were de-
nouncing the moderes, calling for the arming of the people and for a "national revo-
lution".232 Also the JP was now outclassed in terms of membership by the Croix de 
Feu. With the latter organization there was scarcely any public contact 233 There were 
some who were members of both organizations, the most notorious being Pierre Bur-
geot, who benefited from the secret support of the league in his electoral campaign in 
1936.234 A few Croix de Feu militants also appear on Federation lists in the municipal 
elections of 1935, admittedly in areas where the right had no chance of victory, and 
229 ADR 4m 235, Prefect, 31-3-34; Union republicaine, 26-8-1934. 
230 Another example of such links is that the Paris correspondent of L 'Union republicaine, Jacques Debu-Bridel 
(future Left Gaullist deputy), had been a member of Action fran9aise and the Faisceau. He had at one time de-
scribed himself as a "monarcho-fascist". (H. Coston, Partis,journeaux et hommes politiques, Paris, 1960, p. 16). 
231 For example, in September 1934 Perret, Salles and a number of Federation municipal councillors attended a 
mass celebrated by the abbe Perret at St Franrrois de Sales. In February 1935 Perret was on the platform at a Tait-
tinger meeting. Nouvel/iste, 9-4-1934, 9-2-1935. 
232 See Chapter ten. 
233 Except that in the early days of the league the Union republicaine had published some of its communiques. 
234 They also include the Conseiller general, Alexandre Sabarly, who was found to have a Croix de Feu badge in 
his pocket when in 1935 he was arested for fraud. (He was later aquittted on all charges). On Burgeot see AN 317 
AP 88, Burgeot to President of PSF in the 6th arrondissement, 12-5-1938; Burgeot to Marin, 13-5-1938. In the 2nd 
arrondissement a large proportion of Federation members were also adherents of La Rocque's league (interview 
with HC). 
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without any reference to their affiliation to the league.235 The Croix de Feu's fanatical 
insistence on its independence is one reason for the absence of public contacts. 
As to Perret's private attitude to the leagues, we can only guess. Given his 
reservations before 1932, his polemics with the PSF from 1936, and the absence of 
close collaboration with the leagues in the period between, there is little to suggest 
that Perret saw anything more than a subordinate role for them. 236 The only league 
which was explicitly condemned was the Front paysan of Dorgeres, which was seen 
as encroaching on the terrain of the parties, and as engaging in demagogic opposition 
to the decree laws of Lava1.237 Since the Front paysan was not established in the 
Rhone the Federation had no need to fear the repercussions of such an attack. So per-
haps this was a coded warning to all the leagues. It is most likely that Perret saw the 
leagues as a means of combat against the left, and was prepared to use them to call to 
order the feeble conservative establishment. William Irvine is probably correct to ar-
gue that the Federation tolerated the leagues as long as they did not encroach on its 
own terrain. 
The second reason why the Federation cannot be seen as fascist is that it never 
ceased to speak for a narrow section of the ruling class. Certainly Perret's appeal was 
greater than in the Tardieu period. But the essential problem was that like other orga-
nizations the Federation found it difficult to balance and reconcile the contradictory 
demands of its supporters. This was especially difficult in a party where a narrow 
group of notables, and above all Perret himself, were responsible for policy. As a re-
sult the Federation tended to oscillate between pleas for respect of the general interest 
and special pleading for the merchant-manufacturing branch of the silk industry. 
From time to time the silk industry, unlike any other branch of the Lyonnais 
economy, was the subject of Perret's weekly editorial in L 'Union republicaine. 238 No 
other sector of the economy benefited from this kind of advocacy. His support for free 
trade put him at odds with most other businessmen, even with some silk manufactur-
ers.239 Perret also called for a general return to the family workshop. 240 This had been 
one of his reasons for opposition to the Marchandeau Law, another question on which 
Perret's views diverged from the majority of businessmen.241 He called for a pro-
gramme of public works, which would include the restoration of national monuments 
and the tapestries they contained. This would give work to weavers of embroidered 
235 Notably the engineer Pierre Combes in the third arrondissement. There were also a couple of lesser Croix de 
Feu militants on the Villeurbanne list. 
236 La Republique lyonnaise, 1932. The royalists stated that although the Federation was some times subject to 
criticism, it was not considered an enemy party. 
237 Union republicaine, 3-11-1935, 17-11-1935. . 
238 Union republicaine, 18-3-1934 (centenary of Jacquard); 11-1935 (entente in the silk industry); not until 1939 
did he go as far as to write a8iece directly on his own speciality 29-1-1939 (La misere de l'industrie de la dorure). 
239 Union republicaine, 2-1 -1932, 4-12-32, 18-3-1934. 
240 Union republicaine, 18-3-1934. 
241 See page 205. 
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silks such as those Perret himself produced.242 To finance this project Perret favoured 
a large national loan. Although he argued that public works would eventually profit 
the nation, there was no disguising the incompatibility of this measure with financial 
stability.243 This simultaneous pressure for deflation and subsidy is typical of the kind 
of pressure faced by the government, and was a major cause of the crisis of Parlia-
ment. 
Perret had little to offer the increasingly strident popular constituency of the 
right The party's only social policy was mutualization of social insurance. The forty 
hour week was rejected on the grounds that it would cause big business to increase 
productivity through "machinism", thereby endangering the artisanate. 244 The price 
support measures demanded by the conservative peasantry were also rejected, Perret 
advising them, "aide toi, Ie ciel t'aidera". The Federation took the side of large 
landowners against the government's wine laws. Shopkeepers were accused of profi-
teering by the Federation sponsored Ligue de defence des consommateurs. Perret en-
visaged the transformation of shopkeepers into agents of big companies, paid on a 
commission basis.245 There can be little doubt that the groups concerned, given the 
heightened sensitivity to professional interests in this period, were aware of the Fed-
eration's views. 
So the conservatism of Victor Perret cannot be described as fascist. Rather, it 
represented the populism and authoritarianism of an ultimately narrow section of the 
Lyonnais elite. The masses were mobilized only in a symbolic sense. He distrusted 
the genuine mobilization of the leagues. Consequently he was unable to produce the 
transcendental platform essential to the formation of a genuine "national opposition". 
It is perhaps surprising that Victor Perret did not, to this end, exploit his own 
long-standing commitment to corporatism and the wide popUlarity of that doctrine in 
conservative circles. Corporatism continued to form a part of Perret's discourse. 246 
He approved in principle the idea of corporative organization of the silk industry. He 
was also aware of the doctrine's integrative potential. It is worth quoting at length his 
views on the subject for they demonstrate perfectly the function and appeal of corpo-
ratism: 
n sera egalement necessaire de tenter au plus tOt un rapprochement entre les producteurs de la 
terre et ceux de l'industrie, car depuis trop longtemps, on les oppose les uns aux autres pour 
des buts ... sur lesquels il est inutile d'insister [sic]. 
n n' y pas des fondeurs, des tisseurs, des metallurgistes, des chimistes, des elec-
triciens, des cultivateurs, des viticulteurs, de gros metayers et de petits exploitants, il y a des 
Franyais qui travaillent, qui produisent, et tous les interets sont solidaires. 
242 Union republicaine, 9-10-1932. 
243 Union republicaine, 3-3-1935,17-3-1935. 
244 Union republicaine, 28-1-1934. 
245 Union republicaine, 16-10-1932. In August 1934 a series of articles appeared attacking bakers for profiteer-
ing. 
246 Union republicaine, 16-10-1932. In 1932, for example, he called for the "resurrection of corporations" as a 
means of overcoming foreign competition. 
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Eh bien nous sommes convaincu qu'un rapprochement entre to us les organismes de 
la production est possible. Nous avons des Chambres de Commerce, des Chambres 
d' Agriculture, parfaitement qualifiees pour entreprendre cette oeuvre nationale d'une tres 
grande portee economique. 
Ce serait au surplus un excellent moyen de limiter un peu, en attendant de la trans-
former, l'emprise politique sur tous les rouages de la vie meme de notre pays. 
230 
In this quotation we see the assertion of a mythical national interest and the ascription 
of division in the nation to outside agents. Typically, however, the national and pro-
fessional interest would have to be enforced by compulsory membership of the syndi-
cate and the disciplining of "commer~ants marrons".247 
Yet for all this, corporatism was never more than a sub-theme of Federation 
propaganda. Apart from Perret few writers in L'Union republicaine showed much in-
terest in it. Corporatist ideas appear in only two or three of the dozens of electoral ad-
dresses produced by the Federation. More common are defences of liberalism. Even 
Perret himself did not hold consistently to corporatism, re-asserting on several occa-
sions his allegiance to the liberal tradition. 248 
One explanation for this paradox is that Perret's corporatism was aimed at the 
protection of the merchant-manufacturing mode of production.249 Yet we have seen 
that those most loudly demanding corporatist measures at this time had little interest 
in the artisanate. Indeed, many of them saw corporatism as a means of developing 
mass production. This might well have discouraged Perret from pressing to hard his 
own version of corporatism. 
Furthermore, liberalism remained influential in the Federation, reinforced by 
the fact that most militants read the Nouvelliste. We have seen that Beaujolais 
landowners did not espouse corporatism. Neither did some in the silk industry. The 
predominant motif in the campaign against the entente project had been the defence 
of economic liberalism. The chief opponents of the entente were precisely those 
medium factory producers and non-usiniers who were also found supporting Perret's 
wing of the Federation. It is significant that Perret was much more outspoken on the 
subject of corporatism when speaking to the Federation's national congress than he 
was in Lyon.250 There is of course no necessary connection between a desire to pre-
serve luxury industry and corporatism. One Federation militant argued that the laws 
of supply and demand, based as they were on individual initiative and private prop-
erty, were ideally suited to a nation of small business, diversity of taste, and quality 
production.251 What Perret did share with liberals of this type was a suspicion of big 
business and mass production. 
247 Union republicaine, 
248 See for example his advice to farmers on page 229 above, and Chapter eight. 
249 See chapter eight. 
250 AN 317 AP 82/3, Perret speech on general policy at the 1934 congress of the Federation. Here too Perret 
stressed that one of the principal aims of his corporatism was to "soustraire l'ouvrier qualifie ~ l' influence du syn-
dicat revolutionnaire". 
251 Union republicaine, 11-11-1934. 
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For these reasons Perret tended to fall back on their peculiar brand of liberal-
ism, with its assumption of a natural level of demand which could be ignored only at 
great risk.252 This enabled him to attribute the crisis to a moral imbalance. For Perret, 
"On ne viole pas impunement, en effet, les lois de la morale, de la nature, pas plus 
que la tradition et celles-ci furent trop longtemps remplacees par la speculation sous 
toutes ses formes, les benefices illicites, l'immoralite dans les affaires, la tMorie du 
moindre effort, la soif immoderee du gain et du plaisir.253 If such reasoning was ac-
cepted then there was no need to discuss concrete issues. In December 1934 Perret 
stated that he could not pronounce on wine and wheat prices because he lacked ap-
propriate qualifications--a disability which had not excluded him from member-
ship of the Cornice agricole of Lamure. The Federation's manifesto for the senatorial 
elections of 1935, put forward no agricultural programme at all, even though a large 
proportion of delegate represented rural communes. It was simply asserted that town 
and country had a common interest. 254 
The disadvantage of such a strategy was that it did not have the wide appeal of 
corporatist doctrine, with its ability to proclaim the primacy of profession and nation, 
whilst simultaneously permitting the illusion that individual interests too would be 
satisfied. In the eyes of many on the right the Federation remained elitist and egotisti-
cal. In 1936 a PDP writer urged voters not to support 
Ie Parti dont toute la politique economique n'est que la cristallisation au tour de privileges 
abusifs de la peur que ressentent justement cette poignee d'individus - on les appelle les 
«DEUX CENTS» - qui redoutent d'etre depossedes de ces scandaleux privileges - pour ce Parti 
enfin dont la collusion d6claree avec les mouvements fascistes [ ... J est une insulte a votre 
fidelite republicain - et un element de guerre civil demain.255 
The collaboration of the Federation with the leagues was not, however, as close as 
many imagined. Indeed, the leagues increasingly tended to criticise the Federation in 
the same terms as the PDP, seeing it as an emanation of big capital and a failed politi-
cal class. The Croix de Feu had never been willing to be a tool of the Federation. 
Victor Perret had played the role of sorcerer's apprentice. 
The Centre right: Between Popular Front and Authoritarianism 
The Centre right was not immune from the pressures which pushed the Federation to 
the far right. Both Christian democratic and the lay centre rights experienced difficul-
ties as a result of the economic sectionalism and political polarization of the depres-
sion. Minorities in both were touched by anti-parliamentarianism. The Republican 
tradition of the centre right was not necessarily a barrier to authoritarianism. Most 
militants, however, did remaine faithful to the democratic tradition. Indeed, they es-
252 See page 238 for Isaac's views. 
253 Union republicaine. 17-2-1935. 
254 Union republicaine. 4-12-1932. 13-10-1935. 
255 Trail d'union des dernocrales populaires du RhOne. April. 1936. Bold text in the original. 
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caped from the difficulties in which they found themselves by making a fetish of Re-
publicanism. 
Take first the PDP. There is no need to go into the social and economic poli-
cies of the Christian democrats during this period, for they closely resemble those of 
the CFTC. The slump was attributed to liberal materialism; the solution was said to be 
democratic corporatism based on free trades unionism under state arbitration. Like the 
CFTC the PDP in the Rhone occupied an equivocal position on the margins of the 
right It was pushed to the left by the material grievances of its largely white collar 
rank and file, while its integration into the social Catholic network, which permitted 
articulation of and shaped those grievances in the fIrst place, tied the party to the 
right An additional problem faced by the PDP was that of any movement claiming to 
represent the lower middle class in a period of social polarization. Themes such as 
popular democracy, "les classes moyennes", and the dual opposition to big capital and 
Marxism, were features which drew the PDP towards the Radicals. But with the ex-
ception of democracy these ideas were also shared by the extreme right. We saw in 
the case of small business that Radical ideology might provide, in certain circum-
stances, a bridge to the far right The same applies to the PDP. This does not mean 
that the PDP was proto-fascist, but that in some circumstances it was difficult to hold 
a centrist line. Whether this leads to a rightwards or leftwards shift also depends on 
context. The question has to be addressed because after June 1936 the PDP in the 
Rhone collapsed. 
One example of the uncertainty of the PDP is provided by Jules Maire, editor 
of the Petit Montagnard de Tarare. A member also of the Federation until late 1935, 
Maire was on the right of Christian democracy. In the month before the collapse of 
the Cartel Maire had been calling for "pitiless cuts" in government spending, and for 
assertion of the authority of the state against "feudalisms large and small" in much the 
same way as Victor Perret had done. He approved of the riots of 6th February, deny-
ing that they were the work of fascists: "les anciens combattants sont bien du Peuple 
tout court et non tributaires des organismes politiques".256 Maire also called for a 
"government of Public Safety". Yet its members were to be centrist politicians such 
as Doumergue, Flandin, Herriot and Laurent Bonnevay. Furthermore, Maire approved 
of the anti-fascist strike of 12th February, a useful warning, as he saw it, to those right 
wing extremists who had attempted to exploit the events of 6th February.257 Over the 
next months Maire's views emerged from this flux. He backed Bonnevay, although at 
times somewhat reluctantly, in his struggle against Victor Perret. Maire, although 
tempted by authoritarianism, remained on the moderate right. But it is possible nev-
256 Petit Montagnard de Tarare, 3-12-1933,14-1-1934,11-2-1934. 
257 Petit Montagnard de Tarare, 11-2-1934, 18-2-1934. 
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ertheless to see that belief in centrism could, in some circumstances, lead on to hostil-
ity to "politicians" who divided France between right and left. 
One PDP militant who did launch frankly into authoritarianism was Maurice 
Vicaire. Vicaire was a municipal councillor in the 6th arrondissement, as well as sec-
retary general of the Cartel des combattants.258 In 1936 he stood as a veterans' candi-
date in order to protest against the theft of their victory of 6th February. He de-
nounced "l'esprit politicienne qui empoisonne notre ville", and called for budgetary 
deflation, reform of the state, corporatism as a means of protecting small property 
against capitalism, and for national unity in the face of the revival of Germany. He 
gained 15% of the vote.259 
Simultaneously the left of the PDP progressed. In Cours the PDP section 
joined with the CFfC in opposing wage cuts in the blanket industry, thereby earning 
the distrust of local employers. This campaign contributed to the election of the PDP 
leader Dr. Lheritier to represent the canton of Thizy in the Conseil gem!ral in October 
1934, and the capture of the mairie of Cours from the left.26o In Lyon members of the 
party's youth groups were reported to have been seen at Popular Front meetings. 261 In 
the city the left of the PDP was led by the lyeee professor, Jacques Bonnet, Secretary-
general of the Rhone federation. Typically, Bonnet explained that he was in accord 
with the Popular front on the main elements of his programme--international 
peace, social reform and defence of the Republic against the leagues.262 But he did 
not join the Popular Front because it was an electoral manoeuvre which masked 
communist plans for class struggle and revolution.263 
Consisting of a cluster of parties, committees, interest groups and individuals 
united only by their central position in politics, the lay centre right was perhaps more 
vulnerable to sectionalism and polarization than the Christian democrats. By 1934 the 
Alliance democratique was hopelessly riven by factions. Some were tempted by the 
far right. Here too it was possible to turn aspects of the party's ideology to the far 
right, once, of course, they were detached from democracy. 
This is evident in the ephemeral youth group of the Alliance, which was active 
in 1933. One of its two founders, Rene Bouteille, had previously been a member of 
the IP. The basic idea was that the Alliance should reconcile Frenchmen over the 
heads of the old parties which had broken apart under the force of new ideas. This 
would create a strong France able to stand up to Germany.264 There is, to be sure, 
258 The Carlel de Cobmatlanls linked the two main national veterans' associations, the UNC and the Union 
fMerale. 
259 Nouvellisle, 12-4-1936, 15-4-1936, 16-4-1936, 18-4-1936,22-4-1936. 
260 Pelit Montagnard, 9-9-1934, 13-1-1935. The PDP also backed strikers at Thizy in January, 1935 (Pel it Mon-
tagnard,1-1-1935). 
261 Nouveau Journal, 14-7-1935. 
262 Trait d'union, April, 1936. 
263 Trail d'union, April, 1936. 
264 Sud-est republicain, October and November 1933. 
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nothing inherently anti-democratic about this. But this kind of thinking might never-
theless have smoothed the passage to the far right of men like Emile Roux. Roux, a 
manager in a silk firm, was a municipal councillor in the 6th arrondissement and 
President of the Lyon section of the conservative veterans' organization, the UNC. In 
1936 he and a group of veterans stood as "candidats de principe" in the general elec-
tion. Roux himself stood against Fran~ois Peissel. They presented themselves as "old 
soldiers without links to the Croix de Feu". In 1937 Roux joined the Parti populaire 
fran~ais. 265 
Such an itinerary was not typical of centre right militants, though in 1936 its 
electorate turned to the Federation. Between 1932 and 1934 the Alliance did move to 
the right. In the general election of 1932 Mansuy represented both Alliance and Fed-
eration in the 6th arrondissement. 266 Yet as Perret became more extreme relations de-
clined. Perret charged Mansuy with opposition to the inclusion of Marin in the gov-
ernment, and with support for the legacy of Briand, which, Perret argued, had pro-
duced Hitler. The centre right had failed to agree to "punishment of all swindlers", 
and had opposed the deflation and tax reductions required by industry and agricul-
ture.267 
This implies that the lay centre right, or at least elements within it, were re-
luctant to break all ties with the left, and even retained some sympathy for reform. 
Centre right politicians defended existing labour legislation. Now that Fran~ois Peis-
sel had moved towards the right,268 the effective leader of the reformist right in the 
Rhone was Laurent Bonnevay. In his Monts du Beaujolais constituency Bonnevay 
moved ever closer to the PDP.269 Like the Christian democrats Bonnevay opposed 
salary reductions.27o Such policies did not endear him to local employers. When Vic-
tor Perret set up a committee of the Federation in Tarare, all but one of the numerous 
industrialists on Bonnevay's committee deserted to the new body.271 
The centre right was also deeply suspicious of constitutional reform. Firstly, 
this was because supporters of reform linked it to social reaction. Secondly, the centre 
right derived its whole raison d'etre from its central position in Parliament and its ac-
cess to state power and patronage. This is no doubt one of the reasons for Laurent 
265 Cour de Justice, 1989, dossier Roux; ADR electiom legisla1ives de 1936. 
266 Nouveau Journal, 25-4-1932. It included constitutional refonn, public expenditure cuts to be detennined by an 
extra-parliamentary commission, and criticisms of the privileges of civil servants. Where the programme differed 
from that of Perret was in a call for profit sharing and in the absence of a demand, found in all Federation mani-
festoes, for mutualization of social insurance, even though this measure now figured in the national programme of 
the Alliance. 
267 Union republicaine, 5-5-1935. 
268 Peissel nonetheless continued to defend the principle of obligatory insurance in a single regime. (Nouveau 
Journal,5-5-1935). 
269 Petit Montagnard, 9-9-1934: Dr. Lheritier underlined the community of ideas which united the Cours PDP 
section to their deputy. 
270 Petit Montagnard, 9-9-1934. In a speech of September 1934 he argued, like the left, that wage cuts worsened 
the crisis by reducing purchas!ng power. A Federation militant, on the other hand, felt that only bistros would ben-
efit from augmented purchasmg power, and that the race would perish as a result. (Union republicaine, 3-11-
1935). 
271 Petit Montagnard, 23-12-1934,13-1-1935. 
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Bonnevay's defence of scrutin d'arrondissement. A list system would have deprived 
Bonnevay of the ability to bring state power to the Monts du Beaujolais. 
There is then, evidence that the issues which had divided the right in the 
Tardieu period remained alive. Yet in general the polemics between Federation and 
centre right in this period did not centre on such issues. The main theme of the latter 
was in fact defence of the Republic.272 Bonnevay claimed in a speech of welcome to 
Prime Minister Flandin in 1935 the conseil generaal was the expression of a pro-
foundly Republican people, which held itself ready to break any attempt to impose 
"personal power": "les Republicains lyonnais et beaujolais se divisent quand ils dis-
sertent ils unissent pour agir".273 Political divisions were therefore superficial. Just as 
Victor Perret, confronted by political conflict and class struggle fell back on a 
Catholic moralism, so Laurent Bonnevay resuscitated the archaic language of 
Waldeck-Rousseau. There was even a revival of the quarrel over lafcite. Perret de-
nounced Eugene Mansuy for having asserted in at prize-giving for the public schools 
of the 6th arrondissement that there had been no popular education before Jules 
Ferry.274 Unable to contend with a deep crisis, both Federation and Alliance sought 
harmony and stability in the rhetoric of the epoch in which they had emerged. Both, 
after all, were led by men who had reached maturity during the Church state conflicts 
of the 1900s. Gramsci's pessimistic judgement of the French right is not entirely wide 
of the mark as far as the Rhone is concerned: 
French parties are [ ... ] all mummified and anachronistic-historico-political documents of 
the various phases of past French history, whose outdated terminology they continue to repeat; 
their crisis could become even more catastrophic than that of the German parties.275 
By 1935 the parliamentary right was entirely incapable of uniting against the Popular 
Front. 
The divisions of the Parliamentary Right 
Until late 1934 relations between conservative parties in the Rhone were fairly good. 
The crisis in the Federation in 1929 and 1930 did not prevent the right and centre 
right from putting forward single candidates in all constituencies but the Beaujolais in 
the general elections of 1932.276 
All the same, Perret's establishment of control over the Federation had begun 
to change things. Already in the 6th arrondissement the setting up of a separate Feder-
ation committee in 1931 had led to difficulties. In the cantonales of that year the Al-
liance and Federation were unable to agree upon a single candidate. Mansuy withdrew 
272 Or issues of trivial imporatance such as Bonnevay's allegation that Perret had borne a grudge against him ever 
since he had refused to back a Perret as candidate to the conseil d'aroruJissement in Lamure. 
273 Bonnevay, op. cit., p. 79. 
274 Union republicaine, 3-11-1935. And for voting in favour of a Conseil general subsidy to a lay education 
group. 
275 Gramsci, op.cit., p. 211. The passage dates from 1933 or 1934. 
276 There had, however, been rumblings in the PDP, some members of which felt that too many concessions had 
been made to the right. Bulletin des "Dernocrates Populaires". January, 1929. 
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on the second ballot without advising a vote for the Federation, and openly voted for 
the Radicals.277 
The turning point came in the late summer of 1934, coinciding with Perret's 
change of tack and the emergence of the Croix de Feu. The issue which precipitated 
conflict was Laurent Bonnevay's role as President of the Parliamentary Commission 
of inquiry into the events of 6th February.278 After the Commission reported in De-
cember Perret launched an attack on Bonnevay, whose view that the 6th February had 
represented a fascist plot was soon to be put forward in a book. From this point on 
Victor Perret, Bonnevay and others were engaged in a continuous polemic. 279 
The conflict had repercussions on the Conseil general. In October 1934 the 
right had, for the first time in the Third Republic, gained a majority in this body. Lau-
rent Bonnevay became President, at the head of a broad conservative majority. But in 
August 1935 the conservative majority split over the question of the leagues. Perret 
was scandalized that only five Federation councillors had voted against a motion con-
demning "factious leagues", but saying nothing of the communists. Three conserva-
tives voted in favour.280 In October Bonnevay put up a centre right list against that of 
the Federation in the Senate elections. A month later the breach in the conservative 
majority on the conseil general was confirmed, as the Federation's representatives 
were evicted. A new majority including the SFIO elected a bureau of Alliance and 
Radical members. Bonnevay retained the Presidency.281 
Not surprisingly the right fought the general election of 1936 in the greatest of 
confusion. Candidates were chosen only after an unprecedented degree of faction 
fighting. According to the police Laurent Bonnevay was behind manoeuvres to pre-
sent a centre right candidate against Fran~ois Peissel, and was conspiring with Herrlot 
to present an anti-Popular Front Radical in the 2nd. Neither of these efforts bore 
fruit. 282 Bonnevay himself faced a challenge in his own constituency from Victor Per-
ret, who mounted what he called "a punitive expedition". Bonnevay was viewed sym-
pathetically by the communists, while Actionfran~aise aided Perret. 283 
The situation was most confused in the 6th arrondissement. Here the Federa-
tion chose Pierre Burgeot only because it could find no-one better. Also competing 
for the right wing vote were an Independent Radical and an ex-PDP veterans' candi-
277 Nouvelliste, 12-9-1931; Union republicaine, 3-11-1935. 
278 At first Victor Perret had expressed pride that one of the Rhone Federation's elues should occupy such a posi-
tion. But as it became clear that the Commission would not be part of the purge demanded by Perret, he began to 
have second thoughts. 
279 During the municipal elections of June 1935 Federation was condemned by the courts for not allowing Bon-
nevay his right of reply. 
280 Against: Bosse-Platiere, Salles, Parrel, Burgeot and Sabarly (all Federation). Abstained: Anier, De Lescure, 
Nicolas (FR); Augros, Mercier (AD), Maire (FR/PDP). For: Lheritier (PDP), Delorme, Mansuy (AD). 
281 Bonnevay, op. cit., pp. 76-78. 
282 ADR elections !egislatives, 1936, reports of 14-11-1935,183-1936. 
283 Nouvelliste, 14-4-1936: "Si vous etes amateur de reunions electorales, ne restez pas 11 Lyon, elles y sont ternes 
et manquent d'imprevu ... Allez plurot faire un tour dans la deuxieme circonscription de Villefranche ... Vous assis-
terez surement 11 une jolie bagarre". 
ADR elections !egislatives, 1936, Lheritier to Prefect on obstruction of AF at Bonnevay meetings. 
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date. The Alliance, egged on by Bonnevay, put forward no candidate at all, its aim 
being to present Mansuy on the second ballot. This plan, however, backfired. With the 
conservative vote split, Burgeot was far enough ahead of his conservative rivals on 
the first ballot to make his withdrawal impossible. So unedifying was the confusion in 
the 6th that there were rumours that business was ready to impose unity by putting 
forward an "economic" candidate.284 
Whereas the right had presented a single candidate in thirteen out of fourteen 
Rhone constituencies in 1928, and 1932, there were competing conservative candi-
dates in six constituencies in 1936. Nevertheless, the right gained a few percent in 
terms of votes, and five right wingers were elected. 1919 excepted this was the best 
conservative result in the Rhone since 1871. With the return of Salles and Peissel to 
the fold and the election of Burgeot, Perret too had reason to congratulate himself. 
Yet within a year the Federation, and indeed the parliamentary right as a whole, was 
widely believed to be facing extinction.285 
Conclusion 
Victor Perret had gained from the polarization which occurred at the end of the 1930s, 
but his triumph masked the deep crisis in which the right found itself, a crisis which 
led to the growth of the leagues. The main elements of this crisis were as follows. 
1. The right was divided in the long-term by religion and attitudes to industrialization. 
These tensions came together in the conflict over conservative reformism between 
1928 and 1932. 
2. The economic crisis, a traumatic and long-lasting experience from the point of 
view of employers in particular, caused existing antagonisms to be pursued with new 
vigour and gave rise to a host of new ones. As a result professional bodies, political 
parties and even governments were either paralysed or buffeted between interest 
groups. Many saw a combination of corporatism and authority as a means of re-inte-
grating (in their own image), a divided society. Liberalism was now favoured only by 
a minority. 
3. A related source of authoritarianism was that businessmen generally agreed on the 
need to reduce wages, social costs and taxes. The Parliamentary system appeared to 
be an obstacle to this deflationary programme. The formation of the Popular Front 
and the revival of trades union activity in 1935 confIrmed them in the belief that 
strong action was needed. Some employers, whilst still subscribing to the above pro-
gramme, were nonetheless prepared to collaborate with the left for pragmatic rea-
sons--yet another source of division. 
284 ADR elections legislatives, 1936, reports of 5-12-1935,22-2-1936,1-3-1936. Republique lyonnaise, 1-2-1936, 
18-4-1936: reported that Johannes Dupraz, Ayme Bernard and C-J Gignoux, all linked to AICA, were spoken of as 
candidates. 
285 Gains in votes were partly due to the absence of a Radical candidate in Bonnevay's constituency, while Elmi-
gar would not have won had the socialist candidate in the Croix Rousse not refused to withdraw. All the same, 
The Right and the Economic Crisis 238 
4. There was a mobilization of peasants, small businessmen and to a lesser extent 
white collar workers, all of whom were becoming detached from their traditional 
leaders. Whilst peasants were attracted to the far right, the two latter groups hesitated 
between the two camps. 
5. The Parliamentary right was ill-fitted in organizational or ideological terms to cope 
with the crisis. Politicians, seemed either to be at the service of sectional interests, or 
to engage in sterile and irrelevant polemics. 
6. The same kind of crisis had paralysed the parliamentary system itself. This could 
best be seen in the contradictions of financial policy. As early as September 1932 the 
Prefect of the Allier reported to the government that 
Le public comprend bien qu'il n'existe qu'un seul solution, c'est la compression des depenses, 
mais sachant que nul ne veut jouer Ie rOle de bouc d'emissaire et que les parlementaires, pour 
des raisons d'interet personnel, seront dans l'impossibilite morale de votef les mesures qui leur 
seront demandees. On s'attend a des chutes successives des ministeres ~squ'~ une aggrava-
tion plus accentuee de la situation.286 
Even Pierre Laval's "superdeflationary" government of 1935 fell victim to the logic 
of the situation. His government disguised public spending in special accounts, 
breached the legal ceiling on the issue of treasury bills intervened in the wheat, wine 
and sugar markets in order to maintain prices and as we have seen sponsored a price-
fixing cartel in the silk industry.287 The parliamentary state was in crisis; the way was 
open for a new kind of political movement practising a new kind of politics. 
286 Quoted in Howlett, op. cit., chapter 1. 
287 Jackson, op. cit., pp. 80-88, 105-110. 
Chapter nine 
The extreme right, 1928-36 
By the mid-1930s bourgeois society in the Rhone was deep in crisis. There was dis-
content with existing political representation and the parliamentary system. There was 
a widespread belief that the regime would have to give way to a more authoritarian 
order, though this would not necessarily mean a break with democracy. The purpose 
of this chapter is to describe the main features of the leagues which flourished in these 
circumstances, and to place them in the context of conservative politics in the Rhone. 
Two points of wider significance will also be examined. The first is the question of 
whether or not the leagues were fascist. The answer obviously depends upon in-
terpretation of the largest league, the Croix de Feu. The view adopted here is that the 
league did represent a variety of fascism, albeit a moderate one. Secondly, we have to 
explain why in spite of the crisis of French society, the leagues did not come to 
power. It will be argued that failure was not inevitable. 
Fascism 
The leagues have been seen in five ways: 
1. As a version of the presidential democracy typified by Gaullism. This is one ver-
sion of the Bonapartist argument. It is not explicitly formulated by any historian, but 
appears to underly some of the arguments of Pierre Milza and Rene Remond. 
2. As a variety of anti-democratic conservatism, which is not fascist because it de-
fends the interests of the so-called traditional elites. Fascism, on the other hand, is 
revolutionary. Another version of the Bonapartist theory, this is one of the definitions 
proposed by Rene Remond. This is perhaps also what Pierre Milza has in mind when 
he describes the Croix de Feu as resembling the paternalist Catholic social ideas of 
Dollfus in Austria. 
3. As a modern mass conservative party, contrasting in these terms with the old elitist 
right This is the argument ofW. Irvine in his book on the Federation republicaine. 
4. As the pursuit of social and economic conservatism by violent and authoritarian 
rather than democratic means. For Robert Soucy and in the recent work of W. Irvine, 
this amounts to fascism. 
5. As an expression of the interests of monopoly capital, which uses the fascist party 
to manipulate the petty bourgeoisie. This is the classic Cornintern view of fascism, 
upheld in a modernized version by the French Communist Party. 
Empirical analysis shows that none of these interpretations fits the Croix de 
Feu. Whilst, however, it is not too difficult to say what the leagues were not, it is 
rather more difficult to say positively what they were. A definition of fascism is of 
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course crucial. An acceptable one has first of all to take account of the fact that not all 
forms of right wing authoritarianism are fascist. It also has to account for both the 
revolutionary and reactionary aspects of fascism, yet at the same time avoid present-
ing fascism as a movement equally hostile to left and right. 1 One prerequisite is a 
definition which comprises not just a typology, but also a theory of the origins of fas-
cism, relating it to the nature of the societies in which it appears. 
The starting point is a society undergoing significant structural change, whilst 
at the same time profoundly divided by class conflict, regional imbalances, religious, 
ideological and political antagonisms. Existing political institutions suffer from 
chronic difficulties in coping with the contradictory demands emanating from various 
sections of society. There is therefore a long-term crisis of the hegemony of the ruling 
class. To these difficulties can be added the de-stabilizing impact of economic crisis, 
the perception of a serious threat to the nation's position in the international sphere 
and of a danger from the left. The development of such a crisis, in one department, 
has been described in the previous chapters. We have seen a growing lack of confi-
dence in political parties and national institutions. There were demands for respect for 
the national interest and for restoration of state authority.2 
Fascism does not inevitably arise from such circumstances, let alone come to 
power. Rather there are a range of overlapping solutions. What they have in common 
is the appeal to authority. Even the left agreed that the crisis could not be resolved 
without coercion. Marcel Deat urged the establishment of a strong state; after 6th 
February 1934 the left in general demanded suppression of the leagues. 
The first kind of conservative response might simply be a demand for the 
strengthening of the executive. Such a form of government could perhaps be de-
scribed as "Bonapartist", but "presidential" would probably be a more appropriate 
term. In France in the 1930s such demands came from many quarters, including the 
centre right. 
A second response could be for representatives of the political or social elites 
to espouse a variety of authoritarianism which does not accept democracy in either 
political or social relations. The anti-parliamentarianism of the Chamber of Com-
merce could fall into this category. There might be an anti-elitist and populist strand 
in the ideology of the groups concerned, but it remains within certain limits, as it did 
in the case of the Federation of Victor Perret. This kind of authoritarianism is some-
1 The argument which follows relies heavily upon E. Laclau, "Fascism and Ideology", in Politics and Ideology in 
Marxist Theory, London, 1977, and on Geoff Eley, "What produces Fascism: Preindustrial Traditions or Crisis of 
the Capitalist State?", Politics and Society, 12, 1983, pp. 53-82. One does not have to accept the Althusserian 
problematic of the former in particular to see the value of these two essays. 
2 It is important to understand that this does not mean that fascism, or any other of the responses to this crisis are 
socially or politically neutral. On the contrary, the crisis is experienced differently by all groups. Authoritarianism, 
presented in terms of the respect for the general interest, is always coupled to vigorous pursuit of special interests. 
For example we have seen that business authoritarianism was related to the desire to roll back social reform, while 
small businessmen saw the state as subject to the occult influence of the puissances d'argent. 
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times related to the so-called "traditional elites". But in fact there is no automatic 
connection with such a group. Rather, it can be espoused by any section of the elite, 
depending on context. 
In any case, the notion of a "traditional elite" is a nebulous one, sometimes 
used as a euphemism for a feudal ruling class, and sometimes simply to refer to the 
more conservative sections of a capitalist class. The concept of traditional author-
itarianism can be used only with much qualification in a country like France where 
the feudal mode of production was long since dead. Victor Perret was not globally 
hostile to the modern world or to modern ideas. In what sense could the Legitimist 
Marius Berliet, owner of one of the largest factories in France, be said to represent a 
"traditional elite"? "Traditional authoritarianism" is best understood as the survival of 
a set of ideological attitudes. They might best endure in certain social groups, but 
might also be espoused by others, and are also much modified by contact with capi-
talism and by the emergence of the radical right. Traditional authoritarianism provides 
a fund of ideas and organizational resources from which the extreme right in general 
draws sustenance. This was one of the functions of Actionfran~aise. 
Fascism, then, represents only one possible response to crisis. Whereas the va-
rieties of authoritarianism discussed so far are ultimately elitist, fascism is best under-
stood as a movement of "radical conservatism" which combines anti-elitism and mass 
mobilization. It derives from a feeling among rank and file supporters of the right that 
both political and social elites have failed to meet the material needs of the masses, to 
deal with the left, and to secure the nation's position in the wider world. It is therefore 
a revolt for ultimately conservative purposes, and is strongly hostile to the left, it is 
also radically hostile to "the establishment". 
Fascism is therefore a movement of economic, social, organizational and ide-
ological contradictions. Ideologically it claims to re-assert the primacy of the national 
interest and to eliminate dissident elements, defined in racial or other terms. It is si-
multaneously elitist and anti-elitist in that this task would be carried out by a new 
elite, selected on the basis of merit (distinguished as much by war service as by pro-
fessional capacity). In organizational terms fascism involves a new kind of mass poli-
tics based on both popular participation and submission to a leader. The old parties 
are seen as an unrepresentative clique. Socially, fascism includes the combination of 
anti-capitalism and anti-socialism characteristic of some sections of the petty bour-
geoisie. But fascism is not reducible to a revolt of the lower middle class. The fascist 
movement includes a range of groups, from those on the fringes of the political estab-
lishment, perhaps definable as the "outs", through the petty bourgeoisie, to conserva-
tive elements in the working class.3 One of the principal features of the appeal of fas-
3 See G. Eley. Reshaping the German Right. passim. 
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cism is its apparent ability to "reconcile" a great variety of sectional interests with the 
nation.4 
The success of fascism is not inevitable. Two factors can be emphasized. First, 
to come to power in both Italy and Germany fascism was dependent upon an alliance 
with other types of authoritarianism, and on the presence of the "friends in high 
places". For this reason fascist movements form alliances with conservatives, and 
may themselves include conservatives in their own ranks. In France a fascist-conser-
vative alliance did not emerge. Big business and parliamentary conservatives hes-
itated, but in the end did not turn to fascism.5 Second, Fascism thrives best where it is 
able to attack an already weakened left. In such circumstances elements of the left 
may join the fascists, thereby reinforcing the radical tone of the movement. In France 
the left developed a more effective anti-fascist strategy than in Italy or Germany. 
The Sociology of the Leagues 
It is important to make clear the nature and limitations of the samples used for analy-
sis of the sociology of the leagues. Each presents unique problems. In the case of Ac-
tionjran9aise the 145 individuals for whom profession is known represent only 30% 
of the names found in the sources, mainly because they were rarely associated with an 
indication of residence, and because many were students, and for that reason not on 
the electoral list. Table 15, however, suggests that as far as is measurable the final 
sample is a reasonable approximation to the original one.6 The table gives the per-
centages of four groups which can be identified in both sources by their titles, or in 
the case of students by membership of a special section. The differences are minimal. 
Even the proportion of students is similar in both sources, and moreover is close to an 
estimate of seven percent given by a former member of the league. 7 
Table 15: Representativeness of Action Jram;aise 
sample 
Press Sample 
Aristocrats 4.9 4.9 
Particule 12.0 9.0 
Doctors 4.9 3.4 
Students 5.1 4.8 
4 As Geoff Eley puts it fascism involves "radical authoritarianism, militarized activism, and the drive for a cen-
tralized repressive state, with a radical nationalist, communalist, frequently racialist creed, and with a violent an-
tipathy for both liberal democracy and socialism". This paragraph as a whole relies upon G. Eley, "What Produces 
Fascism'?". 
5 On the problematic relations of fascists and conservatives see M. Blinkhorn, "Allies, Rivals or Antagonists? Fas-
cists and Conservatives in Modem Europe", in M. Blinkhorn (ed.), Fascists and Conservatives, London, 1990. It is 
argued that whilst fascism dominated the alliance in only Germany and to a lesser extent Italy, there were many 
other regimes where there was a subordinate fascist element, such as Spain. 
6 This, of course, does not mean that either sample is a faithful reflection of the real membership of the league. 
7 A. Fleuret, "L'extreme droite dans Ie Rhone, 1929-39", memo ire de maitrise, Lyon II, 1979, p. 21. Interview 
with Joe Faure. The explanation for this is probably that the difficulty of identifying students in the electoral list is 
compensated by the tendency for those lists to conserve occupation at the time of inscription. 
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For the JP and Croix de Feu it was possible to constitute only small samples. 
Few names were collected from the sources, and residence, essential for identification 
in the electoral lists, is hardly ever given. Thanks to the relative marginality of the JP 
this is not too serious, but the Croix de Feu are a different matter. Almost clandestine 
in character, the latter published only five numbers of its journal from January 1934 to 
April 1936, of which only three survive. Few communiques were released to the 
press. Police reports on the Croix de Feu in the Rhone have survived neither in local 
nor national archives. The only option was to constitute a sample of fifty-three indi-
viduals by looking up in the PSF sample the 114 Croix de Feu members cited in the 
sources. This method has obvious drawbacks, for it cannot be assumed that Croix de 
Feu militants joined the PSF. The sample also comprises groups which were not rep-
resentative of the league as a whole----departmental leaders and those cited in the 
press because of their involvement in violent incidents. Nonetheless, the method does 
appear to produce coherent results, which do not diverge markedly from what is 
known of the national recruitment of the league. 
Numbers 
It is possible to build up a fairly accurate picture of the numerical strength of the 
leagues. Scattered information in police reports and the press can be compared with 
the number of JP and AF members in our own sample of militants. The latter is bro-
ken down by year in Graph 24.8 Some gaps are filled by Table 16, which shows par-
ticipation in annual Jeanne d'Arc parades.9 Figures in normal print are police figures, 
while those in italics are from the press. Police figures were normally preferred, but 
where they are lacking or clearly wrong, press accounts have been used instead. lO 
Comparison of Graph 24 and Table 16 shows that from 1928 until 1934 the 
extreme right was dominated by the AF and JP. Within this period it is noticeable that 
when AF did well the JP did badly and vice versa. This suggests if not actual inter-
change of members, then at least recruitment in the same milieu. The question of 
whether a dictator should be elected or hereditary did not, it seems, much matter to 
some. When conditions for the extreme right began to improve in 1933 the JP and AF 
8 Because sample size for the JP is small. it has for this analysis been enlarged by including all those individuals 
cited in the press regardless of whether or not they could be tied down to a particular arrondissement or commune. 
The graph is not a good guide to the strength of JP and AF in relation to each other. only of change in the two 
leagues over time. 
9 AN F7 13 306. Fete Jeanne d'Arc. This method was used by the Interior Ministry itself to keep an eye on the far 
right. The figures are from ADR 1m 172. fetes publiques. and from various newspapers. in partiCUlar La 
Repub/ique Lyonnaise, La Fleche, Le Nouvel/iste. 
10 The Action franraise figure for 1931 is taken from the party press. However. given that league and police esti-
mates for the following year are identical. it may not be greatly exaggerated. The estimate for 1935 for the royal-
ists comes from Anti-fascist journal. La Fleche. which usually gave figures a little below those of the police. 
The police figure for the JP in 1935 was 500. This is almost certainly too high. The figure of 210 comes 
from the usually reliable anti-fascist journal. La Fleche. 
The police gave a figure of 100 for the Bonapartists--almost certainly a typing error. La Fleche 
counted only three. the Nouvelliste described a delegation. 
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were already suffering from the competition of the Croix de Feu. The two leagues 
enjoyed a 
Graph 24: Militants of the Extreme Right, 1928 to 
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Table 16: Participants in Jeanne d'Arc Demonstrations, 1931-1939 
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 193811 1939 
CF del del del 550 2,500 4,000 15,000 4,500 
AF 1,000 ? ? 900 500 430 x 213 
JP del del ? 200 210 ? ? ? 
SF x x x 35 100 ? x x 
Fr x x x 30 0 ? x x 
PPF x x x x x x 190 del 
8pts ? ? ? 10 10 ? ? 20 
Bpts = Bonapartists; CF = Croix de Feu/pSF; SF = So/idaritt Francaise; JP = Jeunesses patriotes; 
Fr = Francistes; del = delegation. 
brief swan-song in late 1933 and 1934. But from 1935 both JP and AF declined both 
absolutely and relative to the Croix de Feu. No other group profited from the growth 
in public sympathy for the extreme right after 1934. Solidarite Jram;aise and the 
Fran~istes managed no more than a foothold and a toehold respectively. 12 
Thanks to the vigilance of the police it is possible to put total AF membership 
in the agglomeration at 1,100 in 1928.13 The prefect reported in 1933 that the local 
royalist journal La RepubUque Lyonnaise was read only by those "already won over 
11 Figures for 11th November parade of 1938. The Joan of Arc parade was banned in 1937 and 1938. 
12 AN F7 13 238. A report of the Interior Ministry on the national strength of So/idarile jranqaise, probably com-
piled in 1934, describes the Lyonnais section as "embryonic", though the party press asserted the existence of no 
less than ten sections, covering Lyon, Villeurbanne, Villefranche and Tarare. 
13 AN F7 13 205, 17-11-28. This is close to the 1,200 and 1,500 members cited by two former members of the 
movement who were interviewed in 1979. A. Fleuret, op. cit., p. 21. No date is attached to the membership figures 
cited. 
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to royalist doctrines". But the evidence supports Eugen Weber's view that the influ-
ence of AF was out of proportion to its size. The police reported 3,000 at a meeting of 
Maurras in February 1928, in spite of appeals by Cardinal Maurin for Catholics to 
stay away. Eleven months later Rene Benjamin drew 2,000 to a conference. In the au-
dience was Federation Deputy Antoine Salles. 14 
No independent estimate of membership of the JP could be found. In 1929 
Marcel Didier, President of the Lyon section, claimed 1,200 members, but com-
plained that only 200-300 regularly attended meetings.15 These figures are consistent 
with a claim of 500 members in the JP's Phalange universitaire, if the league's state-
ment that half its adherents were students is accepted. 16 It is unlikely, however, that 
the JP was equal in size to AF, as these figures would imply. Their arrondissement 
sections never had even the limited vitality of those of the royalists, while JP leaders 
had a fraction of AF's crowd-pulling power: police informers counted 500 persons at 
meetings with Taittinger and Henri de Kerillis in 1928 and 1929.17 It is reasonable to 
guess that membership of the JP was somewhere between 500 and 800 in the in its 
best years. 18 Nonetheless, because of the JP's contacts with the parliamentary right it 
was not without influence. 
As long as it operated on the fringes of the veterans' movement the Croix de 
Feu was quite open about its membership. Figures cited in the bulletin of the associa-
tion are given an air of authenticity by their modesty. The first thirty-four Croix de 
Feu adherents met in Lyon on 8th December, 1929. By 1932 there were 300 of them. 
On his first visit to Lyon in December 1930, la Rocque, then Vice-president, regarded 
Lyon as "a veritable example to the association as a whole". But as President-general 
he changed his view, making known in April 1931 his annoyance that the Rhone sec-
tion was one of only three in the country in which recruitment was stationary,19 La 
Rocque's attempts to stimulate activity do not, however, appear to have brought suc-
cess until late in 1933. Communiques from the league began to appear regularly in the 
conservative press only in that year. Monthly prefectoral reports first mention the 
Croix de Feu only three days before the riots of 6th February.20 Table 16 confirms 
that substantial growth took place only after 6th February. 
14 AN F7 13 040, 4-7-1933; AN F7 13 205, 27-2-1928, 20-1-1929. 
15 L'Unionjrallfaise, November 1929. In December he reported that since 1926 membership had risen from 200 
to over 4,000. These figures may be reconciled with the figure given above if they represent respectively 
Lyon!Rhone and the south east region. 
16L'Alerte, 1-5-1930. 
17 AN F7 13 235, 24-1-1928,18-1-1929. This was a far cry from the early days of the league, when rally with 
Taittinger and Redier had been attended by 2,500. 
18 L'Alerte, December, 1935. Didier boasted defensively that "nous sommes une poignee de jeunes franyais" 
(CAlerte, 24-3-1929). L'Alerte admitted that the JP were not as numerous as certain others leagues, but found 
comfort in a comparison with Jesus Christ and his twelve apostles. 
19 La Releve, 11-11-1930, December 1930, April 1931, January 1932. At the beginning of the new year he re-
mained critical, remarking that Lyon had enough members only for a second rank provincial town-a fault put 
down by him to "the Lyonnais mentality, very attached to old ideas". 
20 ADR 4M 236, 3-2-1934. 
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From this point membership figures given by the league become less reliable. 
A figure of 3,000 was cited in April 1934, while the newly organized Volontaires Na-
tionaux (VN), grouping those too young to have served in the trenches, claimed 600 
adherents in Lyon and 1,500 in the region in the summer of that year. 21 A Croix de 
Feu communique claimed 15,000 marchers on the Jeanne d'Arc parade of May 1936, 
while police sources suggested the still impressive figure of 4,000.22 If it is assumed 
that the lower figure is the correct one, and that the league was able to mobilize two 
thirds of its members for its the most important date in the calender of then extreme 
right, then it is possible to guess at a total membership of 6,000 in the Rhone on the 
eve of dissolution. By 1936 the Croix de Feu were already the most significant far 
right organization hitherto seen in the department. 
Geography 
The geographical implantation of the three major leagues is shown in Maps 10.1 to 
lOA. Royalist sympathisers lived chiefly in the space of the "old bourgeoisie' and 
aristocracy. In this AF resembled the elites of the Federation. Many resided in the 
presqu 'fIe. Particularly noticeable is a concentration in districts 105, 106 and 107. 
The strength of Radicalism in the constituency of Edouard Herrlot set political life 
there in an archaic mould, particularly as the right expected little electoral success 
there. Whereas there are twenty-eight militants in the bourgeois districts of the penin-
sula, there are a mere seven in those of the 3rd and 6th arrondissements. Royalists are 
also found in the western suburbs, where many of the wealthy possessed country 
houses. Another area of royalist strength is 7th arrondissement, accounted for by the 
presence of the University.23 
Outside of the agglomeration, royalists were numerous in the Beaujolais 
wine growing area including the town of Villefranche, an area where nobles were nu-
merous, and where some had town houses in the 2nd arrondissement of Lyon. AF was 
also well supported in the textile towns of the Monts du Beaujolais another area 
where traditional values were strong. According to the police the league had in Cours 
a security service equal in number to that of Lyon, consisting of 60 commissars24 and 
an important number of vehicles.25 
Although the number of JP militants on Map 10.3 is small, a pattern is never-
theless apparent. Like the royalists, JP sympathisers lived in the area around the fac-
ulties. JP militants also resembled the AF in their preference for wealthy areas of the 
21 Le Nouvelliste, 8-7-1934. 
22 LeNouvelliste, 11-5-1936; ADR 1M 172. 
23 The faculties are in districts 702 and 704. 
24 A part of the "strong arm" of the league, the adult equivalent of the Came lots du roi. 
25 AN p7 13 205, 17-11-1928. In COUTS the PDP were also very strong, winning the mairie in 1935. The main po-
litical division in this textile town ran through political Catholicism, opposing royalist integrism and Christian 
democracy. 
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city. The only evidence of JP influence in the countryside is the intermittent existence 
of a section at Arbresle. 
In view of the poor quality of the Croix de Feu sample, all that can be said 
about Map lOA is that the majority of Croix de Feu also lived in bourgeois areas of 
the city.26 The map suggests that Croix de Feu militants prefer the bourgeois districts 
of the 2nd arrondissement to those of the left bank. Other evidence suggests, however, 
although the league had originally drawn its cadres from the traditional areas of the 
extreme right, with time it expanded into the bourgeois areas of the left bank. In April 
1936 the section covering the 3rd and 6th arrondissements was described as the fastest 
growing in the department. 27 Where the old extreme right had drawn support from the 
areas of the Catholic bourgeoisie and aristocracy, with their history of anti-Republi-
canism, the Croix de Feu recruited more widely. The league did not break into work-
ing class areas, but by 1935 the it was making progress in rural areas. Whereas the AF 
was implanted only in those parts of the countryside where the nobility was strong, 
the Croix de Feu had sections all over the department. 28 
Age 
The most striking feature of Graph 25 is the youthfulness of militants of the extreme 
right in generaI.29 The average age of AF, JP and Croix de Feu militants in 1934 was 
forty-two, forty-one and forty respectively. Of the parties of the parliamentary right 
only the PDP has a similar age profile,3D a fact which confirms that Christian 
democrats and royalists tended to recruit in the same milieu, and which does much to 
explain the bitterness between the PDP and the extreme right. 
The relative youth of Croix de Feu militants is all the more remarkable be-
cause the sample consists in majority of party leaders. Especially noticeable is the 
high recruitment of la Rocque"s league amongst those in their thirties (48%). 
Furthermore, 31% of Croix de Feu militants were aged thirty-six to thirty-nine in 
1934. This age group was that upon which the brunt of fighting during the war had 
fallen)1 Many of those under thirty found their way into the sample because of 
involvement in violent incidents. Most were probably "Dispos"--members of the 
paramilitary security service of the league. That the over sixties are fairly numerous 
reflects the presence of a number of retired senior officers. The military reference was 
shared by all three generations. 
26 No less than 59% of those resident in Lyon and Villeurbanne lived in such areas as defined by Jean-Luc Pinol. 
27 Flambeau du sud-est, April, 1936. 
28 That there are a few Croix de Feu militants in working class Villeurbanne is due to the presence in the sample 
of activists noted by the police after incidents in nearby Decines (Isere). 
29 Youthfullness would be even more noticeable were the contribution of students to both leagues taken fully into 
account. 
3D The mean age of PDP militants was forty, that of the Alliance forty-seven, and of the Federation forty-nine. 
31 Prost, Les Ancien c~mbattants, volume two, chapter one. One would have had to have been thirty-five or older 
in 1934 to have fought 10 the war. 
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Although royalist militants are also comparatively young in relation to those 
of the parliamentary right, it is noticeable that AF does better than either the Croix de 
Feu or JP in the older generation. The shape of the graph supports the contention that 
an older generation of committed royalists served as an organizational base for 
younger activists many of whom had only a loose commitment to the monarchy. 
Social Class 
The breakdown by occupation of militants of the Croix de Feu and AF is shown in 
Graph 26, while the social class of twenty-nine IP is shown in Table 17. The largely 
bourgeois profile of the Croix de Feu and IP contrasts 
Graph 26: Social class of militants of the leagues in the RhOne 
sharply with the more petty bourgeois royalist league. But since the great majority of 
the Croix de Feu sample are drawn from the leadership of the league, its appeal to 
32 The royalist sample covers the years from 1928 to June 1936, while the Croix de Feu sample covers only 1934 
to June 1936. 
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white collar workers and peasants is certainly underrepresented.33 There is no evi-
dence of strong support for the Croix de Feu in the working class. So although both 
Croix de Feu and AF recruited mainly in wealthy districts, not all of its members 
were drawn from the elites. This shows the importance of a whole network of social 
relations. 
Domination of the JP by students is confirmed by the pains taken by the 
league to deny that it consisted of "daddies' boys" with money in their pockets, 
mocking the fate of the working classes.34 A more honest writer described the JP as 
composed not uniquely of youth, but also of veterans, retired officers and business-
men.35 Whatever the real proportions, however, there can be little doubt that the JP 
was an almost wholly bourgeois movement. 
Table 17 Social Class of JP members 
Students 11 
Ruling class 8 
White collar 5 
Workers 2 
Farmers 3 
The liberal professions are overrepresented in the AF. But the professions were 
equally well represented in the lay centre right, the PDP and indeed the left, and more 
so in the Croix de Feu. Table 15,36 moreover, confirms that doctors are nowhere near 
as numerous in the AF as Eugen Weber (mistakenly) estimates them to be}7 Royalist 
support in the professions was probably declining. The days when the pretender's rep-
resentative in the south-east could be elected btitonnier of the order of advocates in 
Lyon had gone.38 A new generation of Catholic intellectuals was attracted by Chris-
tian democracy as much as by royalism. 
Two characteristics of royalist businessmen stand out.39 Firstly big firms were 
well represented.40 Bruno Flachere de Roustan, who had succeeded his father as rep-
33 The petty bourgeois nature of those in the sample because of their involvement in street disturbances supports 
this supposition. For example the three dispos involved in a shooting incident at Villeurbanne in 1935 were all 
ofice workers. 
34 Alerte, October 1934. One writer claimed that most JP members were either workers or white collar workers. 
But others estimated that between one third and half of members were students. NouveIliste, 21-1-1928, 21-12-
1929. 
35 Alerte, October 1929. 
36 See page 242. 
37 Weber, op. cit., pp. 266-7. His result is due to a methodological error. Doctors make up 25% of Weber's sam-
ple, which he claims to be "quite random". Yet he constituted it simply by noting the profession of the 273 out of 
873 cadres who gave their professions in the Almanacs de l'Action Frant;aise of 1933. Doctors always gave their 
profession in their titles, and so are bound to be overrepresented! 
38 Regis Flachere de Roustan had been biilonnier before WW1, He was the uncle of the Comte de Paris's repre-
sentative in the 1930s. 
39 For this discussion the financiers of the royalist league as listed in a police report of 17-11-1928, (AN F7 13 
205) have been drawn upon, though they were not included in the sample. 
40 Here too we have to part company with Eugen Weber, (op. cit., p. 263, who states that AF drew support largely 
from small and medium firms. He cites the blanket makers of Cours as an example. Whilst most Cours Finns were 
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resentative of the Duc de Guise in the south-east, was a member of the board of di-
rectors of Descours & Cabaud, one of the largest metal trading companies in the 
world. This fIrm financed not only AF, but a number of other extremist organiza-
tions.41 Marius Berliet, as a Legitimist, was suspicious of AF. He was nonetheless 
prepared to fInance it.42 His nephew Joseph was a member of the league. Secondly, 
with the exception of the Berliets, royalist businessmen came from relatively conser-
vative sectors of the economy. Employers in the Beaujolais cotton industry were nu-
merous.43 Two of three royalistfabricant de soieries were merchant manufacturers in 
Victor Perret's embroidered silks category.44 Luxury industries were also represented 
by three jewellers. Business supporters of AF resemble those to whom Victor Perret 
appealed.45 Affinity between AF and the right wing of the Federation can also be seen 
in the appeal of royalism to the aristocratic and bourgeois landowners of the Beaujo-
lais.46 The leader of the Beaujolais section of AF was the Comte de Fleurieu of Arnas, 
perhaps the wealthiest landowner in the department. 47 Action franr;aise is more over-
represented amongst retired groups than is any other league or party. This reflects the 
fact that those who were economically active often hid their royalist sympathies. 
It is not possible to say much about petty bourgeois support for the AF. It is 
noticeable that royalism was relatively popular among small shopkeepers, a group 
which makes up a greater proportion of AF militants than it does of any other conser-
vative movement. There was some justifIcation for royalist efforts to exploit discon-
tent in this group. The AF also drew a significant proportion of its members from pri-
vate sector white collar workers. Royalist white collar workers, as far as one can tell 
from a small sample, worked in small and medium family fums.48 In both Lyon and 
Cours they frequently worked in firms owned by royalists. On the other hand, the few 
workers in the sample were more likely to be found in large firms. 
Closer examination of the occupational profIle of the Croix de Feu shows a 
league very different to AF. In spite of the smallness of the sample, it is possible to 
see in the Croix de Feu certain features of the PSF.49 There is some evidence to con-
firm K-J. Muller's identifIcation of the Croix de Feu with modernizing business. 50 It 
medium sized in terms of workers employed-perhaps 250 on average-this tightly linked group of firms 
monopolized blanket production in France. 
41 A member of the Cabaud family, though not a businessman, was leader of the royalist veterans' group, the As-
sociation Marius Plateau. 
42 Saint-Loup, op. cit., p. 210 "n [Berliet] a rencontre Charles Maurras un jour a Paris pOUT exprimer son admira-
tion au legitimiste et a l' ecrivain, l'un et l' autre egan~ dans ce parti d 'Action Fran~aise qu'il juge aussi fiI!buleuse 
que les autres". 
43 For example Emile Brun of COUTS, who employed 200 in 1928. 
44 Proton de la Chapelle, and Aime Fichet. The other, Jarosson, was a usinier. 
45 In this case it is possible to agree with E. Weber, who identifies AF with backward business. (p. 63). 
46 The expression "bourgeois oligarchy is used by R. Locke, op. cit., to described those bourgeois dynasties who 
supported the Legitimists in the 1870s. 
47 Garrier, op. cit., p. 444. This, at least, had been his status in 1914. 
48 Neither of the two royalists employed in banks worked in those where Catholic trades unionism was strong. 
One worked in the Lyon branch of the Westminster Bank, the other in the Villefranche branch of Credit Lyon-
naise. 
49 See Chapter eleven. 
50 MUller, op. cit., pp. 89 ff. 
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is significant that there was no genuine representative of the silk industry,51 but that 
here were two bosses of medium engineering firms. 52 The presence too of a number 
of senior managers and salaried engineers suggests continuities with the progressive 
bourgeoisie of the late 1920s. But certain qualifications must be made, for big busi-
nessmen in the modern sector were not attracted to the Croix de Feu. Only one big 
businessman, a lesser member of the Morin-Pons banking family, is known to have 
backed openly the league. Even he was eliminated in March 1935. The Croix de Feu 
drew most of its business support from family firms particularly in the engineering 
industry. Such firms had in the late 1920s followed big businessmen like Weitz. But 
since the onset of the depression hostility to large fIrms had grown, all the more so as 
big engineering employers were increasingly united with the elites of the silk indus-
try. In consequence medium firms had good reason to feel unrepresented either by the 
Chamber of Commerce or established political parties. Big business meanwhile had 
become somewhat disconnected from party politics--a potentially dangerous 
development. 
All that can be said of Croix de Feu support among white collar workers is 
that it was probably drawn mainly from those resident in central areas of the city, that 
is from the same areas in which the CFfC recruited. There is more reliable qualitata-
tive evidence of the nature of Croix de Feu support in rural areas. Here too there is a 
continuity with social Catholicism. A letter of Abbe Marteau, chaplain of the JAC in 
the Rhone, to Felix Garcin, reveals a "confusion qui s'etablit de plus en plus entre ces 
groupements [les Croix de Feu] et nos mouvements d' Action catholique".53 At about 
the same time the Nouvelliste reported "la curio site de plus et plus grande que les 
populations rurales montrent a l'egard [des Croix de Feu].54 The Croix de Feu, then, 
appear to have fastened onto the discontent of young conservative peasant proprietors. 
Given the youth of JAC militants it is unlikely that they were the sole source of peas-
ant support for the Croix de Feu. But the JAC were part of a wider movement of self-
conscious peasant activism, of which Jean-Marie Parrel was typical. 
In sum, the sociology of the Croix de Feu suggests a mobilization of rank and 
file supporters of the parliamentary right, often perhaps touched by social Catholi-
cism, together with sections of the elites which saw themselves as insuffIciently well 
represented by existing institutions and parties. Rarely for a major conservative party 
in the Rhone, the Croix de Feu were not after 1935 led by a businessman. Louis 
Freynet, was a thirty-seven year old representative for a St. Etienne firm of printers. 
Certainly businessmen and the bourgeoisie in general were overrepresented among 
51 The nearest was Xavier Ricard, boss of a fme metals finn which amongst other things made gold threads for the 
silk industry. 
52 Perron, leader of the fourth sector had a small metal engraving fum in Villeurbanne. The other representative 
was Guichard, proprietor of a foundry. 
53 Michoud to Garcin, 30-3-1936, in Archives of the Union du sud-est, quoted by Gayet, op. cit 
54 Nouvelliste, 23-4-1936. 
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Freynet's collaborators. But after the exclusion of Morin-Pons in 1935 no large capi-
talists were present, though the latter almost certainly continued to finance the 
league. 55 Some leaders were on the margins of the elite. One such was Jacques Morel-
Journel, who in 1935 led the Croix de Feu in the Beaujolais. Brother of the Chamber 
of Commerce president, but not involved in the family business, Jacques Morel-Jour-
nel lived as a bourgeois landowner in a commune near Villefranche. Jacques was re-
puted to have resented this exclusion. 56 So when the Croix de Feu presented them-
selves as an expression of "les classes moyennes", their views were shaped as much 
by the effort to define and legitimate a disparate movement as by sociological reality. 
The Croix de Feu cannot be reduced to a movement of the petty bourgeoisie. 57 
Soirees mondaines, Parish circles and veterans 
All three leagues under consideration had in common a hierarchical and disciplined 
organization, designed to prepare members for action on the streets. But in other re-
spects the modes of encadrement of the leagues differed substantially. Whilst Action 
jranfaise struggled to find a new mode of insertion into social and political life after 
Papal condemnation, the JP profited from the discomfiture of the royalists to establish 
itself in the Catholic network. The Croix de Feu, on the other hand, broke with tradi-
tional methods of organization. It developed the military principle to a greater extent 
than any other league, and used veteran organizations to create a quasi-secular 
movement based on family and quartier. 
Action Fran~aise 
The return to power of the right in 1926 was not the only reason for the terminal de-
cline of the AF which began in the late 1920s. Papal condemnation of the league was 
a serious blow. Cardinal Maurin had reputedly been sympathetic to Action Franfaise. 
He was rumoured to have refused a request from Rome to initiate the process of con-
demnation of the league.58 In the following years, however, Maurin did his duty, fre-
quently reminding the faithful that involvement in Action Fran~aise was forbidden. 
On one occasion he was taken to task in the royalist press for a pastoral letter preach-
ing submission to the established regime. Colonel de la Corne asked whether this 
principle could be generalized to include Russia or the Vendee. 59 
55 The new delegue regionale for the south east, Rouillon, was presented by the left as a representative of big 
business. In reality he was salaried manager of a chain of shops, the Casino de Saint Etienne-a frrm, inciden-
tally, with numerous connections to the far right. 
56 Journal d'Henry Morel-Journel, 21-11-1929 and 1 
57 This is to dispute the argument ofP. MachCfer, "Les Croix de Feu", passim. 
58 During the furore provoked by Papal sanctions he adopted an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards the Mau-
rrassians, earning an indirect rebuke in Osservatore Romana A. Dansette, in Histoire religieuse de la France con-
temporairw,ll. Sous la /lIe republique, Paris, 1952, describes Maurin as an intransigent and an integrist. See also 
Paul, op. cit." pp. lSI, 160. Henry Morel-Journal reports in his diary that Maurin craftily refused to say whether 
Action fran~aise could be sold outside churches. (Journal, 27 -12-1926). 
59 ASR 1, La Republique lyonnaise, 10-3-1928. 
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In 1928 Admiral Schwerrer encouraged Lyonnais royalists to resist. 60 In the 
same year Lyonnais royalists created the Association Saint-Louis, an offshoot of the 
Dames royalistes. Its ostensible purpose was to pray for France. But, said the police, 
the real aim was to penetrate milieux closed since the condemnation. 61 Certainly in 
the 1930s royalists still retained influence among the senior Catholic laity through 
families such as the Lucien-Bruns and the Jaquiers. Henry de Moinecourt's role as a 
journalist on La Republique lyonnaise did not prevent him from occupying a leading 
position in the Oeuvre des cercles. But such people had to be discreet, so it is doubtful 
whether the efforts of the Cercle Saint Louis were successful. 
The practical effects of condemnation were considerable. The Nouvelliste 
ceased to print AF communiques.62 In the summer of 1926 many of the clergy had 
been willing to speak up for Action jran(;aise,63 Yet in the 1930s hardly any were 
willing to do so. Condemnation of AF also cleared the way for Republicans to estab-
lish themselves in parish cercles. La Republique lyonnaise reported that one of their 
commissars had been expelled from the St. Bruno parish circle--that of Victor Per-
ret--because he had requested that a chaplain speak on the subject of Papal infalli-
bility.64 
Action jran(;aise nonetheless survived. It did so partly by developing into a 
kind of elite counter-society, a tendency present in Lyonnais royalism since the 
1870s. It goes without saying that royalists were closely linked by family ties. One 
example is the Berliet family, where kinship was cemented by fidelity to the pre-Con-
cordat Petite eglise. Another example is Henri Brac de la Perriere, one of two family 
members in the Camelots du Roi in 1928, who was married to a Jarrosson, a family 
which also included royalist sympathisers.65 
AF took on some of the features of a salon. Many of its meetings were politi-
cized soirees mondaines. A reception for Princess Genevieve in Villefranche included 
a conference with slides given by the Comte de Colbert on the history of the royal 
family--conferences were the staple fare of the best society in the Rhone. r«eet-
ings of the Jeunes flUes royalistes frequently ended with dancing. Needless to say the 
more turbulent elements of AF, such as Pierre Mondon, lathe operator and "repute 
60 AN p7 13 205, 16-4-1928: "si I'on me refuse les demiers sacrements, et bien tant pis, je suis sur que Ie Dieu 
juste m'acceuillera, car i1 ne peut pas couvrir les erreurs humaines de son representant terrestre". 
61 AN p7 13 205,17-11-1928. 
62 It is unlikely that this was, as some royalists alleged, because the Nouvelliste too was fearful of papal condem-
nation. 
63 Journal d'Henry Morel-Journel, 27-12-1926: "en somme, a voir }'attitude de beaucoup de royalistes et meme 
des pretres, on voit combien Ie peril auquelle Pape a voulu couper court etait grave". 
64 La Republique lyonnaise, 25-6-1927. attributed the incident to infiltration by members of Marc Sangnier's Je-
une republique, the arch-enemies of the royalists. It is more likely that Catholics in general were offended by this 
slight on the integrity of the Pope. 
65 Many AF businessmen in particular were related: for example two members of the Valette family, of the Tan-
neries Vallete & Faugier. 
66 AN p7 13 205, 4-12-1928. A reception at the Salons Berrier et Millet, Place Bellecour, in honour of a relative of 
the Due de Guise, followed a similar pattern (6-12-1928). 
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tres violent" were not invited.67 It is possible that AF took over the role that the se-
cretive Cercle de Lyon, defunct since the war, had once played in elite sociability. 68 
Another important aspect of elite royalism was its penetration of artistic and 
cultural life in Lyon. La Repub/ique Lyonnaise doubled as a literary and theatrical re-
view. In a city where bourgeois liberalism had traditionally been associated with 
philistinism, this was an important means for royalists to maintain their specificity. 
This lends significance to Calixte's dismissal of a young noble as a pretentious youth 
who occupied himself in founding artistic reviews which never survived more than 
two seasons.69 Royalists also included a number of amateur historians, who busied 
themselves with the elaboration of an anti-republican tradition for the city.70 In 1940 
the Vichy government appointed a royalist to the city council as delegate for the arts. 
Except in the Beaujolais, where they remained a sizeable and cohesive social 
group, royalist elites rarely took part in open AF activity. The Pretender tended to act 
as an alternative focus of political loyalty for salon society. Flachere de Roustan, hist 
delegate, was seen only intermittently at AF meetings, and was not a member of the 
regional committee of the league. Even in the Beaujolais male nobles were discreet in 
their support for AF. The police said of one reception, "il est a noter que les elements 
ruraux, hobereaux et proprietaires du Beaujolais, etait plus nombreux que ceux de la 
ville. D'autre part l'element feminin dominait largement".71 In Lyon the only meet-
ings where aristocrats were regularly seen were those of the Dames royalistes and the 
Jeunes flUes royalistes.72 Royalist families, whether aristocratic or bourgeois, were 
willing to allow their names to appear in subscription lists published in La Repub/ique 
lyonnaise, to permit their sons to join the Camelots, and their wives to attend AF re-
ceptions. But heads of families, with businesses and farms to run, either did not ad-
vertise their royalism, or they supported the Federation. Such attitudes help to explain 
the transformation of the USE into a pressure group operating within the Republican 
system. They also explain why there was an arms-length relationship between royalist 
elites and popular royalism. 
Excluded from the parishes and faced with JP competition for the allegiance 
of students, the most important remaining source of influence over the masses was 
through the limited means of patronage in the hands of royalist elites. Perhaps this is 
why the some of the tradesmen who supported the royalists sold luxuries--from 
cars to jewellery. More important were the employment opportunities in the hands of 
business sympathisers. Commissaires and Camelots were placed in firms where they 
were guaranteed free medical treatment, one months' wages in case of sacking, and 
67 ADR 4m 637 (Associations), 13-10-1932 (report on Mondon). 
68 On the Cercle de Lyon see Pinol Mobi/ites et immobi/ismes, pp. 228-9. 
69 Dufourt, op. cit., p. 125. 
70 K. Passmore, "La droite, une contre-mobilization", in La memoire Mifian~ forthcoming. 
71 AN F7 13 205, 4-12-1928. Out of seventy persons present. only twenty were men. 
72 AN F7 13 205, 4-12-1928. 
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permission to leave work whenever called upon by AF. Firms listed by the police as 
employing a group of leaguers, included Berliet, Descours & Cabaud, and a number 
of smaller fIrms.73 
Royalist elites were also content to allow the leadership of AF to rest with a 
group of "political brokers", a group which had connections to the elite but were at 
one remove from it. 74 The leading royalist personality in the south east was Louis 
Jasseron. Aged forty-two in 1934 Jasseron was from a family of soyeux, whose firm 
made high quality embroidered silks. Jasseron stands somewhere between notability 
and professional politics. He gave his profession as journalist in the employ of La 
RepubUque Lyonnaise, whilst his position as regional secretary of Action Jran(;aise 
was included in his entry in the exclusive Tout-Lyon annuaire. La Repub/ique Lyon-
naise acted as liaison between royalist elites and politicians. 
One step further from the elites, but bourgeois for all that, were the leaders of 
the Commissa ires, Came/ots, and local sections. Emile Brun, thirty six years of age, 
had inherited a large blanket factory in Cours from his father. He joined AF in 1921, 
and was made president of the Roannais federation in 1928. Until his exclusion for 
embezzlement in 1932 Brun was perhaps the most active member of the league, par-
ticipating in several escapades.15 Another such militant was Jean Goirand, owner of a 
medium sized paper wholesalers. Like Brun he was characterized by the police as 
"tres violent".76 
To this group fell the task of organizing, in theory at least, for the violent 
overthrow of the Republic. At a meeting in 1926 a representative of the national lead-
ership re-emphasized that AF would not flinch from direct action, for the Republic 
still had many defenders who would not give up without a fight.77 If the police are to 
be believed, Came lots and Commissa ires were divided into squads, each of which 
contributed a number of "gens surs" to a squad armed with coshes and revolvers. 
These shock troops were, the police said, "audacious, dangerous, and familiar with 
the use of fuearms". On Sunday afternoons militants engaged in fuing practice on the 
estate of a friendly landowner at Dardilly. Police reports on the members of these 
squads are evocative: Jean Vallette, son of businessman, was marked out by his great 
size. He had achieved notoriety by unscrewing the name plate from Herriof s door 
and displaying it at a Camelot dinner.18 
73 F7 13 205, 17-11-1928. Smaller firms include hnprimerie Rey, La Providence Assurances, and the Marchand 
de soies, Delval. Our own sample confirms that At the Tubize artmcial fibres factory in Venissieux the caretaker 
in the part of the company housing estate reserved for supervisory personnel was a Federation member. A number 
of AF commissars also lived there. 
74 The other two were Gregnot, an insurance broker from the 1st arrondissement; and a thirty seven year old pub-
licist, Paul Garcin who in 1928 stood as a "candidat sportif' in the general election. 
75 His police file describes him as "un grand chef de I' AF": "tres violent, Brun paye de sa personne et de ses de-
niers". 
76 AN F7 13 205,17-11-1928. 
77 AN F7 13 200, 11-3-1926. As the police euphemistically put it Emile Brun, was "considere tres suspecte contre 
Ie regime actuel" (AN f113 205, 13-10-1928). 
78 AN F7 13 205,17-11-1928. 
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Not all of the activities of AF militants were harmless pranks. On several oc-
casions, as we shall see, they were involved in violent incidents, often involving 
firearms. All the same, in the early 1930s the activist wing of AF was not solidly or-
ganized. This was more than a simple conjunctural problem, for the lower echelons of 
the league also felt the effects of Papal condemnation. Exclusion from parish cercles 
has already been mentioned. From 1927 royalists complained of difficulties in orga-
nizing Catholic university students, who were turning more and more to the 
"republican" JP.79 Students furnished a considerable proportion of Camelots, so it is 
not surprizing that by March 1929 the royalists were unable to find people who were 
willing to sell L 'Action Fran~aise in front of the offices of Le Progres.80 AF never re-
covered from this crisis. Local sections displayed no real vigour, in spite of several re-
organizations. In October 1932 AF created the Cercle Cyrano in the hope of winning 
back the interest of members who were less and less ready to frequent the league's 
headquarters. The cercle provided beers, hot drinks, food and games.81 
The Cercle Cyrano did not revitalize the league. What is most interesting is 
that only when faced with collapse did AF organize such a centre, and then only in 
imitation of the Croix de Feu. This underlines firstly the extent to which AF had been 
dependent upon the Catholic network to bind it together, and secondly on the organi-
zational resources of aristocratic and bourgeois elites. The latter appear to have been 
ambivalent in their attitude towards militant politics, and desirous that it not get out of 
contro1.82 
On the other hand, the activist wing did have some autonomy. AF could there-
fore function as a haven for those of an extremist temperament in periods when such 
ideas were not widely favoured. When circumstances improved these activists, whose 
commitment to monarchy was not deep, were available to form the cadres of new or-
ganizations. This had happened in the mid-1920s with the F aisceau, and would hap-
pen again in the mid-1930s. After the dissolution of the league in 1936 the movement 
split into its component parts. On the one hand elites re-organized in the Groupe Lug-
dunum, which moved ever closer to the Federation. On the other hand, rank and file 
militants flooded into the Croix de Feu and above all the PPF. 
The Jeunesses patriotes 
Unlike royalism the JP emerged as a reaction to crisis. appearing in the Rhone in 
1925. Yet the new league also profited from the crisis of royalism. Close analysis re-
veals a small but complex organization. combining features of the royalist tradition, 
fascism and a modern constitutional conservative party. 
79 AN p7 13 205, 27-12-1928. 
80 AN p7 13 200, 15-3-29. 
81 ADR 4m 637 (associations), 13-10-1932, 5-3-1936; AN p7 13 205, 18-10-1932. 
82 Colonel de la Come was a representative of the cautious elitist wing, and was opposed to the methods of Emile 
Brun. 
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The JP made no secret of its Catholicism.83 It appears to have taken on the 
place of royalists in the parish network. Many JP were adherents of the Cercle des 
etudiants catholiques in the 7th arrondissement, which provided lodgings for some 
activists.84 There was no shortage of priests willing to preside the annual mass in re-
membrance of the JP dead. In the early 1930s Louis Marchal led both the JP's own 
veterans' organization and that of the Church.85 Through such links the JP contributed 
to the mobilization of Catholic youth for the Federation. 86 
The JP also inherited from the AF a predilection for paramilitarism. In 1930 
the police reported an elaborate system for letting JP members know whether they 
should bring revolvers or merely coshes to meetings. 87 Some of this, no doubt was 
posturing: adherents were melodramatically urged to be ready at all times to disguise 
the numbers on their berets. In 1930, moreover, there were several complaints from 
Paris of the "lack of method and organization" of the Lyonnais JP. One reason per-
haps was that the JP disagreed on the purpose of their paramilitary wing. Henri de 
Kerillis came to Lyon on several occasions to urge upon the JP the view that their real 
duty was to win over "les imbeciles qui, sans opinion, ne savent de quel cote voter". 
He preferred to harness the energy of the JP to electioneering on behalf of the parlia-
mentary right. 88 But even the supporters of Kerillis agreed that the JP constituted an 
indispensable reserve of armed force. 
The JP stood in a changing and ambiguous relationship to the establishment. 
The league was financed by big business. The name of Gillet is mentioned in police 
reports.89 Certainly the JP did not have the membership needed to finance its own 
journal. Independence might as a result have been compromised: reports that with-
drawal of support from the Nouvelliste had torpedoed L'Alerte in 1931 might well be 
correct. But Victor Perret's equivocal attitude to the JP suggests that it did have a de-
gree of autonomy. This derived partly from a recognition in some sections of the es-
tablishment of the limitations of notable politics, and partly from the complex and 
often contradictory relationship of the Catholic network to conservative politics. 
The Croix de Feu 
Until the mid-1930s any movement of the right desirous of mobilizing a popular con-
stituency was dependent upon the Church. In this respect the Croix de Feu repre-
83 Union Frarlfaise, 7-4-1929. Auguste Allaix wrote that it was perfectly reasonable that Catholicism should pro-
vide the mystique of a political movement, and denied that the Church was an accomplice of capitalism. 
84 AN F7 13 234, 14-5-1927. Three of the students plotted on map 10.3 gave were lodged by the cercJe's Maison 
des etudiants catholiques, directed by abbe Roullet, at 4 rue Montesquieu (bureaux 704). It was reprted in L 'Alerle 
in August 1936 that the JP had once mobilized the youth of the Cercle calholique on behalf of Laurent Bonnevay. 
85 The Droils de religieuses ancien combattanls (DRAC). 
86 See Chapter 5. 
87 AN F7 13 235, 8-4-1930, 2-5-1930. The JP's "groupe mobile" had apparently also been organizing a truncheon 
for each member. 
88 AN F7 13 235, 24-6-1930. 
89 AN F7 13 235, 11-~-1939; One fO.rmer activist told me that Taitti!1ger himself financed the Lyon section out of 
his own pocket. Interview With MonSieur Guy Jarrosson, former PreSident of the Lyon section. 
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sen ted a new departure, for the league did not draw upon the organizational resources 
of the parishes, and was viewed unfavourably by the hierarchy. Colonel Morin-Pons, 
a leader of the VN, was a Protestant. Each year on the 11th November the Croix de 
Feu held services in Catholic and Protestant churches, and even in a synagogue. It is 
probable too that the league won over some employers in the engineering industry, a 
group which had previously adhered either to the Radicals or the lay centre right. The 
rise of the Popular Front had given added urgency to the old question of how to over-
come the c1ericaVanti-c1erical divide. Yet closer analysis reveals once again that mere 
consciousness of the problem was insufficient. 
The Catholic reference was not so easily conjured away. Given that most 
members were undoubtedly practicing Catholics, the Croix de Feu could not have re-
jected Catholicism. Indeed, Cardinal Maurin himself once attended the league's an-
nual mass. Until 1934 a number of clerics were members of the league.90 There is no 
mistaking the league's debt to aspects of Catholic thought. In so far as the league did 
achieve its goal of transcendence it was through submission to a strong leader in a 
militarized party. It is this which made possible the attraction of engineering employ-
ers to the Croix de Feu, rather than a genuine ideological rapprochement. 
Above all the Croix de Feu owed a debt to social Catholicism. The at-
tractiveness of the movement to the adherents of the JAC has already been mentioned. 
Abbe Marteau spoke of links between the Croix de Feu and Catholic Action in gen-
eral, mentioning the ACJF in particular. He drew attention to "la situation 
qu'occupent dans nos oeuvres certains propagandistes [des Croix de Feu] ou du pa-
tronage qu'ils leur accordent' and to "la propagande indiscrete faite par ces groupe-
ments aupres de nos militants et dirigeants".91 The precise details of such links are a 
matter for further research. Suffice it to note that a former President of USIC, Marcel 
Canat de Chizy, was a leading activist in the Croix de Feu, 92 and that there was a 
supporter of the league on the administrative council of the Chronique.93 
Two things explain the connection between social Catholicism and the Croix 
de Feu, and also the ambiguity of that connection. The first is the readiness of many 
social Catholic militants to collaborate with non-Catholic organizations in order to 
demonstrate the relevance of Christian solutions to practical social and political 
problems, and ultimately therefore to attain the goal of re-Christianization. 94 The sec-
ond is the way in which pressure group politics in interwar years had become inter-
twined with the religious division. Much of the impetus behind the rise of the Croix 
de Feu came from the discontent of conservative white collar workers and peasants, 
90 Including the chaplain of the garrison of Lyon. 
91 Gayet, op. cit., p. 73-4. 
92 I interviewed a former Croix de Feu actiVist, Jacques Darodes, who had been raised in the milieux of the 
Chronique. 
93 Henri Franchet, professor and former ALP activist. 
94 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
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whose grievances had been articulated by social Catholic movements with their cor-
poratist view of the world. For these two reasons apparantly economic demands were 
in practice inseparable from Catholicism. 
Nevertheless, there was bound to be friction with the hierarchy. Abbe Marteau 
saw the goals of the Croix de Feu as antipathetic to those of Catholic Action. He 
feared that the elites of Catholic Action would be lost in the ideologically eclectic 
Croix de Feu. The result would be another step towards de-Christianization.95 Fur-
thermore, the Church feared the rivalry of the Croix de Feu in the social field. This 
too emerges from Marteau's letter to Garcin,96 and was later acknowledged in private 
by the PSF.97 The Croix de Feu threatened the charitable activities of the Church, 
while its social centres rivalled the parish cercies, and implicitly therefore also posed 
a threat to the Federation. AF, although just as unreliable on theological grounds, had 
not posed this sort of challenge, and so had been more easily tolerated. 
The Croix de Feu was able to rival the Church because of its debt to the veter-
ans' movement, especially the conservative UNC. Yet even here the Catholic refer-
ence could not easily be expunged, for these interest groups too had been formed 
within Church and lay networks. In the Rhone the two main veteran associations, 
UMAC and the UNC, can be considered respectively as on the one hand centrist and 
lay and on the other as conservative and Catholic. The distinction was by no means 
straightforward. UMAC's leader, Mercier was a supporter of Victor Perret and there-
fore further to the right than UNC President Humbert Isaac.98 Isaac represented a 
moderate tendency within the UNC, was opposed to the pro-league wing of Jean Goy, 
and saw the Croix de Feu as anti-Republican.99 
As Antoine Prost argues, the mass of adherents of veterans' associations was 
reluctant to follow those who attempted to use the movement for their own ends. lOO 
All the same, they were essential to the growth of the Croix de Feu. Isaac refused the 
patronage of the UNC to one of his colleagues in the bureau of the Rhone UNC who 
had set up a Croix de Feu organization in the Ardeche. lOl But he was powerless to 
95 Gayet, op. cit., pp. 73-4. 
96 "Bien plUS, Ie mouvement «Croix de Feu», ne va-t-il pas II l'encontre du but poursuivi? Mis en face de deux 
groupements dont run leur demande un effort: effort de pensee, effort de redressement personnel, effort de rayon-
nement et de service total de la paroisse,la commune et la profession et un autre qui ne leur demande qu'une adhe-
sion et la participation II quelques manifestations massives, Ie choix, pour la plupart sera vite fait". 
97 AN 451 AP 172. For example, in 1939 a PSF activist in Lyon asked Paris whether the clergy were normally as 
hostile to such competion as they were in Lyon. (Bruyas to Madame de Preval, 4-2-1939). G. Howlett, op. cit., p. 
218 confmns this point. 
98 Mercier was a member of the Alliance denwcralique and a municipal councillor in the 2nd arrondissement. 
Prost says of Isaac: "d'une integrite hors suspicion, [ ... ] son passe personnel comme sa tradition familiale font de 
lui un republicain sincere". 
99 In an article in the veteran press in October 1935 he asked to what kind of dictatorship la Rocque was leading 
his men, and expressed the fear that Croix de Feu methods would harden the left-right division and lead ultimately 
to civil war. Prost, us Ancien combattanls, vol 1, pp. 170-1. More than once Isaac was criticised for his Briandism 
by the Croix de Feu of the Rhone. 
100 Prost, Les ancien comballants, vol I, concludes "plus que les acteurs de l'histoire, les anciens combattants 
semblent en etre Ie temoins" (p. 193). R. Soucy, "France: Veteran Politics Between the Wars", in S. Ward (ed.), 
The War Generation: Veterans of the World War, New York. 1975, pp. 59-99 comes to a similar conclusion. 
101 Prost, op. cit., p. 165, letter of 9-6-1934. 
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prevent such contacts from taking place. At the time of its founding the Croix de Feu 
in the Rhone had been an integral part of the veteran movement. As such it enjoyed 
the official patronage of Army and Church, both of which sent representatives to 
Croix de Feu functions until late 1933. The main Croix de Feu activity was to partici-
pate in the events of the ancien combattant calender. 102 Delegations were sent to 
commemorative masses held by various associations, with the express intention of 
winning adherents.103 Members were urged to pay special attention to the small world 
of regimental associations, "ou tout Ie monde se connait et ou les parasites de la 
Gloire ne peuvent que difficilement agir pour leurs petits «combines person-
nelles»".I04 Examples of this type could be multiplied: in the Monts du Lyonnais one 
Croix de Feu group was constituted by the President and Vice-president of the com-
munal veterans' group.105 Until the spring of 1935 the Croix de Feu in the Rhone 
were led by Louis Marchal, boss of a medium sized wood-working fum. A much-
decorated war veteran, aged 58 in 1934, Marchal was well-known as an activist of the 
far right, having been local President of Antoin Redier's Ugion in the early 1920s. 
He was also leader of the DRAC, and organization which lobbied for the interests of 
mobilized clergy.106 Marchal symbolizes the interpenetration of religion and pressure 
group politics between the wars. 
In spite of its connections to the Church, the veterans movement was essential 
to the realignment of the right. 107 Old soldiers' groups had an enormous member-
ship--nearly 30,000 in the Rhone in 1935. lAPs such, although the UNC was 
Catholic, it was a rival to the Church. This was bound to have implications for a right 
which in both town and country relied upon the Church for its links with the masses. 
Croix de Feu organization was similar to that of the veterans' associations, in that 
bars and games rooms were installed in its sector headquarters. 109 Certain of the ideas 
of the veterans' movement from the unity of the trenches to the notion of a moral elite 
formed by war could be taken over by the Croix de Feu, without, however, losing 
their respectability. 
The veterans' movement also contributed to the militarization of the Croix de 
Feu. The league was organized hierarchically from la Rocque himself at the summit 
102 La Releve, November, 1930: On 11th November 1930, for example, the league marched between the Gueules 
casses and the trepanes de guerre. 
103 La Releve, January 1931: "Votre participation encore modeste et rudimentaire aux ceremonies publiques, 
comme vos delegations aux messes anniversaires et ceremonies auxquelles nous invitent d'autres associations nous 
ont deja valu bon nombre d'adhesions. 
104 La Releve, November, 1930. 
105 Nouvelliste, 3-11-1934: the commune concerned was St. Martin en Haut. A "sortie" of the Lyon Croix de Feu 
to Neuville in 1934 was welcomed by the Amicale des ancien combattants of that commune (Nouvel/isle, 9-7-
1933). 
106 On the Legion, see Soucy, French Fascism, chapter two. 
t07 This is to modify the argument of Antoine Prost, (Les Anciens combattants. vol 2, pp. 182-204), who argues 
that in rural areas the ancien combattant associations were simply the latest form of an ancient type of sociability 
which can be traced back to the confreries described by Maurice Agulhon. Their function was "the slow reproduc-
tion of what already existed". 
108 Prost, Les Anciens combattants. vol 2, pp. 63-4. 
t09 ADR 4m 637, 5-3-1936. 
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down to "hands" of a few men at the base of the movement. Local leaders, often re-
tired officers, were appointed rather than elected. In September 1933 the Rhone Croix 
de Feu voted a motion promising to follow la Rocque "to the end". 110 A year later the 
police reported that regional leaders had sworn to obey "sans comprendre et sans dis-
cussion aux ordres de Paris". 1 11 
The militarization of the Croix de Feu will be dealt with more fully at a later 
stage. For the moment it is sufficient to note that the discipline of the Croix de Feu 
gave it a greater degree of independence from social and political elites than that pos-
sessed by other conservative movements. Hierarchy, discipline and the symbolism of 
the trenches also helped the league to present itself as above the religious issue. But 
few non-Catholics were convinced by this claim. 
The Politics of the extreme right 
To understand fully the nature of the extreme right in the early 1930s it is useful to 
divide the period into three. The fIrst stretches from the return of the right to power 
under Raymond Poincare in 1926 to the Cartellist victory in the general elections of 
May and June 1932. The second lasts until the fascist riots of 6 February 1934. The 
Third culminates in the elections of April and May 1936. 
From Poincare to the Cartel des gauches 
In the first period prosperity, relative political stability under a conservative govern-
ment and the decline of communism ensured the marginality of the far right. Its ap-
peal did not extend much beyond a hard core of militants, students in particular. One 
index of the weakness of the extreme right is the near absence of confrontation on the 
streets. In May 1927 about 40 JP students armed with canes and tear gas had dis-
rupted the performance of a play of which they disapproved at the Theatre de 
Lyon.112 A more serious incident occurred in October 1928, when Action fran~aise 
militants invaded a sitting of the municipal council. 113 Led by Emile Brun, a number 
of Camelots penetrated into the Chamber; fights broke out between them and some 
councillors before the police were able to intervene. 114 Apart from a series of inci-
dents between paper sellers outside the offices of Le Progres in early 1930,115 and 
110 Nouvellisle, 22-9-1933. 
111 AN F7 13 028, 27-10-1934. 
112 AN F7 13 234, 12-5-1927. Nouveau Journal, 6-5-1927. 
113 The purpose was revenge for the death of a royalist at the unveiling of a statue of Emile Combes at Pons. 
114 AN F7 13 205,4-12-1928,31-10-28. That evening about 100 royalists demonstrated in front of Le Progreso 
but were soon dispersed by the police. Brun and two other Commissaires, now the heroes of ACIionfra1l9aise, re-
ceived short suspended sentences for their actions. 
115 Nouvellisle. 17-2-1930,25-2-1930. The Nouvellisle spoke of weekly exchanges on this spot which did not fail 
to draw an interested crowd. The most important was the bagarre of February 1930, in the course of which alP 
student was knifed. 
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from a clash between communists and Camelots in Vaise,116 this was the last distur-
bance of any importance before 1934. 
Nonetheless, the extreme right did manage to survive. The leagues were kept 
alive by the crisis precipitated by the reforms of the Tardieu period. Elsewhere in 
France this had contributed to the mobilization of Defense paysan and the Ligue des 
contribuables. In the Rhone the crisis led to the rise of Victor Perret. On the one hand 
there was an alliance of the centre right with the moderate wing of the JP. The link 
was provided by the Republicains nationaux of Henri de Kerillis. On the other there 
was an implicit alliance of Action franr;aise and the JP right with the Victor Perret. 
But before examining these alliances mention must be made of the Croix de 
Feu. Until 1934 this movement played a secondary role in Lyonnais politics. Nation-
ally la Rocque's league backed the domestic but not the foreign policies of the re-
formist conservative governments of 1928 to 1932. It was perhaps subsidised by 
Tardieu. At this time the league could be seen as promoting an authoritarian version 
of Tardieu's conservative reformism. Hence Ernest Mercier's flirtation with the 
movement. 117 In Lyon, however, the Croix de Feu adhered to a more independent 
line. Glimpses of the future can be seen in the promise that as genuine front line sol-
diers, the Croix de Feu would regenerate first a veterans' movement corrupted by 
preoccupation with pensions, and then France as a whole.118 But the Croix de Feu 
were almost wholly preoccupied with opposition to Briand. There were virtually no 
explicit pronouncements on domestic policy from the Rhone Croix de Feu before 
1932. 
The best supporters of Tardieu in the Rhone were the JP. Taittinger, the 
movement's leader, drawing the lessons of the moment, ceased to call for the over-
throw of the Republic and set his followers the more modest task of acting as an hon-
est broker in the affairs of the parliamentary right. To this end he began to co-operate 
with the Republicains nationaux of Henri de Kerillis. 119 Kerillis himself travelled to 
Lyon on several occasions in order to urge the JP to devote themselves to the inculca-
tion of a few simple ideas into the minds of undecided voters, and to reject violence 
except in the event of a communist coup. Kerillis therefore declared himself against 
acceptance of an offer of financial aid from the fascist millionaire Fran~ois Coty.120 
Kerillis's strategy was accepted by the Regional Secretary of the JP, Auguste Allaix, 
and above all by his assistant Marcel Didier.121 In January 1928 the JP set up a poster 
116 F7 13 205, 10-6-1931. This incident began when a royalist meeting in a cafe was disturbed by the noise of 
communists in an adjacent room. Over the next three evenings there were a series of confrontations. 
117 G. Howlett, "La Rocque, the Croix de Feu, and the Parti Social Fran~ais", D. Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1986. K-I. 
Muller, "French Fascism and Modernization", JCH, 9,1976, pp. 75-107. 
118 La Releve, June 1931. One sympathiser, the writer Claude Ie Marguet, spoke of a government led by "les 
mauvais bergers, des ennemis sournois, des meteques complice et puissant". 
119 For the history of the JP on the national level in this period see Soucy, French Fascism, chapter 8. 
120 AN F7 13 235, 24-1-1928, 18-1-1929. 
121 Unio.nfraru;aise, January 1929: "La violence, les cris,le chahut, la trique, que l'on emploie contre les pillards, 
des bandits ou des vandales, ne sont pas des moyens de persuasion. 11 faut que nous mettons bien cela dans la tete". 
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committee and declared themselves ready to follow Kerillis's orders. 122 JP leaders ac-
cepted the whole social and political programme of Tardieu, but viewed Briand's for-
eign policy less favourably.123 
It is hardly surprising that this shift from extreme to centre right was not uni-
versally accepted. The radical wing of the JP was led by a twenty-seven year old po-
litical adventurer and advertizing agent, Etienne se Raulin de Guetteville de Real de 
Camp. A former member of Action franfaise in Brittany, de Raulin was notorious for 
having faked an armed attack on himself. In Lyon he advocated collaboration with the 
AF and preparation for combat in the street,124 Kerillis's techniques, De Raulin said, 
were better suited to launching a new brand of chocolate than the election of a candi-
date. They would result in the sacrifice of French independence to electoral commit-
tees and ultimately to the powers which financed them. 125 There was also a more 
petty bourgeois tone to his discourse, for in the municipal elections of the spring of 
1929 De Raulin agitated for an alliance between the right and the committees of Vic-
tor Augagneur, the ex-socialist mayor of Lyon, now engaged in a demagogic cam-
paign to unseat Herriot. 126 De Raulin, then, represents the fascist side of the JP: anti-
communist, anti-capitalist, hostile to the political establishment, anti-democratic and 
ready to resort to violence.127 If France were to become truly national then it must be 
governed by a trained elite, leaving everyone else simply to get on with work and 
family life. 128 
De Raulin resigned as propaganda secretary of the JP in late 1928, but he con-
tinued to edit the party journal, Union jranfaise, which was his personal property. 
The definitive break came during the municipales of the spring of 1929. At a Radical 
rally for the municipal elections De Raulin shouted "A Berlin!" as soon as Edouard 
Herriot began to speak. The incident ended with De Raulin being physically pre-
vented from getting onto the platform. On the following day de Raulin was arrested 
on a warrant issued by the Bordeaux police for fraud. His rivals in the JP profited 
from his discomfiture to expel his friends from the league.129 De Raulin, out of gaol, 
formed a new group around Union jranfaise, taking a few JP with him to form a 
"Syndical Action Committee". 
Yet this did not end dissent in the JP. It is probable that most were suspicious 
of Didier's moderate line, and were not ready to see the JP become an adjunct of the 
122 Nouvel/iSle, 23-2-1928. 
123 AN F7 13 235, 24-6-1930. Truttinger at Lyon in June 1930 that construction of fortifications was a waste of 
money. 
124 Unionfra~aise, 7-4-1929. 
125 Unjonfra~ajse, July, 1930. 
126 Unionfra~ajse, 26-5-1929. The aim, of course, was to win over the electorate of the Radicals. The Augag-
neuristes found de Raulin's support rather compromising. 
127 Unjonfran~aise, January/February 1930. Whilst de Raulin was prepared to participate in elections, he would 
have preferred to see "notre France gouverne par un pouvoir independant des resultats electoraux. 
128 Union.t,a~aise, September 1928. 
129 AN F 13 235,19-4-1929, Unionfra~aise, 5-5-1929. 
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parliamentary right. 130 In October 1929 the JP voted a motion obliquely criticizing 
Taittinger's support for the Briand government. De Raulin meanwhile kept up his ag-
itation for a united front of all nationalist groups, organizing a joint meeting between 
of JP and AF in December.131 Such an alliance appeared close to realization in Febru-
ary 1930 when a number of JP came to the aid of a group of Camelots who were un-
der attack from the communists. 132 The incident appears to have revived the extremist 
wing of the JP' for in a meeting to discuss a response, a Phalange leader urged 
reprisals, using fIrearms if necessary.133 Preparations for the organization of an armed 
"groupe de fer" were got underway. The result was Didier's resignation from the 
presidency of the Lyon section in November 1930. Soon after he became Director of 
the Propaganda Centre of the Republicains nationaux.134 
By this time, however, the JP had been marginalized.135 The league had great 
difficulty in replacing Didier. Its newspaper disappeared in December. In January the 
Phalange universitaire had to be dissolved. The decline of the JP into sectionalism 
was paralleled by a split in de Raulin's group at the end of 1931. A disparate group of 
Maurrassians like Dr Millet and young fascists like Fernand Sape, left to found a new 
monthly, La Patrie lyonnaise. 
The AF too had its problems, but since the league was less of a reaction to cri-
sis it was less sensitive to conjunctural problems. Neither did the royalists suffer the 
damaging faction fighting of the JP. There were conflicts between the more moderate 
Colonel de Corne and Emile Brun.136 But this did not have the political implications 
of the split within the JP. Neither did the exclusion of Emile Brun for embezzlement 
in 1931.137 
Royalists united in siding with Victor Perret in the disputes which divided the 
parliamentary right. The AF therefore attacked "Ie petit agite Henri de Kerillis [qui] 
va venir prochainement a Lyon pour essayer de demolir l'action de M Victor Perret, 
juge trop national parce que trop fidele a l'action de M Louis Marin". 138 Similarly the 
JP were denounced for their leader's Briandism.139 At the same time the royalists at-
tempted to co-operate with the radical wing of the JP.140 
130 AN F7 13 235, 11-1-1930. The police reported that few JP attended a meeting of the Republicains nalionaux at 
the headquarters of the JP in January 1930. The audience was composed largely of elderly men. 
131 AN f113 235. 
132 Nouvellisle, 25-2-1930. 
133 AN F7 13 235, 27-2-1930: "disant qu'il y avait assez de victimes et que, au revolver il fallait repondre par Ie 
revolver, l'lla matraque par la matraque". 
134 Nouvellisle, 24-11-1930. 
135 The Taittinger moment had passed. 
136 AN F7 13 205,15-3-1929,11-5-1929,7-11-1929. 
137 Fleuret, op. cit., p. 17: An interview with a former AF activist reveals that Brun had collected considerable 
sums from small industrialists and artisans of Cours and Thizy for the purpose of an action against the Republic. 
The interviewee believed the collection to have been for personal ends. 
138 La Republique lyonnaise, 4-4-1931. Another example is a reprint of Perret's call for union of the right (28-3-
1931). Marin was also praised at the previously mentioned joint JP-AF meeting. 
139 On the national level relations between Maurras and the Taittinger-Kerillis axis had been poor since 1929. La 
Republique lyonnaise, 13-9-1930. 
140 F7 13 205, 18-12-1929. 
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AF and the Federation recruited in the same "traditionalist" milieu. Both at-
tempted not so much to tum the clock back as to control the direction of change, and 
to reconcile economic progress with hierarchy. The old aristocracy, La Republique 
lyonnaise said, had gone. But a monarch would create a new elite. It would combine 
the aristocracy, "oit se transmettant encore, par Ie sang et l'education, les aptitudes a 
certains emplois diplomatiques et militaire" with businessmen, fathers of families, 
practitioners of charity, elements of the intelligentsia and the artisanate.141 Finally, 
the AF resembled Perret's Federation in its possession of a proto-fascist sub-current. 
The monarch was often presented in terms similar to those of used by "republican" 
defenders of the strong state, as a leader independent of the sectional interests. Re-
stored corporations would not govern, but would simply advise the monarch. 142 
Elsewhere in France the Tardieu reforms had led to a reaction in the form of 
autonomous proto-fascist movements: Dijense paysan and the Tax-payers' League. 
In the Rhone Victor Perret had been able to take the head of the anti-reform move-
ment, thereby neutralizing the far right. Furthermore, the Rhone lacked a strong tradi-
tion of Christian democracy, which in Brittany had prepared the way for 
Dorgerism.l43 In the late 1920s the JAC were only just beginning to establish them-
selves. The USE the most powerful of the agrarian associations, was able to co-opt 
Dorgeres"s movement when it did attempt to establish itself in the Rhone. Meanwhile 
the small business Ligue des contribuables was inhibited by the entrenchment of 
Radicalism in. Lyon. In subsequent years, however, it became increasingly difficult 
for established parties to contain the far right. 
The 6th February 1934 in the Rhone 
Paris was not the only city in France to experience disturbances on 6 February 1934. 
In Lyon the first demonstrations were the work of nationalist students who on 11 th 
January staged a mock funeral of the Republic. Even according to a hostile Lyon 
republicain the coffin was followed by several hundred people. Posters appeared in 
unaccustomed numbers; political meetings multiplied. l44 Action Fran~aise, which 
contained the most lurid accounts of the Stavisky scandal, sold unusually well. By 3 
February the police already felt that "contrairement a lnabitude, une partie du public 
a paru considerer avec une certaine sympathie les manifestations du parti royal-
iste".145 
On 6 February the five o'clock edition of Salut Public contained a call from 
the JP for the population to assemble at six. At 6.30 the JP themselves arrived and be-
gan to distribute tracts. They were soon joined by a group of Came/ots, and by mem-
141 La Republique lyonnaise, 5-3-1932. 
142 ibid. 
143 S. Be~er, op. cit., passim. P. Barra!, "Les Syndicats bretons de cultivateurs-cultivants 
144 AN P 13 040, 3-2-1934: the police estimated 4,000 per day from the 5-12-1934. 
145 AN p7 13 040, 3-2-1934. 
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bers of the Croix de Feu. Within a short time a crowd estimated by the police at sev-
eral thousand had gathered. News from Paris of shootings raised the temperature. 
Amidst cries of "Ca ira, les deputes, on les pendra", demonstrators attacked trams and 
formed columns. But although the police, on their own admission, were over-run, at-
tempts by demonstrators to force their way up the rue Republique to the Hotel de 
Ville, were not well coordinated. Communists meanwhile fought with police on the 
Place Terreaux in front of the Town Hall. From about 9.00 until 10.00 p.m. there was 
a lull. Then there was a second, lesser demonstration from 10.00 p.m. 
There were further demonstrations on the two following nights. They were 
now met by CGT counter-demonstrations. The two sides insulted each other with 
cries of "Vive Ie roil" and "les Soviets partoutl Cafe chairs were used as weapons. 
Shots were fired, each side blaming the other. There were 80 arrests. 146 
What is the significance of these riots? If we are to agree with Rene Remond 
that Parisian events represented merely a demonstration which turned to tragedy, "not 
even a riot", then Lyonnais events are barely worthy of notice. 147 Remond points to 
the lack of a co-ordinated plan for a putsch and the presence of only [sic] 30,000 lea-
guers amongst the demonstrators on the Place de la Concorde. 148 He argues that the 
mass of demonstrators did not know what they wanted. They were easily calmed by a 
mere change of majorities. In part Remond is right. Yet a more nuanced interpretation 
is possible. The rioters of 6th February could be seen as part of a coalition of conser-
vatives and fascists. Had they managed to break through police barriers, it is possible 
that the outcome might have been a government of conservative parliamentarians, 
fascists and representatives of "non-political" bodies such as the UNC, probably 
voted by parliament. Fascists would have been only a minority in such a government. 
And whilst may be true that many demonstrators were content with Doumergue, 
many others were not. In other words, a fascist takeover was not imminent on 6th 
February. Yet there was a conjunction of fascists and conservatives and widespread 
readiness to accept the resolution of political problems by violent means. This inter-
pretation is also of use in understanding events in Lyon. 
Clearly the riots in Lyon were less serious than those in Paris. There was no 
sustained attempt to invade the Hotel de Ville. Had this been a priority of the leagues 
then they could have assembled on the place Terreaux, instead of half a mile away at 
Place Bellecour. Partly, however, this was because of the symbolic significance of 
Bellecour to the extreme right. This enormous square, once known as the Place Louis-
Ie-Grand, on which stood a large equestrian bronze of Louis XIV, was the traditional 
146 This account compiled from daily press in Lyon, and from AN p7 13 040, 3-2-1934 and 3-3-1934. 
147 Remond, op. cit., pp. 283-5. 
148 There must, in reality, have been some co-ordinaiton. For example, G. Howlett, op. cit., ch. 2, reveals an ulti-
matum by the laegues to la Rocque in order to pursuade him to take part. 
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starting point of its demonstrations. They would then go via the rue Republique to 
confront either the Town Hall or the Prefecture. 149 
Also relevant are the words and deeds of organized participants. The Croix de 
Feu played only played a minor part. No doubt orders from Paris advised caution. The 
shock troops of the league, the VN and the dispos, had only been created in December 
1933. The Croix de Feu only really moved to the front of the political stage after 6 
February. The Croix de Feu will therefore be dealt with in the following section. 
It goes without saying that royalists were opposed to the existing regime. It is 
sufficient to note the league~s response to the riots themselves: "nee dans Ie sang de la 
Commune, Marianne a voulu encore se repeindre de sang avant de mourir".150 This 
does not, of course, mean that the royalists intended to overthrow the Republic on that 
particular day. 
Most interesting is the attitude of the JP. In spite of their lesser numbers the JP 
played a central role on 6th February. They occupied a pivotal position between the 
fascist and the parliamentary right, and through their access to the press they were 
better able to communicate with the public at large. The JP were responsible for the 
only tract known to have been distributed on the 6th February in Lyon. It was more 
moderate than a notorious leaflet calling for a "national revolution" handed out by the 
JP on the Place de la Concorde.151 The Lyon tract begins with an "Appeal to the Peo-
ple of France". The sacrifice of Prefect of Police Jean Chiappe to the communists 
[sic], was seen as the beginning of a purge (une formidable hecatombe) of army, judi-
ciary and administration. "Le regime des fiches va renaitre. Le delit d ~ opinion est 
retablie": 
Laisserez-vous etablir la dictature d'une clan? Laisserez-vous etrangler nos libertes? Petits 
fonctionnaires, independants et patriotes, laisserez-vous supprimer votre gagne-pain? 
L'opinion publique doit clamer sa volonte. Devant la decomposition parlementaire il imposera 
silence aux factions et donnera a la nation des chefs digne d'el1e. 
Un veritable complot se trame au dedans et au dehors contre notre pays. 
APPEL au PEUPLE de Lyon 
Assez de scandales, assez de vols, assez de politiciens protecteurs patentes des escrocs. Une 
majorite qui couvre les delrousseurs de 1 'Epargne se rend complice. Nous ne jetons pas a tort 
ou a travers la suspicion contre les innocents, mais nous exigeons une justice inexorable contre 
tous les coupables quelques hautes places qu'ils soient L'autorite en France sera respecte Ie jour ou e1le sera respectable. Que Ie parlement se nettoie, ou Ie peuple s 'en chargera.152 
The most striking thing about the tract is its ambiguity.153 On the one hand it can be 
interpreted as fascist in its appeal to a strong leader who would impose silence on 
factions, in its demand for purges, and in the fact that it was distributed by men who 
showed themselves to be ready to attack both public property and the police. On the 
149 Hence the symbolic significance of the Prefecture's insistance that Jeanne d'Arc demonstrations begin and end 
on the "republican" left bank of the Rhone. 
150 Republique lyonnaise, 6-1-1943,10-2-1934. 
151 Reprinted in L. Bonnevay, Le sixfevrier, Paris, 1934. 
152 Reprinted in Salut Public, 7-2-1934. The JP exchanged more than words on 6th February. 
153 Remond, op. cit, p. 284. Rene Remond dismisses the Parisian version on the grounds that the JP "worshipped 
a verbal tradition". The Lyonnais tract is less radical, notably in not calling for a national revolution, a term popu-
larised by Hitler. 
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other, the tract implies that not all parliamentarians are gUilty. This could be inter-
preted as leaving the door open for a government of Union nationale, and probably it 
was meant to be so understood. But it is significant that there is no explicit demand 
for a change of majorities. The tract is perhaps best understood as an effort to recon-
cile fascist and authoritarian conservative viewpoints. This makes sense if we remem-
ber that the JP themselves were chronically split between fascists and conservatives. 
This is confrrmed by the fact that in the weeks before the riots, most JP had 
rallied to Taittinger's call for a "national revolution"--a slogan popularized by 
Hitler. J-H. de la Barriere declared in October 1933 that "la periode humanitaire, 
democratique, internationaliste de l'apres-guerre est une peri ode perimee". Outdated 
institutions were about to be swept away. The only alternatives were either "social 
revolution" or a "redressement nationale par l'autorite dans l'ordre et dans 
l'autorite",154 There was no distinction between democracy and parliamentarianism 
here. 155 Other JP continued to act in alliance with the Republicains nationaux--at 
this time organization of a school for public speakers was their main preoccupa-
tion.156 Yet even this group approved, for their own reasons, the riots of 6th February. 
As for the mass of demonstrators, their motives and intentions cannot be 
known. The best evidence is the verdict of the police: 
Ces evenements, sans revetir un caractere d'emeute aussi grave qua Paris ont neanmoins 
revele un etat d'esprit populaire inconnu jusqu'ici a Lyon. En effet les veritables militants ex-
tremistes ne depassaient guere dans l'ensemble Ie chiffre de 7 a 800 personnes et il apparait 
que leur rOle d'agitateurs n'auraient eu qu'un effet assez restreint s'ils n'avaient opere comme 
un ferment favorable dans un milieu de plusieurs milliers de spectateurs indubitablement sym-
pathiques aux exactions de to utes sorles commis par les manifestants,157 
The example of the Rhone confirms amply that Ie six jevrier inaugurated a period of 
heightened interest in politics. 
What is more important in the present context is that few conservatives were 
ready to condemn either the riots themselves or the notion that a government could be 
overthrown by street action. There is no need to repeat what has already been said 
about the attitudes of conservatives like Victor Perret. Nor is it surprising that, the 
Nouvelliste should see the Stavisky affair as confirmation that neither the free market 
nor Christian morality any longer regulated affairs between men. 158 We also saw in 
the previous chapter that Christian democrats like Jules Maire in Tarare and Maurice 
154 L'Alerte, October, 1933---my italics. On the evening of 7th February de la Barriere was arrested at Place 
Bellecour. 
155 Regional delegate Auguste Allaix placed greater emphasis on the need for constitutional reform, especially a 
strong and democratically elected president But even if we leave aside the plebiscitary element of fascism, Allaix 
can hardly be described as a democrat, for he also called for action in the streets, national revolution, and 
''repuration necessaire" (L'Alerte, December 1933, January and February 1934). 
156 L 'Alerte, November 1933. 
157 AN F7 13 040, 3-3-1934. See also AN F7 13 040, 3-2-1934: "contrairement a rhabitude, une partie du public a 
paru considerer avec une certain sympathie les manifestations du partie royalistes, lequel n'avait d'ailleurs rein 
neglige pour sa propagande: meetings, journaux et affiches". 
158 Nouvelliste. 20-1-1934. Furthermore, the Nouvelliste's headline on the morning of 6th February, "Paris tout 
entier sera ce soir dans la rue pour crier son indignation et manifester son mepris de l'injustice", was a clear in-
citement to Lyonnais to do the same. 
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Vicaire in Lyon approved of the events. 159 Some members of the administrative 
council of the Chronique sociale welcomed the riots. Similarly, Humbert Isaac, a re-
putedly unimpeachable Republican wrote in La Voix du combattant that without the 
demonstrations "la RepubJique auraient vecu".160 Indeed, it is difficult to find an un-
equivocal condemnation of Ie six jevrier anywhere in the political or economic estab-
lishment. 
There was in early 1934 a broad consensus stretching from Christian 
democrats to the leagues, that the authority of the state should be strengthened. Most 
conservatives agreed that economic recovery depended upon cuts in public spending, 
and therefore upon elimination of "sectional interests" from parliament. This is not to 
agree with Michel Margairaz that the right as a whole was united around a fascist 
programme, for the common denominator in this coalition--reform of the 
state--was at a much lower level than this. t§hce in power the coalition rapidly 
fell apart. Nonetheless, the broad appeal of anti-parliamentarianism may be seen as 
legitimizing the activities of the leagues. These movements, moreover, contained fas-
cist elements which were increasingly strong. 
The crisis of the left also worked to the benefit of the leagues. This is not the 
place to go into the history of the Radical Party. Suffice it to recall the emergence of a 
proto-fascist small business movement in 1932. In Paris the equivalent movement, the 
Ligue des contribuables, actually participated in the riots of the 6th February. The at-
titude of the Lyonnais equivalent, the UF, is unknown. But that one of the bastions of 
the democratic and republican tradition should become detached from its leaders in 
this way was clearly a development fraught with danger. 
It is possible to see in the period from 1932 to the 6th February 1934 the be-
ginnings of a crisis which might have led to the emergence of a genuine fascist threat. 
One must, of course, be careful not to over-state the argument. In early 1934 the ex-
treme right remained weak and dispersed. The bulk of active supporters were proba-
bly students.162 Furthermore, whilst the extreme right was increasingly able to set the 
tone for conservatives in general, it was for the moment prepared to accept that its 
programme might be realized through Parliament. Both AF and the JP were at flrst 
prepared to accept Doumergue--providing a number of demanding and undemo-
cratic conditions were fulfilled. They also tended to distinguish between the 
"unimpeachable" Doumergue and his scheming ministers. 
In sum, the example of the Rhone suggests that France in February 1934 was 
not Germany in January 1933. A more revealing comparison would be with Germany 
in March 1930. In Germany in that year, authoritarianism was a part of the political 
159 See chapter nine. 
160 Quoted in Prost, Les anciens combaltanls, voll, p. 164. 
161 M Margairaz, op. cit., passim: "les differents familles de la droite agissent comme un tout fonctionnel". 
162 AN p2 2667, 9-2-1934. The one participant whose occupation is known was a student at the medical faculty. 
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agenda; a left wing government had fallen over the question of deflation, which was 
linked in business circles to roll-back of social reform. A parliamentary conservative 
coalition dependent upon special powers was installed. The. election of 1928 had 
shown that the conservative Weimar parties were losing support to proto-fascist sec-
tional parties which in the elections of 1930 would be swept up by the Nazis. From 
this point on, however, the histories of France and Germany diverge. Whilst in the 
form of the Croix de Feu a mass fascist party did emerge, it did so in circumstances in 
which it stood little chance of coming to power. To explain why this was so is our 
next task. 
From 6th February to June 1936 
After 6 February the tone of the JP became ever more violent, though its moderate 
current was not eliminated.163 Auguste Allaix declared in February that the "national 
revolution"--a term borrowed from Hitler and Mussolini--was under way. In 
May he reminded leaguers that they had the duty and the right to keep arms in their 
houses. 164 At about the same time as Victor Perret, Allaix turned against Doumergue. 
He demanded rule by decree, dissolution of the Chamber, suppression of "anti-na-
tional" parties and Masonic lodges, revocations of civil servants and strict controls on 
immigration. 165 
But by now the JP counted for little in comparison with the Croix de Feu. By 
the end of 1934 the latter eclipsed all rival leagues. In this section we will firstly ex-
plain why the Croix de Feu became pre-eminent. Then we will ask whether or not this 
league was fascist. Thirdly, we will explain why, in spite of the crisis of the constitu-
tional right in 1934 and 1935, the Croix de Feu did not come to power. 
The central reason for the success of the Croix de Feu was its ability to present 
itself as independent in political and social terms. 166 The centrality of this theme can 
be seen in a VN tract of 1935: 
163 L'Alerle, April, 1934. It was now represented by Andre Gacon-Camoz, who was also an activist in the Feder-
ation. He too referred to a "national revolution", but for him it meant merely an elected president and constitu-
tional reform. 
164 L 'Alerle, May, 1934: "Vous avez Ie droit et Ie devoir d'etre armee et bien armes, si vous tenez a votre liberte, 
a votre vie. Chaque membre de la ligue doit donc posseder chez lui son equipement compiet, afin d'etre pret a 
marcher au premier signal. N' avez aueune crainte. Si la loi vous defend d'avoir sur vous des armes, elle ne vous 
empeche point d'avoir chez vous des annes pour proteger votre vie, en cas de besoin.I1 y a done un nuance et vous 
avez Ie droit pour vous". 
165 L'Alerle, September. 1934. 
166 AN 451 AP 81: in a letter of 18-7-1930 Louis Gros, the first president of the Croix de Feu in the Rhone wrote: 
".v0us n'ignorez pas que no~e association reste jalousement independant des partis politiques quels qu'ils soient et 
hent avant tout choses a son mdependance". 
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Les Volontaires Nationaux 
sont 
Farouchement independants 
Soli dement organisees 
Leur programme est simple 
Servir la France 
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To be perceived as independent was vital for a movement which promised reconcilia-
tion of a divided nation. In this respect the Croix de Feu were well placed simply by 
virtue of being a new movement, untainted by the compromises forced upon the AF 
and JP.1 67 But this does not explain the success of the Croix de Feu relative to a 
movement like Solidarite franr;aise, of which the corporatist and authoritarian pro-
gramme was more or less identical. The Croix de Feu's above party image was culti-
vated in a variety of ways. 
Firstly, the Croix de Feu was able to exploit its proximity to the veterans' 
movement. It made much of its status as an elite among veterans, though with the dis-
advantage that in the early years many had joined simply for the prestige of wearing 
its insignia.168 In conservative eyes the generation de feu was synonymous with fra-
ternity, class collaboration, independence and the national interest. Also the Croix de 
Feu appropriated some of the prestige of the army as embodiment of the nation. The 
reference to the veterans' movement could also be incorporated into a radical conser-
vatism. The idea of service in the trenches implied both submission to hierarchy and a 
sense of equality in the war generation. In this way it could help to contain the contra-
dictions of a movement of "conservative revolt", preventing it from turning into a 
general assault on the established order. 
The nature of the league's leaders reinforced the claim to independence. At 
fIrst the Croix de Feu had drawn some of its leaders from the JP. Louis Marchal was 
the best known. 169 Another leader, Morin-Pons, was well known as a member of a 
banking family. In the course of 1934 and 1935 the Croix de Feu able to eliminate too 
visible representatives both of big capital and of other political movements. 170 The 
Croix de Feu were now led by political unknowns, with a liberal sprinkling of retired 
lieutenant-colonels. l71 Possession of a mass party gave the Croix de Feu a degree of 
autonomy not possessed either by notable parties or by other parties of the far right. 
167 There is therefore something in Stemhell's claim that the pure fascism of intellectuals, which claims to be 
above parties, is corrupted by contact with reality. The reason, however, is not because "pure fascism" really is 
"neither left nor right", as Sternhell would have it, but because even fascist intllectuals are not completely able to 
distinguish the general interest from the bourgeois interest. 
168l.A Releve, 7-12-1930. 
169 For example, Colonel Chene and Charles Favre-Gilly, both of whom had been presidents of the JP. 
170 This pattern coincides with that identified by Philippe Machefer, ("Les Croix de Feu", op. cit., passim), who 
argues that in the course of 1935 la Rocque attempted to secure the independence of the Croix de Feu from fi-
nanciers like Pierre Pucheu and Ernest Mercier. . 
171 In the PSF, and probably also in the Croix de Feu, it was official policy not to choose as leaders either busi-
nessmen or those who had ocupied prominent positions in other leagues. 
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Thirdly, the Croix de Feu were careful not to involve themselves in political 
alliances. This was one reason why la Rocque had been reluctant to participate in the 
demonstrations of 6th February. Even this was turned to advantage. Louis Marchal 
answered criticism of la Rocque's temporization by stressing that the Croix de Feu 
would act only where success was certain--he did not reject the principle of an at-
tempt to invade the Chamber. l72 In this way the Croix de Feu were able to cultivate 
the idea that la Rocque somehow held the fate of the nation in his hands. 173 After 6 
February the league continued to keep its distance from the rest of the extreme right. 
The Croix de Feu did not adhere to the Front national, formed in June 1934. This 
body grouped in the Rhone the JP and Solidarite fran~aise, and enjoyed the informal 
support of the AF.174 In 1936 the Croix de Feu did not even participate in the com-
mittee which had traditionally organized the Joan of Arc parade. 
Pierre Milza sees the absence of contact between the Croix de Feu and the ex-
treme right as evidence that the former were not fascist. He also makes much of links 
to Tardieu in 1931-2.175 Apart from the obvious objection that history is littered with 
alliances between fascists and the parliamentary right, P. Milza makes too much of 
support for Tardieu, which had been an episode in the pre-history of the league, and 
which in the Rhone had amounted to very little in any case.t76 In 1934 and 1935 la 
Rocque's league were keen to dissociate themselves from the parliamentary right. The 
Croix de Feu distanced itself from the Doumergue government more rapidly than any 
of its rivals: la Rocque's description on 7th February of the government as "un 
pansement provisoire sur la gangrene", was widely publicised in the Rhone. To be 
sure the dressing should not be ripped off, but the Croix de Feu should hold them-
selves ready to clean out the wound. l77 We have seen that the Croix de Feu had fewer 
contacts with the Federation than the JP or even AF. 
So much for the reasons why the Croix de Feu outdistanced its rivals. But 
does all of this amount to fascism? Some have seen the Croix de Feu programme as 
too "vague" to be fascist. It is certainly difficult to ascertain la Rocque's programme 
from his Service public, published in 1934, on which most historians have relied. Re-
fusal to pronounce on questions of policy, was, however, deliberate, as the failure of 
the Croix de Feu in the Rhone to endow the movement with a regular journal sug-
gests. In fact "vague" is not really a good way of describing Croix de Feu ideology. 
172 One of the grievances against la Rocque of Paul Chopine, a former leader of the dispos in Paris, was that the 
Croix de Feu had managed to appropriate the glory of 6th February without having done anything on that day (Paul Chopine, Six ans chez les Croix de Feu, Paris, 1935). 
173 For example La Republique lyonnaise mockingly reported a Croix de Feu member who believed that la 
Rocque "tenait Laval". 
174 AN F7 13 028, 16-6-1934. The royalists declared their willingness to participate in "action" against the com-
munists. 
175 Milzs. op. cit., p. He also mentions La Rocque's saving of Laval in November 1935, when he agreed to a 
truce ... 
176 G. Howlett, op. cit. pp. points out that their was in policy terms little convergence between Croix de Feu and 
Tardieu. 
177 Nouvelliste, 10-2-1934. Note again the images of the war. 
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More exactly the movement displaced questions of policy into a future where they 
would be resolved by a putative corporate system, and where those responsible for di-
viding the nation would have been eliminated. In spite of this deliberate imprecision, 
it is possible to detect a few simple themes in Croix de Feu propaganda. But these 
cannot be analysed separately from the actions of the movement: the Croix de Feu 
were expert in the art of propaganda by deed. 
Restoration of state independence makes sense as a slogan in a context where 
the state was perceived as having fallen into the hands of sectional and occult inter-
ests. As Andre Rossignol put it "il faut un Etat independant et fort, affranchi de la 
dictature de l'argent, affranchi de la dictature occulte des loges qui nous gouvement 
aujourdnui dans des buts internationaux et mysrerieux". Rossignol goes on to outline 
a series of constitutional reforms. They are broadly similar to those demanded by the 
Federation. and, moreover by just about every other group on the far right, including 
Solidarite jranr;aise, which is generally seen as fascist. 178 There is therefore no need 
to go into detail. The lynchpin is a strong president, whose mode of election was 
never mentioned,179 whose function would be to arbitrate conflicting interests ex-
pressed through a corporative system. Parliament would occupy only a secondary 
role. 180 Corporations would be based on "de-politicized" syndicates, which would be 
forbidden to organize on the national level. 181 Suspicion of pluralism is revealed by 
the notion of one militant that "Ce mouvement est decide a nettoyer ce pays des ele-
ments troubles qui l'agitent et a assurer a la France une vie d'ordre et d'honneur: la 
franc-ma~onnerie est la principale responsable du desarroi de notre pays". 182 
It should also be borne in mind that constitutional questions were not a major 
theme of Croix de Feu propaganda,183 Much more common were ambiguous denun-
ciations of parliamentarianism and electoralism. Rossignol, for example, asked 
"croyez vous vraiment que Ie luxe de ce parlementarisme actuel qui n'a rien resolu 
des problemes du jour corresponde aux angoissantes realites de demain?"I84 During 
the campaign for the 1936 elections Le Flambeau declared that it did not expect reno-
vation to come from a failed electoral system, but that the league would nonetheless 
attempt to ensure that good candidates were put forward. 185 Certainly there is ambi-
guity here, for this could be seen as expressing a preference for a different system of 
178 Solidaritefran~aise du sud-est, 7-2-1934 and 12-3-1934: A strong elected seven year presidency, universal 
suffrage, female vote, family vote, extra-parliamentary ministers, parliament to lose the right to propose financial 
laws, corporatism etc. 
179 So much for the plebiscitary tradition. 
180 Flambeau du sud-est, 15-10-1934. 
181 As la Rocque put it in Service Public, the elective principle would be retained-the aim of the Croix de Feu 
was rather to "ecarter les inconvenients du suffrage universel, aujourd'hui admis dans tous les pays du monde", by 
means of constitutional reforms. 
182 Nouvelliste. 19-6-1935. 
183 Rossignol's article in October 1934 is the only published discussion of the issue in the Rhone in the entire pe-
riod from February 1934 until the dissolution of the league. 
184 I.e Flambeau du sud-est, October 1934. 
185 I.e Flambeau du sud-est, April 1936. 
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voting. But on the other hand there is no clear distinction between opposition to par-
liament and opposition to democracy tout court. There is evidence that the national 
leaders of the league made no such distinction.186 
The radicalism of the Croix de Feu is underlined by the anti-elitist and anti-
capitalist current. The message that the Croix de Feu were "a l'abri des partis et des 
politiciens, contre la haute finance internationale", was hammered home in countless 
tracts. 187 Indeed, the principal argument deployed to refute the idea that the Croix de 
Feu were fascist was that they were independent of capitalism.188 This anti-elitism 
was not merely rhetorical. The programme of the Croix de Feu included measures 
such as state control of the bank of France, and the acceptance that temporarily at 
least the state would have to take a leading role in the organization of corporations. 189 
Anti-capitalism must be understood in relation to the recruitment of the league among 
the "anti-establishment" bourgeoisie and lower middle class. It translates both a long 
term crisis of the liberal-silk hegemony in Lyon and a conjunctural feeling that the 
establishment had failed in its tasks. In future, France would be governed by a new 
elite drawn from front-line veterans, a familiar notion in the ancien combattant 
movement. One militant described himself as an old soldier returning to service to 
save France for a second time: "pour refaire la France aussi pur qu"elle l'avait ete 
pendant quatre ans et demi".190 
Related to anti-elitism was a quasi-insurrectionary motif. This is implicit even 
in Louis Marchal's defence of the Croix de Feu's inaction on 6th February: "[la 
calme] est conforme a la consigne des Croix de Feu «ne se meier a aucune agitation 
sauf quand it s'agit d'une action forte et qui reussira»".191 As he put it on another oc-
casion, honest men were not obliged to follow those with dirty hands.192 The national 
leadership encouraged such a spirit by repeated references to H-Hour and D-Day, and 
by frequent "alerts".193 This does not, as will become clear in a moment, mean that 
the Croix de Feu aimed at violent overthrow of the Republic. 
This brings us to the paramilitarism of the Croix de Feu. Its members were, 
like those of rival movements, engaged in "routine" conflicts such as those between 
186 In private the national leadership of the Croix de Feu did not make this distinction. In a document drawn up to 
explain the league's attitude in forhtcoming elections, it is stated that although Hitler and Mussolini had achieved 
"interesting results" through electoral methods, they could not be used by the Croix de Feu: "II est hors de doute 
que Ie mouvement Croix de Feu est d'inspiration anti-parlementaire. Beaucoup de membres eprouvent une verita-
ble repugnance pour les elections. Ceux-Ia ont donnees leur adhesion aux Croix de Feu comme un protestation 
contre Ie system politique actuel et parce qu'i1s des formes et des possibilites d'actions politique nouvelles". 
quoted in Howlett, op. cit., p. 
187 ADR 4m 236, tract of December 1935. 
188 Nouvelliste, 4-10-1935. 
189 Le Flambeau du sud-est, April 1936: programme for the elections of April and May. 
190 Nouvelliste, 4-10-1935. 
191 Nouvelliste, 15-2-1934. 
192 Nouvelliste, 23-1-1934. 
193 It is also worth pointing out that amongst the leadership of the Croix de Feu in the Rhone were men such as 
Charles Favre-Gilly, who warned in the journal of the JP that after the unarmed demonstrations in Paris, "qu'une 
autre fois les Nationaux descendront armes et bien armes, afin de pouvoir resister a egalite avec les forces poli-
cieres qui seraient tentes de recommencer leurs belles prouesses" (L 'Alerte, 14-2-1934). 
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paper sellers in the rue Republique. Chance meetings of leaguers and anti-fascists 
sometimes got out of hand. In November 1935 four dispos returning from a demon-
stration got out of their car to rip down anti-fascist posters in Villeurbanne, where-
upon they were shot at by a pro-communist cafe owner. One of the dispos was seri-
ously injured in the face.1 94 In Villefranche in the summer of 1934, a young metal 
worker who was a member of both the Volontaires nationaux and Action fran~aise 
shot an adherent of the SFIO youth group. 195 
More important are the secret mobilizations held by the league from the winter 
of 1934. Rene Remond sees these as "political boy-scoutism for grown-ups". At most 
the Croix de Feu borrowed the outer trappings of fascism.196 A recent thesis on the 
Croix de Feu maintains that la Rocque's purpose was to sustain the enthusiasm of his 
followers whilst keeping them out of trouble.197 These views are open to criticism. 
Boy-scoutism was designed amongst other things as preparation for military training 
and war. Form and content of a movement are not in practice easy to distinguish. Rit-
ual submission to authoritarian discipline is in fact central to a movement of which 
the goal was reconciliation of a fractured society. Even if such trappings were bor-
rowed-doubtless in some measure they were--one would still have to explain 
why these particular symbols were appropriated by this particular movement. The 
second argument rests on the belief that La Rocque was playing a kind of double 
game, aiming at the transformation of the league into a conventional political party. 
This is a teleological argument, for which, moreover, there is no evidence other than 
the fact that the PSF moved in that direction. 198 A sounder method is to look at these 
mobilizations in their context. 
The use of the term "paramilitary" to describe the famous motorized sorties of 
the Croix de Feu is not misplaced. In October 1934 instructions arrived from Paris or-
dering that in case of "serious events" in any part of the country local leaders were to 
convoke all members. They were to assemble on the outskirts of the town, where 
drivers would receive sealed envelopes containing their destination, which were to be 
opened in the course of the journey. The eventual destination would be unknown even 
to the regional leaders. At about the same time leaders were required to take the oath 
of "unquestioning" obedience referred to above.199 This tactic was adopted partly as a 
defensive measure, for since February 1934 the meetings of the far right had been sys-
194 Lyon republicain, Nouvelliste, 28 and 29-11-1935. 
195 ADR 4m 269, report of the Sub-Prefect of Villefranche; La Republique lyonnaise, 21-7-1934. The Sub-Prefect 
believed this to have been a premeditated attack. The CUlprit received three months imprisonment plus a fine. 
196 Remond, op. cit., p. 290. Pierre Milza admits that these manoeuvres, with their elaborate rituals, are similar to 
those of "totalitarian" movements, but stresses that Croix de Feu violence remained at a symbolic level. Since P. 
Milza does not consider the implications of a symbolic appeal to violence, Rene Remond's distinction between 
formal borrowings from totalitarian regimes and the essence of the movement seems to lie behind this argument 
(Milza, op. cit., pp. 135-6). 
197 Howlett, op. cit., passim. 
198 In fact the only evidence we possess of the league's private intentions suggests the opposite. see footnote 186. 
199 AN F7 13 028, 27-10-1934. See also page 261. 
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tematically disrupted by anti-fascists. 2OO Secret mobilizations represented both a tacti-
cal retreat and a radicalization of the Croix de Feu in that it reinforced the semi-clan-
destine nature of the league. 
Subsequently almost all Croix de Feu demonstrations conformed to this pat-
tern. Since the supposedly secret instructions for the first such rally fell into the hands 
of an anti-fascist newspaper we are well informed about it. The plan was for two days 
of events, to be camouflaged behind a fund-raising sale and a musical evening. On the 
morning of Saturday 22nd December la Rocque was to arrive unannounced by plane. 
Dispos were to assemble at Place Tolozan in Lyon, from where they would depart for 
a rally at Bourgoin in Isere. They would keep badges and arm-bands in their pockets 
until the order to don them came from section leaders. Members were also warned 
"aucune initiative personelle doit etre prise". The orders concluded with the instruc-
tion that the note should be burned once its contents had been memorized.201 
In the event things did not go as planned. On Saturday morning Lyon republi-
cain appealed for a "riposte ouvriere et democratique" at place Tolozan.202 At the last 
moment the organizers changed the assembly point, but a number of Croix de Feu 
went to place Tolozan where they were met by a hostile crowd. The demonstration 
was not, however, a complete fiasco, for 200 dispos were able to set off from the al-
ternative destination. On the following day 3,000 people heard la Rocque speak at a 
cinema in Lyon.203 A circular from Marchal announced that the affair had proven that 
the Croix de Feu were a force against which attempts at revolution would be bro-
ken.204 
This fiasco should not detract from the significance of such manoeuvres. They 
fall into three categories. Firstly there were major nationwide mobilizations such as 
those commemorating the battle of the Marne in September 1935. According to the 
press 5,000 Croix de Feu from all over the south-east assembled at Grand-Lemps 
(Isere). Pierre-Joseph Arminjon, a Nouvelliste journalist who accompanied the col-
umn from Lyon described enthusiastically how the manoeuvre had been organized in 
scrupulous secrecy at twenty-four hours notice.205 It is perhaps this kind of exercise 
which comes closest to Remond's "boy scoutism". But Arminjon was in 1937 to de-
scribe with the same boyish enthusiasm his participation in a squad which helped 
break a strike of farm workers in the department of the Marne. He described the fol-
lowing exchange when he reported for duty: 
- Vous ne craignez pas la bagarre? 
- Je suis ancien ... enfin ... dissous si vous voulez. 
200 Weng Ting Lung, "L'Historique et la doctrine des Croix de Feu", These de droile. Nice, 1970, pp. 46-50. 
201 La Fleche, 29-12-1934. 
202 Lyon republicain 22-12-1934. 
203 ADR 4m 236, 26-12-1934. 
204 La Fleche, 19-1-1935. 
205 Nouvelliste, 23-9-1935. The Lyonnais leadership was informed of the route on departure, and of the fmal des-
tination whilst on the road. 
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- Bien, bien; mais attention: pas de politique. Vous etes uniquement Ia pour sauvez la re-
colte.206 
277 
The Marne mobilization was more than a mere picnic. It is hardly credible that they 
were not seen by participants as preparation for some sort of future action, or that they 
were not designed to overawe and intimidate political opponents.207 
A second category of demonstrations were not merely "harmless" expeditions 
to the fields. Rather they were organized sorties into working class suburbs, probably 
organized on departmental initiative. As the orders for one motorcade put it, "the 
greatest secrecy must be maintained in order to retain the advantage of surprise". 208 In 
1935 there were a series of expeditions to such destinations as St. Etienne, Ville-
franche, Vienne, and Givors. The St. Etienne motorcade, in which 500 dispos trav-
elled in a convoy of 104 cars was probably the most impressive after the Marne com-
memoration.209 In late August 1935 a caravan of dispos arrived in the industrial 
commune of Decines, a few kilometres to the west of Lyon in Isere. They proceeded 
to fill the town and according to the mayor to annoy the inhabitants. A counter-
demonstration was rapidly organized. As the dispos emerged from a meeting projec-
tiles were thrown and revolver shots exchanged. A number of Croix de Feu were in-
jured and their cars damaged.210 It is difficult not to see an intimidatory purpose in 
such activities. The unexpected arrival of a motorized and highly organized convoy of 
dispos in an overwhelmingly working class area, in a period when cars were still a 
rare sight outside of affluent city centres, cannot be interpreted in any other way.211 
When the extreme social and political segregation of the Lyonnais agglomeration is 
taken into account, along with the concentration of Croix de Feu membership in the 
bourgeois centre of the city, then motorcades take on the character almost of an inva-
sion of a foreign country. They can also be seen as a ripost to increasingly frequent 
left wing demonstrations in the centre of the city. Philippe Burrin distinguishes Croix 
de Feu violence, designed merely to intimidate the left, from that of the Nazis, who 
provoked disorder in order to pose as the sole rampart against anarchy.212 Yet in 
206 Nouvelliste, 28-7-1937. 
207 As a Nouvelliste editorialist put it, "aurait-on il y a trente ans mobilise des dizaines de milliers d'hommes a 
cinquante kilometres de leur residence pendant tout une journee, en les astreignant a porter leur repas, uniquement 
pour leurs faire accomplir quelques mouvements d'ensemble et entendre plus au mains de discours vibrants, sinon 
eloquents? Certainement non! (Nouvelliste, 22-6-1935). 
208 La Fleche, 26-1-1935. Whilst the police knew that the rally was to take place, they did not know of its desti-
nation. (ADR 4m 235, January 1935). On the occasion of the Decines rally the police were at fIrst informed of the 
meeting, but then told that it would not take place. (PV Conseil municipale Decines, 27-1-1936). 
209 ADR 4m 235, June, 1935. 
210 PV Conseil municipale Decines, 27-1-1936, (thanks to Annie Grange for this information). Lyon republicain, 
21-9-1935. 
211 Henri Dubief's description of Croix de Feu sorties is only a little exaggerated: "Mobilized in military forma-
tions the dispos went in for commando-style operations. Armed and motorized they would move into places where 
the local authority was left-wing controlled, and behave as if there was a civil war on, directing traffIc at cross-
roads and pretending to occupy public buildings. If the locals objected they would provoke a fight, and blood was 
sometin=mes shed in the enduing brawls". (P. Bernard and H. Dubief, The Decline of the Third Republic, 1914 to 
1938, Cambridge, 1988). 
212 Burrin, op. cit., pp.191-2. 
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practice this distinction was meaningless, for Croix de Feu activities could and did 
provoke disorder.213 
This emerges too from consideration of the third type of Croix de Feu mobi-
lization: the set-piece parade in the centre of Lyon. From 1934 the focus of Croix de 
Feu commemorative practice shifted away from war memorials to the annual march 
to the statue of Joan of Arc. Partly this was because marches were forbidden on 11 th 
November 1934. But it was also a sign of politicization.214 Since the tum of the cen-
tury Joan of Arc had been the major historical symbol of the extreme right. 215 Many 
saw the jl!te Jeanne d'arc as a rival to July 14th. As the Nouvelliste put it in May 
1935, "en face de taus les dangers interieurs et exterieurs que court la patrie, les patri-
otes lyonnais, sans distinction d'etiquette, unis dans Ie meme amour du pays ont de-
cide de celebrer comme i1 convient la fete nationale".216 
The Croix de Feu made no effort to distance themselves from this view of the 
commemoration. The Jeanne d'arc parade represented an opportunity for a large 
scale paramilitary parade. The order of march for May 1936 laid down that at the 
head of the column were six cars, followed by twelve cyclists and 24 dispos in two 
ranks of twelve. Next came the regional leadership, the standard and its guard and the 
wreath, all protected by files of dispos on each side of the street. Then came the four 
sections, marching in step with one metre between files and 1.5 meters between ranks. 
The rear of the column was brought up by sixteen dispos and eight cyclists. Marchers 
were to wear a jacket, medals, arm-bands and insignia. Smoking was forbidden. 217 
The military tone was further emphasized by the fact that the Croix de Feu column di-
rectly followed that of the army. The standard of Croix de Feu became visible in the 
Avenue Marechal-Fochjust as the ge regiment of cuirassiers disappeared.218 
The purpose of such demonstrations was firstly to over-awe opponents. The 
11 th November parade of 1935 was to impose "Ie respect a ceux qui seraient tentes de 
Ie troubler. Les evenements que nous vivons nous ordonnent de montrer notre cohe-
sion, notre discipline".219 Secondly, such parades were an implicit reply to those of 
the Popular Front. The point was taken by the Nouvelliste, which described the 1936 
Joan of Arc parade, which it believed to be the largest ever of its type in Lyon, thus: 
[ ... J Ceux qui avaient assiste au passage des hordes communistes Ie premier mai sont pro-
fondement impressionnt!s par Ie contraste. Tandis que les Moscoutaires avaient defile dans un 
desordre indescriptible, derriere leurs drapeaux rouges et leurs pancartes haineuses. hurlant 
213 In any case it is to be doubted whether even Nazi activists consciously adopted a Machiavellian strategy of this 
type. 
214 ADR 1m 171,25-10-1935. In Villefranche in 1935 the Croix de Feu were excluded from the official parade of 
the veterans' movement for political reasons. 
215 ADR 1m 171, 16-11-1928. In Lyon the statue of Joan of Arc at Place Puvis de Chavannes in the 6th ar-
rondissement, inaugurated in 1928. had been built by a committee presided over by Antoine Salles. 
216 Nouvelliste. 16-5-1935. My italics. 
217 ADR 1m 172,16-5-1935,11-11-1935, May 1936. 
218 Nouvelliste. 11-5-1936. 
219 ADR 1m 172.11-11-1935. 
The Extreme Right, 1929 to June 1936 
«l'intemationale», criant des injures A toute une partie de la population, les Croix de Feu 
marchent dans I'ordre et dans Ie silence qui font une enorme impression sur Ie foule.220 
279 
The parade was an allegory of the type of society desired by the Croix de Feu, one in 
which order, hierarchy and military discipline would be applied to civil society, and 
in which government would be in the hands of the war generation. This is reinforced 
by the role of women and children, who were to line the route in order to create 
favourable ambience among spectators. The role of the Croix de Feu is to serve as the 
unifiers of a society divided by the class hatred preached by the communists. 
The place occupied by violence in the Croix de Feu is then a complex one.221 
The Croix de Feu presented themselves as both guardians of order and as a movement 
prepared to challenge the status quo. This apparent paradox was reconciled by the 
contention that the Croix de Feu were either acting against, or preparing to forestall, a 
communist action, and by the implication that the league had taken upon itself a re-
sponsibility which the state could no longer fulfil. 222 Croix de Feu mobilizations 
share characteristics of those of both the Italian fascists and the Nazis. Like those of 
the Nazis Croix de Feu parades were designed mainly to overawe opponents and to 
win converts by presenting the league as the only force capable of defeating the left. 
The Croix de Feu differed from the Nazis partly in degree, for the French movement 
was clearly less violent, and did not make a cult of violence for its own sake. The idea 
of mass mobilizations was borrowed from Mussolini, but whereas the squadristi were 
prepared to evict left wing local governments, the Croix de Feu stopped short of actu-
ally investing town halls. 
So Croix de Feu violence was not designed to overthrow the state. Yet neither 
did the league have a strategy for the winning of power by constitutional means, for it 
condemned as futile both participation in elections and the idea of a conservative 
majority. Given la Rocque's "H-Hour" rhetoric there can hardly be any doubt that 
members expected the movement to win power. Many must have believed that a 
communist coup would provide the pretext for a Croix de Feu government. The lead-
ers probably hoped that if the social and political situation deteriorated sufficiently 
then the La Rocque would be called upon to form a government of "public safety". 
His movement would merely need to demonstrate its efficacy as a unifying force and 
potential government. Paramilitary manoeuvres were one means of doing this. 223 
So were the Croix de Feu fascist? The example of the Rhone eliminates cer-
tain interpretations. The Croix de Feu did not aim merely at a reformed democracy 
with a strengthened executive, for neither their constitutional nor their social ideas 
were democratic. Neither can the Croix de Feu be seen as a dictatorship of the 
220 Nouvelliste 11-5-1936. 
221 The argument which follows owes much to R. Bessel, Political Violence and the Rise of Nazism. London, 
1984. 
222 See Louis Marshal's declaration that the Croix de Feu represented the force against which a revolutionary as-
sault would break (page 276). 
223 La Rocque's replies to the committee investigating the events of 6th February support this interpretation. 
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"traditional" ruling class, for the league contained a real "anti-establishment" and 
anti-capitalist strand. This feature of the Croix de Feu also rules out the view of 
Robert Soucy that the Croix de Feu pursued conservative goals through violence, as it 
does the view of the Communist Party that the Croix de Feu were merely an instru-
ment of monopoly capital. William Irvine is correct to see the Croix de Feu as inau-
gurating a new style of politics, but this is only part of the story. 
In 1934 and 1935 many varieties of conservative called for reassertion of the 
primacy of the national interest, strengthening of the executive and limitations on the 
reach of the elective principle. Where the Croix de Feu differed was in that their so-
lution was a radical one. It was based on a mobilization of rank and file conservatives 
through a mass movement which arrogated to itself the task of cleansing the nation 
and restoring its unity. The league implicitly challenged the state's monopoly of vio-
lence in order to restore order and was a political and social threat to the establish-
ment. The radicalism of the Croix de Feu was, however, contained within the limits 
of its origins as a conservative revolt. In short, the Croix de Feu differ from constitu-
tional and authoritarian conservatism in their combination of radicalism and reaction, 
mass politics and violence. In terms of the definition used in this chapter the Croix de 
Feu were fascist, even if they were more moderate than Italian and German move-
ments. 
Whether the Croix de Feu were fascist or not, we still have to explain why the 
league failed to win power. The most common explanation, the lesser depth of the cri-
sis in France is not sufficient. Indeed, it is arguable that in June 1936 the French 
bourgeoisie experienced a threat at least equal to that in Italy in 1918 to 1921 or in 
Germany after 1928. More interesting is Rene Remond' s suggestion that fascism 
could not implant itself in France because of the strength of its democratic tradition, 
especially that of the lower middle class embodied in the Radical party. The right too, 
Remond argues, was relatively impermeable to fascism, for it was divided between a 
traditionalist wing which looked back to the ancien regime, and a liberal-Orleanist 
wing which had long since accepted democracy.224 
This argument is not acceptable without qualification. One could object that 
just as France has a stronger tradition of democracy than Germany, so it also has a 
longer history of radical rightism. Our study has shown the mutability of such tradi-
tions. We have seen how the "traditionalist" wing of conservatism adapted itself to 
the modern world and how it contributed to the development of a radical right, 
thereby transforming itself in the process. We have also seen how corporatism and 
authoritarianism emerged from the collapse of the Orleanist tradition of the Lyonnais 
224 R6mond, Les Droites en France, pp. 222-223. Having experimented with many forms of government the 
French were, he argues, cured of the temptation to follow political adventurers. It should be noted that Remand 
uses this argument to explain two things which must be kept separate. First, to explain why leagues (which Re-
mand does not believe to be fascist) did not win power. Second, why fascism could not take root in France. 
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bourgeoisie,225 and that some pro-Radical small businessmen were turning towards 
anti-parliamentarianism. 
Neither does R. Remond leave any room for the fact that in concrete historical 
circumstances individuals may have at least a partial understanding of the ideological 
traditions which surround them. On this basis they are sometimes able to make delib-
erate use of them. This was precisely what the Popular Front did. In France the reac-
tion of the left to the threat of fascism was fundamentally different to that of its 
counterparts in Germany and Italy. The Popular Front developed a three part anti-fas-
cist strategy which effectively reduced the room for manoeuvre of the far right.226 It 
comprised action on the streets, material demands and exploitation of the democratic 
tradition. Detailed analysis of anti-fascist strategy is outside the scope of this study. 
But the most important components were as follows. 
Let us look fust at street politics. In the Rhone the events of 6th February in-
augurated a period of regular demonstrations and often violent clashes between left 
and right. Already in the summer of 1934 the Lyon police were warning the Interior 
Ministry of "a certain anxiety" amongst the population caused by "les reunions et 
manifestations qui ont eu lieu dans toute la France depuis Ie debut de l'annee et au 
cours desquelles des violences ont ete exercees de part et d'autre".227 In 1934 and 
1935 firearms were used on at least nine occasions, there were two deaths, and a 
number of serious injuries. Many of these were chance encounters, for example be-
tween groups of paper sellers.228 
What is most interesting, however, is that whilst during the 6th February crisis 
an AF militant had been able to boast that "the streets belong to us",229 the initiative 
was very quickly lost to the left. After February the conservative press is full of com-
plaints that meetings of the far right were being consistently troubled by anti-fascists, 
"dans des conditions qui font de chaque manifestation une emeute sanglante".230 In 
March the AF cancelled a meeting in the 6th arrondissement after receiving threats 
from the left.231 At about this time the JP and AF were reportedly holding talks with 
225 Orleanists had, of course, sponsored Boulanger. 
226 It is arguable that the tactics of anti-fascists in Britain were instrumental in causing the decline of the BUF, 
though it had in any case presented much less of a threat than the French extreme right. See R. Skidelsky, Oswald 
Mosley, London, 1975, p. 386 for his interpretation of the consequences of the disturbances at Olympia. 
227 AN F7 13 028,3-7-1934. In October 1934 Herriot wrote to the Prefect to protest at the "intolerable incidents" 
which had occurred in several campaign meetings for the local elections (Nouvellisle, 3-10-1934). 
228 Nouvellisle, 10-6-34: on 9th June 1934, for example, several police charges were needed to disperse a crowd 
on Place Bellecour. Headline: "Assez de bagarres - rue Republique". See also La Republique lyonnaise, 16-6-
1934. Something of the atmosphere can be gauged from a published threat from the JP: "nous tenons a renouveler 
aux bandes socialo-communistes que dans Ie cas ou un crime serait commis sur un JP, nous n'hesiterons a abattre 
comme des chiens les responsables" (L 'Alerle, April, 1935). 
229 LA Republique lyonnaise, 20-1-1934. 
230 La Republique lyonnaise, 14-7-1934. Similarly, Auguste Allaix in L 'Alerle, September 1934: "Ies partis anti-
nationaux sont maitres de la rue et n'attend que Ie moment propice pour s'emparer des leviers de commande et 
mettre France en pillage". 
231 Lyon republicain, 8-3-1934, Republique lyonnaise, 10-3-1934. Several militants turned up anyway, and in-
evitably fighting broke out. Revolver shots were fired and a Camelot well-known to the police was injured by a 
bullet in the shoulder. 
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the Croix de Feu and certain veterans' groups with a view to organizing protection for 
their meetings.232 
The most spectacular confirmation of the new balance of forces was provided 
by a meeting held in a hall off Place Carnot on 20th June 1934. The purpose was to 
seal the recent formation of the Front national, so security was provided jointly by the 
JP, AF and SF. Jean Renaud, national leader of Solidarite franr;aise, was to be the 
main attraction.233 Hundreds of invitations were distributed.234 Meanwhile anti-fas-
cists, largely by means of graffiti in working class districts, called for a counter-
demonstration.235 The meeting was a disaster. Jean Renaud could not hide his dis-
pleasure on finding that only 200 had turned out to hear him, but he thanked those 
who had not been "too frightened" to come.236 Outside a crowd of 6-700 fought a 
pitched battle with the police A communist died some days later of his wounds. At the 
end of the meeting Renaud's audience had to exit under police cover, hiding their in-
signia out of fear of the communists.237 
Not only did this fiasco ensure that Solidarite franr;aise would make no mark 
upon Lyonnais politics. It was also a major defeat for the AF and JP. After this date 
neither league appears to have come into direct contact with the communists except 
when selling newspapers, or when their members were beaten up by the them.238 The 
only exception was a private war between AF and Gaston Bergery's Front Social. 239 
By the end of 1935 the AF and JP were once more reduced to seconding the parlia-
mentary right.24o Meanwhile communists disrupted the meetings of the far right al-
most at will. 241 This pattern appears to have been repeated across France. It was the 
background to La Rocque's decision to hold only secret large scale meetings, and 
helps to explain why in conservative eyes the Croix de Feu became the only credible 
anti-communist force. 
232 AN F7 13 238, 13-4-1934. The results are not reported, but the Croix de Feu must have refused their support. 
233 AN F7 13 238,19-3-1934,5-4-1934. Solidarilefranraise first showed signs of life in the Rhone at the begin-
ning of 1934, largely as a result of the activity of Jacques Reifenrath, a member of the national leadership of SF 
charged with organizing the "13th region". Reifenrath had little success. An inaugural congress had to be post-
poned, and by March 1934 Reifenrath owed, if the police are to be believed, 50,000 francs in the region, the tele-
phone and electricity had been cut off at his headquarters and the furniture re-possessed. Only alliance with the JP 
and, informally, the AF, in the Front national gave the league any influence. 
234 Humbert Isaac refused to allow the UNC to patronise the meeting. Prost, op. cit., vol 2, p. 165. 
235 AN F7 13 238,18-6-1934. 
236 AN F7 13 238, 22-6-1934. He then launched into a violent diatribe in which he urged his audience to "unmask 
a Freemason each day, and to point them out in the street as if afflicted by a contagious disease". The speech was 
punctuated by cries of "death to the Freemasons!" 
237 AN F7 13238,22-6-1934,25-6-1934. Jean Renaud sent a telegram to the Minister of the Interior complaining 
that he had received insufficient protection from the police. 
238 For example, Johanny Berlioz of the JP was beaten up by communists on the day of the 1935 Joan of Arc pa-
rade as he went to get the league's flag from the boot of his car. 
239 AN F7 13028,30-6-1934, Nouvellisle, 28-6-31. in June 1934 an AF member was killed in a gun battle which 
followed a royalist attempt to seize the Front social's newspaper, La Fleche. AF was also able to mount an attack 
on the relatively soft target represented by a Marc Sangnier meeting in favour of international co-operation 
(Nouvelliste, 15-3-1935). 
240 Both leagues took up Victor Perret's cause against Laurent Bonnevay 
241 The communists were even active in disrupting league meetings in the countryside. For example the JP suf-
fered counter-demonstrations at Arbresle in May 1935 and at Champagne au Mont d'Or in July 1935. The former 
led to a quite a serious incident. 
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But by late 1935 it was apparent that these tactics too were counter-produc-
tive. In September the Croix de Feu had begun a series of large scale paramilitary 
manoeuvres, thereby contributing to a serious rise in political tension. In October the 
national press was full of rumours of a coup d'etat. On 16th November there were se-
rious clashes between anti-fascists and the Croix de Feu in Limoges.242 The situation 
was calmed only when a Croix de Feu deputy, Jean Ybarnegaray, offered the dis-
arming of all leagues, thereby avoiding the withdrawal of Radical support from the 
Laval government. 
Pierre Milza sees this as evidence of Croix de Feu subservience to the parlia-
mentary right.243 It is true that from this date the Croix de Feu became less combat-
ive. Large scale motorcades were abandoned after 5th December, until they were re-
sumed by the PSF. La Rocque himself, having arrived unannounced in Lyon on De-
cember 20th, declared that those who had joined the Croix de Feu in search of vio-
lence or adventure would be eliminated. 244 
But this change of tactics was forced upon the league. Even after this date the 
Croix de Feu retained its sceptical attitude to constitutional methods. There is no evi-
dence, contrary to what some historians have claimed, that la Rocque was now plan-
ning to transform the Croix de Feu into a parliamentary party.245 More important was 
the left's reaction.246 On December 2nd Rhone anti-fascists declared a "levee en 
masse". Mayors of left wing communes warned of an imminent coup. In Tarare 
preparations were made to block communications between Lyon and Paris. The town 
hall of Villeurbanne was protected by the hoses of the municipal fue brigade. One ru-
ral commune was reported to have blocked its main street with a cart.247 The Lyon-
nais Croix de Feu responded tamely with a poster which proclaimed "Le mouvement 
Croix de Feu n'est pas generateur de desordre. nne veut provoquer personne".248 
To Radical voters, however, the Croix de Feu appeared in a rather different 
light. Given that in the Rhone, at least, communist disruption of right wing meetings 
was far more frequent than the reverse, it is perhaps surprising that Radicals should 
almost universally demand dissolution of the leagues, not of the Communist Party.249 
Further research would be needed to explain why this was. But one reason is that anti-
fascists were able to present themselves as defenders of order against subversive 
242 Typically, the immediate cause of this riot was an anti-fascist counter-demonstration outside a Croix de Feu 
meeting. See r. Dixon, "Limoges under Vichy", M. Phil. thesis, Warwick, 1987. 
243 Milza, op. cit., p. 139. 
244Nouveaulournal,20-12-1935. 
245 On the contrary, the only evidence we have suggests the opposite. See footnote (7). 
246 The obvious falsity of the belief that the Croix de Feu were planning to seize power is immaterial. On the 
other hand some of the accusations, for example that the Croix de Feu were planning to rehearse the 
"neutralization" of the Town Hall of Vi1leurbanne, have an air of credibility. This type of manouevre had been car-
ried out in the past Moreover, Lyon republicain's information on the league had often turned out to be correct in 
the past. 
247 Lyon republicain, 1st-4th December, 1935. 
248 Nouveau lournal, 3-12-1935. 
249 On the attitude of Herriot and the Radicals to the leagues see Berstein, op. cit., vol 2, pp. 392-3. 
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leagues. Clearly the events of 6th February themselves were grist to the anti-fascist 
propaganda mill. The French left, unlike its German and Italian counterparts, was able 
to do this because it subordinated the vocabulary of revolution to that of republican 
defence, thereby undermining the credibility of the Croix de Feu as a force able to re-
store order. This in turn permitted the Popular Front to transcend the sectionalism of 
politics in the early 1930s. The German and Italian mistake of focussing on class is-
sues was not repeated. 
The call for a "levee en masse" undermined for an audience sensitive to the 
Jacobin tradition the claim of the Croix de Feu to represent the nation. Similarly Lyon 
n?publicain's comparison of Rouillon, regional delegate of the Croix de Feu, to 
Deroulede, who had "appeared before the High Court for much less" exploited Radi-
cal opposition to personal power. Most important, perhaps, the left insisted on the 
manipulation of the Croix de Feu by big capital. This again was presented in terms of 
Republican opposition to "financial feudalisms". The "200 families" slogan had the 
triple advantage of connecting with this Republican view of aristocratic capital, of 
exploiting the tendency of petty bourgeois movements to personalise their enemies, 
and of permitting the inclusion in the Popular Front of "good capitalists". 
The third component of Popular Front strategy, on which there is no need to 
insist, was its attention to the material needs of the lower middle class. As well as the 
inherent attractiveness of, for example, a comprehensive grain policy, this tended to 
reinforce claims that the Croix de Feu were subservient to monopoly capital. 
The total effect of the Popular Front's propaganda was to undermine the Croix 
de Feu's ability to combine defence of order with opposition to the political and eco-
nomic establishment, a delicate balance at the best of times. Instead, in Radical eyes 
the Croix de Feu appeared to be a subversive movement in the pay of monopoly cap-
ital. The effectiveness of Popular Front strategy is not just visible in the sphere of 
politics proper. In the previous chapter we saw how the turn to the right of pro-Radi-
cal small-businessmen was contained, if not reversed, in 1934 and 1935. Similarly, 
we saw how the CFfC were attracted by the material demands of the Popular Front. 
Even some sections of business saw the forty hour week as a means of limiting over-
production. 
As for the Croix de Feu, they succeeded better than the parliamentary right in 
presenting themselves as independent from sectional interests. Where the Federation 
addressed its audience as property owners, and often openly defended the interests of 
a section of the ruling class, the Croix de Feu spoke only of Frenchmen, avoided the 
old quarrel over religion, and avoided detailed pronouncements on policy. This was 
sufficient to win over many Federation supporters, as well as some supporters of the 
centre right, especially sensitive to the appeal of "reconciliation". But the vocabulary 
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of the Croix de Feu tended to reinforce the Popular Front's picture of the league as a 
new edition of the counter-revolution. 
The leagues, and perhaps also fascism, failed to come to power in France 
partly because of the actions of the left. It must not, however, be forgotten that the left 
operated in more favourable circumstances in France. Working class unity alone 
could not have prevented the rise of fascism in Germany or Italy. The absence of 
mass unemployment in France made it easier to use the strike weapon for political 
purposes. The Republican-democratic tradition itself helps to explain the readiness 
with which the left embraced the Popular Front in the fIrst place. Through the Radical 
press the anti-fascists had privileged access to the lower middle class. It is important 
too that the police, in Lyon at least, saw themselves as part of this democratic tradi-
tion. The far right often complained of being placed on an equal footing with the 
communists. In Lyon, at least, state and fascist violence did not reinforce each other 
as they did elsewhere. 
One last reason for the failure of the Croix de Feu is that they did not win the 
backing of either the political or the economic establishment. There was no marriage 
of the authoritarianism of the elites with the radical conservatism of the Croix de Feu. 
On the national level fIgures like de Wendel and Mercier were interested by the 
league. But worried by its radicalism. They never considered La Rocque as anything 
other than than a last resort. 250 In the Rhone leaders of the "constitutional" right such 
as Victor Perret and business leaders like Henry Morel-Journel were certainly disen-
chanted with parliamentary democracy. Big business as a whole in the Rhone had be-
come somewhat detached from political parties in the early 1930s. Yet beyond proba-
ble contributions to Croix de Feu coffers there is little evidence of backing for the 
Croix de Feu.251 The Croix de Feu would be turned to only when there was no alter-
native. In France, although a very serious political and social crisis did develop, the 
unity of the left together with the reliability of the police, made a break with the ex-
isting regime a very risky proposition. 
To sum up, the Croix de Feu can be seen fIrstly in the context of local politics 
as the consequence of the disintegration of the liberal-silk hegemony. We can see in 
the Croix de Feu a version of the democratic corporatism of the engineering industry 
in the late 1920s (minus the largest firms) adapted to new conditions, together with 
elements of the social Catholic movement. This new alliance was cemented by corpo-
ratism, anti-communism anti-capitalism, and authoritarianism. This re-emphasized the 
250 AN p7 13 241.20-7-1935. On de Wendel and the leagues see Jeanneny. De Wendel. p. 705. where it is argued 
that de Wendel always had two irons in the fire. financing varius leagues. but devoting the bulk of hios efforts to 
the Federation republicaine. De Wendel. in AN p7 12900.4-7-1935. is said to have aided the Croix de Feu out of 
fear of the left. but was doubtful whether la Rocque was capable of resolving the problems that would arise once a 
dictatorial regime had been established. His aim was to replace la Rocque once he had won power with someone 
enjoying the respect of the army and possessing greater prestige in the country. 
251 The left claimed that such firms as Gillet were financing the Croix de Feu. Given that the Gillet and other big 
firms were at this time financing the Frant;istes. this might well be correct 
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extent to which the Federation had become the party of the Catholic, liberal and silk 
establishment. 
It has also been argued that the Croix de Feu were a fascist movement. Their 
fascism was, however, relatively moderate. This is to be explained to a considerable 
extent by the circumstances in which the league operated. Whereas in Germany and 
Italy fascists ad been able to count on the support of police, army and many parlia-
mentary conservatives, and faced a deeply divided left, this was not the case in 
France. The league had been obliged to adopt a semi-clandestine posture at the end of 
1934, to retreat further in December 1935, and then in June 1936 the league tamely 
accepted dissolution by a communist backed government. 
Chapter ten 
Bourgeois society and the Popular Front 
"Nous commen90ns a nous apercevoir que les promesses demagogiques de M. Leon 
Blum dans son journal et les promesses plus larges encore publiees dans «l'Humanite» 
ont fait croire a certains ouvriers que Ie grand soir est proche".1 So commented the 
Nouvelliste on the industrial action at Renault at the end of May. Yet even a newspa-
per as ready to prophesy doom as the Nouvelliste could hardly have foreseen the mas-
sive wave of factory occupations which began in Paris on 2 June, which quickly 
spread to the provinces and which were not even calmed by the concessions of a 
frightened patronat at the Hotel Matignon during the night of 7 and 8 June. 2 
In the Rhone, there were hardly any strikes at all until after the signature of the 
Matignon accords} This is not the place to examine in detail the strikes which began 
in earnest on 8 and 9 June in large metallurgical firms such as Berliet. Suffice it to 
note that an agreement to respect the Matignon accords signed by employers and 
unions in the presence of the Prefect on 10 June had little impact. Strikes soon spread 
to the whole of the department and affected most sectors, from silk weaving to large 
cafes and department stores. The peak of the strike wave came on 25 June, a day on 
which there were perhaps 35,000 on strike. By the end of the month the movement 
had more or less subsided. The two most bitter disputes, in the Gillet factories and the 
building industry, ended in triumph for the workers in early July. Building employers 
had to give in after 3,000 workers invaded their headquarters.4 According to the ad-
ministration's figures some 70,851 workers had been involved in strikes in Lyon and 
the suburbs by 13 July.s This represents about half of the workers and employees in 
the agglomeration. 
Historians, blessed with the gift of hindsight, have generally dismissed the 
idea that France was on the brink of Revolution in June 1936. They are doubtless cor-
rect to do so. But this does not mean that it is necessary to agree with Antoine Prost 
that the strikes were merely a collective celebration. 6 The most recent interpretations, 
those of Jean Kergoat and Julian Jackson, are more nuanced.7 They agree that al-
though the workers were not always clear about what they wanted, the strikes did 
raise the issue of power relations within the enterprise and that the workers were con-
1 Nouvelliste, 28-5-1936. 
2 The best recent accounts are J. Jackson, The Popular Front in France. Cambridge, 1988. and 1. Kergoat, La 
france du Front populaire. Paris. 1986. 
3 The following brief account of the strikes of JU:f: 1936 in the Rhone is compiled from the press and from the ac-
counts..pf the Procureur de la republique (AN BB 8 especially 3010). 
4 BBllS8 3010,27-7-1936. 
5 BB1 3010,31-7-1937. 
6 A. Prost, "Les greves de juin 36: essai d'interpretation", in R. Remond (ed.), Leon Blum. chef de gouvernement. 
7 Kergoat, op. cit, ch. 5. 
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scious of this. So too were employers in the Rhone, for one of the chief preoccupa-
tions of the Chamber of Commerce in June 1936 was to secure from the government a 
statement of support for the principle of private property.8 But a challenge to political 
relations was only implied. The workers did not question the coalition with the Radi-
cals, even though that party's opposition to occupations was well known. 
Jean Kergoat goes on to suggest that some of the preconditions for revolution 
were present. There was a crisis of intermediate groups. We have seen how in the 
Rhone both white collar workers and the self-employed had become detached from 
conservative leadership, and were hesitating between fascism and the Popular Front. 
In June there was a wave of unionization on the part of middle managers and engi-
neers, temporarily at least under the influence of the COT.9 There is no need to insist 
on the divisions of the bourgeoisie or the paralysis of the right. Even during the 
strikes some employers remained favourable to the Popular Front. 10 
Conservatives then had good reason to believe that Revolution was possible. 
Furthermore, in the conservative mind revolutions were the work of ruthless minori-
ties. So the fact that the workers themselves did not directly challenge state power 
was irrelevant. It was expected that the left would profit from disorder in order to 
stage a Bolshevik-style coup.ll This is the view which emerges from a letter of Victor 
Perret to Louis Marin written on 17 June: 
La situation a Lyon est effrayante et se complique de jour en jour. Nous sommes dans une sit-
uation vraiment revolutionnaire et tout ce que vous avez predit se confrrme une fois de 
plus-.-Mais je me d~mf~de ou M. Blum veut en venir et s'il attendra les emeutes qui ne 
sauralent tarder pour agrr. 
On the other hand Perret was not certain that a revolutionary situation would develop 
into actual revolution, for he went on to discuss tactics for the coming parliament. But 
there can be little doubt that Perret was conscious of a threat to the status quo. 13 
Those closest to the workers temporarily discarded the illusions of conserva-
tive propaganda. This can be seen in an exchange in the Chamber of Commerce be-
tween Philippe Rivoire and Joseph Vulloid, the latter fresh from negotiating with his 
workforce: 
M RNOIRE [ ... 1 voudrait connaitre l'attitude de la CGT. M. VULLOID repond qu'elle est 
d'accord avec les patrons. Des engagements ont ete pris sous l'arbitrage du Gouvernement et ils 
ne sont pas respectes. C'est tout la question. M RNOIRE demandant s'il n'y a pas un syndicat 
communiste plus puissant que celui de la CGT, M, VULLOID precise qu'il n'y a qu'un syndi-
8 PVCCL, 11-6-1936. As Henry Morel-lournel put it, "Comment pouvons nous seconder les efforts du Gou-
vernement pour retablir Ie confiance s'illaisse propager de fausses nouvelles, comme celIe qui promet a la classe 
ouvriere la propriete prochaine des entreprises ou elle travail?", 
9 Kolboom, "Patron at et cadres"; Maurice, op. cit., passim. 
10 PVCCL, 22-6-1936: P. Rivoire lamented in the Chamber of Commerce that "une importante minorite [des 
commer~antes1 etaient resolue a ne rien faire qui puisse nuire au succes du mouvement populaire actuel qui est 
sense devoir ameliorer les conditions de vie des ouvriers". 
11 Nouvel/isle. 30-5-1936. 
12 AN 317 AP 72. Perret to Marin, 17-6-1936. Vinen. op. cit.. p. 33. quotes a similarly ambiguous attitude on the 
part of another Lyonnais businessman. 
13 The same ambiguity emerges from the a letter of another Lyon industrialist written in September, in which he 
both expressed fears of sovietization and civil war and analysed the concrete consequences of production losses. 
Quoted in R. Vinen. op. cit., p. 33. 
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The Nouvelliste, like Rivoire more distant from the factories, spoke of a "Judeo-
Marxist conspiracy". 15 
What is more, conservatives were aware that they had lost control over events. 
On 12 June Morel-Journe1 concluded a session of the Chamber of Commerce by say-
ing that for the moment there was little to be done except to remain in contact with 
the Prefect. 16 Some weeks later in his diary he dreamed of a "gesture" which would 
reconcile patrons and workers)7 Perret merely advised readers of Union republicaine 
to keep cool heads. 18 One measure of this sense of powerlessness was desire of so 
many conservatives to show that they had always wanted social reform. The only 
reservations were on the 40 hour law, but this was safe, for it was not scheduled for 
immediate implementation. One member of the Chamber of Commerce, Ariste Pot-
ton, passed the summer writing a novel in which he described how the crisis was re-
solved in quasi-miraculous fashion by a "non-political" and extra-parliamentary min-
istry headed by a businessman from Grenoble, who had been called upon by despair-
ing politicians. 19 
In the longer term conservatives overcame their disorientation. Nevertheless, 
June 1936 had profound consequences both for the right and for bourgeois society in 
general. A complex dialectic of unity and division within the bourgeois society will 
be described. The threat from the left unleashed a powerful drive for unity of all those 
who believed they had something to lose. By 1938 there was in interest group politics 
a tacit alliance of large and small business with the CFfC and agricultural organiza-
tions, united in opposition to the CGT. Yet the issues which had divided conservatives 
before June 1936 did not disappear, and were aggravated by Popular Front legislation. 
The result was that cohesion in the field of industrial relations contrasted with a fur-
ther deterioration in relations between the bourgeois parties. 
The Decline of the Chamber of Commerce 
The response of employers to the June strikes has been seen in three ways. Adrian 
Rossiter argues that the progressive wing of business welcomed certain of the reforms 
which resulted from the strikes.20 They turned against the government only because it 
did not abide by assurances about the Forty Hour Law. Richard Vinen, in contrast, 
14 PVCCL, 11-6-1936. Edmond Weitz, also reporting from a sector which had been badly hit by the strikes stated 
that if it was difficult to make certain employers see sense, it was even more difficult for the CGT to persuade the 
"dernier manoeuvre de la demiere usine". 
15 Nouvelliste, 14-6-1936,22-3-1936. 
16 PYCCL, 11-6-1936. 
17 Journal d'Henry Morel-Journel, 29-8-1936. 
18 The same advice was widely repeated as the Germans approached four years later. A Nouvelliste editorial of 
25-6-1936 advised that all that was possible was to set an example to others through one's personal demeanour. 
19 Ariste Potton, On a trouve un chef, Lyon, 1937. His first action was to break the CGT by appealing directly to 
its members in an unofficial referendum, after having confounded its leaders with the powerful common sense of 
h~ reasoning. 
2 A. Rossiter, Unpublished conference paper, 1985. 
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contends that the employers movement did not undergo fundamental changes in the 
aftermath of June. The same big business clique remained in control. Its sole aim was 
to undo the reforms of the Popular Front.21 A more nuanced argument is that Ingo 
Kolboom, who argues that in the summer of 1936 the CGPF was transformed on the 
initiative of modern sectors such as the radio-electric industry. They exploited the 
disarray of the CGPF leadership and the discontent of small business in order to con-
vert the CGPF from a pressure group into a protagonist in a system of institu-
tionalized industrial relations. Modern sectors joined with conservatives in a re-
vamped CGPF, able to playa central role in the revanche des patrons.22 
It is the latter view, with some qualification, which best fits the Rhone. In the 
late 1920s the main division within the employers' movement had been between 
liberal silk interests and reformists in the engineering industry, with a minority of big 
silk fIrms wavering between the two camps. The Chamber of Commerce had been 
controlled by the liberals, while AICA had been aligned with reformists. Both sides in 
this conflict were led by large firms, with family fIrms (as far as can be known) 
generally following the lead of the big firms in their sector. With the onset of the 
depression a larger number of big weaving, dyeing and artificial fIbre firms became 
detached from the liberal silk camp. They moved towards a wider big business 
alliance based on moderate protection, corporatism and a pragmatic attitude towards 
labour relations. June 1936 hammered the final nail into the coffin of the liberal-silk 
hegemony, for the social context and legal-institutional framework within which the 
patronat operated had been transformed. The Chamber of Commerce was eclipsed by 
AICA, which was better adapted to the new system of industrial relations. Some 
representatives of big business in the silk industry resisted the new state of affairs. But 
their opposition was weakened by the fact that it was based on a seemingly irrelevant 
tradition of silk leadership and on the narrowest of sectional interests.23 On most 
issues all sectors of big business were in reality in agreement. All were radically 
hostile to the reforms of June, though willing if necessary to adapt to them. Most were 
corporatist and anti-parliamentarian. The main division in the employers movement 
now ran between large and medium employers. The views of the latter were 
expressed through the Federation and PSF, rather than in the forum of interest group 
politics. 
June 1936 undermined further the position of an already hard-pressed Cham-
ber of Commerce. Employers were obliged to deal with workers' delegates in the 
factories; the law on collective contracts and later a system of conciliation and arbi-
21 Vinen. op. cit.. p. 11. H Kolboom. op. cit.. passim. 
R. Vinen is therefore half correct in his criticism of Kolboom's view that 1936 saw a victory for modern over 
traditional business. for in the Rhone antagonisms between AICA and the Chamber had been declining since the 
depression. On the other hand, June must be seen as part of a longer term transformation of patronal politics. 
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tration gave an important role to employers' syndicates.24 This automatically removed 
the Chamber of Commerce from centre stage. During the strikes fears had already 
been expressed that businessmen were turning for advice to their syndicates rather 
than to the Chamber.25 In the longer tenn it was Aime Bernard's AICA, affiliated to 
the CGPF, which made the running. The raison d'etre of AICA was the conduct of in-
stitutionalized labour relations. 
In an effort to preserve its position the Chamber adhered to a plan emanating 
from the Parisian Chamber of Commerce for a Comite national d'entente. This was a 
joint organization of employers' organizations in which Chambers of Commerce 
would playa central role.26 The CGPP accepted this plan as a means of providing it-
self with a front, thereby overcoming the discredit into which it had fallen as a result 
of Matignon. The committee also represented an effort to neutralize the wave of 
protest from small and medium firms which followed Matignon.27 Although it is arti-
ficial to separate this aspect of the reorganization of the employers' movement, the 
mobilization of small and medium business will be dealt with in the following sec-
tion. What is important here is the struggle between the Chambers and the CGPF. By 
the autumn the latter on the national level had lost interest in the Comite. Having 
staked its claim to leadership of the employers' movement through its opposition to a 
"second Matignon", it no longer needed a surrogate.28 
The same processes were at work in Lyon. On the one hand, Michel Delzeux, 
of the small business ACS, was strongly in favour of the Comite d'entente, seeing it as 
a means of fending off the danger of a new small business movement outside of his 
own control. On the other Henry Morel-Journel saw the Comite d'entente as a means 
to limit the influence of AICA. 29 This aim was apparently realized when towards the 
end of July 1936 the Comite was constituted in Lyon, for the bureau was dominated 
by the Chamber.30 The Comite d'entente's ftrst communique contrasted the role of the 
Chamber as the sole official representative of the patronat in the region, with the job 
of protecting sectional interests which fell to syndicates. Neither AICA nor the CGPP 
were mentioned.31 
The Comite d'entente seems briefly to have functioned quite well. But Bernard 
and AICA were not prepared to play second fiddle to the Chamber. In a speech of 1 
24 ADR 4m 236, 24-8-1936: The Prefect commented in August 1936 "on peut egalement souligner, en raison 
meme de l'application des nouvelles lois sociales, la tendance nette de s'organiser fortement tant du cote ouvrier 
que du cote patronal". 
25 PVCCL, 22-6-1936. 
29 On the Comite d'entente see Kolboom, op. cit, pp. 173-236; Vinen, op. cit., pp. 38-44. 
2 This would be achieved by a calculated confusion of Chambers of Commerce with small and medium firms. 
28 This interpretation is derived from Ingo Kolboom. 
29 PVCCL, 9-7-1936. No-one in the Chamber criticized this purpose. 
30 PVCCL, 9-7-1936; CRCCL, 1936, pp. 114-5. Two of the three bureau members were from the Cham-
ber-Paul Charbin (president) and Renaud, who was also there as a representative of the retail trade. The secre-
tary of the Comire was Ayme Bernard. Charbin, was chosen as President because of his "broad authority", mean-
ing that he had often been seen in the past as a compromise figure in patronal conflicts. 
31 CRCCL,1936,p.I13. 
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August Bernard argued that whereas the Chamber represented only local interests, 
and whereas syndicates expressed sectional concerns, AICA was able to combine the 
two roles and therefore act as interpreter of the higher interest of the motherland. 32 
The Chamber meanwhile publicly criticized the excessive role of the COPF, remind-
ing employers that its authority was recognized neither by the textile industry nor by 
the ACS.33 The turning point came in November, when the COPF in Paris presented a 
response to the government on the question of conciliation and arbitration without 
approaching the Comite d'entente. AICA members in the Lyon Chamber such as Ed-
mund Weitz protested their continued commitment to the Committee.34 In fact a 
change had clearly taken place.35 Morel-Journel expressed in January the hope that 
the Chamber would "reprennent une position qu'elles ont--il faut bien l'admettre, 
perdu provisoirement".36 The Comite d'entente became a means by which AICA 
transmitted its views. 
The defeat of the Chamber was due to the discredit into which it had fallen be-
fore June and the fact that AICA was better equipped to deal with labour relations. 
Furthermore, figures like Ayme Bernard and his deputy Johannes Dupraz were pro-
fessionals rather than businessmen, and so better able to pose as representatives of the 
general interest at a time when the patronat was still much divided. 37 And since AICA 
lacked official status it was freer engage in propaganda activities. It was able to orga-
nize in November 1937 a large rally of the local patronat at which all sorts of veiled 
threats were uttered against the government.38 Finally, the Chamber was perhaps slow 
to democratise its image because it took its own representativeness for granted. Since 
the strikes it had been encouraged to view itself in this way because the COPF's right 
to represent the patronat at Matignon had been widely contested. 
What was at stake in this conflict between the two bodies? The attitudes of the 
leaders of the two bodies to labour questions were more or less identical. 39 Certainly 
AICA took a more robust line in public, but this can be explained by the fact that the 
Chamber as an official body had to be more subtle in its pronouncements.40 In private 
Chamber of Commerce members were just as severe. We shall see that both were 
convinced from the beginning of the need to settle accounts with the COT, though 
32 Nouvellisle, 2-8-1936. 
33 The textile industries had withdrawn fonn the CGPF in protest at Matignon. It is typical of bourgeois organiza-
tions in France that the ACS should be affiliated to AICA yet not recognize the authority of the CGPF. 
34 PVCCL, 26-11-1936. The UCS had always had close links to AICA, but in the past had accepted the pre-emi-
ncnce of the Chamber. 
35 Essentially, leaders ofthe DCS like Weitz and Rivoire shifted their allegiance from the Chamber to AICA. 
36 PVCCL, 28-1-1937. Morel-Iournel was commenting on the recognition of the CGPF as the "most representa-
tive" patronal organization, and upon a Chamber of Commerce plan to democratize itself by converting the na-
tional association of presidents into a permanent assemmbly. 
37 This is stressed by Richard Vinen, op. cit., passim. 
38 Nouvellisle, 25-11-1937. 
39 For example, neither organization explicitly criticized the social laws before 1938. 
40 
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both were also willing, if necessary, to adapt to reforms if they could not be over-
thrown. 
Neither is there any clear political difference between the leadership of the 
two bodies. The majority in both Chamber and AICA were corporatists, and agreed 
that the liberal economy had had its day. In two respects they went further than before 
June 1936. In response to the strikes greater consideration was given to the role of 
labour in the corporatist system. Also, for reasons which will be dealt with later, some 
were now prepared to consider compulsory membership of syndicates. The Chamber 
officially endorsed the idea of legally backed ententes in 1936 and again in 1939.41 
Henry Morel-Journellooked forward to a two stage reorganization of the patronat: 
first employers would learn syndical discipline, then a new order would be created in 
which employer and worker syndicates would collaborate in the interests of social 
peace.42 Aime Bernard was against a generalized system of ententes, but recognized 
the need for greater syndical discipline in the transformation industries, and accepted 
that the syndicate ought to have the power to discipline recalcitrant bosses.43 
So what did divide AICA and the Chamber? To begin with there was a per-
sonal dimension. Henry Morel-lournel had long been opposed to the influence of 
AIeA, Ayme Bernard and Edmond Weitz. Morel-Journel's residual dislike of 
Weitz--who had once caused Morel-Journel's demotion from first to second Vice-
president--might well have influenced his conduct in 1936 and 1937. More im-
portant, Morel-Journel was emotionally attached to the Chamber of Commerce and 
was preoccupied with maintaining its prestige.44 He was also sensitive to the tradi-
tional association of the Chamber with the silk industry, seeing himself as heir to 
Isaac and Aynard. It is likely therefore that he saw the rise of AICA as a defeat for the 
silk industry. This might seem paradoxical given that on the main issue of the day the 
two sides were agreed. But what was also at stake was the leadership of the patronat 
in the region, and the ability to influence the government on a whole range of other 
questions.45 
That the balance of forces had shifted against the silk industry was demon-
strated by the fact that in the summer of 1938 the Chamber of Commerce itself ac-
cepted the need for reorganization. The soierie lost one of its eight seats, while other 
industries saw their representation increased from four to eight Wholesalers gained 
41 CRCCL, 1936, p. 190; PVCCL, 1O-1l-1938-the debate in the latter sitting over corporatism was about the 
principle of corporatism, but whether or not membership should be compUlsory, 
42 CRCCL, 1937, pp. 37-38. 
43 Bulletins et Documents de I'AICA, 1-5-1939. Thanks to Richard Vinen for allowing me to see this document. 
My interpretation of it differs from his in that I do not agree that Bernard was systematically anti-corporatist. 
44 He published a pamphlet extolling its virtues in 1937. (Le Chambre de Commerce de Lyon: Notes pour I'usage 
des membres, Lyon, 1937). 
45 PVCCL, 12-11-1936: that the national textile employers federation had withdrawn from both the CGPF and the 
Comite d'entenle may also have entered into Morel-Iournel's calculations, for this must have weakened his bar-
gaining power. Morel-Iournel was certainly displeased at the textile industry's withdrawal from the Comite d'en-
tenle. 
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one seat, retailers saw their representation doubled to eight. 46 There was no opposi-
tion in the full sitting of the Chamber. But six months previously Henry Morel-Jour-
nel had unexpectedly resigned as President. No reason is given in his diary; in the 
Chamber he cryptically referred to "des raisons de principe".47 Perhaps he could not 
bear to preside over the end of a great tradition. 
This brings us to the political attitudes of business. The eclipse of the Cham-
ber of Commerce was a severe blow to the liberal tradition. That both Morel-Journel 
and Dupraz were sympathisers of the corporatist PSF underscores the absence of a 
political division between AICA and Chamber.48 
In view of the discredit into which parliamentary democracy had fallen in the 
eyes of many businessmen since 1933, it is hardly surprising that June 1936 had done 
nothing to reinforce confidence in Republican institutions. Henry Morel-Journel be-
lieved that in accordance with the "law of number" the interests of employers had 
been sacrificed to those of the workers.49 AICA members like Johannes Dupraz were 
equally distrustful of democracy. Ariste Potton, on the other hand, maintained that re-
covery could be achieved without breaking with existing institutions. Government 
would be placed in the hands of an apolitical ministry composed of technicians, but it 
would be dependent upon the confidence of Parliament, and would not be granted 
special powers. Yet his ideas too were predicated upon the elimination of the commu-
nist party and CGT through a direct appeal to the rank and file coupled with repres-
sion of its leadership. 50 
Potton's ideas are illustrative of the fact that big business political strategies 
were open-ended. They could be seen as endorsing either the PSF or the 
"authoritarian republicanism" of Daladier. Even Morel-Journel was dubious about the 
PSF.51 His sympathy for La Rocque's party did not prevent him from attending 
meetings of the centrist Mascaraud committee in 1937 and 1938, or from welcoming 
the Daladier Government in 1938.52 Indeed, Morel-Joumel was an acquaintance of 
Daladier's Finance Minister Marchandeau, with whom he collaborated in his work of 
recovery. 53 Big business still possessed means of influencing the executive through its 
46 PVCCL, 6-10-1938. The reform was decreed by the ministry in August 1939, and would have been the basis of 
that year's elections. 
47 PVCCL. 23-12-1937, 
48 Potton, On a trouve un chef, passim, 
49 PVCCL. 11-6-1936: "C'est Renan je crois qui a dit que l'evidence elle-meme est impuissante en face d'une 
mystique populaire. OU cela va-t-il nous conduire? ... lci ou nous avons la charge de defendre Ie commerce et I'in-
dustrie, nous nous demandons si les patrons et leurs droits ne sont pas sacrifies d'avance aux ouvriers. plus nom-
breux qu'eux, aux nom de la loi du nombre dont s'inspire volontiers les democrates". 
50 Potton, On a trouve un chef, passim, and A Potton and J. Comparat, La revolution qu'ilfautfaire, Lyon. 1938. 
51 Morel-Journel dou~ted the party's ability to transcend the left right division. "Le PSF peut gagner du terrain, 
mais surtout sur Ie partl modere. car pour Ie masse il est Ie «fascisme». Fascisme, mot precieux qui est mis It toutes 
les sauces et designe ceux qui ne pensent pas comme vous". 
52 fournal d'Henry Morel-fournel, 11-4-1938: as "Ie meilleure que ron pouvait souhaiter avec la composition 
presente de la Chambre", 
53 fournal d'Henry Morel-fournel. 26-8-1936. 
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contacts with politicians operating on the margins of Radicalism and in the centre 
right The same flexibility characterized its attitude to social reform. 
Other businessmen possessed neither the political weight nor the economic 
margin for manoeuvre available to big firms. The important divisions within the pa-
tronat were now between large, medium and small business, rather than between en-
gineering and the silk industry or between reformists and conservatives. These con-
flicts were to be seen more in party than in interest group politics. 
Small business and the Popular Front 
For Ingo Kolboom the reorganization of the patronat in the second half of 1936 was 
due partly to the pressure of small and medium business, outraged by the "Matignon 
dictat". In accordance with his view that nothing really changed in June 1936, 
Richard Vinen denies that small and medium concerns were especially outraged by 
Matignon or the strikes. The discontent of small business was, he argues, an illusion 
created by big business for its own purposes. Those who claimed to speak for small 
and medium business represented in reality no-one. 54 The small business movement is 
of obvious importance in understanding the development of conservative politics after 
June 1936, for the PSF presented itself as an expression of the classes moyennes, and 
of their hostility both to the COT and those responsible for the capitulation of 7-8 
June. 
Both the ACS and its radical rival the UF were real movements, able on occa-
sion to mobilize substantial support amongst retailers. Certainly many of their de-
mands were quite acceptable to business in general. The ACS enjoyed a close rela-
tionship with big business. But we have seen that big business was often worried by 
the challenge from retailers. 55 After June 1936 the relationship between big and small 
business became more complex still. On the one hand, there was a greater willingness 
to set aside sectional conflict in the interest of unity against the left. Yet on the other, 
thanks to the reforms of the Popular Front, the reasons for conflict were if anything 
greater, whilst conscious opposition to big business was extended from small shop-
keepers to capitalist family fIrms. Already in the fIrst months of 1936 the Chamber 
had opposed a plan to modernize the national organization of the Chambers of Com-
merce on the grounds that it would give too much power to small chambers. This 
suggests the beginnings of a mobilization of medium firms.56 
There is much evidence of discontent on the part of small business in the 
Rhone after June 1936. In branches as diverse as engineering and the drinks trade 
there were challenges from those claiming to represent small business. 57 It is perhaps 
54 Kolboom, op. cit., especially Chapters 3 and 5; Vinen, op. cit., especially pp. 51-2. 
55 See Chapter 4. 
56 PVCCL, 14-5-1936. In early 1936 the Chamber was also manoeuvring against the new Chambre des metiers, 
seen as a threat to the institutional hegemony of the Chamber, and to the Chamber's control over apprenticeship. 
57 Nouvelliste, 20-3-1937, 24-6-1938. 
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surprising therefore to find that in spite of this there was scarcely any autonomous 
public activity on the part of small business. On the contrary, in the midst of the 
strikes the press announced the formation of a Cartel du Commerce, grouping various 
small business groups such as the ACS and UF, together with AICA and the UCS rep-
resenting big business.58 In the spring of 1937 retailers were in the forefront of agita-
tion against the forty hour week. For obvious reasons this campaign was viewed 
favourably by business in general. There was no repeat of the conflicts of 1933.59 So 
it is not surprising to find that a huge meeting at the Palais de la foire held to protest 
against the introduction of the forty hour week into the retail trade was patronized by 
the whole range of business associations, large and small. Henry Morel-Journel was 
amongst the speakers. For the UF Perroud admitted that many might be astonished to 
see his organization united with the "grand patronat" in the form of AICA, but in pre-
sent circumstances there was no choice.6o 
Furthermore, with time big business seems to have realized that it could afford 
to ignore the grievances of small business. The Cartel du commerce had marked its 
formation in June 1936 by issuing a series of demands which it asked the Chamber of 
Commerce to transmit to the government. These included several points unacceptable 
to big business.61 Some wished to balance the Cartel's text with a qualifying letter. 
More1-10urnel argued that the Chamber ought in current circumstances to demonstrate 
its concern for retailers. The solution adopted was to send the demands to the gov-
ernment, but without explicitly endorsing them. 62 
This was almost the only case where big business made concessions on such 
issues to small business. In the following months attention was focussed upon the rel-
atively peripheral question of purchasing cooperatives run by large firms. The will-
ingness of employers to suppress them became a symbol of collaboration between big 
and small business. But even here employers dragged their feet. 63 In the spring of 
1937 De1zeux complained that the CGPF did not expend sufficient energy in the de-
fence of small business.64 Such complaints were reiterated ad nauseam in the press . 
. Nevertheless, small business organizations never broke openly with big business. 
There were no repeats of the UF campaigns of 1933 and 1935. 
The reason for this is quite prosaic. Small business accepted that the main pri-
ority was defeat of the labour movement. As Delzeux put it, "Ies fran~ais sont divises 
en deux clans: les ouvriers qui n'ont rien a perdre et qui feront tout leur possible pour 
58 Nouvel/iSle, 25-6-1936. 
59 See Chapter 8, page 299. 
60 Nouvel/iSle, 14-5-1937. 
61 Such as the replacement of the turnover tax with production tax and state surveillance of wholesale prices. 
62 PVCCL, 25-6-1936. 
63 PVCCL, 1-10-1936. Representatives of the silk and metal industries claimed to support the idea in principle, 
but fearful of rising food prices, thought up all sorts of obstacles. . 
64 PVCCL, 15-4-1937. 
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gagner davantage, et ceux qui ont une boutique et voudraient bien la conserver". 65 
Small business leaders were well aware that if the COT were to be defeated then big 
business would have to take the lead, for it was only in big entreprises that the unions 
could be defeated. AICA and the Chamber cleverly exploited this weakness. As Ingo 
Kolboom argues, the key was the emphasis on unity of the "patron at", which united 
capitalists and petty producers, and made it possible to present attacks on big business 
as part of a Marxist conspiracy to divide the patronat.66 
The imperatives of the struggle of against the COT did not, however, remove 
the causes of discord between large and small business. Indeed, in some respects they 
were aggravated by the labour legislation of the Popular Front. One problem was that 
whilst business large and small agreed on the need for a show-down with the COT, 
big business possessed the leeway necessary to simultaneously pursue a policy of 
adaptation. 
Richard Vinen disputes the view that small business had any special reason to 
take a stronger line against the strikes of June 1936. Certainly many small businesses 
had escaped strike action. Probably about half of all wage earners in the agglomera-
tion were involved in the strikes. From partial statistics in judicial archives it can be 
seen that most worked in medium and large enterprises, employing somewhere be-
tween thirty and 300 workers. Only in the building industry were smaller firms widely 
affected.67 Yet if many small businesses escaped the strikes themselves, it was much 
harder for them to avoid their consequences. Unionization extended well beyond 
those firms where strikes had taken place.68 Above, all the intervention of the state 
meant that apart from very small firms, especially in remote areas, few could avoid 
wage rises or the forty hour week. It is not surprising that small shopkeepers who 
were obliged to grant concessions to their workers because of strikes in large firms 
saw Matignon as an injustice. 
What is more, they had some reason to be suspicious of big business. Cer-
tainly the latter would have preferred the suppression of Popular Front legislation. 69 
Indeed, before June many would have liked to undo the forty-eight hour and social in-
surance legislation too. Yet at the same time, the attitude of big business to social in-
surance and the story of the entente in the silk industry shows that many large firms, 
65 PVCCL. 22-6-1936. 
66 For example the views of engineering employers in Nouvelliste. 8-12-1937; CRCCL. 25-7-1938. See also Kol-
boom. ff' cit. pp. 263-288. 
67 BB 3010. We do not know the total number of strikes. so it is impossible to calculate the average size of en-
terprise affected. But we do know that there were 509 occupations. which means that the average of occupied firm 
must have employed well over 100 workers. Even the occupation of Berliet with its 5.000 employees does not 
much distort the average. since establishments of this size were rare. 
68 This is clear from Antoine Prost's study of the CGT, which shows that 98% of the "syndicalisable' workforce 
was unionized. His figures are dubious, but no sufficiently so to reject the view of very wide unionization. 
69 There is no reason to doubt the honesty of Henry Morel-lournel's defence of Matignon: "A un moment de 
desarroi, devant Ie spectre de la revolution qu'on agitait devant eux, ils ont du prendre sans delai leurs responsibil-
ites" (CRCCL, 4-2-1937). This is to agree with the assessment of Richard Vinen, op. cit. p. 37: "The Matignon ac-
cords were signed, not because certain industries found them acceptable. but because certain industries viewed the 
consequences of not signing the accords as unacceptable". 
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especially in modern sectors, were prepared to risk compromise with the left if there 
was no other way of gaining their ends. The same ambiguity applies to Popular Front 
legislation. Some employers were more willing and able than others to adapt to the 
new situation. Given that big business had been unable to do away with the Eight 
Hour Law or any other major piece of social legislation, there was good reason to 
adopt a flexible approach. 
Hence the attitude of employers to collective contracts. Those who had been 
interested in collective wage negotiations in the late 1920s had forgotten their enthu-
siasm when faced with the need to compress wages. But in the new situation created 
by June 1936 big business accepted collective contracts as an aid in social pacifica-
tion.70 In the longer term compulsory nationwide contracts also came to be seen by 
the silk, engineering and building industries as a means of ensuring that rivals did not 
gain an unfair advantage by paying lower wages or by avoiding social laws. Paul 
Charbin even complained of the "weakness of the COT in some areas". Only those 
who did their duty, he complained, were penalized.?1 In the silk industry employers 
got together with the CGT and CFfC in order to press for the prosecution of dissident 
firms.72 
Putting the small business point of view Michel Delzeux admitted that non-
observation of contracts was a problem, but he had no desire to see greater state reg-
ulation of small business. He opposed compulsory contracts on the grounds that the 
real problem was "travail noir" and competition from foreign artisans.73 Once the 
CGT had been defeated in the General Strike of November 1938 Delzuex and the 
ACS, unlike the UCS, rejected the idea of collective contracts altogether.74 There was 
then an intensification of a long struggle on the part of big firms to eliminate what 
they saw as unfair competition from small business. As in the conflict over the silk 
entente, big business was prepared to enlist the aid of the CGT to achieve its ends. 
There are other examples of big business flexibility. In January 1937 Henry 
Morel-Journel argued "nous ne perdrons pas notre temps a bouder des lois qui ont ete 
votees. Nous n'avons pas autre chose a faire que d'y adapter Ie mieux possible nos en-
treprises.75 As late as February 1938 the Chamber gave a guarded welcome to Prime 
Minister Chautemps's Statut Moderne du travail. The main purpose of this bill was to 
discipline the trades unions. But it included propositions which would have horrified 
employers before June 1936. Employers were particularly interested in compulsory 
and binding arbitration. True, it has been shown that employers were beginning to 
learn how to make use of the arbitration system for their own ends, but in February 
70 PYCCL, 22-6-1936. 
71 PYCCL, 25-2-1937. 
72 Voixsociale, 25-12-1937,14-5-1938,11-6-1938, 9-10-1938. 
73 PYCCL, 25-2-1937. 
74 Voix socia Ie, 4-2-1939. 
75 PYCCL, 1-4-1937. This advice was also published in CRCCL. 
Bourgeois society and the Popular Front 299 
1938 decisions were still being rendered which employers disliked. Institutionalized 
industrial relations made it possible for workers to express grievances, and sometimes 
gain satisfaction, which simply would not previously have seen the light of day, with-
out even having to strike.76 In one case, large and small business fell out over labour 
relations, with the ACS claiming that the willingness of UCS to agree wage rises for 
employees in department stores had forced small retailers to do the same.77 These ex-
amples have to be placed alongside the fact that big business was simultaneously do-
ing all it could to undermine the COT. The point however is that those who accused 
big business of joining with the COT in a conspiracy against small property had some 
basis for their suspicions. 
All the tensions which had caused small business movements in 1933 and 
1934 to flirt with the extreme right persisted. The PSF directed much of its propa-
ganda towards small business and especially small shopkeepers. The PSF militant 
Marcel Perdriel continued to playa part in the UFo In September 1936 he was re-
ported to have joined with two royalists in organizing a system whereby shopkeepers 
would be rapidly mobilized in the event of a new outbreak of strikes.78 Yet in general 
organizations representing small business remained faithful to the political centre. Al-
fred Elmigar, the UF's new Deputy, sat with the moderate right in the Chamber, 
where he made something of a fetish of parliamentarianism.79 Veuillez, President of 
the drinks trade association, publicly endorsed Herriot's candidature in the cantonales 
of 1937.80 We shall see in the following chapter that the PSF had only marginal suc-
cess in its efforts to win over the Radical electorate. 
Where the PSF was more successful, however, was in latching onto the dis-
content of small and medium capitalist firms. Such firms had been directly affected 
by strike action, were less able than big business to adapt to the new situation, and 
therefore their bosses echoed some of the themes of small business. Firms of this type 
were probably at the origin of organizations like the Syndicat de fa petite metal-
lurgie.81 But no body exclusively devoted to the interests of such firms emerged. 
Without a tradition of separate organization, and conscious of the need for a united 
front of the patronat, the discontent of family fIrms tended to be expressed, as we 
shall see, through political parties, especially the PSF. 
76 For the Chamber"s attitude to the Statut moderne see PVCCL, 24-2-1938. Proposals for union involvement in 
questions of hiring and firing were rejected. 
77 PVCCL, 25-2-1937. On another occasion large and small business fell out in the Chamber over the attitude to 
be taken towards its own employees at the Port Rambaud. Delzeux even balked at the cost of installing showers for 
the workers, arguing that a simple wooden structure with three or four showers would be suficient. Others regarded 
this kind of penny-pinching as a slur on the honour of the Chamber. 
78 ADR 4m 244, September, 1936. 
79 For example he joined the communists in opposing the vote of full powers to Daladier on 4-8-1937, because, he 
said, "j'entends rester integralement republicain. Les pleins pouvoirs sont opposes au Credo republicain et prepar-
ent Ie fascisme". 
80 Nouvelliste, 25-11-1937. Veuillez was, according to the Nouvelliste taken to task for this resaon by participants 
in the employers' rally of November 1937. 
81 One leader was Dietz, a PSF departmental orator. 
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To sum up, small business discontent at Matignon was real enough, and 
briefly big business appears to have been genuinely worried by it. Yet there is no evi-
dence that this discontent obliged big business to do anything that it would not other-
wise have done. On the contrary, small business proved more compliant than it had in 
1933 or 1935. But the threat from the left was insufficient to do more than displace 
the tensions which had divided employers before June 1936. Indeed, Popular Front 
labour legislation intensified certain conflicts. 
The CFTC and the Popular Front 
After June 1936 the CFTC expanded rapidly. Membership increased in the depart-
ment by 400%. In 1938 there were between 5,000 and 10,000 female and more than 
10,000 male members.82 The number of affiliated syndicates grew from nineteen, of 
which most had been inactive, to forty-eight, not including sections of national 
unions.83 
Much of this expansion was in traditional areas of strength in the centre of the 
agglomeration, where parishes were well structured. CFTC-metallurgy possessed in 
1938 six workplace sections, all of which were in firms located in or close to the cen-
tre of the city.84 In the textile towns of the Monts du Beaujolais, where religious 
practice was high, the parish system well developed, and the workforce in the textile 
factories mainly female, the CFTC had perhaps its greatest success of all. After June 
Catholic trades unions also expanded outside of such areas. There were sections d'en-
treprise in three St. Fons chemical factories. 85 CFTC white collar unions put up a rea-
sonable showing in the Prud'homme elections in Venissieux in 1938. 
As before June 1936 most members were white collar workers.86 Judging by 
the numbers of syndicates of technicians and supervisory personnel, the CFTC con-
tinued to appeal preferentially to higher grade salaries. Pre-1936 preponderance 
among the white collar workers of the silk industry was confirmed by the recognition 
of a CFTC dominated cartel as "most representative".87 In the banks too the relative 
position of the CFTC was unchanged. The CGT won 75% of the vote in the first 
round of delegate elections in 1936, but the CFTC represented a substantial minor-
ity.88 
82 Launey, La cnc, maps on pp. 401 and 402. The exact figures are given in the source document, but M. 
Launey does not reproduce them. 
83 Vou sociale, 16-4-1938. A Union departementale had also been created. 
84 Ets. Calor was sited in the middle of the parish of St Sacrement, an area of PDP strength. One of the CFfC's 
rare victories in delegate elections was in the Gillet factory on quai Serin (4th arrondissement). Of eleven known 
sections d'enlreprise, four were situated in central areas; four were close to those areas; three were in the chemical 
factories of St. Fons (see note 0). 
85 Rhone-Poulenc, St Gobain and Ste BlUe at St Fons, and Ste. Electro-chimie at Pierre-Benite 
86 Nationally there was a rise in the relative importance of industrial workers. Whether this happened in the Rhone 
is impossible to say. If there was such a rise it had few consequences for the CFfC in the Rhone. 
87 Vou sociale, 5-3-1938: i. e. the Corporation, the Syndical des dames employees, and the Syndical du passage 
ThiffaUl. 
88 ADR 4m 236, 22-10-1936; Voix Sociale, 13-11-1937. 
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Before June 1936 the CFTC had been attracted by the social, but not the po-
litical, programme of the Popular Front. June intensified this contradiction. Catholic 
workers were urged to participate in occupations; all of the social reforms of June 
were approved without reservation.89 New unions, especially in proletarian areas were 
often led by members of the JOC,90 the goal of which was re-Christianization through 
participation in working class life and culture.91 The JOC was not left wing. On the 
contrary it demanded vigorous suppression of all "fauteurs de brimades" and mea-
sures such as separation of the sexes in factories.92 But like the JAC, the JOC were 
prepared to mute their Catholicism in order to collaborate on practical issues with the 
left.93 A pointer to the future was the presence in JOC ranks in Lyon of a youthful 
Louis Althusser. Meanwhile there was a shift towards the left in the leadership of the 
CFTC. Auguste Gruffaz died in 1937. His place as president of the regional union 
was taken by Raoul Duclos, who was significantly further to the left. The Corporation 
itself was also transformed by the strike wave, as the small group of class collabora-
tors was swamped by new adherents. Its new leader Pierre Tolon was a PDP member. 
The new leader of the departmental union of the CFTC was the metallurgist and Je-
une republique sympathiser, Louis Naillod. 
Yet during the next three years the moderate centrism of the CFTC leadership 
matched the mood of the rank and file less and less. Perhaps the best evidence for this 
is that the expansion of the CFTC after June was accompanied by the collapse of the 
PDP, which had once been the political prolongation of Catholic trades unionism. 
CFTC leaders generally remained faithful to Christian democracy, or less often the 
Federation. But many of the rank and file turned to the PSF. There are a number of 
reasons for this. 
Rapid expansion led to an influx of members whose commitment to social 
Catholicism was sometimes superficial. One CFTC writer described a multitude of 
"sudden and unforeseen" conversions to the principles of syndicalism, which he at-
tributed to "the pressure of events" and the "menace of collectivization".94 Often the 
main motive for joining was opposition to the CGT.95 Anti-COT sentiment was rein-
forced by the fact that Catholic trades unionists, especially in areas where the CFTC 
had previously been absent, were often isolated in a sea of COT members, in an atmo-
89 Nouveau Journal, 19-6-1936. 
90 Vou socia Ie, 11-12-1937. such as Clause, animator of the new metallurgy section in Vlllefranche. 
91 Launey, LA CFTC, pp. 315-7. 
92 Nouvellisle, 30-11-1936 for the demands of the JOC. 
93 M. Launey, La CFTC, p. 333, interviewed Jean-Benolt Mayoud, a metal worker close to the JOC, who worked 
along these lines. J-L Pinal and M. Moissonnier, "Le Parti communiste franyais dans la region lyonnaise, (fin 
1938-finI940)", Cahiers d'Histoire, 1985, reports that after suppression of the party in 1939 Young Commu-
nists met at the homeof a sympathetic JOC member. 
94 Nouveau Journal, 26-2-1937. For such people the union was a necessary evil. 
95 Oral evidence gathered by M. Launey suggests that this was the most important single motive for joining the 
CFfC. (La CFTC, pp. 327-335). 
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sphere where there was a strong pressure to conform. The new syndicates were, 
moreover, not well organized.96 
It is also possible to detect a shift to the right in the old core of the CFfC. 
Even in normal circumstances the attitude of conservative white collar workers to 
trades unionism was ambiguous, seeing it as a means both of collective self-defence 
and of protecting individual career structures. The popularity after June of the term 
"collaborateur" to designate non-manual workers after 1936 is illustrative of the atti-
tude of many. The implicit threat to the social hierarchy in June 1936 and the fact that 
CFfC members were disproportionately higher grade employees, led to suspicion of 
the COT. 
Not withstanding Thorez's main tendue, many COT militants continued to as-
sociate Catholicism with the ruses of the patronat. In the polarized atmosphere of 
1936 to 1938 the CFTC's appeals for class collaboration and comprehension of the 
boss's point of view looked like a source of division.97 The COT was often reluctant 
to allow the CFTC a place at the negotiating table.98 CFfC members, often isolated in 
their workplaces, were vulnerable to the sort of treatment more often meted out to the 
SPF. Some were victims of the "conduite de Orenoble", which involved ritual humili-
ation by female workers,99 At Etablissements Visseaux (Vaise) workers struck in or-
der to oblige six CFfC adherents to join the CGT.100 
The CFTC was faced with the perennial problem of how to stick to its own 
path. Given the dispersal of Christian trades unionists, the much greater numbers of 
the COT, and the indiscipline of the COT rank and file, CFfC leaders realized that if 
they were to play any part at all in industrial relations, then there must be a re-estab-
lishment of order in the factories. Hence insistence on the demand that the COT re-
spect the right of workers to join the union of their choice. 101 The CFfC also saw in-
dex linking of wages as a means of avoiding strikes,102 demanded the reinforcement 
of collective contracts and wanted a strengthening of the labour inspectorate. 
Such demands brought the CFfC into a tacit alliance with the patronat. Em-
ployers usually preferred the PSF's trades union organization, the SPF, or the 
"independent" unions which mushroomed after June, onwards to the CFTC. Indeed, 
the rivalry of the SPF, which recruited in many of the same areas as the Catholics, 
was a factor restraining the rightwards drift of the eFfc.103 Yet a tacit alliance did 
96 Launey, op. cit., pp. 354-7. This was a problem on the national level. 
97 A polemic between CGT and CFfC in the banks touched directly on this. Voix socia Ie, 25-12-1937. 
98 Ironically, the CFfC was often excluded from a system of institutionalized industrial relations for which it had 
campaigned more or less alone. On this problem see Launey, La CFTC, 
99 Nouveau Journal, 16-2-1937. See chapter twelve on the use of the conduite de Grenoble. 
100 Nouvelliste, 17-9-1936. 
101 Voix sociale. 1-12-1936; Nouveau Journal, 10-11-1936. The CFfC did not, however, extend the principle of 
"Iiberte syndicale" to the SPF, seen as insufficiently independent. 
102 Voixsociale, 25-12-1937. 
103 Nouveau Jourrull, 27-4-1937. The CFfC often joined the CGT in denouncing the patronal pressure on which 
these unions were said to depend, and on the grounds that the SPF were not truly independent, refused to ally with 
it for any reason. The Corporation refused an offer from the SPF of a pact: "c'est justement a cause de nos 
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emerge, based on the common belief that the precondition of any constructive action 
was to discipline the CGT. 
The CFTC were also vulnerable to the ideological strategies of the patronat. 
Catholic trades unionists thought in terms of a divinely ordained organic hierarchy. 
Class conflict was only a secondary phenomenon. It would not disrupt the harmony of 
the profession as long as the underlying inter-dependence of things was kept in mind. 
Those who spoke in terms of the primacy of class conflict must therefore be bent 
upon the destruction of society for their own "political" and anti-religious ends. For 
these reasons Catholic trades unionists were ready to listen when employers claimed 
that they were not opposed to trades unionism as such, but only to its politicization. 
For similar reasons on 30 November 1938 CFTC leaders accepted the contention that 
strike action was unjustifiable at a time of national emergency. In other words pa-
tronal strategies exploited the contradiction between the social and the political views 
of the CFTC. 
There is also some evidence of pressure from the Church hierarchy upon the 
CFTC. This was part of a nationwide reaction agianst progressive Catholicism. 104 
Cardinal Maurin had always been a reluctant supporter of Christian democracy. In the 
midst of the strikes of June 1936 a pastoral letter reminded Catholics that they had the 
duty to join a trades union. Maurin reiterated the Church's condemnation of Marxist 
trades unions and urged workers to join the CFTC. Yet the letter implies that current 
events had demonstrated the failure of the CFTC, and ends by seeming to put CFTC 
and SPF on an equal footing.105 There is no need to dwell on the fact that the SPF 
frequently reproached the CFTC with being a confessional union. 106 What is more 
important is that Maurin seems to have perceived an opportunity to undermine the 
CFTC. A few days later Maurin published a clearer endorsement of the CFTC, indi-
cating perhaps that his first letter had not been well received. 107 
Cardinal Maurin died soon after in November 1936; with him disappeared any 
active attempt to undermine the CFTC. His successor Cardinal Gerlier was a former 
President of the AJCF, who had been a member of the General Commission of the 
Semaines sociales since 1923.108 Yet Gerlier was not prepared to tolerate deconfes-
sionalization of the CFTC. On the contrary, he presided personally over the silver ju-
principes de liberte syndicale qu'il nous paralt difficile de faire appel a votre syndicat" (SPF des Ouvriers el em-
ployes de soieries. Bulletin Mensuel, 15-1-1937). 
104 R. Remond, Catholiques et communistes dans les annees trente, Paris, 1966, pp. 244-51. Christophe, op. cit., 
pp. 103-4 indicates that some in the heirarchy were worried by the apparent readiness of the JOe to place social 
above religious issues. 
105 Chronique sociale, 1936, pp. 563-5; Nouvellisle, 18-6-1936. "QueUe doit etre [l'attitude du travailleur chre-
tien] a regard des syndicats dits professionnels qui se fondent en ce moment et qui ne nourrissant aucun sentiment 
d'hostilite contre l'Eglise et la religion? Ces syndicats ne sont pas condamnes et ils ne peuvent l'etre. nest donc 
permis d'y adherer". 
106 Maurin's view of the SPF is entirely consistent with his reputation as a Maurrasian. 
107 Nouvelliste, 30-6-1936. 
108 On Gerlier see X. de Montclos and A. Latreille, (eds.), Eglises et chretiens dans La deuxieme guerre mondiale. 
La region RhOne Alpes, pp. 13-14. 
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bilee of Catholic white collar unions in Lyon in November 1937, turning it into a cel-
ebration of the Catholicism of the CFrC.109 
There were also signs of a newly critical attitude from within the Chronique 
towards certain CFfC positions. For example, Auguste Cretinon took the CFTC to 
task for its condemnation of the Reynaud decree laws of November 1938.110 Cretinon 
had also been involved in setting up a syndicate of private school teachers, in which 
the Catholic reference was very strong,111 The Cercles d'hudes placed great stress 
upon anti-communism in this period. Its annual programme for 1937 and 1938 was 
entitled "Le communisme marxiste, Ie Catholicisme, et les classes moyennes".112 The 
reference to the "classes moyennes" is a significant one, for this set of ideas was asso-
ciated more with the PSF than the CFfC. Indeed, the latter conceived of a partnership 
of unions and business within an expanding capitalist economy, leaving little room for 
the petty bourgeoisie broadly defined. Certainly the majority of Chronique sympa-
thizers did not break with Christian democracy. But there were some links with the 
PSF. One important figure was Henry Franchet, member of the board of the 
Chronique. Franchet began a front page column for the Nouveau Journal in 1936, 
which he sometimes used to influence the CFfC, stressing, for example, the moral 
role of the JOC.113 
In 1937 and 1938 there was a reassertion of a parish based Catholic trades 
unionism against what was seen as the secular and pro-communist JOC. This can be 
seen as related to a reassertion of the primacy of white collar workers within the 
CFfC, a group for which Catholicism and conservatism had always been insepara-
ble.1l4 This coincided with pressures on CFfC members in the factories, and a con-
vergence with the positions of the patronat. 
The best index of the changing attitudes of the CFrC is its attitude to labour 
relations. After the strike wave of June 1936 the CFTC participated in many joint de-
marches with the CGT. But it almost never approved of strike action. More often it 
endorsed the demands of the workers, but disapproved of the methods used to obtain 
them. 115 The CFfC also profited from the defeats of the CGT. Catholic trades union-
ists, for example, made considerable progress at Gillet after the defeat of a strike of 
109 Chronique social de la France, December 1937, pp. 397-401, 748-9. It included a mass at St. Pothin, heart of 
traditional Catholicism in the Rhone. In the previous June Gertier had presided over a celebration of the fiftieth 
anniversary of Catholic trades unionism in France. His theme had been "soyons no us-memes", by which he meant 
the CFfC members should not be ashamed of their Catholicism (Launey, La CITC, p. 373). 
110 Chronique socia Ie de la France. December. 1938. pp. 844-852. Raoul Duclos admitted in La Voix sociale that 
his disapproVal of his decrees was not shared by all of his colleagues. 
111 Chronique socia Ie de la France. October 1937, pp. 745-7. The new union was inaugurated by Chanoine Bor-
net. director of Catholic education. 
112 Programme annuel pour les cercles d'ltudes. 1938. 
113 Nouveau Journal. 24-7-1935. This article appeared at about the same time as Gerlier was urging the CFfC to 
"be themselves" (see note 0). Three days later an article signed "X", perhaps Raoul Duclos, stressed the links be-
tween moral and material conditions. 
114 Launey. LA CITC, pp .. 315-7 .. suggests t~at as the CFfC moved back to the right there was a "reprise en 
main" by the more conservaltve white collar Unions. 
115 This was its position in both major strikes of the period--at Gillet in the summer of 1937 and in the build-
ing industry in the summer of 1938. 
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the summer of 1937. Right up to November 1938 the CFTC defended the principle of 
the forty hour week. It condemned Reynaud's decrees, but also the "political" general 
strike of 30 November 1938. Yet the SPF's line was identical.116 The CFTC even 
organized mass entries into workplaces on 30 November. 117 
Agriculture and the Popular Front 
The Popular Front was largely an urban phenomenon. There was no large scale mobi-
lization of the peasantry to compare with the strikes of June. Nor was there a mass 
movement against them. This was even more the case in the Rhone, where in com-
parison with urban areas the countryside was generally calm. Yet there remained 
sources of tension within rural society, and as in the city, the reforms of the Popular 
Front aggravated them. 
One reason for discontent was the continuation of the economic crisis. It is 
true that in some respects the situation improved from 1936. Above all there was an 
upturn in wine prices beginning in late 1935.118 Newspaper discussions of wine pol-
icy suggest that this improvement benefited in particular small producers of better 
quality wines, helped perhaps by the introduction of appellations d'origine from 1937. 
Big growers, on the other hand, complained of competition from cheap Algerian 
wines, and pressed their views in the press of the USE and Federation. The better 
fortunes of smaller growers seems to have contributed both to halting PSF progress in 
the Beaujolais, and to a decline of rural socialism and the associated cooperative 
movement. 119 Meanwhile, the newly created Office du ble, together with a reduction 
in harvest size, was responsible for a rise in wheat prices. 120 
But the Rhone was not a major producer of grain. The prices of other products 
did not improve. Fruit prices remained depressed, and production was badly hit by 
hail storms and frosts in 1937. One result was a meeting of 400 peasants at Limonest, 
held under the auspices of the USE, which demanded measures against debts. Dairy 
prices too were falling and production was hit by an outbreak of foot and mouth dis-
ease in 1938.121 A new problem was the over-production of vegetables. Market gar-
deners blamed overcrowding of their profession and so demanded controls on those 
who produced vegetables as a hobby.122 At the same time inflation in the prices of 
manufactured goods moved the terms of trade against the countryside. Employers of 
116 SPF-metallurgy opposed assouplissernent of the forty hours law, and like the CFTC demanded that workers 
alone should not bear the cost of rearmament. (Nouvellisle, 25-11-1938. 
117 Vou socia Ie, 26-11-1938, 10-12-1938. 
118 Garrier, op. cit., pp. 602-606. 
119 Perrin, op. cit., passim. For the point of view of big growers see Guy de Saint-Laumer in Union republicaine, 
7-3-1937,14-3-1937. 
120 Nouvelliste, 10-4-1937: According to Julien Riboud the Rhone produced 270 quintals of wheat., of which most 
was destined for home consumption. 
121 Nouvellisle, 10-4-1937. 
122 Nouvel/iSle, 7-6-1937. Andre Cholley, op. cit., pp. 83-107. 
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labour were affected by the extension of the Family Allowance Law to agricultural 
labourers by a decree of August 1937. 
The peasantry were also affected by the strikes of 1936. There were relatively 
few agricultural labourers in the department; most were sons of peasant proprietors 
working with better off peasant families whilst awaiting their inheritance.123 All the 
same, the events of June caused even casual labour for the wine harvest to pose con-
ditions to their employers.124 Market gardeners were given an additional reason for 
hostility to the Popular Front by the fact that their employees had begun to orga-
nize. 125 Agricultural trades unions were set up by both CFTC and CGT, supported 
mainly by vineyard employees. In June the agricultural syndicates of Chaponost and 
Francheville protested at the adverse effects of the closure of wholesalers during 
transport strikes, and the paralysis of processing factories during the strawberry har-
vest.126 There was a new transport strike in October. This time there were reports that 
peasants taking their own milk to market had been attacked by milkmen. 127 
Yet the threat to private property was less explicit than in the towns. In conse-
quence there was less constraint upon conflicts within rural society. Like business 
leaders, the USE and Chamber of Agriculture tended to present projects to which it 
was opposed as harmful to small property. 128 This is evidence of the moral hegemony 
briefly exercized by the Popular Front and the discredit into which "les gros" had 
fallen. It is also related to an ongoing attempt by the USE to channel and manipulate 
pressure from the conservative peasantry. This is evident in USE sponsorship of a 
rally of market gardeners addressed by Henri Dorgeres, for in the past great reserva-
tions had been expressed about his demagogic methods.129 
The rise of the JAC continued. Jean Parrel became a member of the Central 
Council of the Office du ble,130 probably against the wishes of Felix Garcin, but this 
did not prevent him from defending the interests of small producers, or from distanc-
ing himself from the intransigent opposition of the majority of conservative delegates 
to the Office. In the countryside too, though to a lesser extent than in the towns, Pop-
ular Front legislation undermined the cohesion of the conservative bloc.131 Even the 
123 Such was the integration of the domestique into the Parrel household that he asked Jean-Marie Parrel's permis-
sion to get married. Pin, op. cit., p. 124. 
124 ADR 4m 236, 23-8-1936, Sub-Prefect of Ville franc he. 
125 One market gardener told the Nouvelliste, "Jamais avant les derniers greves nous n'avions eu d'ennuis avec nos 
ouvriers" (22-10-1936). 
126 Nouvelliste, 30-6-1936. 
127 Nouvelliste, 10-10-1936. 
128 The best example is family allowances for farm labourers. It was argued that in the Rhone most farm labourers 
were employed by peasants. In reality only a minority of relatively well off peasants employed labour. Nouvelliste, 
10-4-1936. 
129 Nouvlleiste, 16-11-1936. The rally took place at a time when Dorgeres was leading a strike of Parisian market 
gardeners. JAC influence was also strong among maraichers. 
130 Gayet, op. cit, p. 78. Gayet's evidence contradicts Albert Pin's belief that Parrel's candidature had been pro-
posed by Garcin (Pin, op. cit., p. 90). 
131 Pin, op. cit., part II, ch. 3, especially p. 93-4. Albert Pin stresses that the law on the Office du ble specified that 
the main occupation of agricultural delegates had to be farming, a measure which favoured Jean Parrel over Felix 
Garcin. 
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Nouvelliste, which had campaigned bitterly against this "instrument of revolutionary 
policy",132 was obliged to admit that the Office had been welcomed by small produc-
ers of grain.133 JAC militants also defended the right of agricultural labourers to form 
separate syndicates, another idea unpalatable to the USE leadership, and yet more 
evidence of the disruptive effects of the Popular Front. In 1939 JAC militants an-
nounced an imminent "revolution paysanne"; Claudius Delorme was briefly elected to 
the leadership of the USE, thanks to a coup organized by his followers. 134 
For these reasons the authoritarianism evident in agricultural circles before the 
events of June 1936 persisted. Corporatism and authority continued to be seen as a 
means to resolve the tensions of rural society. In 1936 the bulletin of the USE ex-
pressed support for "La Republique autoritaire, a base professionelle", and recom-
mended to its readers a book by Gustave Herve entitled "C'est Petain qu'll nous 
faut".135 
Conclusion 
Three general points can be derived from this discussion of the impact of the Popular 
Front on the interest group politics in the Rhone. 
Firstly, the labour laws, and to a lesser extent the Office du ble represented an-
other blow to the liberal tradition of elites in industry and agriculture. The influence 
of the Chamber of Commerce, one time bastion of economic liberty was in decline. 
Supporters of liberalism were now to be found only in the Federation. 
Second, there was on the level of interest group politics a regrouping of capi-
talists and small businessmen against the CGT under the leadership of the local CGPF 
(AICA). It was supported by the USE, which turned its 1937 congress into a critique 
of the Popular Front. The CFTC too lent tacit support. But at the same time all of the 
pressures which had led business and agriculture towards corporatism and anti-par-
liamentariansim remained active. Only a perceived challenge to private property held 
this bloc together. The political right in contrast was more deeply divided in this pe-
riod than at any point in the period under consideration. All of this confirms Ingo 
Kolboom's argument that the reformed CGPF took over from political parties the task 
of halting the collapse of a disintegrating bourgeois society. 
Third, it might perhaps be surprising that little mention has been made of the 
mobilization of the classes moyennes movement after June 1936. This is because no 
body could have emerged to group all those who claimed to be a part of it-public 
132Nouvelliste,10-10-1936. 
133 Nouvelliste, 27-12-1938: "Soyons juste: l'Office du ble est apprecie favorablement dans les milieux des petits 
producteurs, parce qu'it garantit un prix uniforme quel que soit l'importance de l'exploitation de chacun et quel que 
soit Ie moment ou Ie vente est effectucf'. Franyois Peissel too admitted that the Office had its good side (Nouveau 
Journal. 13-11-1938). 
134 G. Garrier, "L'union du sud-est des syndicats agricoles de 1888 a 1939", Bulletin du centre d'histoire de la re-
gion lyonnaise, 1981. 
135 L'Agriculteur du sud-est, 8-11-1936. 
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and private sector white collar workers, peasants, small businessmen, technicians, en-
gineers etc. Even sectional groups such as small businessmen did not act separately. 
Two groups which are of particular interest in the context of conservative politics had 
hardly any impact at all in interests group politics: engineers and medium capitalist 
firms.136 The notion of the classes moyennes was in reality a mythical construction. 
As such it is best studied as a political phenomenon. 
136 It is well known that there was a flourishing of engineers' unions after June 1936. Yet apart from a strike by 
1,200 supervisory personnel at Berliet, there is hardly any evidence of their activity in the press or any other 
source. This is especially true of conservative engineers associations like USIC and SIS, even though engineers 
played a prominent part in the PSF. 
Chapter eleven 
The militants of the right, 1936 to 1939 
The electoral victory of the Popular Front and the strikes of June led to political po-
larization and a major upheaval in the French right. In the Rhone the Alliance 
democratique and the PDP collapsed. The Federation republicaine lost many of its 
supporters to the far right, but proved too deeply rooted to disappear entirely. On the 
extreme right Action jran9aise had been dissolved by the government in February 
1936. Four months later it was the turn of the Fran9istes, Jeunesses patriotes, Soli-
darite jran9aise and the Croix de Feu to be dissolved. All reappeared under other 
names. But apart from the Parti social fran~ais (PSF), the reincarnation of the Croix 
de Feu, all were of marginal significance. Meanwhile a new movement appeared, the 
Parti populairejran~ais (PPF) of the renegade communist Jacques Doriot. 
Historians have detected a link between the supposed social composition of 
the PSF and PPF and their politics. The PPF is seen as proletarian and therefore fas-
cist, 1 while Z. Sternhell sees the PSF as bourgeois and therefore conservative. Pierre 
Milza, on the other hand sees the latter as an "inter-class party", and therefore the first 
modem conservative party in France.2 Philippe Machefer describes the PSF as a 
movement of a petty bourgeoisie menaced by social reform. 3 
Leaving aside the social determinism which often underlies them, there is rea-
son to question these views of the PSF and PPF. Historians have uncritically accepted 
data on the background of PPF members published in the party press. The other main 
piece of evidence--the supposedly working class recruitment of the Marseille sec-
tion of the party--has been shown conclusively to be false by Paul Jankowsky. Int 
the case of the PSF scarcely any research has been done into the sociology of mili-
tants. 
In this chapter it will be argued that three related factors explain the sociology 
of the two parties: the ongoing struggle for hegemony within the conservative bloc; 
social and political polarization, and the attraction of a minority of supporters of the 
left to the far right. Like the Croix de Feu the PSF recruited from that section of the 
bourgeoisie and lower middle class which was disenchanted with business elite. This 
opposition included bosses of medium family firms deprived of a voice in interest 
groups, especially in the modem sector, and by social polarization. In contrast the 
Federation became more than ever a party of the "old elites", all the more so because 
1 J-P. Brunet, Jacques Doriot. Du communisme aufascisme, Paris, 1986, pp. 269. Z. Stemhell, "Strands of French 
fascism", passim. 
2 Milza, op. cit., pp. 138. 
3 Machefer. "Le Parti Social Fran~ais" L'Information historique, pp. 77-8. 
4 Paul Jankowsky, Communism and Collaboration: Simon Sabiani and Politics in Marseille. 1919-1944, London, 
1989. 
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after June it became difficult to mobilize support in proletarian suburbs. The PPF rep-
resented an alliance of the militants of the dissolved leagues with sympathizers re-
cruited from the suburbs, a few of whom were ex-communists. 
The Samples 
The PSF and FR samples include 1056 and 976 individuals respectively.5 The PPF 
sample of 159 is at least big enough to ascertain the main features of the party. The 
samples also represent a more homogeneous body of party militants than does the 
pre-1936 sample. There are, nevertheless, certain problems. Rates of identification in 
electoral lists vary between parties because of the quality of information in the 
sources.6 This presents difficulties only in the case of the PPF, where only two fifths 
of militants could be identified. It is therefore possible that the proportion of young 
and working class sympathizers is underestimated. Rates of identification also vary 
between arrondissements. In the Federation the pattern is much the same as in Chap-
ter 5, with higher rates of identification in the suburbs. There is also a particularly low 
level of identification for the Federation in the 7th (60%). In the case of the PSF the 
main problems are above average identification in the 7th (78%) and below average 
in the 4th (48%) arrondissements. Neither of these sections, however, were large, so 
the sample is not unduly affected. It is the PPF which presents the greatest difficulties, 
for there is a much greater variability between sections. To generalize, the PPF sam-
ple privileges the contribution of militants in bourgeois and proletarian areas, and di-
minishes recruitment in districts which are socially unsegregated. None of these dis-
tortions, however, need stand in the way of analysis. 
Membership 
The PSF claimed the enormous figure of 30,000 members in the Rhone in mid-1937, 
and one year later declared itself to be on the way to 40,000 adherents.7 What this 
figure includes, however, is difficult to say, for children may have been enroled by 
their fathers and mothers, and it is not certain whether those who had not paid their 
subscriptions were eliminated from the lists. Moreover, they do not accord with what 
is known of individual sections.8 Calculations based on police and party estimates of 
section membership suggest a membership of between 13,000 and 20,000 at the PSF's 
peakY A figure in the upper part of the range is suggested by the mobilization, ac-
5 See Appendix 4. 
6 The Federation has the highest rate of identification (79%), followed by the PSF with 66%, and then the PPF of 
which only 42% could be identified in electora1lists. 
7 VolOnlaire '36, 16-7-1937, 1-6-1938. Le Volontaire '36, 1-15 August 1936, claimed a circulation of 60,000 in 
nine departments. 
8 ADR 4m 236,20-10-1938. For example a police report stated that in October 1938 that there were 700 members 
in of one of the three sections in the 2nd arrondissement. 
9 Membership of sections varied between 600 and 900. There were twenty-two sections. 
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cording to the police, of 15,000 supporters for the parade of 11 November 1938.10 
Whatever the real figure, there can be no doubt that the PSF was the largest political 
movement ever seen in the Rhone. It was considerably larger than any of the left wing 
parties)1 Furthermore, in September 1936 the PSF showed that it was an electoral 
force by winning a by-election for the Arrondissement Council in the 2nd ar-
rondissement. 
Beside the PSF the PPF was not very significant. 12 Police reports stress the 
failure of the party to recruit more than a few hundred adherents in the department. 
Despite issuing 60-80,000 invitations to the regional conference of July 1937 only 
1,200 people turned up.13 Not surprisingly the PPF was of marginal significance in 
electoral terms. Unless the party stood as joint candidate of the right it was incapable 
of winning more than four or five percent of the vote. Like the JP before it the PPF 
owed whatever importance it had to collaboration with the Federation. 14 
As for the Federation, the defeat in the 2nd arrondissement by-election in 
September 1936 seemed to presage the disappearance of the party. At the departmen-
tal congress of the Federation in January 1937 it was admitted that many adherents 
had deserted to new formations. 15 Yet as time went on the FR appears to have recov-
ered some ground. Certainly there was a decline in the vitality of local committees, 
but press accounts of their activities are consistent with a reasonably high member-
ship. In rural areas in particular the Federation remained a force in electoral terms. 
Probably PSF and Federation were about equal in vote winning power. 
The Political Backgrounds of Militants 
The PSF 
In the Rhone formation of the PSF was announced in the Nouvelliste on June 24th. 
The first members were signed up in mid-July.16 At the end of the month 2,500 
founding members travelled to Lyon from seven departments to hear La Rocque 
speak. A few days later the new party organ, Le Volontaire '36, appeared. At the end 
10 Freynet, the departmental leader, told a meeting in the 2nd arrondissement that he expected 30,000 on this pa-
rade. The PSF press subsequently reported 20,000 marchers. One section, the 7th, claimed that half of its 600 plus 
members had participated. 
11 Pinol and Moissonnier, op. cit, put membership of the PCF at 5,200 in the Rhone in 1939. N. Greene, Crisis 
and decline: The French Socialist Party in the Popular Front Era, Ithaca, 1969, p. 308, puts the SFIO at a maxi-
mum of 2,600 in 1938. 
12 D. Wolf, Doriot: Du Communisme au Collaboration, Paris, 1971, p. 220, quotes a figure of 6,000 in the region. 
Since regional leader Albert Beugras claimed only 3,000 in 1938 this is surely an over-estimate. (L'Attaque, 19-2-
1938). 
13 ADR 4m 263, 23-12-1936. 29-7-1937. The PPF had to abandon its plan to demonstrate on 11 November 1937, 
even though it might have been expected to have been able to make a showing at a time of intense social conflict. 
14 Further evidence of numerical insignificance comes from the interrogation of Henri Carton in 1945: "Je me suis 
occupe de la propagande PPF dans Ie but de grossir nos rangs. Malgre nos efforts en ce sens les resultats acquis 
etaient de faible importance". ADR Cour de Justice de Lyon 1454. 
15 AN 317 AP 79. Report of Lavalette to departmental congress, January 1937. 
16 Nouvelliste, 24-6-1936, 9-7-1936. The first offices were both in the centre of the city at quai Bondy and quai de 
Retz. 
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of the year a departmental federation was officially constituted, grouping fourteen 
sections. 17 
The continuities with the Croix de Feu are unmistakable at the level of leader-
ship. Only one Croix de Feu leader did not join the PSF.18 The editorial team of Le 
Volontaire '36 stressed its continuity with that which had produced Le Flambeau du 
sud-est and its determination to maintain the spirit of the Croix de F eu. 19 Whether the 
PSF inherited the rank and file of the Croix de Feu is impossible to determine with 
any certainty. The only police report on this subject stated in September that the PSF 
in Tarare had not yet succeeded in grouping all former Croix de Feu members. 20 But 
Tarare may be an exception, for after promising beginnings by the Croix de Feu the 
PSF do not seem to have made great headway. In the rest of the department the fact 
that the PSF made progress essentially in the areas where the Croix de Feu had been 
strong suggests continuity. 
We are on safer ground in saying that the majority of PSF members who had 
previously been politically active came from the parliamentary right Octave 
Lavalette admitted losses from the Federation.21 The geographical and social back-
ground of PSF militants suggests reruitment from the PDP and Alliance electorate 
too. Yet few militants of the old right played a sufficiently visible role in the PSF to 
find their way into our sample.22 The reason is partly that the most active ad her-
ents--those in our sample--remained faithful to their party, and partly that it 
was officially policy in the PSF that cadres should not be drawn from those who had 
played a prominent part in other movements.23 This is perhaps also why there is only 
one former PDP member,24 and one former Action/ran9aise leaguer, Marcel Perdriel, 
even though La Repub/ique Lyonnaise admitted losses to the Croix de Feu. 25 
It is at the level of voting behaviour that the continuity of PSF and the parlia-
mentary right is most evident, in spite of the PSF's claims to have bitten into the left's 
electorate.26 The only election in which both Federation and PSF stood together with 
the three Popular Front parties was for a Conseil d'arrondissement seat in November 
1936 in the seven southern polling districts of the 2nd arrondissement. The seat had 
fallen vacant thanks to the death of a Federation member. To general surprise the PSF 
17 Nouvelliste,I-12-1936. 
18 Alex Beraud, leader of the second sector. The only other major change was that Etienne Rouillon took over PSF 
organization in Algeria, his duties as regional delegate being taken on by General Grollemund. 
19 Le Volontaire '36, 1-15 August 193: "notre equipe est indissoluble comme notre esprit, anime de la mystique 
Croix de Feu. Notre volonte demeure". 
20 ADR 4m 244, 23-9-1936. 
21 AN 317 AP 79, report to congress of Federation, January 1937. "II est indeniable--et l'election du 2 ar-
rondissement I'a demontr6---que ces partis ont recrute abondamment dans nos rangs et que la masse de leur ad-
herents est faite, en grande partie, de nos militants". 
22 An exception was Charles Vianney, who became a departmental orator in the PSF. 
23 Bulletin d'informalion du PSF, 26-6-1937. 
24 Dr. Aude of Vaugneray. 
25 La Republique lyonnaise, 28-12-1935. 
26 ADR 4m 236, 23-1-1937. The party's aim was to address itself first to sympathizers, and then to a group re-
ferred to by party leaders as "les evolues", those who had voted for the Popular Front, but now regretted it. 
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outdistanced the Federation on the fIrst ballot, and won on the second.27 The PSF vote 
correlates better with the 1936 vote for the right than does that of the Federation. In-
deed, rather than winning over the left, the PSF helped restore the unity of the Popular 
Front. On the second round the left vote increased substantially.28 
This conclusion is supported by analysis of the local elections of October 
1937. For these elections the right put up a single candidate in most constituencies, so 
it is difficult to assess the separate appeal of Federation and PSF. Nonetheless, it is 
clear that the Federation had most successs in winning Radical support, and indeed 
had greater appeal to the right. Because it was confIned mainly to difficult constituen-
cies, the PSF won no seats at all. Even in the south of the 5th arrondissement, where 
the right would normally have expected to win, the PSF was defeated on the second 
ballot because of the unwillingness of Radicals to vote for it. And whereas the six 
Federation candidates in the agglomeration were able to maintain more than 90% of 
the right's 1936 votes, two of the three PSF candidates in the agglomeration suffered 
embarrassing set-backs, winning only 81 and 83%. Where it is possible to make a 
comparison, the picture is similar in the countryside.29 Here too it would seem that 
the Federation had the greater success. Two of the three Federation candidates gained 
98% of the right's 1936 vote.30 In the four cases where the PSF was the sole party of 
the right it did substantially less well. In Neuville it gained only three quarters of the 
1936 vote)1 These figures confIrm Fran~ois Goguel's conclusion that the PSF would 
not in 1940 have made the electoral breakthrough upon which it counted. 32 
There is one exception to this pattern. In the canton of St Laurent de 
Chamousset there was in 1937 a bitterly fought contest between PSF and Federation, 
which resulted in a victory for the latter by forty-four votes. The Radicals put up no 
candidate, calling upon their supporters to abstain. In the event most of them probably 
voted for the PSF. Whereas the Federation vote correlates best with the 1936 conser-
vative vote, that of the PSF correlates better with the Radical vote. The reason lies in 
the centrality of the religious issue in mountain politics. The close identification of the 
Federation with the clergy, Radical voters preferred the more secular PSF as a means 
of expressing hostility to the Popular Front. 
27 ADR elections partielles, 1936, 5-11-1936: the Prefect said of the PSF candidate: "Influence politique assez 
limitC--Chances minimes d'etre elu", 
28 ADR elections partielles, 1936: on the fust ballot much of the Radical electorate abstained. Between rounds the 
Popular Front parties produced a poster which presented the election as a confrontation between fascism and 
democracy. 
29 In all but eight cantons the picture is complicated by the failure of the Radicals to present a candidate, or by the 
right's support on the first ballot for an anti-Popular Front Radical. 
30 On the other hand the Federation lost 28% of the right's 1936 vote in the canton of Belleville because of the 
presence of the Radical senator Bender. 
31 The PSF gained 95% of the 1936 vote in Limonest. 90% in l'Arbresle and 86% in Anse. Losses were perhaps 
inflated in Neuville because the 1936 vote for the right had been inflated because this was the home canton of 
deputy Peissel. 
32 F. Goguel. "Les elections Iegislatives et senatorielles partielles", in R. Remond and 1. Bourdin (eds.), Edouard 
Daladier, chef de gouvernent, paris, 1977. Howlett, op. cit, p. 323. 
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Ex-Radicals reinforced the anti-establishment disposition of the party. But 
such radicalism owed more to the PSF's recruitment from groups previously touched 
by movements in the orbit of the centre right and Federation left. This is impossible to 
prove through electoral analysis, but can be demonstrated by looking at party ac-
tivists. 
The PPF 
More problematic is the political origin of the PPF. It is certain that the national lead-
ership of the party was dominated by ex-communists. Relying on statistics published 
by the party press Jean-Paul Brunet suggests that 39% of the rank and file had had no 
prior political affiliation, 33% had come from the left, and 27% from the right.33 It is 
to be doubted whether much value can be attached to these figures, not simply be-
cause they derive from the party, but because the division into three fairly equal parts 
reflects the ternary vision of society so popular on the right in this period.34 Further-
more, for this level of ex-communist support for the PPF to have been real, there 
would have had to have been far more dissidence in the PCF across France. In fact the 
party effectively prevented Doriotist influence from spreading to other areas. 35 In the 
Rhone the emergence of the PPF owed more to the dissolution of the leagues, the 
perennial search of the right for a movement able to win over the working class, and 
to the impact of June 36 on a minority of workers and white collar workers in the 
suburbs. 
Albert Beugras was a young engineer at Rhone-Poulenc in Peage de Rous-
silon. Before 1936 he had not been an politically active, but his favourite reading, 
Gringoire, Candide and Je Suis Partout, situated him on the right. Having been 
forced to flee his home as a result of the strikes of June 1936, Beugras found himself 
in Paris at the time of Doriot's "Rendez-vous de Saint-Denis". Beugras adhered to the 
PPF five days after its formation. Because Doriot knew no-one else in Lyon, Beugras 
was immediately named detegue for the south-east. 36 
In Lyon Beugras found a handful of adherents. Several were members of the 
obscure Comites de rassemblement anti-sovietique (eRAS). These had been formed 
as a front for the dissolved Franr;istes. But they served as means of linking former 
members of all the dissolved leagues, and even included members of the Federation. 37 
In the following months CRAS members, such as Adrian Anscheling of Solidarite 
/ranr;aise and the Franr;iste leader Fernand Sape, joined the PPF.38 
Sape was from a conservative background. The son of a sexton in the parish of 
St. Pothin, he had worked his way up from a printers' job at the Nouveau Journal to 
33 Brunet. op. cit., pp. 230-231. 
34 Boltanski, op. cit., pp. 52-3. 
35 As Brunet himself argues, op. cit., p. 174-~. 
36 AN Cour de Justice de la Seine, 5144073 ; Marie Chaix, Les lauriers du lac de Constance, Paris, 1974. 
37 L'Attaque, June/July 1936, October, 1936. That the PSF in this period were also engaged in clandestine contacts 
withfther leagues was reported to me by Monsieur Guy Jarrosson, one-time President of the JP. 
38 F 14818, 17-9-1936. Sape was sometimes known by his pen name Philippe Dreux. 
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become a journalist on the Nouvelliste, and subsequently on several other papers in 
Brittany and at St. Etienne. At the age of twenty he had followed Etienne de Raulin 
out of the JP, and then joined with Dr. Millet in his break with De Raulin. After his 
military service Sape was active in the youth group of the Federation. He left the lat-
ter in 1934 for the Fran~istes. Marcel Bucard gave him the task of setting up a section 
of the league in St. Etienne. In 1935 he returned to Lyon to found a Fran~iste journal, 
first published as l'Attaque in April 1936. After the dissolution of the Fran~istes Sape 
wrote articles in favour of the PPF. In June 1937 he joined the PPF, whilst L'Attaque 
became the party journal. Sape later claimed that he had been obliged to take this step 
because his radical social policies had upset his financial backers. 39 
Within the PPF Sape joined a number of other well-known militants of dis-
solved leagues. There were at least three ex-members of the JP, including Jean 
Berlioz, one-time President.40 There were five known members of Actionfran~aise.41 
One ex-royalist told the police in 1945 that he had been recruited by Paul Chartron, 
who had persuaded him that the PPF now represented the only means of continuing 
the anti-communist struggle.42 According to the police the PPF also won the sympa-
thy of younger elements in the PSF, who found la Rocque's party too staid.43 The PPF 
also included one recruit from the centre right: the municipal councillor and President 
of the Lyon section of the UNC, Emile Roux.44 
It is possible to identify only three recruits from the left. None of them were 
founder members of the party. One was Francis Andre. Better known as "guele tor-
due" because of a face disfigured in a car accident, Andre was to become notorious 
during the war for his anti-resistance activities. Until 1937 Andre had been a PCF 
member and sports correspondent of its Lyon journal. At some time in 1937 he joined 
the PPF, where he played a leading role only after 1940.45 Neither of the other ex-
communists played a visible role in the PPF until the war years. 
It is true that some of those who had come to the PPF from dissolved leagues 
were subsequently eliminated. Paul Chartron was expelled in early 1937 because his 
royalist opinions brought him into conflict with Beugras.46 Fernand Sape departed at 
the end of the year, partly because he had embezzled 5,000 francs from the party, but 
39 ADR Cour de Justice du Rhone, 1294. 
40 Louis Allaix and Jean-Pierre Foex had passed through the JP and Franristes. 
41 They included the lawyer Pierre Dures and a commissaire who had been involved in several violent incidents, 
Georges Fercit. 
42 AN Cour de Justice de la Seine, 514 47031. 
43 ADR 4m 236, 5-12-1936, 20-11-1937. There is no reason to doubt this, but because of the deficiencies of the 
Croix de Feu sample it is possible to identify only one such convert-Lucien Petre of Villefrance. 
44 The sources for the political backgrounds of these militants are partly my own sample and partly the dossiers of 
the Courts of Justice of the Rhone and the Seine. 
45 ADR, Cour de Justice, dossier Francis Andre; G. Chauvy, Lyon, 1940-1944, Paris, 1985, pp. 324-5. Another 
former communist, Ennemond Cham bon, one time secretary of the COT metallurgy in the south-east, joined in 
1939 in the wake of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Thirdly, Joseph Desgeorges had been a member of the Front social of 
Gaston Bergery and secretary of the building section of the anarcho-syndicalist CGTSR. He joined the COT in the 
wake of the defeat of the 1938 building strike (ADR, Cour de Justice, 1420(1)). 
46 AN Cour de Justice de la Seine, 514 4703 1. 
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also because he had been opposed to Doriot's policy of alliance with the Federation.47 
Yet the PPF in Lyon clearly originated on the far right. Zeev Sternhell's view that fas-
cism originates on the left in a revision of Marxism must be questioned. Even if the 
majority of PPF activists had not previously been politically active, like Beugras their 
opinions had probably been conservative. All the same the attraction of the PPF for 
ex-Communists must be taken seriously, for there is no equivalent in any other party 
of the right or extreme-right. The radicalism of the fascist right often acted as a pole 
of attraction for dissidents of the left 
Geographical Implantation 
Table 19 shows that the Federation was substantially more rural than it had been be-
fore June 1936, though it remained a little under-represented in relation to the propor-
tion of the electorate resident in the countryside.48 The PSF was more urban than the 
Federation, as it was nationally.49 The PPF, not shown on the table, was more urban 
still, for only three militants lived outside the agglomeration. 
Table 19: The Right in the RhOne, July 1936 to 1939 (percent) 
Party Agglom I Dept I Total 
Federation 61 39 976 
PSF 73 28 1056 
Electorate 65 35 236018 
Table 20: Militants of the Right by Region, July 1936 to 1939(Percent) 
Region I FR I PSF 1 Pop 
Plateau Lyonnais 47 55 49 
Beaujolais viticole 20 14 15 
Monts du Lyonnais 19 14 13 
Monts du Beaujolais 15 17 23 
Total I 318 I 196 I 
Within the department the implantation of Federation militants differs in some mea-
sure from that of previous periods, as Table 20 shows. 50 The most striking change is 
the decline in the proportion of militants in the wine-growing Beaujolais. The PSF did 
not do spectacularly well there either, so the explanation cannot be competition from 
47 See chapter twelve. 
48 In 1928 to June 193655% of sympathizers had resided outside of the agglomeration. 
49 J-N. Jeanenney, "La Federation republicaine" in R. Remond and 1. Bourdin, La France et lesfran~aises, Paris, 
1979. 
50 See Table 5 in Chapter 6. 
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that source. More likely is that the relative health of the economy in Villefranche and 
the rise in wine prices led to a general decline in political tension. 
Because of the relative decline of the Federation in the Beaujolais implanta-
tion in all other areas increases. Even the decline of the Federation on the Plateau 
which had characterized the previous period was halted. 51 As Map 11.04 shows this 
improvement was most marked in industrial communes like l'Arbresle and Vaugn-
eray. Part of the explanation for this is that Fran~ois Peissel, influential in this area, 
was now more or less reconciled with Victor Perret. With the rise of the Croix de Feu, 
Perret perhaps appeared rather more Republican. 
In spite of the relative recovery of the Federation on the plateau, Table 20 and 
Map 11.04 show that the Federation did better in areas of "traditional" conservatism 
than the PSF. The Federation made substantial progress in the Monts du Beaujolais, 
where it had been organized only since Victor Perret's electoral campaign of 1936. 
Even in wine-growing areas the Federation remained over-represented in comparison 
to the proportion of the electorate in that area, and did best of all in Belleville canton, 
where big landowners were most numerous. This confirms the national picture, for 
the PSF had few sections in formerly monarchist rural areas like the west.52 
Map 11.02 shoes that PSF militants were less dispersed than those of the Fed-
eration. This is because whereas the Federation relied upon a network of village nota-
bles for support, the PSF was dependent upon party activists resident in Lyon and 
small towns. 53 This is why PSF militants cluster along the main lines of communica-
tion from Lyon. Most noticeable is the line of militants along the National 7 From 
Lyon to Tarare, and then on to Amplepuis and Thizy. Militants are also found along 
the route through the mountains in the Brevenne Valley, the main road from Lyon to 
St Etienne, and along the north-south Rhone-Saone axis. Table 20 also shows that the 
PSF had established itself in all conservative areas, except the Beaujolais, and was 
even present where the Federation had at one time been unchallenged. 54 The politics 
of deference were breaking down. 
The distribution of Federation militants in the agglomeration exaggerates fea-
tures already apparent before June 1936. Graph 28 and Map 11.03 show that the 
communes of the proletarian south east banlieu remain the most over-represented re-
gion in the Federation sample. 55 But the place of such communes is reduced, con-
51 Federation militants reose from 41 % on the Plateau in 1933 to 47% in 1936 to 1939. This is not an enormous 
difference given the nature of the sample, but it is enough to say that previous decline had been halted. 
52 Jeanenney, "La Federation", p. 349. 
53 V%nlaire '36, 16-7-1937. Squads of EVP would give out tracts at fairs. 
54 Furthermore. the sample probably underestimates the strength of the PSF in the Monts du Lyonnais. Given that 
the PSF placed so much emphasis on winning the Conseil general seat in St Laurent de Chamousset in 1937 it is 
likely that the party had rather more support in the canton than is suggested by the ten militants in our sample. 
55 The appropriate comparison is with Graph 5 and Map 5.8 in Chapter five. The south-east balieu comprizes 
Venissieux, Vaulz en Velin, Bron, St. Fons; the SW banlieu is composed of Dullins, Pierre Benite, La Mulatiere; 
the western is composed og St Foy, Francheville, Tassin, Ecully, while the north consistes of the two communes of 
Caluire and St RAmbert. 
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firming suspicions that overrepresentation was partly due to the nature of the sample. 
Furthermore, committees in such areas met less and less frequently after June 1936. 
That of Venissieux was amalgamated with that of neighbouring St. Fons. Districts in-
habited by the "old bourgeoisie" and their clientele also stand out: the western resi-
dential suburbs and the 2nd arrondissement. Within the latter area Map 11.03 shows a 
new concentration in the area between Bellecour and Ainay, quartier of the aristoc-
racy and conservative bourgeoisie. 56 Another area of strength was in the 4th and 7th 
arrondissements, where the Federation possessed close links to Parish cerdes. In 
contrast to its strength in Venissieux, the Federation was weak in Villeurbanne, the 
southern part of the 7th and the eastern part of the 3rd, which suggests that the party 
did less well in working class districts where there was a long tradition of socialism. 
Graph 28: Geography of the Right in the Ag-
glomeration, July 1936 to 1939 
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The five areas in which the PSF is over-represented all contain a substantial 
bourgeois population: the 1st, 2nd, 5th and 6th arrondissements and the western resi-
dential suburbs. No less than 46% of PSF militants lived in bourgeois areas as they 
are defined by J-L. Pino1.57 In districts such as 505 and 607 PSF supporters were very 
numerous indeed. The real density of PSF members was higher still. For example 
section 67, which covered districts 601 to 603, claimed that it had 587 members in 
June 1938.58 If this figure is accepted then it would mean that membership of the PSF 
56 Under-representation of the Federation in the 1st arrondissement may well be an anomoly. The political com-
mittee of the first hardly met. Activity in this area, especially after June 1936 was focussed upon a satellite of the 
Federation, the Cercle des travailleurs. Those who attended this cercle were, however, not included in the sample, 
just as the members of the Foyer de Perreche were not. This tends to lead to an under-representation of the Feder-
ation in the whole of the peninSUla, and consequently diminishes the extent to which it was a movement of the old 
elites. 
57 See Chapter 4, Map 4.1. 
58 V%n/aire '36,1-6-1938. 
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was equivalent to 12% of the electorate, and 37% of conservative voters.59 It should, 
of course, be remembered that all PSF members were not male, unlike the electorate. 
Unlike the Federation the PSF was well implanted in all ruling class districts. 
In terms of membership the 6th arrondissement, with its six sections, was the most 
important On the other hand, PSF members are not as over-represented in the 6th as 
they are in either the 2nd, 5th, or western suburbs. The main point, however, is that in 
geographical terms the PSF bridged the historic opposition between the Brotteaux and 
the peninsula, and drew support from areas in which both the Alliance and the Feder-
ation had been strong. 
The PSF shared the difficulty of the Federation in penetrating unsegregated 
areas like the 3rd arrondissement and working class areas like Villeurbanne. Where 
the PSF differs is that it is weak in all working class and unsegregated areas. The only 
real exception is the proletarian commune of Oullins. Privately the PSF admitted this 
weakness. Louis Pillot, President in the 5th arrondissement, admitted that the working 
class district of Vaise (districts 501 and 502) "entirely escapes [my] influence". 60 
Given the conventional image of the PPF it is perhaps surprising to find that 
almost as great a proportion of PPF militants live in bourgeois areas of the city as did 
those of the PSF. PPF implantation resembles that of Action jranr;aise in its predilec-
tion for the central district of the 2nd arrondissement, the western parts of the 1 st and 
suburban communes like Tassin. But the PPF also did relatively better than other 
movements in working class districts.61 The PPF's most vibrant section was in 
Villeurbanne. The only rival was that of the 2nd arrondissement, but it was decimated 
by expulsions at the end of 1937. Thus the geographical distribution of the PPF con-
firms the dualism seen in the political origins of its members. 
Age 
The three parties correspond to three different generations. Graph 29 shows that the 
age profile of the Federation is almost a mirror image of that of the PPF. 62 Whereas 
one third of Federation militants were aged over sixty, an equal proportion of those of 
the PPF were aged twenty-nine or less. The PSF falls somewhere between these two 
parties. If the agglomeration alone is considered then the differences between the par-
ties are somewhat reduced; even the Federation retains a certain vitality, for 31 % of 
its militants are aged less than forty. 
59 Using a combination of police and party sources it is possible obtain similar densities of 12% and 28% in the 
2nd arrondissement. Within these two areas the true level of concentration would doubtless have been higher still, 
for both sections included proletarian districts, where there were hardly any PSF militants. 
60 Fonds La Rocque. carton 172. (hereafter AN 451 AP), Mme. de Preval to Kemlin, 9-10-1937. Moreover, 
working class PSF members were more numerous in Vaise than anywhere else. 
61 There is a small overrepresentation of PPF militants in districts defined by J-L. Pinol as proletarian. and quite a 
substantial one in the often working class "railway districts". 
62 Age is calculated for 1938. 
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Graph 29: Age of Militants in the Rhone, July 1936 
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The PPF is the only party of all those considered in which the proportion of 
under-thirties is greater than in the electorate as a whole. For many PPF members the 
social and political struggles of the early 1930s were formative experiences. Perhaps 
surprisingly the PSF does better in the thirty-one to forty age group than in the forty-
one to fifties, that in which veterans were most numerous. Doubtless the proportion of 
veterans had been falling since the creation of the VN in late 1933. Nevertheless, the 
nucleus of the PSF was formed by men who had served in the First World War, espe-
cially as according to the police some younger PSF militants deserted to the PPF in 
late 1936.63 Federation militants were considerably older than they had been in the 
years before June 1936.64 More than ever the party represented the generation of the 
Dreyfus affair. 
Origins 
The birthplace of all militants in the department is shown in Table 21. The Federation 
counted the greatest proportion of locally born militants; the figure of 67% is identical 
to that in previous years. PSF militants, and even more those of the PPF, were more 
likely to have been born outside the department. The proportion of PPF militants who 
had been born outside of the Rhone-Alps region is also considerably higher than in ei-
ther of the other parties. 
If the agglomeration alone is considered (Table 22) then the differences be-
tween the Federation and the PSF are virtually eliminated. It is not at first sight possi-
ble to say which of the two parties was the most "Lyonnais". Yet in view of the Fed-
eration's age profile, and given the fact that natives were rare in the older generation, 
63 ADR 4m 236, 20- 11 -1936. 
64 The pro portion of over sixties rose from 24% to 33%. In the countryside no less than 42% of Federation mili-
tants were aged over sixty, whilst two thirds were more than fifty years old. 
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it is legitimate to describe the Federation as more "Lyonnais" than its rival. 65 Fur-
thermore, natives of the agglomeration were more likely to live in the space of the 
"old bourgeoisie" and those unsegregated areas like the 4th and 7th arrondissements 
where the Oeuvre des cercles was strong. This is another reason why the PSF was 
able to see itself as an "anti-establishment party", even though its own members were 
in one sense just as "Lyonnais". The PPF was even less rooted in the city than the 
PSF. The rarity of natives of the agglomeration in the former is all the more 
significant in view of the youthfulness of PPF members. We shall see, however, that 
the PPF as a whole cannot be described as an "outsider" party. It was mainly those 
militants who were working class who had been born outside the city. 
Table 21: Geographical Origins of Militants of the Right in the RhOne, 1936 
to 1939 (percent)66 
Party RhOne I hone-Alps Other Total 
FR 67 20 13 760 
PSF 57 22 18 691 
PPF 44 25 34 59 
Table 22: Party by Geographical Origin in the 
Agglomeration, 1936 to 1939 (percent) 
Party I NT A I MRA I MFR I NHF I Tot 
FR 50 32 16 2 451 
PSF 47 32 17 3 501 
PPF 34 33 26 5 57 
Elect 39 43 19 
Table 23 Migrants in the Agglomeration by type 
of Commune of Birth 
Rural Urban 
FR 57 43 
PSF 32 67 
PPF 22 78 
Table 23 shows migrant supporters in the agglomeration broken down by the 
type of commune in which they had been born. In the PSF 67% of migrants were born 
65 Indeed. the proportion of natives of the agglomeration in the Federation rose substanially after 1936. 
66 "Other" includes militants born in the rest of France together with a small number who had been born abroad. 
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in communes with populations of more than 2,000 inhabitants, compared to only 43% 
of Federation migrants. The PPF is the most urban of all in its recruitment. Just as the 
Federation was more rural in its geographical implantation, so it was is terms of the 
origins of its urban-dwelling members. 
Table ~~ Origins of the Federation and PSF militants in the countryside, 
1936·9 
Origin FR PSF 
Lives in commune of birth 53 31 
Migration within canton 11 6 
Migration within Rhone 10 13 
Agglomeration 10 14 
Rhone·Alps 10 26 
France 6 11 
Total 307 187 
Table 24 shows that there is an equally marked contrast between the PSF and the Fed-
eration outside of the agglomeration.68 More than half of Federation sympathizers 
lived in the commune in which they had been born, whereas less than one third of 
PSF supporters did so. PSF supporters were considerably more likely to have been 
born outside of the department. They were also more likely to have been born in the 
agglomeration, and indeed in urban communes in general: 52% of PSF migrants in 
the countryside had been born in urban communes, compared to 40% of those back-
ing the Federation. This reflects the fact that the PSF tended to recruit in small towns 
rather than in peasant-dominated villages. In this the PSF resembled the Radicals. 
Social Class 
Graph 30, which shows social class in percentage terms, reveals that the clearest op-
position is between the mainly bourgeois PSF and the more popular PPF. The PSF 
also differs quite substantially from the Federation, recruiting a greater proportion of 
its members in all sections of the ruling class, and also among both higher and lower 
grade white collar workers. The Federation, on the other hand is more attractive to 
workers and farmers. 
There is little evidence here to support P. Milza's contention that the PSF had 
begun to take root in the working class, thereby becoming a "modern inter-class 
force".69 True, the PSF had some support in all classes, and as such represented a 
major threat to the Federation. The PSF was the first party since the ALP to challenge 
the Federation in the countryside. But in P. Milza's terms the Federation had the 
67 Percentages are calculated only in relation to migrants born in metrapolitan France. 
68 The origins of Federation sympathizers is more or less identical to the pre-June 1936 period. 
69 Milza, op. cit., pp. 138-9. Irvine, "The Croix de Feu" is also wrong on this score. 
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greater claim to being an inter-class party. It is perhaps more plausible to see PSF as a 
mass version of the lay centre right. It has the same over-representation in all sections 
of the ruling class; like the centre right it does well among senior managers and 
engineers, who make up 3% of the Federation sample compared to 7% of PSF 
militants. Unlike the centre right the PSF had wide support among white collar 
workers and peasants, but here the influence of social Catholicism in the Federation 
left would have to be taken into account. 
Graph 30: Social Class of Militants in the Rhone, July 
1936 to August 1939 
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In comparison with the pre-June 1936 situation the most notable change in the 
Federation is the substantial fall in the number of farmers, a finding in keeping with 
the more urban nature of the party in this period. The explanation for this is firstly 
that many rural mayors only supported the Federation in election periods, of which 
there was only one after June 1936. Secondly, social conflict in these years was a 
mainly urban phenomenon. At a time when the PSF made rapid progress amongst the 
bourgeoisie, the Federation fell back on its urban clientele of workers and white collar 
workers. 
The PPF graph presents a paradoxical appearance, very different to any of the 
parties considered so far. On the one hand it was better represented than either of its 
rivals amongst both senior managers and higher grade white collar workers, who rep-
resent 32% of all adherents. On the other, the PPF comprised what for a right wing 
party was a small proportion of businessmen (2%), and a large number of workers 
(28%). Again we see the dualism of the PPF. 
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The Agglomeration 
In Graph 31 militants in the agglomeration are represented in relation to their signifi-
cance in the electorate as a whole. For the same reasons as in Graph 16 in Chapter six, 
the occupations used here are those given in the electora1list. Hence the inclusion of 
the category "workers or artisans".70 
As before June 1936 the bourgeoisie are strongly over-represented in all par-
ties, including the PSF. The differences between the parties in respect of their appeal 
to the various sectors of the bourgeoisie are also as before. All three are strongly over-
represented in the liberal professions. The main differences are that whereas the PPF 
is most overrepresented among the "salaried bourgeoisie" and students, the Federation 
does best among businessmen, and the PSF among both businessmen, managers and 
engineers.71 
Graph 31: The Right in the Agglomeration, June 
1936 to 1939 
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None of the three parties can be described as middle class in the broadest sense of the 
term. Both PSF and PPF include a greater than expected proportion of private sector 
white collar workers, but are under-represented in those sections of the lower middle 
class where the right had traditionally been weak: small business and especially the 
white collar workers of the public sector. It is difficult to agree with P. Machefer's 
contention that the PSF were a movement of the "declining" petty-bourgeoisie. 
Neither does Graph 31 make it possible to describe the PPF as proletarian. 
Partly this is because when occupation on electoral list alone is used, as it was in this 
70 As in graph 1~ in chapter six, the ~gglomer~tion in this case means the eleven communes analysed by Jean-Luc 
Pinol, together With Ecully, Francheville, Tassm and Sl Rambert 
71 These differences between the parties are all magnified if only those Federation militants who appear in the 
sources only after June 1936 are considered. 
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case, then the number of workers in the PPF is reduced.72 All the same, the distortion 
is not large enough for us to modify our conclusion. Whilst the PPF included a greater 
proportion of workers than any other party of the right, and this is something which 
needs to be explained, it was nevertheless more attractive to the bourgeoisie than to 
the proletariat.73 
Table 25: Leaders of the Right in the Agglomeration 74 
I FR I PSF I PPF 
AGR 1 
- -
BUS 11 21 1 
SEM 5 13 4 
PRO 7 7 
-
WCI 11 5 5 
WC2 4 9 2 
SBU 2 
-
2 
WOR 4 2 
-
RET 5 2 1 
Total 50 57 15 
The occupational breakdown of party leaders is shown in Table 25. Whereas 
the national leadership of the PPF was fairly proletarian in composition, there were no 
workers at all in the Rhone leadership. Most numerous were the salaried bourgeoisie 
and lower middle class. Albert Beugras, leader of the PPF, was an engineer trained at 
the Ecole superieure de chimie of Mulhouse. Since 1925 he had been employed as an 
engineer at Rhone-Poulenc in Peage-Roussillon.75 These categories are also strongly 
over-represented among the leaders of the PSF, where senior managers and engineers 
make up 23% of the total. Most striking of all is the proportion of businessmen in the 
leadership of the PSF: no less than 37% of the total. 76 The leadership of the Federa-
tion, on the other hand is more balanced. Businessmen are still numerous (22%), but 
the bourgeoisie as a whole represent 48% compared to 72% of PSF leaders. Were 
leaders of PSF sub-sections to be excluded, then the difference would be even more 
marked. 
72 Workers, as a geographically mobile group, are usually hard to locate in electoral lists. This difficulty is com-
pounded .in the case of the PPF by the impr~cision of information in the party press. 28% of the sample consists of 
workers if all sources are used. If electoral lists alone are used then there are 15% workers and 9% workers or arti-
sans--24% altogether. 
73 It might also be noted that if where the right recruited heavily in working class areas, the ruling class and white 
collar workers were nevertheless over-represented in the committes of those areas. In Venissieux, where the Fed-
eration possessed ~n important commi!tee,. nine o~t of twenty-eigh~ militants (32%) can be classified as proletar-
ian--a substantial under-representanon m relanon to the proportIOn of workers in Venissieux. The Committee 
was led by businessmen and wealthy rose-growers. (P. Videlier and B. Bouhet, Venissieux d'A a v 1921-1931, 
Lyon, 1983 for ~he structure of ~e population of Venissieux).. ' 
74 The .Federali.on sample consl~ts of members of the d.epartmental council; that of the PSF of section presidents 
and their depulies and sub-sectton leaders, together With eleven departmental cadres; that of the PPF includes 
members of the Regional bur~au from the Rhone, together with presidents and secretaries of sections. 
75 AN Cour de Justice, 4703 ,dossier Beugras; Chaix, op. cit., pp.10-11. 
76 Sixteen times their importance in the electorate. 
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Federation and PSF militants in the agglomeration can also be compared to 
what little is known of the voters of those parties. The only direct confrontation of 
PSF and Federation in the agglomeration was in the by-election in the southern part of 
the 2nd arrondissement in September 1936. Both parties correlate strongly and posi-
tively with the bourgeoisie, the PSF more so than the Federation. The Federation out-
distanced the PSF only in the two southern districts, where the electorate was more 
popular.77 
The Countryside 
Outside the agglomeration the peasant base of the Federation contrasts with the more 
diverse recruitment of the PSF (see Graph 32). Peasants comprise half of the Federa-
tion sample, compared to one third of that of the PSF. Because of this disparity PSF 
militants constitute greater percentages of all the other social groups except busi-
nessmen.78 The explanation is the appeal of the Federation to businessmen in back-
ward sectors such as the cotton industry of the Monts du Beaujolais.79 On the other 
hand, the PSF does considerably better than the Federation both in the small business 
category, and among workers. So whilst the PSF in the countryside mobilized rela-
tively few peasant militants, it nonetheless had a more popular appeal than in the ag-
glomeration. In the countryside the PSF resembled in occupational terms the Radi-
cals. But it is impossible to say how many militants had ever been Radical voters or 
activists--probably very few. 
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77 Bureaux 209 and 210. 
789% in the Federation, 8% in the PSF. 
79 When profession is broken down by geographical region, the only area in which the Federation does better than 
the PSF is the Monts du Beaujolais. 
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Table 26: Leaders of the Right in the Countryside 
FR PSF 
AGR 6 11 
BUS 5 9 
SEM 
- 3 
PRO 4 9 
WCI 2 6 
WC2 2 5 
SBU 
- 2 
WOR 1 2 
RET 2 2 
Total 22 49 
In Table 26 PSF section and sub-section leaders are compared to members of the Fed-
eration's departmental committee. As before June 1936 the Federation is led largely 
by non-agricultural individuals. So too is the PSF, for farmers make up only 22% of 
the total. Yet the proportion of farmers among PSF leaders is much closer to that 
among party militants as a whole than it is in the Federation, which suggests that 
peasants in the PSF were more activist. This is perhaps also evidence of the impact of 
the JAC on the peasantry, and also reminds us of the challenge presented by the PSF 
to a party which relied on the deference to Church, landowners and village notables. 
Businessmen 
In terms of scale of enterprise Federation and PSF businessmen cannot be dif-
ferentiated. The proportion of directors of societes anonymes is a little higher in the 
Federation, but in view of the poor quality of the sources, the difference is not signifi-
cant. 80 The Federation included a number of big capitalists such as Fran~ois Balay of 
Gillet family, whose presence reminds us that the Federation retained residual support 
among the banking and silk oligarchy which had founded it. We saw in Chapter five, 
however, that the Federation under Victor Perret was becoming a party of medium 
sized family firms. 
It is evident from surviving party archives that PSF leaders were engaged in a 
constant search for contributions from business to finance its complex organisation. 81 
But too much cannot be read into the sources of business finance, for the PSF re-
ceived funds from businessmen of diverse opinions, such as the metal trading com-
pany Descours & Cabaud, which had in the past subsidised Action fran~aise and 
given employment to its members,82 and from the engineering employers association. 
8012% compare in the Federation compared to 10% in the PSF. 
81 ~ 451 AP 172, Frandaz to de Pn!val, 22-10-1937: the PSF's liesure organisation (SPES) would be unable to 
obtam money from party funds because it did not have enough to cover its own needs. 
82 ~ 451 AP 17~. In response to a request for money from the PSF's liesure organisation (SPES), the St Etienne 
busmessman Kemlin, suggested an approach to M Vincens-Bougereau of Descours & Cabaud. (Kemlin to Mme de 
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More significant is the presence in the PSF of representatives of big capital 
like Henri Doll of the Filatures de Schappe, another firm in which the Gillets had an 
interest. Doll's presence can also be seen as evidence that elements of the big business 
elite which had at one time controlled the Chamber of Commerce and the Federation 
had turned to the PSF. We have already seen Morel-Journel's sympathy for the 
party.83 A son and a daughter-in-law of Aynard were also connected to the PSF.84 
There can be little doubt that the same milieu contributed to the finances of the PSF. 85 
Big business was losing interest in the Federation, and in 1936 the Alliance, which 
had to some extent taken on the role of the Federation, had collapsed. This, together 
with the anti-parliamentarianism shown in the previous chapter, perhaps explains the 
turn to the PSF after the shock of June. But we saw in the previous chapter that the 
support of the business elite for the PSF was discrete and never whole-hearted, all the 
more so as in 1938 the centre right recovered much of its influence. 
The PSF was not then a party of big capital in the way that the Federation had 
been in the days of Aynard and Isaac. Like the Federation under Perret, the great ma-
jority of PSF businessmen were bosses of medium family firms. Andre Rossignol, di-
rector of Le Volontaire '36, owned a small dyeing firm. Emile Goirand, Freynet's 
deputy, helped run the family wholesale paper business. At this point the similarities 
between PSF and Federation end. 
The first major difference was that PSF businessmen were substantially 
younger: 37% of them were aged forty or less, compared to only 17% of Federation 
businessmen.86 They also lived in different parts of the department. Map 11.07 shows 
that Federation employers in Lyon preferred the peninsula, with the exception of the 
1 st arrondissement, the northwestern part of the 7th arrondissement, the industrial 
suburbs of the agglomeration and the cotton towns of the Monts du Beaujolais. Above 
all the PSF recruited from the left bank of the Rhone, especially the 6th arrondisse-
ment and contiguous parts of Villeurbanne and the 3rd arrondissement. Thus whereas 
Federation businessmen preferred the districts of the "old bourgeoisie", PSF employ-
ers resided in those of the more advanced wing of the ruling class. Perhaps the most 
revealing opposition is that between the Federation bastion of the Croix Rousse, home 
of traditional silk manufacturers, and the 6th arrondissement where nearly one quarter 
of PSF businessmen resided. This opposition is, however, less marked than that be-
tween Federation and centre right had been. The PSF had significant support in the 
PrevaI, 11-10-1937. This suggest that the communist Vou du Peuple's suggestion that this fum was subsidising the 
PSP to the tune of 10,000 francs per month had some truth in it (Vou du Peuple, 14-12-1936). 
83 Journal d'Henry Morel-Journel, 2-5-1938: for example he approved of his daughter's fian'.cb on the grounds 
that he was "tres PSP". The fiance owned 250 hectares near Moulins. See also Chapter 11. 
84 AN 451 AP 172, Bruyas to de Preval, and carton 278, document of 15-8-1940. 
85 Fridenson, op. cit., p. 260. In August 1936 a company was set up to centralize the distribution of funds to con-
servative parties in the Rhone. 
86 The figures for the over-fifties are 35% and 61 % respectively. 
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peninsula, which suggests that the polarization of June had enabled the PSF to widen 
its recruitment. 
The geographical contrast between the two parties is matched by the sectoral 
breakdown shown in Graph 33. Employers in the textile industries, both cotton manu-
facturers and jabricants de soieries, preferred the Federation. There are five repre-
sentatives of the most artisanal of all silk specialities; embroidered silks.87 PSF textile 
manufacturers, on the other hand, include two gros ja~onniers, a category not repre-
sented in the Federation, and whose hostility to jabricants non-usiniers was long-
standing. These employers too had previously favoured the centre right and left of the 
Federation. 
Employers in the metallurgical industry preferred the PSF. It was possible 
them to see in that party an authoritarian version of the democratic corporatism to 
which some had adhered in the late 1920s.88 The shift of this group from centre right 
to extreme right is symbolized by the accession of George Villiers to the leadership of 
the CSIMR in place of Edmond Weitz. The latter had resigned following the strikes of 
June 1936.89 Whereas Weitz had been President of the Alliance, Villiers appears to 
have seen himself as an arbiter of conservative politics. He financed both the 
Fran~istes,90 and, discretely, the PSF.91 His flexible attitude was typical of that of big 
business. 
87 Three of them lived in the Croix Rousse, an area were the Federation did much better than the PSF among 
businessmen. The one suchfabricant who backed the PSF, Max Dannhauser, was of Austrian origin, and lived in 
the 6th arrondissement. 
88 It is significant that the PSF should retrospectively approve both the abortive corporative projects of 1935, to 
which both tisseurs mecanique and smaller metallurgical firms had been strongly committed. 
89 Villiers, op. cit., pp. 14-15. 
90 ADR Cour de Justice 1294, dossier Sape. 
91 But Villiers contributed to the PSF on condition that the money went only to its social activities, and that his 
support was kept secret; this suggests that many engineering employers remained faithful to older allegiances. AN 
451 AP 172,18-12-1938. 
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The PSF had taken over the function of the centre right as a vehicle for those 
opposed to the business establishment. But this opposition differed in nature from that 
of the late 1920s. Firstly this was because the liberal-silk hegemony had given way to 
a wider big business group. Hostility to the business establishment was therefore no 
longer identified simply with a modern-traditional division, but with medium firms in 
general. Whereas medium firms in the modern sector turned to the PSF, those in older 
industries remained with the Federation. After June 1936 big business was blamed by 
both for the Matignon agreements, and subsequently for being lukewarm in its oppo-
sition to the Popular Front. The PSF seemed to reflect their concerns: Rhone-Poulenc, 
for example, was said by Le Volontaire '36 to have avoided the consequences of Pop-
ular Front labour legislation by setting up subsidiaries in Britain. 92 
The dyeing industry is perhaps typical of such conflicts. The bosses of 
medium dyeing fums were particularly numerous in the PSF. That party's anti-capi-
talism had a special appeal in a branch where economic crisis had accelerated con-
centration in the hands of Gillet. In this case the Federation may genuinely have ap-
peared to be a party of big capital, for on its Comite departmental sat Jean Vulloid of 
the second largest dyeing firm in the region, and Fran~ois Balay of Gillet.93 Gillet, 
moreover, became the scapegoat for the notoriously bad labour problems in the dye-
ing industry. Gillet, and other "trusts", were accused of entering into a conspiracy 
with Marxists in order to destroy "good" capitalists--those who understood the 
duty of the employer to his workforce,94 
In other words, it is possible to see in the dyeing industry the classic symp-
toms of "conservative revolt" against failed elites. The same factors were perhaps also 
at work in the building industry, where small and medium firms were also in the fore-
front of industrial struggles. Like dyers, builders were numerous in the PSF. It is also 
possible to detect the ambiguities of "conservative revolt", for in spite of its anti-cap-
italism, big firms were also interested in the trades union filial of the PSF, the SPF, as 
a strike-breaking organization. At Gillet the SPF flourished in the wake of the defeat 
of a bitter strike in the summer of 1937. More than other employers large building 
firms saw the PSF as a strike breaking organization. For this reason they also col-
laborated with the PPF, which took over the organization of North African strike 
breakers from the patronat. 
92 Le Volontaire '36. 5-3-1937. 
93 Both Balay and Vulloid sat on the Comite departmental of the party. 
94 Le Vo!ontaire '36,~9-7-1~37. The Gillet conflict of 1937. it was argued. "eclaire une fois de plus les vices de 
notre regime economlco-soclale: des reformes socialistes s'appliquent a un liberalisme capitaliste encore unique-
ment prcoccupe de l'economique. Comment en serait-il autrement dans une societe anonyme gcree de Paris, em-
ployant plusieurs milliers d'ouvriers en France et a l'ctranger?". ' 
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Senior Managers and Engineers 
Whereas the proportion of senior managers in the PSF and Federation is fairly simi-
lar,95 engineers are two and a half times as numerous in the new party.96 Engineers 
were also common in the leadership of the PSF, and in the PPF, which possessed a 
special engineers' section. The impact of June 1936 on a group influenced by social 
Catholicism explains the appeal of the PSF to engineers and senior managers.97 The 
result was a group conscious of its own specificity, but simultaneously drawn towards 
the patronat. 98 
The effects of June 1936 are reflected in the fact that PSF senior managers 
were more likely than those in the Federation to work in industrial sectors.99 Engi-
neers were by nature found mainly in modem industries like chemicals and metal-
lurgy, so there is little difference in the sectoral breakdown of those in the PSF or 
Federation. But engineers were much more numerous in the former. 
Many engineers and managers experienced June 1936 as personal trauma. Al-
bert Beugras at Rhone-Poulenc was personally attacked in COT tracts and graffiti was 
painted on his house. He later claimed that in the face of threats to kidnap his chil-
dren, he had been obliged to flee to Paris, where he made contact with the PPF.l00 
The son of Albert Astruc, manager at a large Vaise fIrm, recalls that one of his earliest 
memories was of workers marching past the family home, chanting "Les Astruc au 
poteau!",101 Many PSF and PPF managers and engineers worked in firms at the lead-
ing edge of the struggle against the COT. One example is Paul Lombard, manager of 
another Oillet artificial fibre concern, Rhodiaceta. This factory acquired symbolic 
significance when in September 1936 the workforce attempted to run the occupied 
factory without its managers and engineers. 
Yet if engineers and managers were deeply hostile to the COT, they were also 
conscious after June that something divided them from the patronat. It is noteworthy 
that the great bulk of "cadres" in the PSF and PPF defined themselves as engineers 
rather than managers, for apart from an elite of Poly technicians engineers rarely at-
95 1·8% in the Federation, compared to 2· 2% in of PSF militants. In both parties, nonetheless, they are substan-
tially over-represented. 
96 Engineers constitute 5% of the PSF sample, compared to 2% of that of the Federation. 
97 New Federation militants were even less likely to be engineers or senior managers--3·2% compared to 4% 
of all those active in the Federation after June 1936. 
98 There is a rather artificial debate on this topic between Luc Boltanski, The Making of a Class: Cadres in French 
Society, Cambridge, 1987, ch. 1 (translated from the French edition of 1982), and I. Kolboom, "Patronat et cadres: 
la contribution patronale a la formation du groupe des cadres", MS, 1982, pp. 71-95. Kolboom criticizes Boltanski 
for underestimating the extent to which the cadre movement was encouraged by the patronat. In fact Boltanski's 
argument allows for a subtle interplay of ideological traditions, capital-labour conflict and changes in the nature of 
the enterprise. A better target for Kolboom would have been Marc Maurice, op. cit., who argues for an automatic 
connection between bureaucratizaion of the enterprise, intensification of labour-capital conflict, and an ideology of 
the third way. 
99 Federation senior managers ten1ed to work in non-industrial sectors such as the press and banking. 
100 AN Cour de Justice 516 4703 ,Dossier Beugras-Celor; Chaix, op. cit., 9-11. Marie Chaix's novel is based on 
her father's memoirs, written whilst awaiting trial. 
101 Interview with Dr. Roger Astruc, 1987. This recollection is authenticated by reports in the Nouvelliste of agi-
tation in Vaise at this time: "La ville a ete en effet, absolument livree aux masses du Front Populaire [ ... 1 Les mil-
liers de poings levees, et les incessants cris de «a mort! au poteau!» en dit assez long sur l'esprit qui animent les 
manifestants" (Nouvelliste, 15-7-1936). 
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tained the summits of managerial responsibity.102 The great majority of engineers 
were at one remove from the patronat Some saw themselves as having been aban-
doned by their employers, as "frustrated collaborators" to use lngo Kolboom's expres-
sion. Albert Beugras believed that the cowardice of his employers had led to the vic-
tory of the COT: the workers in his department had refused to strike, but in the end 
the employers gave in and Beugras was sent on holiday.103 
The professional consciousness of engineers and managers had been sharp-
ened in the early 1930s by a struggle to protect their profession from overcrowd-
ing.104 Often this struggle had led to involvement in the dominant engineers organi-
zation, USIC. Can at de Chizy had at one time been its President. Here they had been 
exposed to social Catholic doctrine. From this source engineers took a tripartite model 
of society which after June 1936 enabled them to make sense of their struggle against 
communism and employers and permitted them to conclude that they were uniquely 
placed to reconcile bosses and workers. The theme of the twin combat against com-
munism and employers, held responsible for the upheaval of June 1936, is prominent 
in many of Beugras's articles in the PPF press.105 Beugras's middle way was sym-
bolic, however, for as a full-time activist in the PPF he continued to receive his salary 
from Rhone-Poulenc.106 Often engineers and managers believed that they knew better 
than their employers on matters other than labour relations. Canat de Chizy, company 
secretary of the Societe Lyonnaise du textile, was a defender of the 1935 entente pro-
ject for the silk industry, seeing it as a means for engineers to make their voices 
heard.to7 The prominence of textile industry managers and engineers in the PSF,108 is 
perhaps explained by this issue, as well as by the extent of industrial conflict in that 
industry. 
The position of engineers and senior managers has many similarities with that 
of the businessmen who supported the PSF. Here too it is possible to detect a mobi-
lization of rank and file conservatives against failed leaders. 
The Liberal Professions and students 
The liberal professions and students are more numerous in the PSF (6%) than the 
Federation (4%), though in both parties they are substantially over-represented in re-
lation to the electorate as a whole. The liberal professions are the only occupational 
102 A Grelon, "La Profession d'ingenieur dans les annees trente", in Grelon (ed.), Les Ingenieurs de la crise, Paris, 
1986, pp. 7-32. An example of an "elite" engineer is Canat de Chizy. As company secretary of a large artificicial 
fibre finn, he occupied a very senior position. He was, moreover, the son of an Inspector of Finance and member 
of a wealthy family with connections to the Gillet's. (A. Hamon, Les Mafrres de la France). 
103 Chaix, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 
104 Grelon, op. cit., pp. 7-26. 
105 Chaix, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 
106 AN Cour de Justice 516 47033, Dossier Beugras-Celor. 
107 According to Morel-Joumel, Canat de Chizy had been strirring up trouble against More1-Iournel et Cie. in the 
Societe lyonnaise du textil. Journal d'Henry Morel-Journel, 29-11-1935. 
108 Five out of thirteen for whom profession is known, compared to only one out of eleven in the Federation. The 
leader of the PSFs Neuville section, Paul Cuzin, was manager of Textiles du Rhone, a firm producing rayon. 
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group in which there is a significant difference in the geographical origins of the sup-
porters of Federation and PSP. In the former 68% had been born in the agglomeration, 
in the latter only 35%. Four out of five of those supporting the PPF had also been 
born outside the agglomeration. This difference is all the more important in view of 
the fact that PSF supporters were much younger: 47% were aged forty or less, com-
pared to 22% in the Federation. These differences are only partially explained by the 
greater number of students in the PSF sample. 
The most probable explanation is the over-crowding of the professions in the 
1930s.109 Difficulties were perhaps greatest among those without connections in the 
city. Law students opposed measures enabling solicitors' clerks to embark on legal 
studies even though they did not possess the baccalaureate. Many demanded corpo-
rate regulation of professions. It is therefore significant that whereas the Federation 
included a greater proportion of lawyers, a profession which was already self-regu-
lated, the PSF comprised a higher proportion of doctors, the group in which demands 
for a professional body were greatest. lIO Once again the PSF is the party of the "anti-
establishment bourgeoisie". 
Small business 
The PSF was one of many groups after June 1936 which claimed to express the dis-
content of the classes moyennes. Classes moyennes discourse had many functions. In 
the present context what is important is that it was designed to achieve the old con-
servative goal of winning over the self-employed clientele of the Radicals. To this end 
the PSF retained its links with the radical wing of the small shopkeeper movement, 
the UP. July 1936 Marcel Perdriel was reported by the police to have been involved, 
along with three royalists, in the creation of a group of small businessmen able to 
combat any renewal of strike activity. 11 1 In mid-1937 it was reported that the PSF 
was ready to create its own small shopkeeper organization.112 
It is unlikely that the PSF was more successful in winning over small business 
than any other conservative party had been. In April 1937 the Prefect remarked on the 
failure of efforts, deriving from all parts of the political chessboard, to latch onto the 
discontent of the lower-middle class. Only a small minority, thanks to opposition to 
the Forty Hours Law, had been attracted to the PSF.1I3 The great bulk of small busi-
nessmen remained faithful to the Radicals. Although the Radicals had lost votes to 
right and left in 1936, the cantonales of October 1937 showed that the party had 
109 See chapter nine. 
110 27% of Federation professionals were lawyers, compared to 22% of those in the PSF. The figures for doctors 
were 24% and 35% respectively. 
111 ADR 4m 244, campagnes alarmistes, September 1936. 
112 ADR 4m 236, 24-7-1934. 
113 ADR 4m 236, 24-4-1937. 
Conservative Militants, 1936 to 1939 334 
staged something of a recovery, as it did nationally in 1937 and 1938. The PSF's pro-
jected small business syndicate never materialized. 
It is true that the PSF included a greater proportion of small businessmen than 
the Federation--12% compared to 8% in the latter. But since the proportion of the 
self-employed in the right as a whole remained stable at 10%, it must be suspected 
that the majority of PSF small businessmen had previously been sympathizers of the 
Parliamentary right. It is true that in the countryside small businessmen are over-rep-
resented in the PSF, and that the social profile of the PSF resembles that of the Radi-
cals.114 But even here, with the possible exception of the mountains, most militants 
were of conservative background. It is therefore essential to differentiate small busi-
ness support for the Federation and PSF. 
First, the Federation includes more silk weavers and practitioners of declining 
rural trades such as harness making. 115 More common in the PSF were new trades 
such radio repairers and garage owners. This is partly a function of the greater age of 
Federation militants. But the traditionalist rhetoric of the Federation appears to have 
had some impact on small business. 
More important is the contrasting geographical implantation of small busi-
nessmen in the two parties. Whereas the Federation won support from small business 
in the 7th arrondissement and the proletarian banlieu, the PSF was strong in the bour-
geois 2nd and 6th arrondissements. Social and political polarization explains this 
contrast. 
A favoured tactic of anti-fascists in left-dominated districts was to boycott 
PSF traders. One target was the pharmacist Jean Knersynski. As a member of the 
Croix de Feu Knersynski had been involved in several violent incidents. 116 He now 
led the PSF security service, the Equipes volantes de propagande (EVP), in the 5th 
arrondissement. On 18 September 1936 a tract urging the boycott of three local 
traders, including Knersynski, was distributed. A crowd of perhaps 1,200 surrounded 
his shop.117 Intimidation may have worked, for in the following year Knersynski left 
Lyon.118 It is not surprising that small traders in such areas were reluctant to commit 
themselves to the PSF. 
Shopkeepers were much more likely to join the PSF in central areas where the 
PSF was much stronger. This emphasizes the extent to which the PSF was the expres-
sion and agent of the politicization of entire quartier's--a kind of state within a 
114 Shopkeepers and small traders constitute 8% and 14% of Federation and PSF militants respectively. The dif-
ference is all the more striking when it is remembered that the Federation sample does not include the host of 
peasant mayors who supported the Federation during electoral campaigns. 
115 In the Croix-Rousse the party included two artisan weavers aged seventy-five and ninety-six in 1938. 
116 For example at Decines in the autumn of 1935. 
117 Nouveau journal, 19-9-1936. The tract read "Travailleurs vaisois, n'oubliez pas que Ie pharmacien Knerzyn-
sky, 3, rue Masyrak, est Croix de Feu. Un commeryant Croix de Feu, boycottez-Ie". 
118 We know this because he was removed from the electoral register in 1938. 
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state.119 Le volontaire '36, unlike that of the Federation, carried two pages of maisons 
recommandees, where PSF adherents were assured of a welcome from like-minded 
traders. 120 
Whilst it is certain that the great bulk of self-employed sympathizers of the 
PSF had conservative backgrounds, the possibility that a minority came from Radi-
calism should not be discounted. We have also seen that in the canton of St Laurent 
de Chamousset the Radical electorate preferred the PSF to the Federation. Given the 
dependence of rural radicalism in such areas on small shopkeepers and artisans it is 
possible that some Radical small traders joined the PSF. PSF propaganda in this area 
was highly populist in tone. Two of the PSF militants interviewed claimed that their 
fathers had voted for the Radicals. Both participated in the activities of the EVP, a 
body in which youthful petty bourgeois males were numerous, and where a pseudo-
Jacobin atmosphere reigned.1 21 Where the PSF did win Radical supporters, they rein-
forced the anti-establishment ethos of the PSF. 
White Collar Workers 
In absolute terms white collar workers constitute the largest social group in all three 
parties: 24% of PPF militants; 25% in the Federation and 30% in the PSF.122 The PSF 
trades union, the SPF, was also largely a movement of white collar workers. There is 
nothing new in the reliance of conservative parties upon private sector white collar 
workers for their popular constituencies. But under the surface some complex changes 
had taken place. The background is the contrast between the expansion of Catholic 
trades unionism and the decline of Christian democracy, and the growing gap between 
CFTC leaders and a pro-PSF rank and file. The evidence for the PSF-CFTC link lies 
in the recruitment of the PSF in groups where the CFTC had traditionally been strong. 
First, PSF white collar workers were relatively young.123 Second, like PDP 
and CFTC supporters they lived mainly in the bourgeois and petty bourgeois centre of 
Lyon. Higher grade white collar workers were recruited from the bourgeois 2nd, 5th 
and 6th arrondissements and from western residential suburbs. Lower grade employ-
ees resided in these same areas, but also in the 3rd. This latter area was one where the 
PSF as a whole was not strong, but where the PDP had been well implanted. Only 
where the progress of the PSF was dependent upon the patronal counter-offensive did 
the PSF break out of its confinement in the central areas of Lyon. 124 
119 cf Nord, op. cit., passim on the importance of quartier to Parisian shopkeepers in the 1880s and 189Os. 
120 In 1937 the party produced a directory of sympathetic traders. Bruno Beguet, op. cit., pp. 93-5, analysed the 
residence of traders advertising in Ie Volontaire '36, finding that they lived mainly in the centre of the city. 121 See Chapter 12. 
122 By white ~llar workers in this section I mean both higher and lower grade workers, together with the white 
collar workers ill the PIT, OTL and PLM sometimes classed separately as "public services". 
123 33% of Federation white collar workers were aged forty or less, compared to 55% of those backing the PSF. 124 See page (?). 
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The Federation, on the other hand, gained its white collar support from those 
areas where the Oeuvre des cercles was strong, the 4th and 7th, and among lower 
grade workers resident in the suburbs. The importance of paternalist Catholicism is 
underlined by the fact that the minority of silk employees who backed the Federation 
lived mainly in the Croix Rousse, where the Corporation des employes de soieries 
had most of its members. Here the paternalism of the merchant manufacturing wing 
of the silk industry, symbolized by the Perret-Gruffaz axis, reinforced religious ties. 
Third, inevitably for a movement implanted largely in the centre of Lyon, the 
PSF recruited mainly from medium and small enterprises, often commercial in na-
ture. 125 The Federation in contrast had quite substantial support in the large chemical 
and metallurgical flrms in the suburbs of the agglomeration, such as Rhone-Poulenc 
and Saint Gobain.126 Here too the PSF resembled the CFTC. Catholic syndicates had 
been based on the parishes rather than on individual enterprises, thereby enabling 
them to get around the hostility of small and medium flrms to unions. Where the PSF 
differed from the CFTC was in its near absence from the large banks and department 
stores of the centre, where the CFTC possessed a minority of supporters. Federation 
members were more common in both.127 The relative weakness of the PSF in the 
grands magasins and banks could be due to the fact that PSF militants there devoted 
themselves to the SPF, which was relatively successful in the Grand Bazaar and 
Credit lyonnaise in particular.128 But the SPF were never very strong, even here, 
making little impression in delegate elections. A more plausible explanation is that in 
large concerns CFTC adherents possessed greater awareness of the distinctive princi-
ples of the CFTC, which prevented them from turning to the PSF. Furthermore, ri-
valry with the CGT limited the success of the SPF, for it could be seen as dividing 
anti-communist forces. 129 
The fact that the PSF recruited best in medium and small business cannot be 
seen simply as evidence of manipulation by employers. We shall see that where there 
was such manipulation it usually took place in larger fIrms. Rather the appeal of the 
PSF to white collar workers should be seen in the context of a partial breakdown of 
125 Amongst higher grade workers the PSF recruited more travelling salesmen, while the Federation recruited 
more bookkeepers a group which is more industrial in character. 
126 There were no PSF, but four Federation employees in these two fums. As we shall see there were also several 
Federation workers in the same firms. 
127 There were four Federation militants working in department stores (one each at Galeries Lafayette and Deux 
Passages, and two at Grand Bazaar), while one PSF militant worked at Bon Marche. 
1·3% of all Federation adherents in the department worked in the large banks, compared to 1% of PSF militants. 
10 and 8 individuals respectively. Of the six Federation militants whose place of work is known, four worked at 
Credit Lyonnais, the other two at small banks. No PSF member is known to have worked in a large bank. 
128 The names and places of work of SPF militants come partly from Bruno Beguet who was kind enough to lend 
me the fiches on which his own excellent work had been based, and partly from my own researches, particularly in 
ADR 3u (Parquet de Lyon) 316, 1845 and 2022, and from the SPF Press. The places of work of the nine known 
leaders of the SPF Banque et Bourse are probably representative of PSF strength. Four were employed by Credit 
Lyonnaise, five by smaller banks. 
129 This perhaps explains why CFTC members deserted to the SPF only in smaller firms where the CGT was not 
a direct threat. For example in the employees section of the Trefileries du Rhone (Bocuze), where there were thirty 
voters, the SPF just managed to evict the sitting CFTC delegates. 
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paternalism in medium and small firms due to the bureaucratization of white collar 
work, growth of leisure, the emergence of a popular parish sociability, and the influ-
ence of social Catholics within that network. This created a potential for conflict in 
such firms, which was accentuated by the wide appeal of the reforms of the Popular 
Front. The proximity of employer and employee in smaller firms evoked the possibil-
ity of class collaboration. The CFTC preached its necessity yet at the same time de-
fended social reforms to which the patronat were deeply hostile. Hence the turn to the 
corporatism of the PSF, a system which promised to both protect special interests yet 
to resolve conflict not so much by negotiation as in the CFTC version, but by spiriting 
it away through an appeal to the national interest and strong leadership. 
The importance of corporatism to PSF white collar workers is confirmed by 
PSF recruitment in two groups which had shown an interest in corporatism in the 
early 1930s. Travelling salesmen had campaigned through the CFTC for a statute 
regulating their conditions of employment, an issue which had brought them into con-
flict with employers. 130 The issue was taken up by the PSF.131 The second group were 
white collar workers in the silk industry, who are almost three times more numerous 
in the PSF than the Federation. 132 Their interest in corporatism is confirmed also by 
the fact that the first issue of the bulletin of the SPF silk union was composed largely 
of a defence of the failed entente in the silk industry. 133 
Finally, a word about white collar support for the PPF. As far as it is possible 
to tell from a small sample the PPF recruited from almost the same milieu as the PSF. 
White collar workers in the two parties are roughly similar in age, geographical ori-
gins and in their residence in the bourgeois areas of the city. Where the parties differ 
is firstly in the greater appeal of the PPF to higher grade employees, and secondly in 
the presence of a significant white collar presence in working class areas, especially 
Villeurbanne. Social polarization is again the best explanation, for supervisory per-
sonnel in proletarian suburbs must often have experienced isolation and perhaps at-
tacks from communists. 
This might have been all the more galling because there is evidence that some 
militants had experienced disappointment in their careers. 134 The father of Rene Ma-
zot had been killed in the Great War. Young Rene attended one of the Lycee Ampere, 
perhaps the best in Lyon, but left at age fifteen without taking the baccalaureate, per-
haps because he was an orphan. He worked in several white collar jobs then in 1935 
130 Travelling salesmen make up 39% of the higher grade white collar workers in the PSF compared to 26% in the 
Federation. 
131 Volontaire '36,17-9-1937. 
132 The actual figures are 1 % of all adherents in the Federation, 2·7% in the Federation. Most of these were lower 
grade workers. Such employees are relatively easy to identify because in many gave their profession in electoral or 
census registers as "employe de soieries". 
133 SPF des Ouvriers et employes de soieries, No.2, 7-9-1936. 
134 The source is interrogations of PPF members after the liberation. Obviously people who risked the death 
penalty had good ~eason to attribute their politics to personal misfortune. But if we stick to the facts of education 
and employment hIstOry there does seem to be truth in many of the stories. Sometimes they are corroborated. 
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went to work for another future PPF militant Louis Chazal in his refrigeration repair 
business. But within two years the firm had collapsed. Just before this happened both 
men had joined the PPF. Mazot then found work at Citroen garages, a finn which em-
ployed other militants of the far right. 135 
Workers 
The same factors which have been invoked to explain the recruitment of conservative 
white collar workers can be applied to working class supporters. Federation workers 
lived in the 4th and 7th arrondissements and in suburbs like Venissieux. They worked 
in large chemical and metallurgical enterprises. PSF workers were younger, resided in 
areas where there was a strong bourgeois presence, as well as the third with its PDP 
past, and worked mainly in small and medium finns. Indeed, half a dozen PSF work-
ers were employed in small businesses by their fathers. One PSF militant was a gar-
dener on the Gillet estate at Bully. 136 This does not, however, mean that PSF workers 
were in any simple sense subject to paternalism. The arguments developed in con-
nection with white collar workers apply here too.137 
What is perhaps more interesting is the decline in the strength of the right as a 
whole in proletarian suburbs after June 1936.138 If the right maintained its support in 
the working class, it was because of the recruitment of workers in the centre of the 
city by the PSF. The PPF did relatively well in the suburbs, especially Villeurbanne, 
but PPF militants were not numerous. Yet the right did not decline electorally after 
1936.139 Again the impact of social polarization upon the popular constituency of the 
right can be invoked to resolve this paradox. 
The counterpart of the dense implantation of the PSF in the centre of the city 
was an intense popular consciousness in working class suburbs. Since the cantonales 
of 1934 the Communists had made spectacular electoral gains in the south eastern 
suburbs. l40 According to Antoine Prost a greater proportion of the workforce in the 
Rhone was unionised than in any other department.141 In such an ambience even 
quarrels between neighbours were politicized. This happened in Villeurbanne in the 
summer of 1937 when a communist municipal employee of Spanish origin was shot 
135 ADR Cour de Justice, 635. Another PPF member, Jean Dalla Chiera had attended the Ecole des Beaux Arts in 
Lyon, but emerged without a diploma. Until Januruy 1936 he had been employed as bookkeeper at BerIiet. After 
leaving this job he set up as a pajnter and decorator, but soon found waged work in the building industry (AN Cour 
de Justice de la Seine, 5144703 ). 
136 1·1% of PSF militants were employed in services; 0·4% of Federation sympathizers. 
137 See page 336. 
138 See page 318. 
139 In the legislative elections of 1936 the right gained 18·7% of votes cast. In the local elections of October 1937 
the combined vote of the PSF and PPF was 18.5% of voters. The poll in the latter was remarkably high for a can-
tonal election. 
140 The municipalities of several suburban communes, including Villeurbanne, Venissieux and Bron had fallen to 
the communists in 1935. In 1936 communists had won the seats of Villeurbanne (canton) and the working class 
parts of the 7th arrondissement. 
141 Prost, op. ~it., p. His ~igll!es are a little suspect since they are based on partially corrected, but still unreliable, 
data on the acbve populabon In the 1936 census. But fraud went undetected in many other cities. There can be lit-
tle doubt that levels of unionization were elevated in France. 
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dead by a reputedly fascist worker employed in an artificial fibre factory. According 
to the left several thousand people followed the coffin.142 Meanwhile the left's cam-
paign against the extreme right continued on the streets. In Vaise. known for its 
"village spirit", hostility to the PSF was particularly marked.143 In September 1936 a 
revival of PSF motorcades caused the left to organize street patrols in the district. The 
police reported that purchases of hand guns had been very numerous. l44 Pressure to 
conform was equally strong in the factories. Donations to collections for strikers were 
seen as a symbol of adhesion to the popular cause.145 The "conduite de Grenoble", 
which involved ritual humiliation by female workers. was employed on several occa-
sions against SPF members.146 
Incidents of this kind are a rich source for the study of working class culture. 
But the essential point here is that community pressure made it difficult for the right 
to organize. This is perhaps why it was the less activist Federation which remained 
best-implanted in the banlieu. rather than the PSF. PSF and SPF were able to organize 
only where they fastened onto the counter-offensive of the employers. In the left wing 
press there were frequent accusations of employer pressure to join the PPF and 
PSF.147 That such pressure was sometimes real is confirmed a letter of 1941, in which 
Fran~ois Peisse1 spoke of Paul Cuzin. manager of Textiles du Rhone, as "un homme 
intelligent et complet. [qui] a rnilite ardemment au PSF ecartant de tout embauchage 
ce qui ne donnaient pas leur adhesion ace parti".148 Such was the case in the Gillet 
dyeing factories. 149 After the failed strike of 1937 the SPF made quite significant 
gains in delegate elections in Gillet factories. At the Societe Lyonnaise de textiles 
Canat de Chizy. the company secretary, led a section of the SPF.150 
It is interesting to look at the sociology of the PPF in the light of social polar-
ization. The sample is small, but the differences with the PSF and Federation are 
142 All Lyon dailies, 17-8-1937 and ff. The police, unlike the press, saw this as principally a quarrel between 
neighbours, but admitted that this was impossible to prove (ADR 4m 236, 18-8-1937). The man arrested for the 
crime received only a light sentence for carrying a prohibited arm: "un verdict de classe" was the opinion of the 
PCF (ADR 4m 236, January 1938). Local shopkeepers gave generously to a collection for his family. 
143 AN 451 AP 172: a PSF report on statead that "Vaise se present moins sous la forme de la grande banlieu in-
dustrielle, qu'avec un esprit de grande village, bien particulier, bute deforme en grande majorite [ ... J". Albert As-
truc, PSF president in Vaise, had been on the receiving end of popular discontent 
144 All Lvon papers, 13-20 September 1936. 
145 BB 18' 3063,22-7-1937,29-7-1937. 
146 BB18 3063, 22-7-1937, 8-10-1937. At Pierre Benite in July 1937 the victim was surrounded by a crowd of 
400 women, forced off his bicycle, and made to walk three kilometres to the town hall of Pierre Benite, all the time 
insulted by the crowd. The police, upon rescuing him, remarked on the "extreme state of nervous depression into 
which he had fallen". These incidents came at a time when the tide was clearly turning against the left in industrial 
struggles. In June the police had evacuated the occupied Gillet factories in Villeurbanne with almost no opposition. 
At the level of popular culture working class resistance was more effective. 
147 Bruno Beguet, op. cit., p. 164, quote several examples from the communist You du Peuple. They refer mostly 
to Gillet, Rhodiaceta and Rhone-Poulenc. For example 3-10-1936, Rhone-Poulenc: "forte pression de la personnel 
maltrise. Si l'adhesion avait ete libre il n'y auraient certainemcnt pas tant de syndiques professionnels". 
148 ADR 4m Conseils municipaux, Neuville carton, Peissel to Angeli, 10-2-1941. Peissel advised Prefect Angeli 
to choose Cuzin as mayor of Neuville on these grounds. 
149 Gillet in fact was the common denominator in many such firms: the Societe Lyonnaise du Textil, the Textiles 
du Rhone, Rhodiaceta and Rhone-Poulenc. In Rhodiaceta, once again following the defeat of a strike, the CFTC 
had its greatest success of all. 
150 ADR, 3u 316 parquet de Lyon. 
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striking. Working class militants in the PPF were markedly younger, and generally 
immigrants: 66% of PPF workers were aged forty or less; only two out of fourteen 
had been born in the agglomeration. Several had been born outside France. 151 Per 
haps typical was Henri Carton. Aged twenty-eight in 1938, he had left his birthplace 
at Miribel (Ain) after leaving school in 1924. He worked in a number of fIrms in 
Villeurbanne. Then after a stay in Marseille, followed by his military service, he re-
turned to Villeurbanne at the end of 1933 to work for the dyeing firm, Nombret-Gail-
lard. Carton joined the PPF on its foundation, rapidly becoming secretary of the 
Villeurbanne section.152 There is evidence too that some PPF workers were set off 
from their fellows by their education. Jean David was the offspring of primary school 
teachers in the Aube. He had taken the first part of the baccalaureate, yet became a 
worker-dyer at Vulloid-Ancel and eventually foreman in his brother's dyeing 
establishment. 153 
It is reasonable to conclude that PPF militants were less integrated into exist-
ing associative networks. They would perhaps have been outside of the networks from 
which the FR and PSF recruited in the centre of the city. In the suburbs immigrants of 
a conservative disposition would perhaps have felt more strongly still their exclusion 
from the popular culture which sustained the left. Given the strength of communist 
hostility to Doriot's movement, PPF militants would have been in a highly exposed 
position in the suburbs. Some were indeed the victims of physical violence. 154 In such 
circumstances it is perhaps inevitable that only the young minority should take the 
risk of active involvement in the PPE 
None of this means that working class conservatism in the suburbs was an arti-
ficial creature, dependent upon marginals and stooges of the bosses. Rather, public 
expression of conservative opinion became difficult. Furthermore, like workers and 
white collar workers in the centre of the city they were in a paradoxical position. On 
the one hand they were often favourable to the reforms of the Popular Front, and 
potentially divided from conservative leaders.155 On the other their isolation in a sea 
of communism reinforced the intensity with which conservative opinions were held. 
Hence the appeal of movements which claimed to be simultaneously anti-communist 
and protective of working class interests. As the prefect put it, the growth of the SPF 
151 ADR Cour de Justice, 1576. One such was Armand Mamanti, who had been born at Piombine in Italy in 1902. 
He arrived in Villeurbanne aged twenty-two in 1924, and found a job in a biscuit factory in Villeurbanne. Having 
risen to the position of foreman in 1928, Mamanti was naturalized in 1935. He joined the PPF in 1936 or 1937, 
soon becoming president of the Villeurbanne section. He subsequently joined the L VF, in order, he said, to check 
on living conditions in Russia. He was executed in 1946. 
152 ADR Cour de Justice, 1454. 
153 ADR Cour de Justice du Rhone, 1912. Another example was Femand Sape. Although by 1936 he devoted 
himself full-time to political activism and journalism, Sape had been a print worker. The son of a sexton, and an 
obviously intelligent individual, Sape's education had been ruined by illness ( ADR Cour de Justice du Rhone, 
1294). 
154 For example in July 1937 a young PPF member was beaten up on his way home from a meeting by two men 
who had followed him in a van (Nouvelliste, 23-7-1937). 
155 Even the SPF supported in principle tie idea of the forty hour week, and in some cases tried to claim the credit 
for its implementation. 
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was obviously favoured by certain employers, but benefited also from a real disillu-
sion with the Popular Front. 156 
The Peasantry 
In the previous chapter the growth of the Croix de Feu in the countryside was related 
to the development of social Catholicism, in particular of the JAC. Of course, since 
even the earliest JAC adherents would still have been in their twenties in 1936 to 
1939, the bulk of PSF militants would not have come directly into contact with that 
movement. Yet they might well have been associated with the precursors of the JAC, 
the Groupes d'itudes rurales, and in any case JAC ideas were part of a wider current. 
With this in view it is not surprising that peasant militants of the PSF were 
overwhelmingly from the younger generation. Whereas 38% of PSF militants were 
aged forty or less, only 18% of Federation supporters fall into this category. More-
over, no less than 41 % of Federation peasant sympathizers were aged over sixty, a re-
flection of the party's reliance upon the heads of established peasant families. PSF 
militants are also distinguished by the fact that they were less likely to have been born 
in the commune in which they lived. 
Graph 34: Peasants in the PSF and Federation, July 
1936 1939157 
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to 
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The main difference in regional implantation is that the Federation does better 
than the PSF in the wine growing Beaujolais. Rising wine prices could explain why in 
spite of a promising beginning by the Croix de Feu the PSF made little headway in 
that area. The greater influence of big landowners in this area and their alliance with 
the Church must also be taken into account. Such conditions did not favour radical 
156 ADR 4m 236, February 1938. 
157 Key: LAB = farm labourer, NOI = Farmer, no other indication, PAT = "cultivateur (patron)", PRO = propri-
etor, TEN = tenant, GAR = market gardener etc, WIN = wine grower. 
Conservative Militants, 1936 to 1939 342 
conservatism any more than they had favoured the development of the JAC. Only in 
the southern part of the wine growing region, where big landowners were less numer-
ous, did the PSF make progress. Elsewhere the pattern of peasant support matches 
implantation of the JAC on the plateau and in the mountains. 
More detailed evidence of the nature of peasant support is lacking. Graph 34 
shows the rather scanty information which can be gleaned from electoral and census 
lists. That the PSF includes more whose occupation is given simply as "cultivateur", 
without any further indication of status reflects their comparative youth. The appella-
tions "cultivateur (patron)" and "cultivateur (proprietaire)" were reserved for heads of 
families. The same applies to farm labourers, better represented in the PSF because 
many "domestiques" were young men working with neighbours or relatives whilst 
awaiting their inheritances. 
As before June 1936 tenants are greatly underrepresented. Whether this means 
that tenants were not involved in politics, or that they simply did not record their 
status in the census is impossible to say. There can, however, be no doubt that it was 
peasant proprietors or their sons who took the lead in both parties. The recruitment of 
the PSF among the sons of proprietors, together with its relative failure to interest 
wine growers, is consistent with what is known of the JAC. Also significant is the 
greater proportion of market gardeners in the PSF. Market gardeners had their own 
section in the lAC. They also favoured corporatist regulation of their profession, for 
vegetable prices had been driven down by conversion of fruit producers to vegetable 
production as a result of the glut in their own market. 
Finally, the Federation includes more large landowners. Figures such as Guy 
de Saint-Laumer, the Comte Vivien de Lescure and the Marquis de Fenoyl, moreover, 
played a more visible role in the Federation. The greater proportion of Federation 
militants who gave their occupation as "agriculteur" could be a reflection of their age, 
but perhaps also indicates that the individuals concerned were non-working farm-
ers. 158 
On balance long-term changes in social relations together with short-term po-
litical crisis are at least as important as economic difficulties in explaining the ad-
vance of the PSF among the peasantry. Where the PSF was the product of the sorts of 
social and ideological changes which had also favoured the development of the JAC, 
the Federation continued to be dominated by an elderly agricultural notability, led by 
large landowners in alliance with relatively prosperous elderly peasant proprietors. 
158 On the other hand, the PSF, unlike the Federation, does include two farmers who employed four and five live-
in agricultura1laboueres. 
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Conclusion 
To sum up, the background of PSF militants needs to be understood in the dual con-
text of the struggle for hegemony within the Lyonnais right and of extreme social po-
larization. The PSF can be seen as a movement of revolt against the political, social 
and economic leaders of conservatism at a time of deep crisis within the bourgeoisie, 
in its relations with the conservative masses, and with the labour movement. That the 
PSF represented a right wing movement is suggested by the conservative origins of 
the great majority of PSF militants and voters, and the over-representation in the party 
of the bourgeoisie, white collar workers and peasants. That the PSF can also be seen 
as a radical conservative movement is supported by the comparative youthfulness of 
its adherents; the existence of continuities with the geographical implantation of the 
PDP and lay centre right, and its appeal to "anti-establishment" groups such as bosses 
of family firms, especially in the engineering industry, engineers, the constituency of 
the CFTC, and young peasant proprietors or their sons influenced by the JAC. The 
evidence for placing the PSF in the context of extreme social and political polariza-
tion derives from the concentration of a large membership in the bourgeois and petty 
bourgeois centre of the city. 
The concept of conservative revolt can also be applied to the PPF. It was con-
servative because it had originated in the collapse of existing groupings of the ex-
treme right, because of the over-representation of bourgeois and petty bourgeois 
groups in its ranks, and because of its better implantation in bourgeois areas of the 
city. It was radical in the extreme youth of its members, the near absence of busi-
nessmen, and the presence of a relatively high proportion of workers in its ranks. The 
PPF also appealed to newly self-conscious sections of the bourgeoisie, such as engi-
neers and managers. The PPF too was a product of social polarization, for recent ar-
rivals in the city were more likely to be excluded from existing political networks. 
Some militants had suffered personally from the upheavals of June 1936. 
The Federation became a party of elderly men, dominated by landowners, of-
ten aristocratic, the merchant manufacturing bourgeoisie, Lyon-born lawyers and 
doctors. Faced with the desertion of large sections of the bourgeoisie, and suffering 
too from the hostile political atmosphere in the proletarian suburbs of the banlieu, it 
was best able to maintain a popular constituency where it could rely on Parish social 
circles. 
In the intra-conservative conflicts which followed June 1936 the PSF tended 
to identify the Federation with the "establishment". Only in a sense was this true, for 
in fact the Federation represented a marginalized and declining section of the conser-
vative bloc, while some of the real business establishment of Lyon hesitated between 
centre right and PSF. The Federation's view of the PSF emerges from a description of 
the PSF militants who broke up a Federation meeting in February 1938: 
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Cette jeunesse doree qui a troque ses gants-creme et veston bordes pour la veste de cuir et la 
casquette rabattue, explose eo hues delirantes, en cris de betes fauves. [ ... J Les hommes de Ia 
veste de cuir se jetteot comme des sauvages sur toute ce qui peut avoir de pres ou de loin 
quelque allure bourgeois. La grande majorite de ses energumene ce soot les bourgeois, vous Ie 
pensez bien! mais des bourgeois honteux ... toujours l'honneur et la propret6P59 
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In spite of its relatively broad recruitment the Federation saw itself as the expression 
an established bourgeois elite, challenged by an upstart movement drawn essentially 
from the same milieu. There is much truth in this, for the PSF was clearly not the ple-
beian movement it claimed to be. But there is more to it than this, for it has been 
shown that the anti-establishment claims of the PSF corresponded in a some ways to 
reality. Unable to admit ideological, social or economic cleavages in the bourgeoisie, 
the Federation attributed the challenge of the PSF to moral turpitude. This points 
again to the fact that the extreme right's claim to represent the "people" was in some 
senses a symbolic one, which needs to be analyzed politically and ideologically. 
159 Union republicaine, 27-2-1938. 
Chapter twelve 
The PSF: from paramilitarism to electoralism? 
Pierre Milza, following Rene Remond, sees the PSF as a prefiguration of the modem 
Gaullist movement: "la premiere grande formation moderne de la droite fran~aise". It 
was a mass "inter-class party, resolutely conservative and electoralist. 1 In a similar 
vein William Irvine argues that the hostility of the Federation republicaine to the PSF 
was due to the electoral threat posed to a notable party by one which disposed of 
modern means of organization.2 In his "dissenting interpretation" of the Croix de Feu 
Robert Soucy argues that the conversion of the PSF to Republicanism was oppor-
tunistic. Fearful of dissolution and of association with the German enemy, La Rocque 
rejected the fascist label and feigned a commitment to the Republic. But in the new 
circumstances of June 1940 he eagerly rallied to Petain.3 
Robert Soucy is correct to argue that the PSF was forced by the events of June 
1936 to move away from fascism. But his contention that La Rocque's support for 
Vichy shows his conversion to e1ectoralism to have been insincere is dubious. The 
proposition is unhistorical and wholly unfalsifiable. Had France not been defeated in 
1940, the PSF might just have easily become a conventional conservative party. The 
view adopted here is that the PSF slowly shook off its fascist past - this is most evi-
dent in the gradual abandonment of paramilitarism - yet it remained authoritarian. 
The nature of conservative politics in this period was determined by contra-
dictory pressures. The conditions in which a fascist party might have flourished still 
existed. The two great problems which had divided the right since the nineteenth 
century--re1igion and attitudes to industrialization--persisted and were aggra-
vated by continuation of the economic crisis. The right remained divided. The old 
parties were perceived to have failed in domestic and international politics. Indeed, 
the events of June 1936 further discredited political and business leaders, while Pop-
ular Front reforms increased tensions within the right. These stress zones were all the 
more serious because the victory of the Popular Front, the strikes and the renewal of 
the German threat made the right more conscious of the need for national unity. Yet 
in spite of this crisis fascism as a political option had been dealt a series of blows in 
1935 and 1936 from which it never recovered. It had in any case not been inevitable 
that the crisis should produce a fascist regime or even movement. 
For these reasons the PSF retained its anti-establishment stance and remained 
an authoritarian movement. But its authoritarianism was more concerned with the de-
fence of bourgeois society, while mass mobilization was less a feature of the PSF than 
1 Milza. op. cit., pp. 138-42. 
2 Irvine, op. cit., Chapter 5. 
3 Soucy, "French Fascism and the Croix de Feu", pp. 168, 171. 
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of the Croix de Feu. Whereas in the Croix de Feu coercion, mass mobilization, the 
leader cult and a loosely defined corporatism had been the means of restoring the 
unity of the nation, the PSF placed more emphasis upon the ideological strategies 
necessary to win elections. 
Yet by attenuating its authoritarianism the PSF's lost some of its ability to pre-
sent itself as independent. Although we have seen that the June crisis permitted the 
PSF to widen its recruitment, its ability to transcend the divisions of French society 
was lessened. Where the Croix de Feu won sympathy well outside its own ranks, es-
pecially in the parliamentary right, the same was not true of the PSF. It could be said 
that the PSF collapsed into the religious and economic divisions of French society, 
giving expression to many of the grievances suppressed on the level of interest group 
politics by the need for unity against the COT. This is partly why the broad anti-
communist alliance in the sphere of interest group politics, shown in Chapter ten, 
contrasted with an unprecedented degree of conflict within the right after June 1936. 
The other parties of the right were as bound by these contradictions as the 
PSF. The PPF has more often than not been seen as fascist.4 In fact, the PPF, before it 
took the path of collaboration, was rather hard to distinguish from the PSF. Historians 
have usually exaggerated the extremism of the PPF whilst under-estimating that of the 
PSF. As for the Federation, it escaped the contradictions of a divided society by re-
treating ever further into its Catholic vision of the world. 
Structure and organization 
In June 1936 D-Day arrived. Yet far from engaging in a show-down with the left the 
Croix de Feu tamely submitted to dissolution. There is some evidence that in Lyon 
Croix de Feu members considered resistance,5 but in the event implementation of the 
decrees passed off almost without incident. Two cases of reconstitution of a dissolved 
organization were sent to the parquet, but neither led to prosecution. Virtually the 
only public action of the Croix de Feu during the strikes was to off-load stocks of Le 
Flambeau du sud-est and to counsel that members exhibit tricolours in their windows 
and lapels.6 Other leagues were no better able to resist. The Jeunesses patriotes 
greeted the arrival of the police at their headquarters with a coffin marked "d-git Ie 
reste de toutes les libertes democratiques".7 The only public act of defiance was for 
leaguers to wear a ten centime piece in their buttonholes: "dix sous".8 
4 Brunet, op. cit, pp. 245-267. P. Burrin, op. cit, pp. 312 is almost alone in doubting the fascism of the pre-1940 
PPF. 
5 G. Howlett, op. cit. p. 205, quotes a letter from Lyon to Valence, which states "Pour parer a un coup de main il 
importe de savoir au plus tOt quels sont les buts et les moyennes de l'adversaire. C'est la mission la plus importante 
[ ... ) aussi bien pour la ville que pour les autres localites (renforts possibles des amis et ennemis des regions envi-
ronnantes) [sic). This letter is given added importance by the fact that a document seized by the Police from the 
PSF in Valence mentions the existence of an intelligence organization centred on the rue Vaubecour in Lyon, 
(BB18 30482). Guy Jarroson informed me that the JP had had contacts with all the other leagues during this period. 
6 ADR 4m 236, 22-6-1936. 
7 LiHerte, July-August, 1936. 
8 A pun, of course, on "dissous". 
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It is sometimes suggested that La Rocque did not resist dissolution because it 
offered him the chance to realise his long-term aim of converting the league into a 
conventional political party.9 But this is no more than a post hoc rationalization for 
which there is no supporting evidence. As la Rocque repeated both privately and pub-
licly, in the circumstances of June 1936 resistance would have been at best futile and 
at worst counter-productive.1o In a sense the Croix de Feu were the victims of their 
own propaganda. Convinced that the mass of the workers were good Frenchmen, and 
hypnotised by Bolshevism, the league had prepared for seizure of power by a disci-
plined minority. Pre-emptive neutralization of public buildings was useless in a fac-
tory-centred conflict where the CaT and communists were overrun by their own 
troops. 
To understand that June 1936 was a defeat for the leagues and for paramili-
tarism is essential to a correct interpretation of the PSF. The sentiment was 
widespread that the methods of the Croix de Feu had achieved little more than rein-
force the unity of the Popular Front. 11 This is one reason why the slow disaggregation 
of the Popular Front did not lead to a revival of the kind of tactics that had been pur-
sued by the leagues. The context in which the PSF emerged also helps to explain cer-
tain of the organizational features of the PSF. 
"La famille PSF" 
June 1936 was experienced as an assault upon a whole way of life. This can be seen 
in the reports of the Nouvelliste, one of which remarked upon: 
la presence dans les principales arteres de Lyon d'elements troubles, venus de Villeurbanne, de 
La Guillotiere, de Vaise pour faire Ie coup. II y a beaucoup de repris de justice. lis sont facile-
ment reperable car on ne les voit jamais sur la Place Bellecour et rue de la Republique les jours 
de calme. Montes sur bicyclettes, motos et autres, ils parcourent les rues donnant des mots 
d'ordre a leurs hommes de main masses au coins de rue. f2 
The strikes crystalised latent fears of invasion of bourgeois space by the "barbarians" 
of the suburbs, fears which had already been seen in reactions to Popular Front 
demonstrations.13 Apprehension was magnified by the perceived passivity of the po-
lice and by the dissolution of the leagues.14 It is this which accounts for the politi-
cization, even militarization, of large tracts of bourgeois society through the PSF. 
9 R. Austin "The conservative right and the far right in France: the search for power", in Blinkhom, op. cit., p. 
181. Machefer, "Les Croix de Feu", passim. This was a view sometimes put forward by the PSF itself. In Volon-
taire '36, 15-8-1936, the formation of the PSF was presented as "a necessary next step for a disciplined organiza-
tion". In reality, the conquest of power through participation in elections had been rejected only a few weeks be-
fore dissolution. See Chapter 9. 
10 Volontaire '36, 15-8-1936: La Rocque told an audience in Lyon that if he had gone into the streets in June 
"j'introduisais les Soviets partout". La Rocque took the same line in private when dealing with Pozzo di Borgo's 
advice to resist. Pozzo had claimed to represent the real mood of the rank and file. Yet he was obliged to turn to 
terrorism in the form of the Cagoule. 
11 For example, Jacques Debu-Bridel in L'Union republicaine, 10-5-1936, attributed the right's defeat in the elec-
tions to short-sighted campaigns which appeared to threaten the political rights of the people. 
12 Nouvelliste, 24-6-1936. 
13 Consciousness of the gulf between workers an bosses can also be seen in Henry Morel·Journel's self-reassur-
ance: "Je n'.ai pas peur du peupl~. Je crois que je saurais lui parler" (diary, 29-8-1936). 
14 Nouvelliste 6-6-1936 on the unpotence of the opposition and the passivity of the police. 
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Hence also the dense implantation of the PSF in bourgeois areas of the city--the 
Prefect reported in April 1937 that up to 600 people were attending sector meetings. IS 
The other side of the coin was the difficulty faced by both right and extreme right in 
penetrating proletarian suburbs. 
The tendency towards formation of a counter-society, present in the Croix de 
Feu, became more pronounced in the PSF. The following description of a dinner held 
by the EVP of the 7th arrondissement is typical: 
Naturellement la gaite s'etait installee dans la salle: ceUe gaite que les esprits chagrins veulent 
croire disparue en France, galle qui ne se retrouve que dans ces reunions entre vrais et bons 
camarades, ou les soucis, les contingences, les rangs sociaux disparaissent pour faire place aux 
seules exigences de la solide amitie.16 
PSF functions were a representation of the world as it ought to have been. This ideal 
world was conceived in terms of the family, the importance of which to the limitation 
of conflict in bourgeois society we have already seen. 17 This is all the more signifi-
cant because June 1936 was seen as a threat to the family. The conservative press had 
been horrified by the presence of women in occupied factories. The Nouvelliste spoke 
of "scandals and orgies".18 In the following months there was a period of raised con-
sciousness in many sections of the population, feminists included.19 One of the func-
tions of the PSF section was to contain this threat to the established order. 
The PSF section was often referred to as a family and its headquarters as a 
home.20 Sometimes whole families were inscribed in the PSF. Activities normally 
carried on within the horne or among small groups of friends were transferred to the 
party. Meetings usually ended with games of bridge or belotte. Sections organized 
theatricals, musical soirees and dances. The PSF had its own jazz band. At work the 
PSF member could join the SPF. The Almanach P SF ensured that members purchased 
goods in politically correct shops. The PSF even supplied a surrogate religion in the 
form of worship of the nation. Of course, the PSF family was a patriarchal one. The 
task of giving life to the section went to its leader: "c'est Ie chef qui [lui] donne son 
ame".21 At the head of the PSF family was La Rocque, who was also the incarnation 
of France-he was known to militants as "Ie Patron". 
One of the novelties of the PSF was that it included thriving feminine sections 
in the form of Action civique. The goal of this organization was to prepare women for 
the day when they would be accorded the vote. To this end women would have access 
to libraries, participate in study groups, and act as "auxilaires aux hommes pour les 
15 ADR 4m 236, 24-4-1937. 
16 V%nJaire '36,16-4-1937. 
17 See Chapter 4. 
18 Nouvel/isle, 17-6-1936. 
19 This was symbolized by the presence in the government of the well-known feminist Mme. Brunsehwig. 
20 Nouvel/isle, 4-4-1938 "Le PSF e'est un parti politique, mais e'est aussi une grande famille; done l'obligation 
d'avoir une foyer". 
21 Nouvel/isle, 4-4-1938. 
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aider dans les taches multiples que leur impose Ie PSF'.22 The role of women was 
seen as subordinate, or confined to traditionally feminine activities such as social 
work. Action sociale, a subsection of Action civique, dealt with distribution of relief to 
the poor.23 The PSF regarded work for married women as iniquitous.24 
It should be recognized however that the role of women in the PSF repre-
sented an advance of sorts, especially in comparison with the entirely male Federa-
tion. Madame Ruby, head of Action sociale in the Rhone, was admitted to the inner 
circles of the PSF.25 This was possible because there was more to the PSF than a sim-
ple defence of the bourgeois family. Rather, the development of Action civique repre-
sented an attempt to contain the progress of feminism by according women some au-
tonomy within a disciplined party and within certain spheres. One illustration of 
changing attitudes is that before 1936 women and children had been instructed to line 
the route of Croix de Feu parades in order to create a favourable atmosphere in the 
crowd. In 1938 and 1939 women and children were given a part in the parade itself. 
The same method of autonomy within an authoritarian party was used to contain the 
aspirations of conservative workers. The PSF did not resolve social conflicts. Rather 
it imported them into the party and contained them through symbolic submission to 
discipline. 
PSF ideology also helps to explain its attitude to women. The liberalism of the 
old right had disqualified women from political involvement on the grounds that they 
were not rational. Victor Perret assigned women a place in the professional and fam-
ily hierarchy from which they were not meant to escape. The PSF broke with the lib-
eral view in that it emphasised mystique over reason. Like Perret the PSF stressed 
family and profession, but combined this with a pseudo-democratic egalitarianism. 
One side of this was the male virtue of the veteran; the other was a readiness to accord 
a limited public role to women. It is also possible to see a continuity with the PDP's 
efforts to combine democracy, profession and Catholicism. The PDP had been the 
only conservative party before the PSF in which women had played a visible role. 
Just as the PSF saw the Popular Front as undermining the relationship between 
men and women, so it was held responsible for disturbing the position of children. 
Such fears help explain the outrage which followed an appalling incident in the Croix 
Rousse in April 1937, in which a nine year old boy was killed by a gang of youths. 
For the right there was no doubting that the attack was politically motivated, for the 
22 AN 451 AP 172: statement of the goals of Action civique in the 1st arrondissement of Lyon. 
23 Le Volontaire '36, 1-1-1936: "Si l'action proprement dite est reellement Ie rOle de l'homme, Ie notre, pour etre 
moins en vue, n'en est pas moins actif'. A woman lawyer described PSF feminism as consisting in assisting men in 
their social tasks (Volontaire '36, 24-6-1938). 
24 Le Volontaire '36, 15-10-1937,2-4-1937. "L'abandon de la famille, la diminution du sens moral, la perle d'un 
ideal et l'abaissement des forces spiritueUes dont la France souffre avec tant d'acuite proviennent en grand partie de 
ce vice de la societe capitaliste moderne". 
25 After the war she became a conseiller general. The PSF nationaUy was effectively run by a triumvirate con-
sisting of La Rocque, Noel Ottavi, and Mme. de Preval, head of Action sociale. 
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boy's father was a PSF member. But the real guilty party was a government which 
permitted participation of children in May Day parades.26 
The PSF paid special attention to children. To reinforce hierarchy and disci-
pline it organised physical education through the Societe sportive d'education sociale 
(SPES).27 Even some PSF members had reservations about its methods, complaining 
that "l'enfant se lasse tres vite d'une sorte de gymnastique ou Ie cote distrayant est a 
peu pres banni".28 Children were also integrated into the life of the section in a way 
which reinforced their positions in both family and society. The President of the 4th 
arrondissement section concluded a family evening by addressing "a tous les enfants 
Ie salut paternel du Pere de la Famille PSF, la Rocque".29 Children learned songs 
which expressed their fidelity to the party.30 
In contrast to the PSF, the Federation had always kept its social activities sep-
arate from its political ones. Social centres like the Foyer de Perrache were semi-au-
tonomous bodies. Politics was the preserve of a small group; boules matches and 
dances were for the popular constituencey of the right. Significantly the jazz band of 
the Foyer de Perrache deserted to la Rocque's party, where it became "Ie Jazz band 
PSF'. Only in the late 1930s, in a bid to counter the success of the PSF, did the Fed-
eration introduce social activities into political meetings. The Foyer de Perrache was 
officially taken over by the Federation in 1938. 
Para militarism 
If the PSF represented a counter society it was a militarized one. Although the party 
described itself as "republican", and modelled its statutes on those of the SFIO, power 
flowed downwards, as would be expected in a party which preached a leadership 
cult}l As Le Volontaire '36 stated, the Croix de Feu had not participated in elections 
because "il fallait une discipline et des chefs. Leur recrutement par l'electoralisme 
etait impracticable et la selection naturelle fut la seule maniere d'y parvenir".32 For-
mer members of the PSF reveal that the party was organised in a pyramidal manner, 
with "mains" of five men at the base, dizaines and chefs de dizaines and so on. 33 It 
was this which permitted rapid and secret convocation of members.34 Through the 
confidential Bulletin d'information du PSF and a plethora of circulars, local leaders 
were bombarded with instructions on every subject from the organization of meetings 
26 VolonJaire '36, 30-4-1937, 7-5-1937. 
27 SPES is the last surviving relic of the PSF in the Rhone. 
28 AN 451 AP 172, Bruyas to de Pn!val, 4-2-1939. Bruyas said that SPES methods were "sechement analytique". 
29 VoionJaire '36,16-12-1938. 
30 Volontaire '36, 6-1-1939. Nous lisons Ie Petit Journal / Nous nous inll!ressons ala politique / Nous lisons Ie Pe-
tit Journal / Le quotidien vraiment Ie plus social. 
31 All of those former militants who were interviewed testified to the moral authority of la Rocque. 
32 VolonJaire '36,15-12-1936. 
33 ADR 4m 244, 23-9-1936. This was the method by which Marcel Perdriel envisaged the mobilization of shop-
keepers. He and three others would alert six people who in tum would alert six more; eventually 4,000 shopkeep-
ers, perhaps armed, would assemble. 
34 Interview with M. Marcel Brunet, 1987. 
The Parti social fran~ais 351 
to how to have oneself photographed if injured in a brawl. 35 The local PSF press was 
forbidden to improvise.36 Section presidents were named from above. Local organi-
zations were given some freedom in the choice of candidates for local elections, but 
in national elections Paris had the last word.37 
The paramilitarism of the Dispos was transferred into the EVP. The tasks of 
this organization included street sales of the party press, security at meetings and 
protection of those party orators who asked questions at Popular Front meetings. The 
party denied that the EVP represented a reconstitution of the Dispos. But there was 
considerable continuity of personnel--Jean Knersynski was a notorious member of 
both organizations. We shall also see that the EVP were frequently armed, sometimes 
with revolvers.38 The party line was that the EVP were equivalent to groups in other 
parties. The point, however, is that groups of this type flourished only in the crisis sit-
uation of the 1930s. On the left even the Radicals had some recourse to them.39 The 
parliamentary right had no paramilitary formations of its own, but approved, within 
limits, of the activities of the leagues. 
For all this, the place of paramilitarism in the PSF was not the same as it had 
been in the Croix de Feu. No longer was Lyon divided into military style "sectors", an 
implicit challenge to the regime. Instead the basic unit of organization was the 
"section", which matched Republican administrative boundaries. There was no more 
talk of H-Hour or of days of reckoning. Where the Croix de Feu saw themselves as 
taking over a task in which the state had failed,40 the PSF line was that it would go 
into the streets only to assist police and army in the event of disorder.41 In accordance 
with its readiness to aid the police the PSF laid plans for rapid assembly on the out-
skirts of the city.42 In other words, paramilitarism and authority remained essential to 
the PSF, but there was now a more defensive tone and with time more emphasis was 
placed upon elections. 
At the time of the June strikes the priority of the right was to assert its ex-
istence and to define its territory. Hence the appeal of the press on 24 June, echoed by 
the parties, to put out tricolours. On 22 and 23 June members of all the dissolved 
35 Bulletin d'in/ormation du PSF (A collection of this publication can be found in AN F7 15 151). Localorganiza-
tions were sent a three page form to fill in. 
36 Bulletin d'in/ormation du PSF, 27-8-1937. 
37 Interview Me J. Nicol, 5-3-1987. Joseph Nicol, former President of the 3rd arrondissement section, remembers 
that he was approached from Paris with a request to stand in the general election of 1940. 
38 J. Mazas, interviewed in 1987, informed me that the EVP were often armed with bull whips to protect them 
from the communists. 
39 The communists and the Pivertist wing of the SFIO were best organized in this respect. 
40 For example the idea expressed on 7 February 1934, that the Croix de Feu should hold themselves ready to 
"cleanse" the nation. See Chapter 9. 
41 V%nlaire '36, 16-7-1937. This had been the line of the moderate wing of the IP. 
42 BB18 30482. Detailed procedures for such an action in Lyon were discovered by the police in Valence. La 
Rocque denied their official status, but given that the PSF openly spoke of its intention to engage in such actions it 
would be odd if schemes of this sort had not existed. The Bulletin d'in/ormation, moreover, stated that the PSF was 
"main tenant assez nombreux pour que, dans chaque grande ville, dans presque toutes les petits villes, dans la plu-
part des Villages, nos amis puissent, grace a leurs seuls ressources, s'opposer, par un simple et tenace exercise de leurs droits civiques". 
The Parti social fran~ais 352 
leagues assembled on Place Bellecour. At this moment the strike movement was at its 
peak, but the timing of the demonstrations had more to do with a recrudescence of 
league activity in Paris now that occupations had ended there. The leaguers were con-
fronted by a Popular Front demonstration which had marched from the Bourse du 
Travail on the left bank of the Rhone, via the Prefecture and the rue Republique to 
Bellecour, an itinerary which took it through much of bourgeois Lyon. On both nights 
the demonstrations were comparatively small--no more than 300 leaguers were in-
volved. The police had no trouble in keeping the demonstrators apart. 43 
During the summer there were a number of reports that the PSF had resumed 
the combative methods of the Croix de Feu in working class Vaise.44 In September 
the PSF resumed its motorized sorties. A police report commented "Le Parti social 
fran~ais a continue sa campagne de recrutement, en reprenant les methodes du mou-
vement Croix de Feu (reunions en banlieu,- convois automobiles,- convocations per-
sonnelles etc .... )".45 The first such convoy was to Irigny, a largely working class 
commune, on 11 September. After the meeting there was the usual confrontation with 
counter-demonstrators during which the cars of the PSF were stoned.46 Two days 
later several thousand activists were transported to rural Brindas in order to celebrate 
the Battle of the Marne.47 
The most serious incidents of all were on the 15 September, when the PSF 
held three large private meetings. Those in the 2nd and 6th arrondissement passed off 
without incident, but a counter-demonstration was organized to protest at a meeting in 
the Salle Fran~ois Coppe in the 7th arrondissement.48 By 8 o'clock several hundred 
had gathered outside the hall. As usual each side blamed the other for the firing of 
shots. But it is certain that bullets were fired through the windows of the hall, and that 
petrol bombs were thrown by the demonstrators. According to the Nouvelliste the 
PSF had to threaten the police with the intervention of 2,000 PSF at the Salle Blan-
chon (2nd arrondissement) before mounted police permitted evacuation of the hall. 49 
The atmosphere in September was more tense even than during the Croix de 
Feu campaign of the previous autumn. There were demonstrations outside the shops 
of PSF members in Vaise.50 There was a recrudescence of strikes. At the Rhodiaceta 
artificial fibre factory, again in Vaise, the workers ran the factory without the aid of 
43 Nouvelliste. Lyon republicain. 24 and 25-6-1936. 
44 On 5 July Lyon republicain reported a descent of the PSF into Vaise in order to sell Le Flambeau. The Nouvel-
liSle's version of events was that Vaise was under the control of "les masses du Front Populaire. Disons «masses» 
puisque. parait-il, Ie mot «hordes» beaucoup plus exacte. cependant [ ... J leur deplait souverainement" (Nouvel/isle, 
15-7-1936). La Repuh/ique Iyonnaise commented "No us trouvons tres bien que les Croix de Feu, meme dissous, 
fassent respecter les vendeurs de leur journal. Et no us saluons Ie fait com me une heureuse nouveautc" (11-7-1936). 
45 ADR 4m 236, 022-9-1936. 
46 Nouvel/iSle, 12-9-1936.250 people participated. 
47 Nouvel/iste, 14-9-1936. 
48 A communist tract reprinted by the Nouvellisle: "Alerte! La racaille FASCISTE releve la tete, ils veulent tenir 
leur REUNION en pleine dans notre quartier ouvrier, dans la salle Fran~is Coppee, rue Victorin Sardou". 
49 Nouvel/iSle, Lyon republicain, 16, 17-9-1936. 
50 See Chapter 11. 
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management or engineers, which led to hysterical denunciations of "sovietization" 
from the Nouvelliste.51 Here too the PSF were involved, for the strike had been trig-
gered by an incident involving a supervisor who was said to be a PSF member. The 
police reported abnormally high sales of arms. As in 1935 the left wing press was full 
of reports of an imminent coup. Left wing municipalities were again put on alert. 52 
The PSF campaign continued into the new year, with a sortie to Charly in January.53 
The culmination was a departmental congress in February, the purpose of 
which according to the Prefect was a display of "disciplined force".54 The congress 
did indeed resemble fascist rallies. A massive security operation was mounted by the 
party.55 Photographs in Le Volontaire '36 show delegates saluting in the fascist style. 
Reports of La Rocque's closing speech stress the ardour of the audience reaction 
rather than its content. Rene Remond would see this merely as superficial borrowings 
from foreign regimes. In reality ritual submission to a leader is central to the per-
ceived ability of the PSF to transcend the divisions of French society. 
Rumours of a coup were given a modicum of crediblity when in September a 
group of SPF in Clermont-Ferrand occupied the Prefecture in protest at the failure of 
the police to resolve a strike. There is, not surprisingly, no evidence that the PSF in 
the Rhone or anywhere else did plan to seize power, for this had not been the inten-
tion even of the Croix de Feu. 56 Furthermore, the campaign of 1936 was less aggres-
sive than that of previous years. Sorties into communist heartlands were rarer. The 
mobilizations of 1936 did not take place against a background of apocalyptic D-Day 
rhetoric. The congress of the PSF had juxtaposed the style of a fascist rally with the 
detailed statements of policy more typical of conventional conservative parties. All 
the same, there is reason to question Pierre Milza's view that the PSF was a modern 
conservative party. Moreover, its paramilitary activities did not prevent the PSF from 
winning a by-election in the bourgeois 2nd arrondissement in October. The view that 
the PSF's spectacular success was due to its having rejected street politics must be 
questioned. 
Nevertheless, in 1937 and still more in 1938 the actions of the PSF became 
markedly less aggressive. Paramilitary manoeuvres became ever more rare. 57 Con-
frontations between the PSF and communists continued to occur, usually at public 
51 Nouvelliste,17-9-1936. 
52 Lyon republicain, on 14-9-1936, reported a plan to occupy Ste. Foy and to establish an artillery position on the Fourviere heights. 
53 Nouveau journal, 28-1-1937. 2,500 persons attended a rally. A communist counter-demonstration was fended 
of by the EYP. 
5~ Le Volontaire '36, 19-2-1936. "Yous imposeriez It vos adversaires, vous donneriez It vos adherents la con-
s.clence de leur veri~able force". ADR 4m 236, 22-2-1937. The Prefect added, "i! est incontestable que l'organisa-
bon du PSF s'est affrrme aux yeux d'observateurs impartiaux comme etant bien dirigee, methodique et disciplinee". 55 Interview with Marcel Brunet. 
56 A police inquiry into the intentions of the PSF carried out in September confrrms this. ADR 4m 244, reports of 19,21,23,24-9-1936. 
57 It is noteworthy .that from late 1937 the confidential Bulletin d'information du PSF began to urge caution. For 
exam~le large meetIOgs were not to provoke public anger (21-10-1937); sales of the party press were not to be en-
sured 10 difficult areas merely by the presence of a large security service (No. 67, February, 1938). 
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meetings held by the parties. Many of these took place in small towns. 58 Perhaps the 
most serious was at l'Arbresle in July 1938, when a PSF meeting was broken up by 
communists.59 But it was now rarer for either party to venture into the urban 
strongholds of the other. Paramilitarism, however, was not entirely eliminated from 
the PSF. Two incidents which occurred in 1937 and 1938, together with a brief look 
at set-piece demonstrations mounted by the PSF will illustrate this point. 
The first incident happened during the cantonales of October 1937. The occa-
sion was a PSF meeting in St. Fons in a hall rented from a large building contractor. 
Trouble began as groups of PSF members began to leave the meeting, watched by a 
group of counter-demonstrators. The police concluded that two volleys of shots were 
then fired by the EVP. The result was the death of a nineteen year old chemical 
worker and serious injuries to a PSF member, who had been shot by his own side.60 A 
few days later, presumably in revenge, the PSF candidate for the Villeurbanne con-
stituency was shot in the leg outside his home. Le Volontaire '36 published a photo-
graph of him being carried to vote on a stretcher. 61 These events are interesting firstly 
because they show the tense atmosphere which reigned even after the fall of the 
Blum,62 and secondly that elements in the PSF had not broken entirely with paramil-
itarism even during an electoral campaign. On the other hand, the meeting had not 
been part of a paramilitary sortie into the commune. 
The second incident was of an entirely different nature. After the local elec-
tions of November 1937 relations between the PSF and the rest of the right deterio-
rated sharply. The causes need not detain us for the moment. It is sufficient to note 
that Federation Deputy Philippe Henriot was one of the fiercest critics of the PSF. In 
February 1938 he was invited to speak on "La comedie de la main tendue aux 
catholiques" at the Etoile Cinema in the 2nd arrondissement. When Henriot began to 
speak PSF members dressed in leather jackets and flat caps unleashed barrage of 
whistles and jeers. Stink bombs and flour bags were thrown. Fighting broke out all 
over the cinema, mainly between PSF members and the PPF squad supposed to have 
provided security for the meeting. Commandant Louchet of the PSF and Albert Beu-
gras for the PPF attempted to calm things. But Henriot was obliged to give his talk in 
a nearby cafe. In the following weeks abuse was heaped upon the PSF by all parties 
from the Federation to the royalists, accusing them of adopting the methods of the 
communists. 
58 Nouvelliste, 6-7-1937, Volontaire '36, 9-7-1937. Scuffles occured when Marcel Perdriel attempted to ask a 
question at a communist meeting in Belleville. 
59 Nouvelliste, 18-7-1939. 
60 ADR elections cantonales de 1937. 7.8,9-10-1937. Lyon republicain and Nouvelliste, 10. 11. 12-10-1937. 
61 ADR elections cantonales de 1937. 15-10-1937. The left wing press accused the PSF of staging the attack it-
self. This is highly unlikely. though an anonymous tip-off did lead the police to a chauffeur who worked for a 
wealthy member of the PSF. 
62 ADR elections. cantonales de 1937, 9-10-1937. Freynet to Prefect. Several PSF meetings in the suburbs failed. 
For example at Glvors w~en N~ls began to speak for the PSF. a communist interrupted. asking that all those who 
wanted to hear the PSF rruse thelf hands. No-one did so. (7-10-1937). 
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This was not an isolated episode. Since May 1937 there had been complaints 
of disruption of Federation meetings by the PSF. 63 What is more, the Etoile Cinema 
incident was part of a national campaign of direct action against conservative critics 
of the PSF.64 Those responsible for the attack on Henriot were not disowned. On the 
contrary, Le Volontaire '36 saw it as "un le~on severe mais merite".65 This episode 
casts an interesting light on the claim that the fascist activism of the PPF contrasts 
with the bourgeois caution of the PSF. 66 A few weeks later Henriot returned to the 
Etoile Cinema and was able to speak only thanks to a large security operation 
mounted by the PPF.67 The PSF had not lost its anti-establishment stance. 
The importance of paramilitarism to the PSF can also be seen in the two mas-
sive set piece demonstrations mounted by the PSF on 11 November 1938 and 12 May 
1939. The flrst, celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the armistice, was the largest 
manifestation of the far right ever seen in the Rhone. According to the police there 
were no less than 15,000 marchers, including 2,000 children and 3,000 women.68 The 
parade took place in the period of extreme social tension which preceded the General 
Strike of 30 November 1930, and must be placed alongside a meeting of 18,000 held 
by the CGT on the following day.69 
In form the parade to the statue of Joan of Arc on 12 May 1939 resembled that 
of 11 November. It is all the more revealing of the nature of the PSF because it took 
place at a time when the threat from the left was much reduced. When compared to 
the 1936 Joan of Arc parade it reveals the PSF to be a party in transition. While the 
itineraries of the two demonstrations, from the Place de l'Abondance to the statue 
were identical,70 the style had changed. Whereas in 1936 the order of march had been 
kept secret, in 1939 it was published in advance in Le Volontaire '36, though the EVP 
were warned to accept separate convocations. The orders were also far less detailed in 
1939. Finally, women and children were given a prominent part in the parade itself, 
rather than merely being expected to whip up enthusiasm in the crowd. On arrival at 
Place Puvis de Chavannes, women and children were to form up in front of the men. 
Yet the military motif remains, partly attributable to the desire to demonstrate the will 
of the French to resist Hitler, and partly to the desire to restore national unity through 
63 Nouvellisle, 9-5-1937 (incidents at Tarare, Mornant, Anse), 22-6-1937; Union republicaine, 13-3-1938. 
64 My limited researches into the national PSF turned up two such incidents. The fust was an attack on a Tait-
tinger meeting in the Seine department (AN F7 14817,4-5-1938). The second was on a meeting of Xavier Vallat 
(Nouvel/isle, 5-3-1938). 
65 Union republicaine, 27-2-1938; I'Attaque, 26-2-1938, Volontaire '36,4-3-1938; ADR 4m 236, 22-2-1938. 
66 This is the underlying idea in Milza, op. cit., p. 176. I am not suggesting that the PPF was less extreme than the 
PSF, only that it is quite possible for a movement of the far right to ally with the constitutional right without ceas-
ing to be extremist. 
67 Le Volontaire '36,11-3-1938. 
68 ADR 1m 172, 11-11-1938. The party claimed 20,000 marchers. 69 ADR 4m 236, November 1938. 
70 It is tempting to see this itinerary as a conscious rejection of the traditional starting point of right wing demon-
strations on Place Bellecour. In fact the Prefect imposed the route on the marchers. ADR 1m 172. 
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submission to authority. As Le Volontaire '36 put it, "vous viendrez a cette manifes-
tation PSF avec cette disciple librement consentie qui fait notre force. 71 
To sum up, the PSF remained an authoritarian, disciplined and hierarchical 
party, even after the decline in political tension which followed the General Strike of 
30 November, 1939. Yet militarism was less pronounced. Motorized sorties had been 
abandoned early in 1937; the St Fons incident at the end of that year was the last seri-
ous clash with the communists. June 1936 had demonstrated the futility of paramili-
tary mass mobilizations. Old habits died relatively slowly, but the PSF concentrated 
its efforts more and more upon winning a parliamentary majority. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the PPF were pushed in the same direction as 
the PSF. In December 1936 Doriot travelled to Lyon in order to launch his party. 
Having been refused permission to hold his meeting in municipal halls, Doriot was 
obliged to speak to a mere 150 persons in a cafe owned by a PPF member. By the 
time the meeting ended there was a large counter-demonstration of at least 4,000 out-
side the cafe. Doriot and his listeners managed to escape under police protection, but 
one PPF member shot a police inspector in the foot, and an ambulance thought to 
contain Doriot was attacked.72 The incident did nothing to reinforce the PPF's claim 
to be the only party capable of defeating the communists. The PPF's fate was similar 
to that of Solidarite fran~aise in June 1934.73 According to the Prefect this fiasco 
compromised the PPF's attempts to reach a wider audience.74 Mass mobilization was 
no more effective for the PPF than it had been for the PSF. Isolated PPF members 
were often beaten up by communists. In any case, given the strength of the PSF there 
was little room for another far right movement. 75 The same pattern was repeated on 
the national level, causing Doriot to seek salvation in an alliance with the Federation, 
just as the AF and JP had before him. 
The ideology of the PSF 
A modern right? 
Pierre Milza argues that the PSF rallied to the principles of democracy, thereby be-
coming the first modern conservative party in France. The PSF aimed to gain a par-
liamentary majority by winning over the clientele of the Radicals, and so adapted its 
programme to their sensibilities.76 It is certainly the case that the PSF were moving in 
71 Le Volontaire '36, 5-5-1939, 12-5-1939. 
72 AN F2 2667, 17-12-1936. 
73 See Chapter 9. 
74 ADR 4m 236, 23-12-1936, "Le Parti populaire franyais n'ayant pu tenir les grandes reunions qu'it avait pro-
jetees n'a de ce fait pas touche la grande masse du public et son influence ne se semble pas avoir grandi". During 
the cantonales of 1937 the PPF candidate in Givors was forced to annul a meeting thanks to threats from the PCF 
(Nouvelliste, 8-10-1937). 
75 Coincicentally, La Rocque organized a meeting in Lyon on the day of the PPF congress (Nouvelliste, 25-7-
1937). 
76 Milza, Opt cit., pp. 141-142. 
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the direction of conventional politics, and that they were hunting on the territory of 
the Radicals. But two qualifications are necessary. 
One is that the PSF's commitment to democracy, as the persistence of 
paramilitary methods would suggest, was ambiguous.77 The constitutional projects of 
the PSF were unchanged from the days of the Croix de Feu, and resembled closely 
those of all other movements of the right and extreme right. The programme included 
apparently democratic measures such as proportional representation and female suf-
frage. But these were accompanied by the reduction of parliamentary powers and the 
strengthening of the presidency. In any case reform of the constitution was rarely dis-
cussed directly in Le Volontaire '36. Political reform was seen as a step towards a 
corporate state.78 
There is also some ambiguity in the PSF's attitude to the elective principle. 
The party stressed that its goal was the legal conquest of power and emphasized its re-
spect for the "edifice of the constitution".79 From the beginning of 1938 the PSF 
placed more emphasis still upon elections. Prefectural reports stress the party's in-
creasing avoidance of combative statements, and we have seen that after the Etoile 
Cinema incident, the PSF was less involved in street action.80 The stimulus seems to 
have been the disappointing results, both in the Rhone and in France, of the local 
elections of October 1937 and the possibility that the Popular Front Majority would 
give way to a Union nationale in which there would be no room for the PSF. Hence 
the party's demands for dissolution of Parliament. It was also hoped that the introduc-
tion of proportional representation would free the PSF from the negotiations with 
other right wing parties which had ruined its chances in the local elections.81 Failing 
dissolution, all the party's efforts were to be devoted to preparation for the elections of 
1940.82 In the Rhone, constituency committees were set up for this purpose. It is also 
interesting that the PSF's attitude to the communists changed. After the Clichy riots in 
Paris in March 1937 the PSF campaigned for the dissolution of the PCF.83 Yet in late 
1938 the PSF did not join a noisy crusade for dissolution on the part of the PPF, Fed-
eration and business organizations. 
Yet none of this was incompatible with routine denunciations of Parliament 
and politicians. The idea of a Union nationale was denounced, in language that re-
77 Take for example, the PSF's understanding of the "British model': "Nous avons maintenant en France, un grand 
parti national comparable au grand parti unionist anglais. Que demain eclate une tentative revolutionnaire, Ie PSF 
est, aujourd'hui, capable de cristalliser, de grouper, d'organiser la resistance" (Bulletin d'information du PSF, 8-9-
1937. 
78 Que veut Ie Parti socialfran~ais, 1937, p. 12. 
79 For example, Dupraz in Volontaire '36, 8-12-1937. 
80 ADR 4m 236, 22-1-1938, 22-2-1938. 
81 Volontaire '36,11-3-1938,25-3-1938. 
82 Volontaire '36,1-6-1938,12-1-1939. 
83 Volontaire '36,19-3-1937,7-5-1937. 
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called the Croix de Feu, as a swindle and a plaster on an infected wound.84 Unlike the 
Croix de Feu PSF members were not asked to hold themselves ready to cleanse the 
wound, but the ambiguity is evident. 85 Equally ambiguous was Canat de Chizy's be-
lief that were a government proposal to limit an employer's right to hire and fire en-
acted, then "il ne reste plus que la rebellion illegale qui peut etre reprimee par un 
gouvernment obeissant aux communistes".86 Furthermore, in 1938 the PSF added its 
voice to a campaign for a "government of public safety", made up of "independent 
men" and "designated for a limited and precise task".87 For the PSF such ideas were 
not anti-Republican. So the votes of special powers to Daladier in 1938 and 1939 
could also be approved.88 But Daladier was seen as a stop-gap. His position was men-
aced by the divisive and destructive impulses of Parliament. Daladier ought, it was 
said, to profit from the favourable conjuncture to carry out a "national revolution". 89 
When in July 1939 Daladier demonstrated his Republicanism by postponing for two 
years the elections due in 1940, the PSF was outraged. But, said Johannes Dupraz, 
this was not because "les Fran~ais tiennent beaucoup a voter. lis ont un de gout ac-
centue pour les elections". Rather they did not want to see the life of the Chamber 
prolonged.9o 
The PSF's attitude to fascist regimes in Germany and Italy was equally am-
biguous. In a lengthy article in Volontaire '36, the PSF set out its attitude to Nazism. 
It professed to admire in the German regime its restoration of the supremacy of the 
ideal over sordid materialism, its nationalism, its devotion to order and its efforts to 
promote class collaboration. The PSF had two objections to Nazism. The first, to its 
"warrior spirit", refers to Nazi bellicism in foreign affairs. There was no objection to 
the warrior spirit in politics, for the PSF admired "la vie austere et dangereux" of the 
Nazis. The second reservation of the PSF is that national unity had been imposed 
from above, rather than achieved in the country itself. This objection is weakened by 
the authoritarianism of the PSF's own programme and practice. What is most striking 
is the absence of a defence of German democracy. 91 
The PSF was much more forthright in its praise of the Italian regime. Like the 
rest of the French right the PSF in Lyon regarded Italy as the key to European diplo-
macy, and for that reason saw an alliance with Mussolini as essential. Johannes 
84 Volonlaire '36, 28-1-1938. In the 22-10-1937 edition we read this comment on the recent cantonales: "La 
masse electoral A fait stopper la revolution, mais les institutions qui sont gangrenees ne lui offrent, helas, pas 
grande resistance". 
85 All the more so in the national leader Barrachin's statement that the PSF would triumph legally if possible, by 
force if necessary, but would go into the streets only to resist communism. Howlett, op. cit., p. 222. 
86 Le VolonJaire '36, 28-7-1937. 
87 Volontaire '36, 8-4-1938. On the PSF and the Daladier government see P. Machefer, "Le Parti social franyais", 
in La France et les FraTlfais, pp. 307-327. The campaign for a government of public safety was abandoned at the 
end of the year, when it became plain that such a government would be dominated by Daladier. 
88 VolonJaire '36, 24-3-1939: "une simple permission de gouverner donne a un republicain non-suspect". 
89 VolonJaire '36, 24-2-1939,10-3-1939,12-5-1939. 
90 Volontaire '36, 2-6-1939. 
91 Volontaire '36,15-18-1936. See also 19-11-1937, 11-11-1938, 18-11-1938 for Canat's views on the Strength 
through Joy programme. 
The Parti social fran~ais 359 
Dupraz had something of an obsession with Mussolini. He visited the country in 
1935. On his return he wrote a book, in which his only criticism of the regime was 
that Italian corporations had become cogs in the state machine.92 Yet like the PSF 
Italian fascists had set out to create a middle way between dirigism and liberali sm. 
The purpose of this argument is not to demonstrate that the PSF was fascist, rather 
that it was not whole-heartedly committed to democracy. The PSF was not fascist, but 
the reasons were not those given by the PSF. 
L'ANGIA!~ ~ Q'UON IL •• TAPE 
I.e BourgeoiS de 'Ildce: I'raDce is I'loney I 
Figure 1 
It is also worth mentioning in passing the PSF's attitude to racism. The PSF's 
anti-racism was another reason given by the PSF for its opposition to fascism.93 It is 
not, however, difficult to identify a racist sub-current in the PSF. Leon Blum was of-
ten attacked in anti-semitic terms. This can be be seen in Figure I, which in the clas-
sic manner assimilates Jews, international flnance and socialism.94 One PSF militant 
recounted how since a visit to North Africa he could understand why Muslims peri-
odically pillaged Jewish shops.95 The PSF also regularly denounced the presence of 
foreign workers in France, and depicted the communist party as a party of foreign-
ers.96 Yet racism was never central to PSF doctrine. In view of the strong tradition of 
anti-semitism in France this is perhaps surprising. The explanation is partly the desire 
92 Johannes Dupraz, Regards sur le fascisme, Lyon, 1935. 
93 VolonJaire '36,19-11-1937. . 
94 For example at a communist meeting the PSF militant Jullien asked to speak on the "interesting topic". of the 
collusion of the trusts and international finance with the Jew Blum (Le Volonlaire '36, 1-4-1938). The PSF also 
approved Proudhon's French socialism, not "Ie marxisme a I'Allemand et a la Russe ou a la Juive, ceci est pour 
Messieurs Blum, Mach etc . ... ". 
95 Le Volontaire '36, 19-9-1938. La Rocque himself was equivocal in his view of the Jews. He was reported as 
saying th at "Nul moins que lui ne desir lancer les franfi:ais dans une croisade antisemite, mais tout son sang de 
franfi:ais bouillonne quand il pense que son pays et gouveme par un juif telle que Blum" (I.e Volontaire '36. 19-2-
1937). 
96 Le VolonJaire '36, 30-7-1937. 
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to avoid identification with the Nazis and perhaps more importantly the roots of so 
many PSF militants in social Catholicism. In this period the Church unambiguously 
denounced racism. 
In sum the PSF's understanding of Republicanism was ambiguous. Indeed, it is 
divorced from both democracy, which was rarely mentioned, and from pluralism, as 
the party's corporatist ideas reveal. But there is a real change in tone, especially in 
1938, and particularly when the words of the PSF are placed alongside its deeds. 
A second objection to the Milza thesis is that the PSF is hardly unique in its 
desire to win over the Radical electorate. This had been the aim of every conservative 
movement in France since the turn of the century. Where Edouard Aynard had looked 
to "la promotion sociale", the Croix de Feu had aimed to present itself as the only 
force capable of dealing with the communists. There were a variety of ways of ap-
proaching the Radical electorate, some democratic, some not What is more, this was 
only part of the PSF's strategy, for the it also sought to unite the right and to reinte-
grate the working class into the nation. 
The key word was "reconciliation". As Andre Gautier-Brisson, stockbroker 
and Director of the Rhone Politburo, put it, the aim was to bridge the gap between 
Radical Lyon and communist Villeurbanne and to unite the "generous and social 
right" with those who mistakenly believed that only the left could bring social jus-
tice.97 For Johannes Dupraz only the PSF could achieve reconciliation because it 
alone was independent of the sectional interests which had distorted the efforts of the 
old right.98 Hence the PSF's denunciation of the "trusts", which had profited from the 
free-for-all of liberal capitalism in order to enslave France. It followed from this that 
the PSF alone represented the nation. Rival parties had "emascuIe ce mot en lui don-
nant une signification partisane".99 Ultimately, la Rocque himself personified France, 
with his "legendary strength and courage", "his charm and his smile" and his unique 
ability to gain acceptance as "Ie chef',loo 
Like the Croix de Feu PSF saw themselves as a national opposition, the sole 
force capable of uniting a divided nation and of reasserting the national interest. As 
such it remained a movement of radical conservatism. But whereas the league had re-
lied almost entirely upon the military and nationalist motif, and had refused to pro-
nounce on detailed matters of policy, the PSF developed a sophisticated ideology de-
signed to achieve its ideal of reconciliation. lOl Yet elaboration of a detailed pro-
gramme, together with the decline of the paramilitarism which had been so essential 
97 Volontaire '36, 19-2-1937. This also shows the influence within the PSF of ideas which Sternhell identifies as 
fascist. 
98 VoionJaire '36, 28-4-1938. 
99 VoionJaire '36, 10-8-1937. 
100 Voiontaire '36,19-2-1937. 
101 Volontaire '36,19-2-1937. 
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to the Croix de Feu's above party image, caused the PSF to become identified more 
and more with special interests. 
Les classes moyennes 
The PSF's devotion to the cause of the classes moyennes was designed to detach the 
Radical electorate from its leaders. 102 The classes moyennes reference also expressed, 
and simultaneously contained, the anti-establishment views of the PSF constituency. 
In this way the PSF sought to reunite the divided bourgeoisie.103 These aims, how-
ever, were only partially achieved. 
One of the central themes of PSF propaganda was that the liberal economy 
born in 1789 had unleashed a blind struggle of selfish individuals. Because of in-
equality of capabilities this had led to the emergence of "economic feudalisms". Mo-
tivated by the same greed, the workers in June 1936 had won a series of reforms. 
Since only the "trusts" could afford to pay for these measures, the result was an al-
liance with the CaT and the state which would eventually lead to the elimination of 
the classes moyennes. I04 This was a view with radical implications. 105 
Yet it was also made clear that the threat to the classes moyennes from com-
munism was the more serious. For Johannes Dupraz, who was after all Deputy Di-
rector of AICA, the rapaciousness of big business was limited by "a certain human-
ism" and by its respect for the Franc; the currency represented a "national reality" su-
perior to themselves.106 Indeed, the PSF's attitude to the CaT and to the Popular 
Front reforms was indistinguishable from that of the patronat. 
The radical potential of classes moyennes discourse was also restricted by 
defining the term broadly enough to include almost the whole nation. For Andre Do-
minique the classes moyennes had only one quality, that of being intermediate be-
tween the "grand patronat" and the proletariat. 107 The category therefore included ar-
tisans, managers, technicians, hairdressers, pork butchers, engineers and all the 
"disinherited of the Popular Front".108 Since Dominique distinguished the "patronat", 
those at the head of medium and small enterprises, from the "trusts" it was possible to 
include the major part of the capitalist class. 109 Johannes Dupraz went even further, 
defining the "trusts" in moral terms: the intervention of big business in politics was to 
102 Volonlaire '36, 19-2-1937: the departmental congress of the PSF was said to have been viewed favourably by 
"ces classes moyennes, jusqu'ici les troupes d'elite du Parti radical". See also 26-11-1937. The national leader Bar-
rachin said in Lyon, "ceux que nous voulons dCfendre aussi, ce sont ceux-la memes que Ie Parti radical a lache-
ment abandonnes, je veux parler des c1asse moyennes" (V%nlaire '36, 19-2-1937). 
103 The best treatment of this issue is Boltanski, op. cit., chapter 1. 
104 Volonlaire '36,16-4-1937,12-1-1938. 
105 Le Volontaire '36, 15-8-1936: "Unissez vous contre les ennemis communs qui vous exploitent: les trusts,les 
puissances d'argent, les Monopoles de fait, Ie parti de Moscou". See also Canal de Chizy, 31-12-1937. 
106 Le Volonlaire '36, 28-4-1938. 
107 Le Volonlaire '36, 26-11-1937. 
108 Le Volonlaire '36, 26-11-1937. 
109 Le Volonlaire '36,12-1-1938. 
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be criticized only where it was "powerful, anonymous and occult".110 At the other 
end of the social scale, some foresaw the inclusion of workers into the classes 
moyennes through aquisition of property. 111 
As Luc Boltanski argues, the broad definition of the classes moyennes made it 
possible to reduce the bourgeoisie to a tiny clique and to ignore differences in wealth 
within the conservative bloc.112 By linking the classes moyennes to intermediacy it 
was also possible to make them the spokesmen of general interest, just as engineers, 
heads of department and foremen, it was said, were better placed than employers, and 
much better placed than workers, to interpret the needs of the enterprise. 113 
All the same, PSF writers routinely referred to the problems involved in unit-
ing the classes moyennes. La Rocque told an audience in Lyon that the PSF would not 
attempt to promote the interests of one or another sectional interest; it would "stand 
above" the potential discord within the classes moyennes. 114 Yet it is to be doubted 
whether the PSF in Lyon succeeded in remaining neutral. This can be seen in a diver-
gence over the relationship of the proletariat to the classes moyennes. On the one hand 
Jacques Picquery envisaged the aquisition of private property by the working class, 
and the "regulated" disappearance of "unproductive large fortunes".115 Underlying 
the arguments of this legal consultant to a group of artisan weavers, was the idea that 
the classes moyennes were defined by possession of a "patrimony", which they had 
earned by their own labour, and which distinguished them from anonymous finance 
capital. 
On the other hand Can at de Chizy, engineer in an artificial fibre factory, saw 
the working class as a permanent feature of society. He preferred therefore to place 
the "cadres" at the centre of the classes moyennes, and to make "competence" their 
essential characteristic. The term "cadre" had the additional advantage of implying 
leadership and status within enterprise and society and in turn of of the most senior 
cadres (such as Canat) within the PSF. The idea of the cadre could therefore be used 
to integrate all those who experienced June 1936 as a threat to their status. 116 We 
have seen that this was a major reason for the rightwards shift of white collar workers 
after June 1936. Thus for Canat the cadres included the "healthy" elements of the 
working class, as well as the best small businessmen, shopkeepers and even the most 
productive of the peasantry,117 
110 Le Volontaire '36,28-4-1938. 
111 Le Volontaire '36,12-3-1937. 
112 Boltanski, op. cit., pp. 56-7. 
113 Le Volontaire '36,14-1-1936. 
114Le Volontaire '36,19-3-1937. 
115 19-2-1937. Picquery retained his faith in liberalism, arguing that any measures taken by the PSF must allow 
competition to function (Le Volontaire '36, 5-3-1937). 
116 Hence the concern of the PSF with the levelling of salaries since June (Le Volontaire '36, 30-6-1939), and 
with the problems of foremen, (24-2-1939). 
117 Le Volontaire '36, 19-2-1937 (this article was placed next to that of Picquery), 26-2-1937, 14-1-1938. 
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In the conflict between Pic query and Canat we have the old dichotomy be-
tween new and old sections of the middle class. Luc Boltanski argues that this divi-
sion was not obvious to contemporaries, so an alliance was in practice formed be-
tween the two fractions of the classes moyennes - small business and the cadres. 118 
The example of Lyon, however, suggests that this view must be qualified. We have 
seen that in the sphere of labour relations such an alliance was formed. 119 But the 
same alliance was not reproduced in party politics. The PSF was dominated ulti-
mately by a narrower group of managers, engineers and medium businessmen, with a 
mass following among white collar workers and those peasants influenced by social 
Catholicism. Pro-Radical small producers were not won over. Even conservative 
small businessmen had little voice in the PSF, Picquery's views being far less influen-
tial than those of Canat Indeed, the former ceased to write for Le Volontaire '36 in 
the spring of 1937. 
In the end the classes moyennes discourse of the PSF did not succeed in cre-
ating a broad conservative party. This was partly because the discourse itself owed 
something to the ideological preconceptions and experiences of groups mobilized in 
June 1936, and partly because June had compromised the ability of the PSF to stand 
apart from interest groups. This point can be elucidated by looking at the PSF's views 
on corporatism. 
L'etat social PSF 
We saw in Chapter eight that corporatism arose from a crisis of civil society, in which 
an extreme struggle between interests groups compromised the ability of bodies from 
the Chamber of Commerce to Parliament to mediate the general interest. Corporatists 
assumed that divisions were the work of outside agents such as politicians. There was 
a single professional and general interest which could be reasserted were the profes-
sions to govern themselves. The same kind of reasoning was applied to industrial re-
lations after June: strikes were the work of agitators in the pay of Moscow. So if 
unions were depoliticized then they could be contained in a corporate system. The 
central problem, however, was that the general interest was not self-evident. It had to 
be enforced. The ambiguity of corporatism has to be stressed because historians like 
Pierre Milza use the professed anti-statism of both Croix de Feu and PSF to distin-
guish them from fascism. 120 
118 Boltanski, op. cit., pp. 62-74. He stresses the common hostility of the two groups, unlike big business, to de-
valuation and inflation. This is unconvincing, because most big businessmen were also concerned to maintain a 
strong currency. He also argues that extension of the term "patrimony" to include paper qualifications could unite 
cadres with small business. 
119 Luc Boltanski's researches are mainly confmed to interest group politics, so he assumes the same unity in pol-
itics. 
120 Milza, op. cit., p. 137. To be sure, I am not arguing that the PSF were fascist, but I am suggesting that the PSF 
was an ambiguous movement. (The question of the state in fascism looks more complex still in view of the ex-
treme hostility of the modern extreme right to government involvement in the economy). 
The Parti social fran~ais 364 
Typically the PSF presented its corporatism as an alternative to state interven-
tion. Canat de Chizy, for example, criticized the etatism of Marcel Deat's system of 
planning. For this reason he preferred the Salazar regime in Portugal to the 
"deformed" corporations of Austria and Germany.121 Yet closer analysis reveals the 
contradictions of corporatism. In all those states which experimented with corpo-
ratism in the 1930s and 1940s authoritarianism was the result. 
The PSF's corporatism was intimately related to its views on the classes 
moyennes, in that it was conceived as a way of preventing the anarchy of the market 
economy from leading to the elimination of "les petits". Already the corporation im-
plied discipline. Thus Canat condemned a plan, emanating from the Socialist Minister 
of the National Economy, to facilitate voluntary agreements on pricing, raw material 
supply and marketing.122 It was, said Canat, no longer possible to save liberalism. 
Ententes must be compulsory when desired by the majority in the profession. This 
implied coercion of those who disagreed with the majority. Furthermore, the entente 
would be subject to a degree of state regulation, for the government would have to en-
sure that the decisions of the corporation were respected. He argued, rather obscurely, 
that this would not amount to state control because the government would not be rep-
resented in the corporations themselves, and because state authority would be bal-
anced by that of the regional corporation. 123 
Canat goes further than this, for by corporatism he meant not just agreements 
between fIrms, but an elaborate system of regional bodies in which would sit the rep-
resentatives of business, cadres and workers. 124 They would deal not only with supply 
and demand, but also with labour relations and working practices, and would perhaps 
even manage joint enterprises.125 This meant the setting up of a permanent organiza-
tion with some sort of authority, especially as inter-professional questions would be 
dealt with by "experts".126 
Canat's assumption was that left to itself the profession could manage its own 
affairs. Yet he recognized that existing syndicates were ill-fitted to take their place in 
this system, for those of employers and workers (but not cadres) were dedicated to 
pursuit of the class struggle. They must therefore be reformed along hierarchical lines 
and "depoliticized". They would then become truly professional bodies. This in prac-
tice meant either a purge or suppression of the CGT.127 To be on the safe side, em-
ployers would playa part in the choice of workers' delegates to corporate bodies. The 
right to strike would be limited in the short term to cases of non-observation of a col-
121 Le Volontaire '36, 11-3-1938. On another occasion Canat criticized even Salazar for the politicization of cor-
porations (Le Volon/aire '36, 25-3-1938). 
122 Paradoxically this article was entitled "Contre l'etatisation de la production". 
123 Le Volontaire '36,1-10-1937. 
124 Ententes of the type described above were only a step to the corporate state (Le Volon/aire '36, 20-8-1937). 
125 Le Volontaire '36, 7-5-1937. A separate tripartite system would advise the government on legislation. 
126 Le Volontaire '36, 31-12-1937. 
127 Le Volontaire '36,1-12-1936,14-1-1938. 
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lective contract, and in the long term abolished. It is for these reasons that Canat ar-
gued that corporatism presupposed a moral revolution. 128 
Canat's attitude to patronal unions is more complex. Apparently they were 
treated in the same way as the CGT. Gignoux and the CGPF were from time to time 
denounced for their combative attitudes, and compared unfavourably with the 
"social" approach of the PSF.129 Yet on every practical issue, from the forty hour 
week to wages, the PSF agreed with the CGPF.130 In any case, no employer would 
not have claimed to be acting in the best interests of his workers. All the same, the 
corporation, or rather corporatist ideology, did imply authority over individual em-
ployers. This was because corporatism had been partly a response to the breakdown 
of negotiation in existing professional bodies.131 This point is illustrated by a discus-
sion of the effects of the devaluation of 1937. The government's price commission 
had permitted those flrms who relied on imported raw materials to raise their prices. 
The PSF argued that such firms ought to keep down prices in the general interest, es-
pecially as they would have the beneflt of new export openings. So the government is 
criticized implicitly for not intervening in the market to protect the national interest. 
The PSF escapes this dilemma by asserting that in the organized profession such 
problems could be overcome. Conflict is therefore obscured and the need to coerce 
certain [urns disguised. 132 
The implicit recognition of the need for authority can also be seen in the PSF's 
view of the relationship between corporations and the political power. Although the 
PSF demanded reinforcement of the state, reforms were nevertheless to be conflned to 
those necessary to the maintenance of order. On the face of it this owes something to 
the liberalism. Yet we have already seen that "maintenance of order" was deflned in 
such a way as to include intervention in labour relations and the enforcement of the 
professional interest. As Canat put it, the state would "astreindre les citoyens a rester 
dans les limites du bien general, meme au detriment de leur interet particulier".133 
Furthermore, the PSF argued that the highest corporate body would have no power to 
legislate, but would merely express its views to the political power (Le. the presi-
dency), which in the end would have the power to decide. In this way the "autonomy" 
of the state, already freed from parliamentary control, would be restored. 134 
128 Le Volontaire '36, 30-9-1936, thus Canat criticized Ariste Potton for his belief that the corporate state could be 
brought about by "the wave of a magic wand". 
129 Le Volontaire '36, 12-2-1937, 11-2-1938. 
130 In Le Volontaire '36, 28-7-1937, Canat declared his backing for the CGPF's decision to regard the CGT plans 
on hiring and firing as an attack on the patronat's right to command. Compulsory arbitration was at first attacked 
by the PSF, like the CGPF, as an attack on the rights of bosses (Le Volontaire '36, 1-12-1937). Then when em-
ployers began to see arbitration as a means to pacification the PSF too changed its mind. 
131 Le Volontaire '36, 1-12-1936. One of the stated goals of the corporation was to bring about "harmony between 
the different industries, from the largest to the smallest". 
132Le Volontaire '36, 6-8-1937. 
133 Le Volontaire '36,1-10-1937. 
134Le Volontaire '36,14-1-1938, 25-2-1938. 
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Like the idea of the classes moyennes, corporatism was designed to reconcile a 
divided bourgeoisie and to discipline the labour movement. Again, however, the PS-
F's turn to electoralism undennined the effectiveness of the ideology. Whereas the 
Croix de Feu had rarely touched on the details of corporatism, PSF more and more 
betrayed the special interests of its own constituency. The corporation was explicitly 
designed to reduce the influence of big business by means of regionalization. 135 For 
this reason organization would be by finished product (such as electrical goods), 
rather than raw material (such as steel). The business section of the corporation would 
consist of an equal number of delegates of small, medium and large ftrms.136 The PSF 
went as far as to target particular sectors. For example large firms in the crockery in-
dustry were taken to task for having unleashed a price war in order to drive medium 
and small firms out of business. Organization of the profession, it was argued, would 
prevent such things from happening. 137 In this way too the PSF undermined the ef-
fectiveness of classes moyennes discourse, which relied upon reduction of big capital 
to a tiny and anonymous clique. 
Just as the PSF reflected the views of the medium businessmen who were so 
numerous in its ranks, so we have seen that the organized profession gave a prominent 
role to cadres.138 Here too the PSF proposed practical measures--for example obli-
gatory consultation of cadres before dismissal of workers--which tended to un-
dermine the integrative potential of the cadre discourse. 139 It was on the other hand 
possible to overcome a potential opposition between the bosses of medium firms and 
cadres, who generally worked in large industry. This could be achieved partly by the 
break-up of anonymous large enterprises into federations of semi-autonomous work-
shops run by managers and engineers. They would thus come to resemble medium 
firms,14o There was also an appeal to "competence"--both engineers and medium 
businessmen could be seen as gaining expertise and knowledge through their interme-
diate position and their direct contact with workers. 
The notion of "competence" could also be used to incorporate small employ-
ers and the artisanate into the PSF. The party asserted that France could never acco-
modate itself to mass production,141 But more often it was argued that the organized 
profession would encourage "small inventors" and ensure that the benefits of techno-
135 Le Volontaire '36, 31-12-1937. 
136 Le Volontaire '36, 7-5-1937. Vichy corporate bodies were organized according to raw materials, and were 
dominated by big business. 
137 Le Volontaire '36, 1-4-1938. We saw in Chapter eleven attacks on Gillet. Le Volontaire '36 also echoed the 
concerns of medium and small metallurgy, denouncing large car and electrical fIrms as benefitting from the 
largesse of the state (2-7-1937). 
138 See page 362. For Canat the cadres were better placed than employers, especially big businessmen to represent 
the general interest because of their intermediate position. They could therefore playa part in keeping the state out 
of the profession (Le Volontaire '36, 26-2-1937). 
139 Le Volontaire '36, 31-12-1937. 
140 Le Volontaire '36, 18-6-1937. The model was the Czech Bata firm. For the popularity of such ideas see Kol-
boom., op. cit., pp. 73-4. 
141 Le Volontaire '36,15-1-1937. 
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logical progress were disseminated to the artisanate. 142 The organized profession 
would also regulate apprenticeships and prevent over-crowding of trades. Yet the role 
of small business in the organized profession was less often discussed than was that of 
industry. Some PSF writers were enthusiastic proponents of rationalization. 143 Andre 
Dominique even advised that rationalization was a means of compensating for reduc-
tions in hours. l44 Dominique and Canat were also interested in the ideas of the pa-
tronal avante garde, as expressed by Detoef and the review Ordre reel. 145 There was 
little room for the artisanate in their world except perhaps as dependant sub-contrac-
tors. Indeed, Can at argued that in the silk industry, where electrification had favoured 
home weavers, that artisans should not be allowed to compete with industrial con-
cerns. In the end, the views of the PSF reflected those of medium businessmen and 
engineers, committed to industrial methods, but suspicious of big business. In partic-
ular the mixture of modern methods and suspicion of mass production may have ap-
pealed to medium firms in the engineering industry, where "flexible production" was 
the rule. 
It was not simply, however, that the PSF reflected the economic interests of its 
constituency. In some circumstances the idea of "competence" might have appealed 
to the artisanate. But the PSF's ideas would have had also to have encountered a 
favourable ideological terrain. This could have been been provided by Catholic Ac-
tion, which was not only corporatist, but was based on the idea of the professional 
elite. Yet the artisanate remained anti-clerical, while as we shall see that the PSF be-
came ever more Catholic. 146 
In the countryside, on the other hand, the PSF's ideas connected with those of 
the JAC.147 But even here the price was a narrowing of the PSF's potential appeal, as 
the party's views came more and more to coincide with those of the JAC. Thus the 
PSF took up the cause of small producers of wheat as the Office du hie was reformed 
in 1938 and 1939 according to the wishes of large growers. That the PSF ended up de-
fending the original socialist version against the views of the USE illustrates the ten-
sions within the conservative bloc caused by the Popular Front. 148 Defence of special 
142 Le Volontaire '36, 20-4-1937 (Marcel Perdriel of the small business UF), who argued that the organized pro-
fession would ensure the health of the artisanate by encouraging the small inventor. 
143 Le Volontaire '36, 5-2-1937. It was argued that technological progress caused only temporary problems which 
could be resolved by the organized profession. 
144 Le Volontaire '36,15-10-1937. 
145 Le Volontaire '36, 15-7-1938,3-3-1939. Both Canat and Dominique wrote enthusiastically of the "Rencontres 
de Pontigny", at which French avant garde employers and trades unionists met with Swedish counterr,arts. Their 
only reservations were on Deteofs politics. For example Dominique criticized the "free play of unions " by which 
Detoef meant that existing unions would playa part in his corporate bargaining system. 
146 Catholic Action's specialist branch for small businessmen, led in Lyon by Joseph Folliet, made some progress 
in 1937 and 1938. See also Zdatny, op. cit, pp. 106-7. 
147 The PSF's appeal for a peasant elite recalled the JAC. "Chacun en France parle au nom du pays an. C'est parce 
que Ie paysan est reste amorphe devant la crise, c'est parce qu'il a cherche des remMes individuels aux maux dont 
il souffrait, et qu'il s'est toujours refuse tout action collective que les pouvoirs publiques ant pu Ie berner de tous 
temps et que des incompetents profitards ont parle si longtemps en son nom". 
148 Le Volontaire '36, 21-2-1938, 5-5-1939. Evidence of the growing sectionalism of the PSF is provided by the 
fact that in order to provide. outlets for producers of secondary cereals, the army was asked to make greater use of 
horse-drawn transport The unplications for national defense were not discussed (Volontaire '36,7-7-1939). 
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interests affected the PSF's views on the organized profession, for one of the purposes 
of the corporation would be to limit the influence of specialized lobbies dominated by 
large growers such as the Association genera Ie des producteurs de bIe.I49 In 1939 the 
PSF declared its intention to "demolish" existing syndicates if they did not reform 
themselves, to replace "vieux d6vouements a la cause syndicale" and politicians with 
a genuine peasant leadership, and to furnish syndicates with a powerful permanent or-
ganization. The PSF also aligned itself with the JAC in approving separate represen-
tation for proprietors, tenants, sharecroppers and agricultural labourers within the cor-
poration. I50 
The same tensions can be seen in the relationship of the PSF trades union, the 
SPF, to the parent party. The principal motive in the formation of the SPF was to un-
dermine the COT, a task which the new unions set about with some purpose. But the 
SPF also functioned as a means of containing tensions within the right caused by 
Popular Front reforms. Here too the PSF was not entirely successful. Without com-
promising its hostility to the COT the SPF was tempted to go beyond the programme 
of the PSF in its search for legitimacy in the factories and offices. Thus in the silk in-
dustry the SPF claimed credit for the implmentation of the Forty Hour Law, accusing 
COT negotiatiors of deliberately slowing down negotiations in order to punish white 
collar workers for not having joined the COT. 151 In the banks the SPF denounced "les 
syndicats patronaux, diriges par la haute finance internationale qui cherchent a acheter 
nos dirigeants pour arreter leur action syndic ale", and called for index linking of 
salaries, a demand to which employers were deeply hostile. 152 Unlike the PSF, the 
SPF condemned the Daladier decree laws, but typically nevertheless, contributed to 
the defeat of the general strike which followed.1 53 By 1939 the leaders of the SPF 
were falling out amongst themselves. 154 Similar problems seem to have occurred on 
the national level, for in 1939 the PSF created a new organization, the Propagande 
ouvrier et commercial (POC), directly under party control. In Lyon, POC leader 
Jacques Darodes wrote of the lack of "Croix de Feu spirit" in the SPF, and charged 
the POC with the task of infiltrating and controlling the trades unions.155 Under the 
Vichy regime the SPF separated formally from the PSF. 
It could, of course, be objected that in spite of the PSF's growing pre-
occupation with special interests the opposition to the COT remained primary. The 
SPF, after all participated in strike-breaking. We also saw in Chapter eleven that the 
I49Le Volontaire '36,10-3-1939. 
150Le Volontaire '36, 20-1-1939. 27-1-1939. 3-2-1939. 
151 SPF des ouvriers et employes de soieries, 25-5-1937. In the April issue a plea had been made for application 
of the notorious "cinq-huits" rather than a more flexible regime. La Liberte syndicale, (journal of the SPF in the 
south-east), July 1937, approved of the Forty Hour Act where it could lessen unemployment-a position far in 
advance of any other conservative movement. 
152 Nouvelliste. 4-8-1937. 
153 P. Machefer, "Les Syndicats professionnels fran~ais, 1936-1939", M ouvement social, 119, 1982, 91-112. 
154 ADR 4m 236. 31-5-1939. 
155 Darodes to Durafour, 20-4-1940. quoted in Boulet, op. cit., annexe. 
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mobilization of cadres had in part been due to a sense of having been abandoned by 
cowardly employers. From time to time Le Volontaire '36 echoed complaints that em-
ployers were too soft. 156 The PSF also sought to mobilize the peasantry against the 
Popular Front by portraying the Office du ble as an attempt at sovietization and as 
evidence that the government was exclusively concerned with interests of the work-
ers. Above all, we have seen that on one level a tacit alliance against the COT did 
emerge. 
The contention here, however, is that unity in the sphere of labour relations 
was not incompatible with exceptional disunity in politics. The need for a united front 
against the COT merely displaced conflicts elsewhere. The PSF therefore brought to-
gether elements which had long been opposed to the business and political establish-
ment in Lyon, grouping them around the idea of an elite defined by competence. Con-
sequently the PSF was obliged to take up a position on the historic conflicts in the 
French right about industrialization and the religious question. 
The new Jacobins 
Pierre Milza argues that in order to win over the Radical electorate the PSF took on 
board elements of that party's programme. It therefore moved away from the far right. 
Jacobinism was indeed central to the image of the PSF. Yet the PSF divorced the am-
biguous social heritage of the Jacobins from political democracy, integrating it into an 
authoritarian view of the world. In so doing the PSF sought to wrest the Revolution-
ary tradition from the Popular Front and to undermine the commitment of the Radi-
cals to it. The PSF's Jacobinism also gave expression to, and simultaneously con-
tained, the radical dimension of the PSF's conservatism. 
The Revolution was central to La Rocque's idea of "reconciliation". The PSF 
put 14 July on the same level as the jere Jeanne d'Arc. The symbolism of the Revolu-
tion was even more essential to the PSF in Lyon.157 This is probably because of the 
strength of Radicalism there, and because of Herriot's identification with 
Girondins.158 Iacobinism can be seen in the title of the party journal, Le Volontaire 
'36, with its evocation of the Volunteers of 1792. This title also recalls the Volontaires 
nationaux, the most fascisant element of the Croix de Feu. Next to the title are the 
features of a National Volunteer drawn on the background of a tricolour flag. At the 
head of the editorial was a sans culotte leaning on a pen instead of a pike. The martial 
image resurfaces in the motto of the journal: "comme celui de Valmy Le Volontaire 
'36 lutte contre la tyrannie des agents de l'etranger pour la liberte et la nouvelle 
France". 
156 Le Volontaire '36, 24-2-1939. 
~57 Of 23 known titles of the PSF press, there were only two which contained an explicit reference to the Revolu-
tion. 
158 E. Herriot, Lyon n'est plus, Lyon. 1939. especially introduction. 
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The enemies of France were both internal and external. The PSF must, of 
course, be seen in the context of the rising international tension after 1936, but inter-
nal and external politics cannot be separated. Like the rest of the French right the PSF 
rejected the notion of a war in defence of democracy. France should fight only if di-
rectly threatened. For this reason the PSF denied the universalism of the Jacobins. The 
idea that France had a mission to save the world for liberty and justice was a manoeu-
vre of the communists, who aimed to use the cry of "La patrie en danger!" in order to 
imprison and shoot their enemies. It follows from this that the communist claim to 
represent the nation, expressed through the Popular Front, was a false one. Their lead-
ers, it was said, acted only on the orders of Stalin, the "Tsar of Russia". 159 The sol-
diers of the Revolution, in the hands of the PSF, became xenophobic. 160 
e4 I., 
}.flit~/.urs Communis I., 
Figure 2 
If the communists were the agents of a foreign power, then the link detected 
by them between the patriotism of 1793 and class struggle, must also be false. The 
oath of July 14 1935 which had sealed the formation of the Popular Front had repre-
sented a theft of the jete nationale in order to divide the nation. 161 The true intentions 
of the crowd on 14 July had been to "bouter l'etranger hors des frontieres".162 This 
idea can also be seen in Figure 2. 
In the hands of the PSF the Revolution was put to use as a means of promoting 
class collaboration and national unity, and of undermining the Popular Front. But the 
159 Le Volontaire '36, 25-3-1937. This is why the PSF made heroes of the soldiers of Valmy, not of BalTes's 
Napoleon, for the former had merely defended French soil. 
160 Le Volontaire '36,9-5-1937. This is the opposite of the Maurrassian idea according to which the crowd which 
took the Bastille had been composed of Freemasons, Jews and "meteques". 
161 Le Volontaire '36,14-7-1939. 
162Le Volontaire '36, 9-5-1937. 
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Revolutionary image must also be interpreted in the context of the PSF's radical con-
servatism. The PSF believed the Revolution to be incomplete. A new movement was 
to be directed against parliamentarians. When in July 1939 Daladier prorogued Par-
liament, Le Volontaire '36 compared the deputies to a feudal class "dont Ie mandat 
n'est qu'une charge lucrative", entirely from the control of electors, who were 
"taillable et corveable a merci".163 
The PSF also agreed with the communists upon the need for an "economic 
'89", on condition that it was a national movement directed against "international fi-
nance")64 In ideological terms, paradoxically, the target was "Ie liberalisme 
economique, doctrine chere aux radicaux et aux vieux partis moderes, issus les uns et 
les autres de la revolution bourgeoisie et non sociale de 1789", which had permitted, 
thanks to excessive individualism, the domination of the "trusts".165 Implicitly, and 
somewhat unjustly in view of that party's evolution under Victor Perret, the PSF 
identified the Federation with 1789, liberalism, big capital and hence with the ene-
mies of the nation. In this the PSF drew upon and distorted Christian democratic 
thought, which had long argued for the completion of the political democracy derived 
from 1789 with social democracy. This is another example of continuities between 
the centre right and the PSF. 
In contrast to La Rocque, who carefully erased the Terror from his view of the 
Revolution, the Lyonnais PSF identified themselves with the Jacobins against 
1789.166 On the 150th anniversary of the storming of the Bastille in 1939 Le Volon-
taire '36 celebrated the legend of the soldiers of the Year IT with a piece which reveals 
much about the self-image of the PSF. The Convention had not saved France with an 
improvised army, motivated solely by revolutionary elan. At the beginning the sol-
diers had been "spoiled by politics". It had been necessary to replace "political" gen-
erals with true soldiers like Hoche and Bonaparte. Volunteers were disciplined by 
veterans in the demi-hrigades. The result was: "heros sans peur et sans reproche, 
desinteresses, meprisants les recompenses pecuniaire qu'ils jugent indignes d'eux, les 
soldats de l'An IT sont rassassie par la discipline au point d'endurer sans bronc her les 
plus cruelles souffrances". The piece goes on to imply that revolutionary justice was 
acceptable where the interests of the nation were at stake. 167 Here we meet another 
theme of the PSF: if France is to resist Hitler then the country must first undergo a 
moral revolution. 
The PSF saw itself as a battle-hardened national elite, able by implication to 
regenerate France. It is interesting to note that the Jacobin reference was particularly 
163 Le Volontaire '36,4-8-1939. 
164 Le Volontaire '36,14-7-1939. 
165 Le Volontaire '36,14-7-1939. 
166 For la Rocque's view seeLe Petit journal, 14-7-1939. 
167 Le Volontaire '36, 14-7-1939. Thus Saint Just and Lebas were correct to have shot a soldier who had stolen 
eggs from a farmyard. 
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marked in the EVP, whose insignia was a reproduction of Rude's Marseillaise. On one 
occasion the EVP of the 3rd arrondissement presented a tableaux, in which they 
dressed up as sans culottes.168 It is also possible that the EVP were recruited from 
families with a Radical background. 169 Formed essentially of young lower middle and 
working class males, the pseudo-Jacobin mythology of the EVP can be seen also as a 
reassertion of masculinity in the turmoil of the Popular Front. This was the other side 
of the PSF's relatively tolerant attitude to female involvement in politics.170 In this 
there is also a reversal of the counter-revolutionary view, in which France was de-
picted in terms of suffering femininity and the revolutionaries as lecherous brutes. l71 
Indeed, in the symbolism of the PSF, even Joan of Arc was masculinized--a "male 
lesson" for the mass of Frenchmen too selfish to think of their country. 172 
The Jacobin vocabulary of the PSF was not confined to the pages of Le 
Volontaire '36. On occasion, moreover, it was successful in winning over a part of the 
Radical electorate. Such may have been the case in the canton of St Laurent, where 
PSF and Federation confronted each other in the local elections of October 1937. On 
the one hand the Federation candidate, the ex-officer Alexandre La Batie, had been 
approved by all but one of the canton's mayors-the classic alliance of landowners 
and peasant notables on which the Federation depended in the mountains. 173 La Batie 
also echoed the themes of the Federation: hierarchy, hard work, self-denial, family, 
motherland, property and religion. The appeal of the PSF was altogether more pop-
ulist, mixing Jacobin rhetoric with the themes of the veterans' movement: 
Vous vous dites Ancien Combattant, dites plutot officier de I'Active Combattant, 
paye avant, pendant la guerre et apres; muni d'une retraite de plusieurs dizaines de mille francs. 
Ce n'est pas l'ancien poilu gagnant 5 sous par jour. Non, qu'il n'y ait pas d'equivoque, vous etes 
un Combattant et non pas ce qu'on appelle un Ancien Combattant. 
Vous vous dites que vous defendez les agriculteurs, et vous ecrivez «Place aux hum-
bles», mais par votre candidature vous ne prouver que votre desir d'ecra~er avec moi les petits 
et les humbles. 
This kind of appeal connected with the anti-elitism of both Radicals and of peasants 
influenced by the JAC. La Batie responded by accusing the PSF of fascism and by 
placing the party on an equal footing with the communists. 174 Alexandre Bosse-
Platiere protested that in the Federation "nous n'avons pas d'uniformes, pas de bras-
sards, nous n'avons jamais defiles, nous ne sommes pas des sans culottes, nous 
sommes des sans chemises multicolores".175 
To sum up, the pseudo-Jacobin rhetoric of the PSF was designed to detach a 
part of the Radical electorate from the Popular Front and to give expression to the 
168 Le Volontaire '36,13-1-1938. 
169 The two individuals I interviewed who had been associated with the EVP claimed that prior to June 1936 they 
had voted for the Radicals. 
170 See page 348. 
171 La Republique iyonnaise, 25-2-1939. 
172 Le Volontaire '36, 5-5-1939. 
173 Union republicaine, 9-1-1938, 16-1-1938, 17-4-1938. 
174 Volontaire '36, 28-1-1938. 
175 Volontaire '36, letter of 8-12-1937. 
The Parti social franc;ais 373 
anti-establishment impulses of those who saw themselves as a new elite, destined to 
save the nation. The same discourse also contained this radicalism, preventing it from 
turning into an all-out attack on the social system. Jacobin egalitarianism was cor-
rected by the notion of an hierarchical society led by an elite chosen on the basis of 
service to the nation. Thus in the above tract, the "humble" are identified with unre-
flectingly obedient conscript soldiers, and the primacy of the nation over material in-
terest thereby reasserted. Anti-capitalism too was limited by the identification of the 
"trusts" with a cosmopolitan clique, and by presenting class struggle as the work of 
foreign agents. But just as the PSF's corporatism and devotion to the classes 
moyennes was compromised by the defence of special interests, so the party's Jacobin 
discourse was undermined by the religious issue. 
The PSF and the Church 
If the PSF was to present itself as Jacobin then it was essential that it should not be 
seen as clerical. Portrayal of Hoche as a defender of la patrie rather than as the 
"butcher of the Vendee" reveals that the PSF wished to cut itself off from the counter-
revolutionary right.176 Like the Croix de Feu, and in accordance with its mission of 
reconciliation, the PSF declared itself to be above the religious divide. The PSF would 
respect all beliefs, including atheism, on condition that they not be exploited for po-
litical purposes. In the view of Canat de Chizy Catholicism alone was insufficient to 
hold society together. Only the "mystique Croix de Feu", which had been born in the 
trenches, could bind together rich and poor.l77 Yet the PSF also anticipated the mod-
ern far right, as well as owing something to Maurras, in purporting to defend a civi-
lization which was inevitably Christian.178 The PSF's attempts to place itself above 
the religious divide, however, were less and less successful. 
On the face of it the religious question seemed to be losing some of its capac-
ity to divide. The Church-state issue was not raised during the election campaign. The 
Popular Front attempted to reach out beyond the constituency of the traditional left. In 
a radio address on the eve of polling in April the communist leader Maurice Thorez 
offered his hand to Catholic workers and peasants. Once in power Leon Blum at-
tempted to engage in a dialogue with the Papacy and in a interview with Sept sug-
gested that Christian morality could be the basis of collaboration between Catholics 
and the Popular Front.179 Edouard Herriot made a celebrated trip to the Holy land. 
Yet at the same time as the left was attempting to build bridges to Catholics, 
the identity between Catholicism and the right became more absolute than ever. Like 
the Orleanists of 1848, many anti-clericals discovered the value of Catholicism as a 
176 See page 371. 
177 Le Volontaire '36,14-5-1937. 
178 Le Volontaire '36, 28-5-1937. 
179 Paul Christophe, 1936. Les catholiques et Ie Front populaire, Paris, 1980; R. Remond, Les Catholiques. Ie 
communisme et les crises, Paris, 1960. 
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prop of the social order. The most spectacular demonstration of this "new spirit" was 
the signature in 1939 of a parliamentary motion denouncing the Lay Laws by a num-
ber of Radicals. 180 The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936 further rein-
forced the link between Catholicism and hostility to the Popular Front. 
For the PSF in consequence it became ever more difficult to maintain its neu-
tral attitude to religion, for Catholicism and anti-communism appeared more and 
more to be two sides of the same coin. Canat de Chizy, in the same article in which he 
argued for the primacy of the "mystique Croix de Feu", also reminded his readers that 
Catholicism was a useful buttress of a necessarily inegalitarian social order, because 
of its "sanctions terribles contre ceux qui contriendrait sa loi formelle".181 Spain too 
was a source of difficulty. At fIrst the PSF rarely mentioned Catholicism in this con-
text, arguing instead that Franco should be supported because of his anti-communist 
struggle and because the French national interest demanded allies in the Mediter-
ranean.l82 But the PSF had to contend with the fact that perhaps the majority of its 
members also read the Nouvelliste, for which Franco was a holy warrior. 
A turning point in the PSF's attitude came in April 1937 with the murder of a 
young boy by a gang of children in the Croix Rousse. 183 Here too the Nouvelliste 
played a crucial role in stirring up public opinion. It was reported that the victim, a 
member of a well-known Catholic family, had been returning home after purchasing a 
lottery ticket in aid of Catholic education. Of course the incident was linked to the 
Popular Front and to Spain.184 The PSF could hardly stand aside from such hysteria, 
all the more so as the boy's father was a party member. Le Volontaire '36 reported that 
"comme Tharcisius i1 a ete lapide par les ennemis de la religion". 185 During the affair 
the PSF was obliged to restate several times its own support for Catholicism. After-
wards the religious reference in PSF discourse became more explicit. One edition of 
Le Volontaire '36 was headed "La civilization chretienne en peril". The editorial de-
tected the same alliance in France of materialist socialism, Radical Freemasonry and 
godless communism which had devastated the churches and convents of Spain. 
Another reason for the confessionalization of the PSF was that although cer-
tain leaders of both left and right had for different reasons sought to find common 
ground on the religious question, the rank and fIle were not always ready to follow. 
Indeed, in the Rhone there seems to have been something of a backlash on the part of 
some Radicals. The Rhone federation of the latter voted a motion condemning those 
Radicals who had called for revision of the Lay Laws. 186 Since the parliamentary 
180 Berstein, H istoire du Parti radical, pp. 484-6. 
1811£ Volontaire '36,14-5-1937. 
182 For example, Le Volontaire '36, 24-2-1939. 
183 See page 349. 
184 Nouvelliste, 24-4-1937 and following issues. The Nouvelliste went as far as to publish the details of the au-
topsy. 
1851£ Volontaire '36, 30-4-1937. 
186 Berstein, Histoire du parti radical, p. 486. 
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motion in question had been proposed by a PSF deputy the result was a polemic with 
the PSF.187 Meanwhile, those who stood to lose most from the Radicals' changing at-
titude to the Church, the Instituteurs lai'cque du Rhone, called for a renewal of anti-
clericalism in a much publicised conference at Belleville. 188 At the same time the 
growth of the CFfC, its growing hostility to the CGT, and the hierarchy's efforts to 
prevent deconfessionalization of Catholic unions (never in any case a serious danger) 
re-emphasized the importance of Catholicism to the white collar constituency of the 
right 
It might at first sight be supposed that the growing conviction on the right that 
religion was essential to social order, and the attraction of some Radicals to this view, 
had at last laid to rest a major source of division within the French bourgeoisie. 
Catholicism and conservatism appeared to coincide. 1936 was indeed a significant 
turning point. Yet to adopt this point of view would be to neglect the deep conflicts 
within Catholicism, and the way in which these conflicts were related to conservative 
politics. The decline of Christian democracy after June and the growing power of the 
Catholic right should not obscure this. In the polarized atmosphere of the Popular 
Front social Catholics turned to the right, but their opposition to the Catholic estab-
lishment was not reduced. 
We have seen that the PSF owed a debt to social Catholicism. Militants like 
Jacques Darodes and Philippe Andriot had been had been involved in the Chronique. 
Canat de Chizy, once President of USIC, claimed that Papal encyclicals were the 
foundation of the PSF's corporatist ideas.189 On many occasions Le Volontaire '36 ar-
gued that Catholic Action pursued the same ends as the PSF.190 Examples of this type 
could be multiplied. The main point, however, is that as the PSF perfected its elec-
toral programme people like Canat were given more opportunity to develop their 
views. For such people social questions could not be conceived separately from reli-
gious issues. Thus the PSF agricultural spokesman, influenced by the JAC, saw mod-
ernization of agriculture both as a means of putting a stop to the rural exodus and to 
defend a rural Christian civilization against the communists. Modernization could be 
achieved only through application of Catholic ideas on reform of agricultural syndi-
cates, for which reason it would be necessary first to restore religion to state schools; 
Catholic France could be saved only by preserving the peasantry,191 All Catholics 
would have agreed with the latter. But not everyone agreed with the need to reform 
organizations like the USE. In other words, Catholicism was not simply the tool of an 
187 Le Voiontaire '36,16-6-1939. 
188 Union republicaine, 30-4-1939. 
189 Le Volontaire '36,11-3-1938. 
190 Le Volonlaire '36,30-7-1937. 
191 Le Volontaire '36, 9-4-1937, 4-6-1937,15-7-1938. 
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homogeneous right, but an ideological battleground. Hence Canat's claim that it was 
the PSF, not Victor Perret, which best reflected the Church's social teachings.192 
The PSF and the right 
After June 1936 conservatives of all tendencies called for unity. Typical was the Nou-
velliste's appeal for the formation of a "compact mass of citizens" determined to ob-
struct the path of revolution: "nous avons eu trop d'associations et de partis, poursuiv-
ant d'ailleurs des buts louables; il n'en faut plus qu'un seul aujourd'hui. In the short 
term the Nouvelliste saw the PSF, along with the Senate, as the only barrier to revolu-
tion.193 But ultimately the Nouvelliste hoped for a reversal of majorities in Parliament. 
It therefore envisaged conservative unity in terms of an alliance of existing parties, 
together with a new movement grouping people from all parties. 194 
Victor Perret, worried by the rise of the PSF, put forward a similar proposal in 
September, and indirectly criticized the PSF for sowing discord on the right. 195 Con-
flict came into the open in November when the PSF won a Conseil d'arrondissement 
seat from the Federation in the 2nd arrondissement. The Federation candidate had 
withdrawn in favour of the PSF. But the election over, Victor Perret regretted that 
there had not been a single conservative candidate. 196 The JP and royalists also took 
the side of the Federation, the latter going as far as to publish the Federation's election 
address. 197 
Relations between the PSF and the rest of the right began to deteriorate na-
tionally in the spring of 1937. As in Lyon there were quarrels over by-elections,198 
Then in March Jacques Doriot proposed a Front de la liberte, an alliance stretching 
from his own PPF to anti-Popular Front Radicals. The Front was officially launched 
in May. It would have a minimum programme, otherwise leaving parties free to pur-
sue their own ideas. Crucially, participants would not put up candidates in seats held 
by other members of the Front. 199 The PSF rejected an initiative that it rightly saw as 
an attempt to neutralize it. But Victor Perret welcomed a proposal which matched so 
closely his own views, declaring that nothing could be achieved without the respect of 
"situations acquises".200 A further round of polemics ensued. The temperature was 
192 Le Volonlaire '36, 26-11-1937. Similarly Canat said that what was most disappointing about the Federation 
was that "parmi leur electorat se trouvent la majorite des Catholiques. Or, il n'y a rien de plus oppose a la doctrine 
sociale de l'eglise que ce conservatisme liberal". (Volontaire '36, 26-11-1937). 
193 ADR 4m 236, 24-8-1936, 22-9-1936. In the summer of 1936 the PSF was the only right wing party in the 
Rhone which showed any sign oflife. Nouvel/iste, 16-7-1837. 
194 Nouvelliste, 24-7-1936. 
195 Union republicaine, 6-8-1936. 
196 Union republicaine, 15-11-1936. 
197 Since the summer La Repuhlique lyonnaise had been regretting the profusion of parties: "n y a ceux qui disent 
que la Republique ne va pas bien! Sit eUe va tres bien au contraire. II n'y a jamais eu autant de partis. II en sort tous 
les jours de nouveau. Ils ne rompent pas meme avec la tradition republicaine et democratique qui est de se taper 
dessus mutuellement!". 
198 The best known was at Mortain (Calvados) in April. See Irvine, op. cit., pp. 138-144. 
199 P. Machefer, "L'Union des droites, Ie PSF et Ia Front de la liberte ", RHMC, 17, 1970, pp. 112-126. Irvine, op. 
cit., pp. 147-9. 
200 Unionrepublicaine, 23-5-1937, 30-5-1937, 6-6-1937. 
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raised further when in July the dissident Croix de Feu Pozzo di Borgo, alleged that 
when Prime Minister in 1930 Andre Tardieu had subsidized the Croix de Feu out of 
government funds.201 At a meeting in Lyon La Rocque denounced Pozzo. Thanks to 
the error of a local member La Rocque's comments found their way into the press. As 
a result Pozzo sued La Rocque for defamation. In September the Lyonnais public 
were treated to the spectacle of conservative worthies dismantling each others' repu-
tations in a highly publicized trial. 
This was not the best preparation for the local elections of November 1937. 
On the national level the main parties of the right concluded an agreement to present a 
single candidate in each constituency--known as the Republicains social anti-
communiste (RSAC).202 In the Rhone negotiations began in May; agreement was an-
nounced in August.203 The upshot was that PSF candidates were confined mainly to 
seats held by the left. In compensation the Federation conseiller d'arrondissement in 
the canton of St Laurent stood down, leaving the way open for the PSF. There was 
much discontent within the PSF.204 It is indeed surprising that the PSF should have 
accepted such an inequitable arrangement. The most likely explanation was that the 
party had been deluded by the presence of a minority of ex-Radicals amongst its mil-
itants into thinking that it could win seats from the left. Hence the party's insistence 
on being allowed to stand in Edouard Herriot's constituency.205 In the end PSF mem-
bers were disciplined. Those of the Federation were less so. The main conflict centred 
on St Laurent, where Alexandre La Batie stood against the PSF candidate. La Batie 
was vaguely disowned by Victor Perret, but won narrowly. 
The PSF - Federation conflict was not the only problem, for there were a 
record number of dissident candidates on the right. 206 Laurent Bonnevay's supporters 
refused the patronage of the RSAC. The PDP split publicly when one of its members 
urged support for Edouard Herriot. Lyon republicain commented "La bataille des 
elections cantanales est marquee dans Ie camp des reactionnaires, par l'etalement au 
grand jour des rivalites de clans et des dechirements internes". 207 
Thanks to the decline of the Radicals in the coutryside, a product of long-term 
social changes, the right won two seats on the Conseil. In consequence the Radicals 
were eliminated from the majority in the Conseil general, which now shifted to the 
right. But in the wake of the elections intra-conservative relations declined to a new 
201 P. Machefer and F Kupferman, "Presse et politique dans les annees trente: Ie cas du Petit Journal", RHMC, 22, 
1975, pp. 7-53. Howlett, op. cit., pp. 248-264. 
202 See Howlett, op. cit., pp. 264-7. 
203 Le Volontaire '36, 27-8-1937. 
204 Lyon republicain, 1-10-1937, reported that Robert Poiget, the PSF arrondissement councillor in the 2nd, had 
wanted to stand for the conseil general. 
205 Le Volontaire '36, 25-2-1938. 
206 For example, the old champion of the centre right in Villefranch, Ernest Planche, stood against the PSF. The 
moderate ex-Deputy J-B. Delorme was defeated by an RSAC candidate, to the delight of the Nouvelliste. 
207 Lyon republicain, 2-10-1937. A few weeks later in Union republicaine, 28-11-1937, Victor Perret wrote, "Ies 
partis nationaux [ ... J ne connurent jamais de crise aussi profonde et aussi douloureuse que celIe dont nous souf-
frons en ce moment". 
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low. For the PSF the elections had been a fiasco. Thanks to La Batie's victory in St 
Laurent the party won no seats. Its failure to bite into the Radical electorate was 
plain.208 The great effort made by the PSF in Herriot's constituency could not prevent 
the ex-Prime Minister from increasing his share of the vote. A lengthy and ill-tem-
pered controversy over the significance of the result ensued. Victor Perret wrote a se-
ries of nine editorials in L'Union republicaine attacking the PSF. The nadir came in 
February 1938 with the break up of Henriot's meeting by the PSF.209 Since the elec-
tions had been a disappointment nationally for the PSF the party resolved that it 
would henceforth put up candidates of its own in all constituencies. As a result every 
by-election in France and the Rhone was the cause of polemic. 
There is here much evidence to support William Irvine's contention that the 
conflict between the Federation and the PSF was essentially electora1.210 Had the PSF 
followed the Croix de Feu in remaining aloof from the electoral process then differ-
ences between the two movements could surely have been contained. The Federa-
tion's support for an "alliance des chefs" was also clearly related to its desire for self-
preservation. But W. Irvine is on less safe ground when he argues that there were no 
programmatic differences between the two parties. There are two main problems with 
this view. The first is that W. Irvine accepts at face value the assertions of Federation 
members like Victor Perret that the PSF had stolen its programme from the old right. 
Given that Perret wished to preserve his own position he had an interest in making 
this claim.211 The second problem is that W. Irvine confines his attention to the labour 
question, where neither the Federation, the PSF, nor indeed the PPF differed.212 
So in what sense was there a programmatic conflict between PSF and Federa-
tion. We have seen that the PSF saw itself as a "national opposition". For Johannes 
Dupraz, "Le conservatisme fran~ais echoua devant Ie triple probleme de la Paix, de la 
Crise et de la Reforme sociale". In June 1936, said the PSF, conservatives reaped the 
208 See Chapter 11. 
209 See page 354. 
210 Irvine, op. cit., chapter 5. 
211 In private the Federation was perhaps more honest. Louis Marin said that if the PSF programme resembled 
that of the PSF on the majority of points, "il y a un certain nombre de points qui restent volontairement imprecis et 
qui marquent une demagogie croissante, une orientation a gauche dont la Federation se fait gloire de n'avoir voulu 
a aucun moment" AN 317 AP 82, conseil national of 4-11-1936). Similarly Jean Guiter privately accused La 
Rocque of turning towards the Radicals (AN 317 AP 28-2-1939). We have seen that the PSFs efforts to win over 
the Radicals meant separating their anti-capitalism from democracy, but this does not deprive the evidence of its 
force. 
212 It would be tedious to compare programmes in detail. Suffice it to say that the PSF sometimes condemned 
those who opposed social reform. In fact no-one opposed the principle of social reform. An example is the Forty 
Hour Law. Like the patron at the PSF did not oppose the law in principle. But it did argue that it should have been 
implemented without salary increases, and claimed that hours legislation disrupted the Taylorization of factories. 
Government "amtmagement" of the law was criticized on the grounds that it did not go far enough (Le Volontaire 
'36,8-10-1937,1-7-1938,15-1-1938). The PSF also echoed patronal sentiments on the control of hiring and firing 
(Le Volontaire '36, 28-7-1937). Like the patronat the PSF approved collective contracts as long as they were not 
national (Le Volontaire '36, 1-12-1936). Like the patronat and the rest of the right the PSF favoured mutualization 
of social insurance. Its call for a minimum wage was not as P. Milza believes a leftist position. Rather it meant a 
minimum wage to be set by region and profession, which would be calculated by corporations dominated by engi-
neers and bosses. 
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harvest they had sown.213 Business leaders too, "les mauvais patrons", would have to 
share the blame for June.214 In the eyes of the PSF these two groups of guilty men had 
in common their commitment to liberalism, a creed which permitted the strong to 
crush "les petits". Their nationalism was merely a cover for self-interest.215 The mis-
sion of the PSF was to sweep away this failed elite. Detached from economic inter-
ests, the PSF represented "l'elite sociale nouvelle, qui secoue les vieux cadres bour-
geois".216 For these reasons the PSF argued that the defeat of the Popular Front could 
not come about simply through a parliamentary alliance such as the Front de La /ib-
erte, but must be achieved "in the country itself'.217 So far we have a political con-
flict which is compatible with the Irvine thesis, though it is clear that there was more 
at stake than mere electoral advantage. 
The PSF's identification of the Federation with the business establishment was 
to some extent unfair. The Federation had been viewed unfavourably by big business 
since the early 1930's. What is more, we have seen that the Federation was ambiguous 
in its attitude to liberalism. But that the PSF's enemy was to some extent symbolic 
should not obscure the ideological and social opposition between the PSF and Feder-
ation. Although both Croix de Feu and PSF claimed to be above sectional interests, 
we saw in Chapter eleven that both nevertheless attracted the support of particular 
groups--from employers in the engineering industry to white collar workers, engi-
neers and peasants influenced by social Catholicism-all of which had a history of 
opposition to the conservative "establishment". We have also seen that in the PSF the 
imprint of individuals raised in the social Catholic tradition became ever more visible. 
There was, for example, no equivalent in the Federation press of the detailed discus-
sions in Le VoLontaire '36 of issues like the nature of the corporate state, the place of 
cadres in society or of the need to reform old-fashioned agricultural unions. For 
Can at, the roots of the Federation's hostility to the PSF lay in "la peur insurmontable 
que cause Ie futur Etat social fran~ais qui saura n'en doutons jamais, sous peu de 
temps, instaurer en France, transformer la Republique des profiteurs, des tares, des 
compromis, des viveurs en un etat propre et net".218 
The profundity of the conflict between the PSF and the Federation becomes 
clearer if we remember that after June 1936 the Federation became more than ever a 
party of Catholic landowners and the old bourgeoisie. The willingness of Victor Per-
ret to share platforms after June 1936 with royalists, who recruited in the same milieu, 
is one indication of this.219 Another is that the party was best able to resist the PSF in 
213 Le Volontaire '36, 29-4-1938. 
214 Le Volontaire '36, 22-10-1937. 
215 Le Volontaire '36,15-1-1937. 
216 Le Volontaire '36,15-10-1937. 
217 Le Volontaire '36,28-5-1937. 
218 Le Volontaire '36, 26-11-1937. 
219 Le Volontaire '36, ~-12-1936, reported that the royalist Lugdunum group had distributed tracts during the 2nd 
arrondissement by-electIon, which spoke of "les droits du premier occupant". 
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the 4th and 7th arrondissements of Lyon, where these elites were linked to the masses 
by the Oeuvre des cerdes. 
The importance of traditional Catholicism to the Federation can be seen in the 
interest it showed in a Congres marial held in 1939, just as the PSF were preparing to 
celebrate the 150th anniversary of the Revolution. Festivities lasted for four days, be-
ginning with the arrival of Madonnas from all the parishes of the diocese, and in-
cluding immense open air services, and a reconstruction of the arrival of the mission-
ary St. Po thin in Lyon. Victor Perret recognized in the congress an image of the world 
as it ought to be.22o There was, he said, no discord and no counter-demonstration. On 
the contrary, the whole city was united in witnessing "a magnificent religious drama". 
Persons of all classes participated, and were motivated by the spirit of collaboration 
which softened the life of the less privileged. They were united "dans un acte de foi, 
guides et entraines par leur chefs hierarchiques".221 
Of course, Perret had in mind communist subversion. But it is not surprising 
that those who viewed the world in this way saw the PSF too as a threat. Partly, as 
William Irvine argues, this was because the better organized PSF posed an electoral 
threat to the Federation. Ironically, militants like Bosse-Platiere, who had at one time 
denounced Fran~ois Peissel for ignoring the wishes of party militants, now preached 
the virtues of informal organization: "Chez nous il y a un president qui nous traite en 
collaborateurs et amis".222 But Bosse-Platiere's statement implies too that a whole set 
of social and ideological relations that were under threat. 
Victor Perret tried to pretend that nothing divided Federation and PSF. Yet as 
relations between the two parties deteriorated, other points of view were expressed. 
An anonymous writer in Union republicaine described those responsible for the pre-
viously mentioned Etoile Cinema incident thus: "les vestes de cuir, les foulards 
tapageurs et les casquettes de Villeurbanne [of the PSF] semblaient s'etre venus se 
meIer aux cols casses du bon quartier d'Ainay". Yet this proletarian air was mere af-
fectation. 223 The PSF leaders were "un pharmacien devoue, entraine aux combats de 
rue et aux violences electorales, [Knersynski] ret] un pale bourgeois d'Ainay, honteux 
de son nom,--un de ces arrivistes sans espoir qui pensent toujours fouroir double 
caution pour l'ambition d'abord, pour leur pusillanimite ensuite".224 This reveals the 
gap in political culture between Federation and PSF. It also reminds us of reminds us 
220 ADR 4m 236, 4-7-1939. A police report suggests, that in the milieux of the "vieille bourgeoisie catholique" 
some were shocked by this kind of popular mobilization. I found no evidence to support this view, but it is not im-
plausible. 
221 Union republicaine, 1-7-1939. 
222 Union republicaine, 8-7-1937. Similarly Pierre Burgeot refused to join the PSF parlaimentary group on the 
grounds that he could not accept blind party discipline (AN 451 AP, 26-6-1936, quoted by Howlett, op. cit., p. 
228). 
223 It is interesting to compare this with the left's view of PSF activists. According to Le Democrate, 2-10-1937, 
one could recognize PSF members by their "casquesttes trop neuves et l'incoherence de leurs propos". 
224 The first named is Jean Knersynski, the previously mentioned Vaise pharmacist. The second was perhaps Jean 
Madignier, a 35 year old lawyer resident in the rue Sala (2nd) and born in Lyon. He was responsible for PSF pro-
paganda in the Rhone. 
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of Joseph Rambaud's contemptuous dismissal of Republican parvenus in the 1880s, 
and of the debt owed by Perret's Federation to this strand in the Lyonnais right. 225 
Other militants saw the PSF as subversive. Alexandre Bosse-Platiere de-
nounced a movement of sans culottes,226 and claimed that the regimentation of thou-
sands of men in the service of a "mystique" and in total devotion to a leader was a 
"fetichisme qui peut conduire aux pires exces et au pires erreurs".227 Guy de Saint-
Laumer believed that the exhibition of monster portraits of La Rocque and the hold-
ing of tempestuous demonstrations prepared the way for the communists. 228 Alexan-
dre La Batie claimed during the local elections, that that "Ie canton de St. Laurent qui 
s'est toujours defendu contre Ie COMMUNIS ME, se defende aussi contre Ie FAS-
CISME".229 
Leaving aside our own doubts about the fascism of the PSF, it might be ob-
jected that such views were expressed only after the PSF became an electoral threat to 
the Federation, and that the Federation's own attitude to the Republic was ambiguous. 
Such views could therefore be regarded as opportunistic.23o Indeed, the Federation's 
links with other leagues were reinforced. The Federation merged with the PRNS 
(formerly the JP) in May 1937.231 In order to fight off the PSF in the St. Laurent 
election, Alexandre La Batie posed as the champion of the Defense paysan of 
Dorgeres. The Federation also collaborated with the PPF in the Front de fa Liberte. 
Most successfully, Federation and PPF joined together in promoting the Union mili-
taire jran(;aise, an organization founded in 1938 by the ex-Cagoulard, Loustenau-La-
cau, and which was dedicated to the suppression of the Communist Party. 
In view of such contacts, it is indeed probable that had the PSF not posed an 
electoral threat to the Federation, then the views quoted above would not have been 
expressed. Yet it still has to be explained why the Federation denounced the PSF in 
this particular way. The answer is that, as we have seen, the Federation had always 
been suspicious of leagues of any type, especially in private.232 The Federation had 
been particularly suspicious of Defense paysan, but it was relatively safe for La Batie 
to collaborate with it because the movement was not established in the department. 
The Federation was forced to pay attention to the leagues, but it attempted to contain 
them, partly by encouraging them to keep out of electoral politics. 
225 See Chapter 2. 
226 See page 372. 
227 Le Volontaire '36, 22-4-1938. 
228 Union republicaine, 13-3-1938. 
229 Tract, reprinted in Volontaire '36, 128-1-1938. 
230 Irvine. op. cit., p. 154. n. 49. 
231 Union republicaine, 6-6-1937. Perret said "nous assistons se soir a une mariage, je dirai meme que nous regu-
larisons une situation". This was part of an abortive national move towards merger (Irvine, op. cit, p. 130). 
232 See Chapter 8. 
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Conclusion 
Like the Croix de Feu the PSF portrayed itself as a national opposition. Party mili-
tants saw themselves as a new elite forged in struggle. They were ready to sweep 
away an egotistical political class, to dispose of the communist threat and to restore 
the national unity essential if France were to hold its own in international politics. Yet 
whereas the Croix de Feu had spumed electoralism and brandished the threat of vio-
lence, the PSF increasingly placed the emphasis upon winning a majority in Parlia-
ment. The paramilitarism of the Croix de Feu was gradually, though not completely, 
abandoned.233 For these reasons the PSF cannot be described as fascist, though its 
conservatism remained radical, authoritarian and populist. Had the war not intervened 
it is possible that the PSF might have evolved into a conventional conservative party. 
The reason for this change of tack was the defeat of June 1936. The victory of 
the Popular Front, the strikes and the perceived unreliability of the police made a vi-
olent show-down with the left appear very risky. It was widely believed on the right 
that the methods of the Croix de Feu had served only to cement the unity of the Pop-
ular Front. For this reason the disaggregation of the Popular Front did not lead to a re-
vival of paramilitarism. The far right in France did not carry out the kind of attacks 
upon a defeated and divided left that had occurred in Italy and Germany. 
Yet the tensions within society at large and within the right which had led to 
the growth of the leagues remained. In some respects they were aggravated by the 
Popular Front. Therefore the less authoritarian stance of the PSF, its participation in 
electoral process and the denting of La Rocque's authority as a result of the Tardieu 
affair, compromised the party's ability to present itself as above social, ideological 
and political divisions. The result was increased conflict between conservative parties. 
Even in the face of a massive challenge on the part of the left the French right was 
unable to unite. Had the elections of 1940 taken place faction fighting would probably 
have reached new heights. The PSF planned to present candidates against sitting Fed-
eration deputies.234 The centre right had its eye on Federation seats in the 6th and 2nd 
arrondissements.235 
In other parts of France the right was consoled by the increasingly con-
servative stance of the Radicals. Yet the Radicals found it as difficult as any other 
group to escape the sectionalism of French politics. Serge Berstein shows that Radi-
calism in the 1930s ceased to regard itself as a "parti de gouvernement" and instead 
became a lobby for sections of the lower middle class.236 In the Rhone political con-
flict was exacerbated by the fact that Radicalism there did not participate in the shift 
233 It might be objected that Hitler too had decided upon the parliamentary route to power in the late 1920s. But 
the Nazis pursued both electoral and paramilitary methods simultaneously. 
234 The lawyer Andriot would probably have stood in the 2nd arrondissement. Joseph Nicolle told me that he had 
~~r asked by the PSF in Paris to stand in the 3rd arrondissement. . 
Fonds Flandin. carton 89. 
236 Berstein, Histoire du Parti radical. ch. 8 and conclusion. 
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to the right. The local Jeunesse radicale-socialiste rejected the proto-fascism of the 
parent organization. Party militants responded to the competition of the socialists by 
setting up workplace cells, the Amicales radical-socialistes. They were especially 
strong in the civil service and even the police force and helped to maintain those 
groups in their centrist tradition. Edouard Herriot set himself up as national leader of 
those Radicals opposed to the authoritarianism of the Daladier government. 237 
Nevertheless, conservatives in the Rhone, as elsewhere in France, had little 
choice but shelve their doubts about Daladier. Fearful of the left and of the possibility 
of an "ideological war" against fascism, but too divided to take power for themselves 
the right from the PDP to the PSF acquiesced in the authoritarian Daladier regime, 
making a distinction between the patriotism of the Prime Minister and the sectarian-
ism of his party. The Daladier government carried out an offensive against the social 
laws of 1936, provoked and crushed a General strike, withdrew police powers from 
communist municipalities, placed Marseille under administrative rule and prorogued 
Parliament for two years some time before war was certain. 
The defeat of France in 1940 may have been primarily due to the ineptitude of 
the military. But the reasons for the response to defeat must be sought in the disinte-
gration of French politics in the 1930s and before. 
237 Berstein, Herriott pp. 249-257. 
Chapter thirteen 
Conclusion 
From the turn of the century until the late 1920s the right in the Rhone was dominated 
by a Catholic and Liberal Progressism which could trace its origins back as far as the 
Revolution. It was characterized by a commitment to liberal democracy, market 
economics and free trade and was rooted in the historic association of Lyon with the 
manufacture of silk textiles, banking and international trade. Fear of the proletariat 
meant that the Church was seen as a sanction of the liberal order. In consequence 
Catholicism became crucial to elite self-identification. Through their domination of 
Chamber of Commerce and Federation republicaine, wealthy families like the 
Aynards, the Isaacs and the Ribouds ensured that this liberal tradition outlived the 
relative decline of the silk industry after the Great War. In the early 1920s the USE 
was also won over to liberal republicanism. 
Liberal attitudes were transmitted to white collar workers and even to some 
workers by the propagation of a semi-myth of the career open to talent. This was 
particularly true in the silk industry, where many employees worked in close contact 
with their bosses and where social mobility was relatively common. Status and social 
mobility were linked in tum to Catholic values, so that a white collar worker could 
attribute perceived success to having adhered to the austere moral code of the Church. 
Much the same was true of the peasants on the plateau, where Catholic values could 
be seen as protecting better off "bonnes familIes" against the dangers of subdivision 
of land. 
Progressism was never entirely stable. Even before the war it suffered from 
internal contradictions. Conservatives like Aynard attempted to incorporate the 
radicals into the right by placing defence of property above class interest But because 
of the way in which Catholicism and conservatism were related in the minds of his 
supporters this was difficult to achieve--Aynard could not tolerate attacks on the 
Church. Furthermore, the Church was not a reliable ally. The Ralliement helped to 
unleash a popular conservatism which nourished both the radical right and the 
Chronique sociale. 
Progressism was also challenged from outside by groups descended from the 
Legitimists and intransigent Orleanists. Conservatives of this type were entrenched in 
Catholic institutions like the Oeuvre des cerdes. The Nouvelliste, read by most of the 
conservative electorate, combined integral Catholicism, liberalism and suspicion of 
Republican "new men". Such ideas found support among landowners in the 
Beaujolais and the mountains. A few businessmen in the Beaujolais cotton industry 
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and in the merchant-manufacturing branch of the silk industry were also attracted by 
traditionalism. 
In the 1920s liberal Progressism entered into crisis. In the countryside the 
loyalty of peasants to notables, whether Progressists or Catholic landowners, began to 
be undermined. The reasons were that a strengthening of medium peasant proprietors, 
a more developed peasant sociability and the increasing vulnerability of the peasantry 
to the market came together with the development of the JAC. In Lyon the hardening 
of social barriers and the feminization of white collar work coincided with the 
formation of the CFTC. Both JAC and CFTC promoted an anti-liberal corporatist 
doctrine. 
Meanwhile the diversification of the Lyonnais economy, greatly accelerated 
by the war, led to the expansion of the engineering industry. Many of the bosses in 
this industry were recruited from the anti-clerical artisanate, which permitted the 
development of a double hostility, economic and ideological, to the conservative 
establishment in Lyon. In the late 1920s engineering employers like Weitz preached 
the value of industrial expansion and social reform. This represented another 
challenge to the liberal individualism of the Progressist elites of the Federation 
Ti!publicaine. 
These tensions came together in the crisis caused by the reform programme of 
the conservative governments of 1928 to 1932. Reformism was supported by a loose 
(and politically ineffective) coalition which included the CFfC, the Alliance 
democratique, engineering employers, the PDP, and the left wing of the Federation. 
Some sections of the liberal-silk elite also hesitantly supported reform. Others became 
somewhat detached from the debate and indeed from the Federallon, which had 
hitherto been th~~r vehicle. Business elites had little sympathy either with reformism 
or with the tone of the anti-reformists. 
Opposition to the reforms was led by Victor Perret and the right wing of the 
Federation. It drew support from some employers in the merchant manufacturing 
branch of the silk industry and drew upon the ideological and organizational resources 
of Catholic integrism, particularly the Oeuvre des cercles. Perret's opposition to 
reformism was anti-liberal and populist in tone. But it must nevertheless be seen as a 
movement of elite self-defence. 
With the onset of the economic crisis and the electoral victory of the Cartel in 
1932, Victor Perret's popUlarity on the right grew. Yet the economic crisis also caused 
sectional conflicts to be pursued with a new vigour. Institutions came to be identified 
with narrow special interests. The Chamber of Commerce, once seen as the 
representative of the general economic interest of the region, was perceived as a lobby 
for big business in the silk industry. It is true that agreement on corporatism and 
moderate protectionism now united big business in both the silk and engineering 
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industries. But medium and small finns, as the fiasco of the entente in the silk 
industry showed, felt that they had been deprived of a voice in professional affairs. 
Small business, mainly Radical in sympathy, protested on the streets and flirted with 
the far right. Medium employers in older branches of the economy expressed their 
hostility to the establishment through the Federation. Those in the engineering 
industry voiced their discontent through the Croix de Feu. In the latter they met with a 
mobilization of white collar workers and peasants, who had been prepared for 
autonomous political action by social Catholicism. In the context of the Rhone, the 
Croix de Feu represented an anti-establishment conservatism. 
By 1935 the liberal silk elites were already isolated from the main currents in 
Lyonnais politics. They had little sympathy either with the Federation of Victor Perret 
or the Croix de Feu. Their only outlet was through the politically ineffective Alliance 
democratique. As a result of June 1936 the Chamber of Commerce too was 
marginalized, essentially because it was ill-suited to the conduct of institutionalized 
industrial relations. The focus of the employers' movement was now AICA, which 
was dominated by a broader big business group in which the silk industry was merely 
one element amongst several. As a result of June 1936 some big businessmen now 
supported the PSF. But their support remained discre~ partly because the party had 
little prospect of coming to power, but also because the PSF was more and more 
identified with sectional interests. The PSF was more visibly the party of younger 
peasants and white collar workers touched by social Catholicism, of engineers 
influenced by USIC who blamed selfish employers for June and of medium 
engineering employers. The Federation, in contrast, was more than ever the party of 
Catholic and traditionalist bourgeois and landowners. By 1939 the Progressist 
hegemony was all but extinct, though the Lyonnais elites were to tum once again to 
liberal Republicanism in 1945. 
What does the story of the right wing in the Rhone tell us about the history of 
French conservatism? Why has the French right been unable to form a united party? 
Why has it been vulnerable to authoritarianism? More precisely, how is the 
emergence of the leagues of the 1930s to be accounted for? Did they pose a 
significant threat to the Republic, and were they fascist? 
Third Republican conservatism was inherently unstable. We have seen that the 
French right was divided by two interconnected problems: the desirability or 
otherwise of industrialization and the religious issue. As a result conservatives often 
found it difficult to recognize as allies those whose economic position was similar. 
Many of the anti-clerical fraction of the bourgeoisie were attracted to the left. Those 
conservatives who spoke of the need to place economics above ideology were likely 
to be met by incomprehension. 
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Before World War One these problems were, with some difficulty, contained 
by the broad appeal of liberal-democratic parliamentarianism. An ideology which was 
able to incorporate Catholic liberal-conservatives like Edouard Aynard, anti-clerical 
conservatives like Poincare, much of the Radical party and even on occasion the 
socialists. The notion of the Republic as a society of opportunity was capable of 
incorporating a broad alliance of social groups. It provided a framework in which 
differences could be resolved by negotiation and compromise. 
After the war containment of the tensions in both French society and in 
conservatism became far more difficult. One reason was the accentuation of the 
structural imbalance in the French economy. The efforts of some conservatives to 
build up small producers as a bulwark against post-war labour unrest contrasted with 
desire of Redressement franr;ais to win over the working class through social reform. 
Another reason was the stimulus given by the war to the organization of interest 
groups. The Church too participated in the development of such lobbies, thereby 
accentuating the tendency to organize on confessional lines. These developments 
made it much more difficult for conservative parties to agree among themselves or to 
represent and synthesize the interests of those groups which supported them. What is 
more, the formation of so many lobbies, some with official status, implied the 
weakening of parliament. Coalition politics became evermore difficult. The centre left 
and right suffered especially from fragmentation because so many pressure groups 
concentrated their efforts on this strategic location. Already in 1926 it was necessary 
to resort to special powers in order to resolve crisis. 
These problems came together in the reform programme of Andre Tardieu. 
His efforts to implement some of the ideas of Redressementfranr;ais led to the kind of 
reaction from Catholic and "traditionalist" sections of the ruling class typified perhaps 
by the forgemasters de Warren and de Wendel, that we have seen in the Rhone. In 
some parts of France the popular constituency of the right were mobilized by the 
Ligue des contribuables and the Defense paysan. All of these groups shared a radical 
populism which looked forward to the leagues. All were radically hostile both to 
social reform, especially to the Social Insurance Law, and to the political class which 
it saw as responsible for these measures. 
The economic crisis in France did not reach the depths of that in Germany. 
But it lasted longer and affected the constituency of the right more than that of the 
left. Most on the right were now united in opposition to further social reform and on 
the need for deflation. Yet the slump had intensified the conflict of interests groups 
within the conservative bloc. When the parliamentary right returned to power after the 
riots of 6th February 1934 it found itself entirely unable to implement the deflationary 
policy on which all apparently agreed, thanks to the contradictory demands of its 
supporters. Only special powers permitted anything at all to be done. Even then, 
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deflation was compromised by a host of measures which worked in a contradictory 
direction, such as price support for agriculture. The right also failed to deal with the 
rise of the left. Its divisions over this issue helped prevent it from taking an 
unambiguous stand on the renewal of the German threat. It was feared that an alliance 
with Russia would play into the hands of French communists. 
The breakdown of the pluralist system of negotiation in civil society, the 
incapacity of the right, the paralysis of Parliament, and the belief that it was in the 
hands of sectional interests especially the COT--Ied to a wide interest in 
authoritarianism. Representatives of the constitutional right like Tardieu demanded 
the strengthening of the executive. Victor Perret in the Rhone adopted an 
authoritarian and populist stance and collaborated with anti-parliamentary leagues. 
The most spectacular manifestation of authoritarianism were leagues like the JP and 
Croix de Feu. They represented a mobilization of the rank and file of the right, made 
possible by the fragmentation of conservative politics, against failed conservative 
leaders. The Croix de Feu saw themselves as a new elite, ready to reassert the 
primacy of the national interests and to sweep away sectional interests like the 
"trusts" and the COT. 
Progressism had resolved conflict by discree"t negotiation between notables. 
Victor Perret sought a monopoly of decision making for established social powers, 
relying upon religion and authority to keep the masses in line. Reformists like Mercier 
envisaged formal negotiation between organized interests in a pluralist society. What 
held the Croix de Feu's vision of the world together was a bogus form of negotiation 
in a corporatist system, and above all authority. Hence the appeal of the Croix de Feu, 
in Lyon at least, to groups which had previously supported the democratic 
corporatism of the late 1920s. 
The Croix de Feu however, had little chance of coming to power. By the time 
the great expansion of the league had begun in 1934 the cards were already stacked 
against it. In 1932 and 1933 the situation had been more favourable. The 
incompetence of the Cartel government in 1932 had caused a revival of anti-
parliamentarianism. Sections of the Radical electorate shared in this mood. The 
extreme right began to revive. The riots of 6 February were approved, for different 
reasons, by almost every strand of conservative opinion. At this stage the fascist right 
remained subordinate--most looked to a solution within the existing system. But 
the seeds of a more serious crisis were present. 
The reaction of the left ensured that a full scale fascist crisis did not develop. 
The effectiveness of anti-fascist action on the streets, proposals for social reforms and 
above all manipulation of the Republican tradition, deprived the leagues of room for 
manoeuvre. Indeed, the Croix de Feu prospered relative to other leagues partly 
because of its success in combining mass mobilization with semi-clandestinity. The 
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rank and file of the radicals were won back to the left. No alliance between 
conservative establishment and the Croix de Feu, essential to the success of fascism, 
took place. In the circumstances of 1935 bringing la Rocque into the government 
must have looked a decidedly risky course of action. June 1936 was a major defeat for 
the leagues, obliging La Rocque to move away from the paramilitary methods of the 
Croix de Feu. But the tensions which had produced the Croix de Feu still existed. The 
right remained authoritarian, turning to Daladier for lack of an alternative. Petain was 
viewed more favourably. 
The fundamental problems which had plagued the French right persisted under 
the Vichy regime and beyond. By 1945 most conservatives agreed on the social value 
of the Church. But the Church was not always willing to act as a tool of the ruling 
classes, while conservatives continued to struggle over the meaning of Catholicism. In 
1945 large sections of the rank and file of the right were mobilized by the Mouvement 
republica in populaire, while discredited conservative elites returned to liberalism and 
attempted to downplay the religious question. Industrialization also remained an 
issue. In the elections of 1951 elements of big business attempted to manipulate small 
producers through the Groupement de defense des contribuables. As a result they 
contributed to the emergence of the anti-capitalist Poujadist movement 1 Many of 
these tensions contributed to the collapse of the Fourth Republic in 1958. In the 
1960s, under the authoritarian rule of de Gaulle, a stable conservative majority 
appeared to have emerged, facilitated by the decline of religious practice and by a 
new consensus on the value of growth. But May 1968, the disappearance of de 
Gaulle, a new world economic crisis and above all the victory of Mitterand in 1981, 
demonstrated how shallow this conservative unity remained. 
1 R. Vinen, "Big business and the groupemenl de dej'ence des conlribuables", unpublished paper, 1990. 
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Appendix two 
The Conservative deputies of the Rhone 
1928·1932 
Lyon II Antoine Salles 
l'Arbresle Fran~ois Peissel 
Givors Jean-Baptiste Delorme 
Tarare Laurent Bonnevay 
1932 to 1936 
Lyon II Antoine Salles 
l'Arbresle Fran~ois Peissel 
Tarare Laurent Bonnevay 
1936 to 1940 
Lyon II Antoine Salles 
Lyon IV Alfred Elmigar 
Lyon VI Pierre Burgeot 
I 'Arbresle Fran~ois Peissel 
Tarare Laurent Bonnevay 
Constituency boundaries 
Constituency 
Tarare 
Villefranche 
l'Arbresle 
Givors 
Cantons 
Tarare, Amplepuis, Thizy, Lamure, Le Bois d'Oingt. 
Anse, Villefranche, Beaujeu, Belleville, Monsols 
Neuville, l'Arbresle, Limonest, St. Laurent, St. Symphorian. 
Vaugneray, St. Genis Laval, Condrieu, Givors. 
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Unions affiliated to the CFTC, 1919 to 1935 
Union 
Corporation des employes de soieries de Lyon 
Syndicats professionnels feminins de Lyon 
Syndicat libre des ouvrieres de tissage 
et de la broderie de Tarare 
Union Syndicale des dames employees de la 
commerce et de l'industrie 
Syndicat professionnel de la soie et du textil (Amplepuis) 
Union syndicale des employes de la region lyonnaise 
Syndicat de la metallurgie et des parties similaires du Rhone 
Syndicat du meuble * 
Syndicat libre du textil (Thizy)* 
Association interprofessionnelle de Givors 
Syndicat professionnel des cheminots (Oullins) 
Syndicat professionnel des cheminots (Lyon) 
CFTC de l'Arsenal 
Syndicat libre du batiment 
Syndicat professionnel des agents et employes PTf 
Syndicat professionnel des cheminots (Tarare) 
Syndicat professionnel des traminots 
Syndicat professionnel du textil (Cours) 
Syndicat du textil, teinture et de l'appret G'Arbresle) 
'" Cited in sources on only one occasion 
Date of founding 
1886 
1889 
c. 1900 
1900 
1911 
1912 
c. 1919 
c. 1919 
1920 
1922 
1922 
1922 
1923 
1923 
1925 
1928 
1930 
1931 
1935 
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Methodology 
The journals published by conservative parties are a rich source of information. 
Particularly useful are accounts of the activities of local sections. These normally 
recorded the names of committee members, attenders of meetings, births, deaths and 
marriages and various other kinds of information. Sometimes only the family name of 
the individual is given, but often address and occupation. 
Party sections in the agglomeration usually corresponded either to municipal 
arrondissements in Lyon, or to commune in the suburbs. Outside the agglomeration 
party organization was loose. But commune of residence of attenders of meetings is 
nearly always given in the press. It is therefore possible to identify individuals cited in 
the press in electoral lists. 
Electoral registers contain far more information than their British equivalents: 
besides the full name of the elector, commune and department of birth, date of birth, 
occupation, and address are recorded. In Lyon, Villeurbanne and Villefranche the 
polling station at which the individual would vote is also recorded, which permits a 
fine analysis of social structure. 
Once the address of the person has been found, it is then possible to locate the 
elector on the nominal roll of the five yearly censuses, which are organized 
alphabetically by street. From these registers we should in theory learn whether an 
individual was an employer or an employee, his place of work and details of his 
family. 
Armed with the name, address and date of birth of an individual the 
possibilities are limited only by the time available to the researcher and the state of 
the archives. It would be possible to use information on birth certificates (such as 
paternal profession), and perhaps also to discover military records and tax 
assessments. However, in the present study only two supplementary sources have 
been used. The Annuaire de Tout-Lyon lists the wealthy inhabitants of Lyon, Tarare 
and Villefranche. It gives addresses of both city and country residences, the maiden 
name of the spouse, and membership of cercles, as well as information of more 
dubious historical value such as "at home days". Secondly, the Indicateurs Lyonnais 
Henry and Indicateurs Fournier, published annually like the Tout-Lyon, are a mine of 
information on many aspects of society in the Rhone. A considerable proportion of 
the inhabitants of Lyon and Villeurbanne are listed alphabetically and by street, along 
with their occupations. The names and addresses of the mayor, tradesmen, industrial 
establishments, and main landowners are listed for each commune of the department. 
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From party newspapers, supplemented in a handful of cases by persons 
mentioned in government reports, a file of over 5,000 militants and sympathizers, 
representing almost all the parties and leagues of the right, was established, covering 
the years from 1928 to 1939. Using all the above sources it was possible to identify 
the professions--the most frequently obtained piece of information-of around 
70% of these individuals. It should, however, already be clear that these files do not 
constitute a representative sample of the Lyonnais right, or of any of its constituent 
parties. At best it is a collection of party activists, members and sympathizers who 
turn up in the party press and sometimes police reports. It is therefore essential to 
identify some of the main sources of bias. 
Problems appear at all stages of the process of identification. Some parties did 
not publish a journal. In such cases the daily press usually filled the gap. The only real 
problem from this point of view is presented by the Croix de Feu, which ceased to 
publish its internal liaison bulletin in early 1932. Thereafter Le Flambeau du sud-est, 
appeared only seven times in the following three years. Only three of those survive 
and in any case are singularly uninformative, as are their communications in the daily 
press. Only a very small sample could be constituted. No such problems exist in the 
case of the PSF.l 
In the case of the Federation republicaine a problem of a rather different 
nature occurs: that of whether or not to include certain individuals in the sample. 
Many persons are cited in the press only because of involvement in the social circles 
loosely attached to the party.2 Although these were important methods of securing a 
mass following for the party, inclusion of individuals reached through leisure 
activities must be regarded as over-extending the definition of militant Had these 
individuals been included, members of the trades unions organized by the PSF, the 
SPF, could also have been added. Not only would the inclusion of specialized groups 
like this bias the sample, but the line has to be drawn somewhere. 
Nonetheless, around three out of ten individuals were not located in the 
electoral list. Causes of non-identification include the fact that bourgeois 
voters-including Victor Perret--were often registered in the commune in which 
they possessed a second home. Conversely, some of those who turn up in rural 
meetings were registered to vote in Lyon. 
But the most important problem is insufficiency of information. An activist 
known only as Durand would be impossible to identify given the presence of 
numerous homonyms (see Table 27). The more often a person is cited, the more 
complete the information. The professions of less than 60% of persons active in only 
1 See pp. 423-4. 
2 The Foyer de Perrache, Foyers sociaux de la rive gauche, or the Cerc1e des Travailleurs of the First 
arrondissement. 
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one year were identified; the occupations of all 118 of those active in five or more 
years are known. 
Table 27: Causes of non.identification in electoral lists 
a b 
2nd arrdt. (PSF) 12 20 
5th arrdt. (PSF) 18 15 
Villeurbanne (FR) 14 17 
Tarare (FR) 9 6 
Monts du Lyonnais (FR) 10 5 
a = not found due to homonyms. b = not found for other reasons 
Non-identification because of insufficient information weights the sample because of 
variability on this score between sections. This can be measured by breaking down 
the sample by area, as in Graph 35. 
Graph 35: Percentage of militants identified on electoral list by 
arrondissement, 1932 to June 19363 
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It is noticeable that above average identification levels are a feature of suburban areas, 
whether in Villeurbanne and other working class suburbs or in the western banlieu 
which comprises both industrial areas like Oullins and bourgeois residential areas like 
Ste Foy les Lyon. This is the reverse of the situation that would be expected if 
geographical and social mobility were the chief source of non-Iocation.4 
3 These years are chosen because of the way in which militants were searched for in electoral lists. All militants 
active in the years 1932 to 1935 were searched for in the electoral list of 1934. Those active in 192& to 1931 were 
searched for 10 1931. Those active in 1936 to 1939 were looked for in the lists of 193&. 
4 Pinal, Espace social, p. 16. For the 6th arrondissement J-L. Pinollocated 31 % of electors in the census list, but 
only 48% in St Fons. 
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Variations in the completeness of information, reflected in geographical 
differences in levels of identification in electoral lists, are related to types of 
organization and forms of militantism in the Federation Republicaine, which 
accounts for the overwhelming majority of individuals in the this period. In areas 
where sections were dominated by notables--chiefly the 1 st and 2nd 
arrondissements, information given in the press was sketchy. In the more activist 4th 
and in suburban communes, details were far more plentiful. Another reason for the 
high level of identification in suburban areas is the exaggerated presence of municipal 
election candidates in the suburban samples.5 
For the period from 1936 to 1939 it is possible to measure variations in levels 
of identification both between areas and between parties. Again quality of information 
is important. 6 PSF militants are less frequently found than those of the Federation 
because of a tendency for the former to give only the surnames of those present at 
meetings. In the case of the PPF the problem of poor quality of information is com-
pounded by a high turnover in membership and by the sketchiness of party 
organization. Some PPF sections cover more than one arrondissement, so that the 
chances of finding more than one elector with the same surname are much increased. 
Identification of Militants in Electoral List· 
IOj PPF ~:~,~.ra~,0,~,~,~,~,~, , , 
1 • a " It II ., V S WIN lIB 10. J1f p 
Graph 36 
Graph 36 shows the mean rate of identification for each party. In the cases of 
the Federation and the PSF there is not all that much variation in identification rates. 
The Federation sample confirms the picture shown in Graph 35, with higher rates of 
5 See pp. 148-9. 
~ Mean ~ate of identification f~r the Federati.on is 79%. For th~ PSF it is 66~ .. 
V = Villeurbanne; S = workmg class banheu (Vaulx en Vehn, Bran, Vemssleux, St Fans, Oullins, La Muatiere 
Pierre Benite); WIN = mainly bourgeois residential suburbs (Tassin, Francheville, Ecully, Caluire, St Rambert). ' 
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identification in the suburbs and countryside than in Lyon. Within the agglomeration 
the only major anomaly is the under-identification of militants in the lower middle 
class and working class 7th arrondissement (60%). This arrondissement made a 
significant contribution to the Federation. To some extent this must be compensated 
by the above average identification of militants in other working class areas. 
In the case of the PSF the only problems in the agglomeration are a low level 
of identification in the 4th (48%), and an above average level of 78% in the 7th. 
Neither of these sections, however, were large. More significant is the low level of 
identification in the Monts du Lyonnais (56%). 
It is the PPF which presents the greatest difficulties, for there is a much greater 
variability between sections. To generalize, the PPF sample privileges the 
contribution of militants in bourgeois and proletarian areas, and diminishes 
recruitment in districts which are socially unsegregated. None of these distortions, 
however, need stand in the way of analysis. 
Graph 37: Occupations of militants found on electoral but 
not census lists 
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The second major cause of non-identification in electoral lists is geographical 
mobility, linked in turn to social mobility. There is obviously no way of discovering 
the occupational breakdown of those not identified on electoral lists. However, there 
is reason to believe that it would be similar to the profile of those identified on 
electoral registers, but not in the census. In his study of the electoral lists and census 
registers of Lyon, Jean-Luc Pinol shows that non-identification in the census is a 
function of youth and occupational instability. So young students and unskilled 
workers are most difficult to find. 8 Investigation of our own sample shows that the 
causes of non-identification are basically the same as in the electorate as a whole (see 
Graph 37). In occupational and generational terms the same groups are more difficult 
8 Pinal, op. Espace Social, pp. 16-20. 
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to find.9 The only major difference is that overall rates of identification are much 
higher in our sample. lO This reflects the fact that political militants were more deeply 
rooted in the agglomeration and the more bourgeois and elderly nature of 
conservative militants. 
Outside of the agglomeration identification levels are high for those involved 
in agriculture, reflecting the relatively stable nature of rural society. Above average 
levels of identification are also recorded for those elements of village society which 
were closest to agriculture--shopkeepers and the category workers or artisans, 
which includes traditional trades such as blacksmiths and masons. In smaller 
communes, no doubt, the quasi-totality of electors were registered to vote. 
Summing up the exact nature and extent of distortion in the files of 
conservative militants and sympathizers is impossible. Nonetheless, it is clear that use 
of electoral and census lists emphasizes the part played by the older, more settled part 
of the population: bourgeois in Lyon and its suburbs, agricultural and artisanal in the 
countryside. Probably a more important source of bias is poor quality of source 
material. 
These problems affect the major parties in different ways. In the case of the 
Federation the general difficulty in locating the young and unskilled is compensated 
by exaggeration of the importance of suburban electors. But in the case of the PSF it 
is possible that the importance of the bourgeoisie and elderly is exaggerated. 
9 The only significant exception is the case of shopkeepers, for whom Jean-Luc Pinol found only average levels of 
non-identification. This is perhaps a consequence of the multitude of bankruptcies, and consequent geographical 
mobility, among small shopkeepers in the early 1930s. 
10 Whereas J.-L. Pinal found no more than 65% of a random sample from the electoral lists of 1936 our level of 
identification was 75%. • 
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Coding of professions 
The method used to allocate the 730 occupations recorded in the sources is that 
elaborated by Jean-Luc Pinol, itself adapted from the system of coding elaborated in 
the 1960s by INSEE.1 The occupations given in the sources were first grouped into 
the fifty basic categories listed below,2 and then combined and re-combined 
according to necessity. 
One peculiarity is that if electoral lists alone are used, it is impossible to tell 
whether those engaged in traditional trades such as shoemaking were employees or 
artisans. For this reason it was necessary to create a category of "workers or artisans" 
(25). 
Table 28: Flux 
artisans3 
of coding: businessmen and workers or 
Business Worker/artisan 
(origin) (destination) 
Businessmen 65 10 
Senior Managers 3 0 
Shopkeepers 5 3 
White Collar 12 7 
Artisans 2 31 
W orkers/ Artisans 7 15 
Workers 2 27 
Others 5 6 
The imprecision which results can, however, be greatly reduced by using the 
supplementary information in censuses and trade directories. Using this information 
reduces the "worker or artisan" category to negligible proportions. The results of this 
recoding can be seen in Table 28. Except in cases where direct comparison with Jean-
Luc Pinol's study of the electorate was necessary, census and trade directory 
information has been given precedence over that in the electoral list. 
1 Code des metiers. Index analylique detail/e, paris, 1968. Code des categories socio-professionnelles, Paris, 1969. 
J-L. Pinol's Espace social contains a table in which over 1,000 appellations are categorized, and a full discussion 
of his methodology. 
2 These are the thirty-nine categories used by J-L Pinol, together with eleven rural categories. 
3 Thus, of those coded as businessmen on the electoral list, 65% had been businessmen on the electoral list, 12% 
had been white collar workers etc. Of those coded as workers or artisans on the electoral list 10% became 
businessmen, 3% shopkeepers etc. ' 
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Code in fifty categories 
1 Blank 26 Sailors 
2 Blank 27 Labourers 
3 Industrialists 28 Domestic service 
4 Artisans 29 Housewives 
5 Fishermen 30 Other services 
6 Merchants 31 Artists 
7 Small shopkeepers 32 Clergy 
8 Liberal professions 33 Army, Police 
9 Secondary teachers 34 Students 
10 Engineers 35 Retired businessmen 
11 Senior Managers 36 Retired (public) 
12 Primary teachers 37 Retired (private) 
13 Para-medical 38 Other inactive 
14 Technicians 39 Others 
15 White collar.l 40 Agriculturallaoour 
16 White collar 41 Agriculture • 
17 Office workers 42 Agriculture ("patron") 
18 Silk white collar 43 Peasant-proprietor 
19 Shopworkers 44 Proprietor· 
20 PTT white collar 45 Market gardener 
21 OTL white collar 46 Tenant 
22 PLM white collar 47 Sharecropper 
23 Foremen 48 Winegrower 
24 Workers 49 "vigneron" 
25 Worker or artisan 50 Prop-winegrower 
Code in 10 categories5 
AGR Agriculture 40-50 
BUS Business 3,6 
SEM Senior managers tO,l1 
PRO Liberal professions 8,9 
WCl White collar 1 12-15,31-33 
WC2 White collar 2 16-22 
SBU Small business 4,5,7 
WOR Workers 23-28,30 
RET Retired/inactive 29,35-39 
STU Students 34 
; No ot~er information . 
Us~d 10 Graphs 13. 18. 26.30. The eleven category code use~ 10 .graphs 15. 16 and 31 simply removes workers 
or artIsans from the WOR category. All other graphs are recombmatIons of these two basic groupings. 
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